# Harris v. Pinellas County, Florida

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128014

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

JAY HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2459-TPB-TGW

PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al.,

Defendants.
_______________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
Defendant Bob Gualtieri’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law” (Doc. 17);

Defendant “Pinellas County’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law” (Doc. 23); and

“Defendants Jesus Gonzalez and Chief Judge Shawn
Crane’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law” (Doc.
35).

Plaintiff Jay Harris filed responses in opposition. (Docs. 28; 33; 36). After
reviewing the motions, responses, court file, and the record, the Court finds as
follows:
Background1
Plaintiff is a deaf resident of Pinellas County, Florida, who relies on
American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreters to communicate. On June 30, 2024,

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with mortgage fraud. According to Plaintiff, he
was denied access to qualified ASL interpreters during this arrest. He also alleges
that he was denied access to interpreters at other arrest and detention proceedings,
court hearings, and public training workshops in Pinellas County from 2022
through 2025. Plaintiff alleges that despite requesting the interpreters, no
qualified interpreter was provided, and that he experienced significant delays and
technical difficulties with other auxiliary aids. For example, Plaintiff claims that on

August 21, 2024, his interpreters left midway through his court proceedings without
explanation, forcing the hearing to be rescheduled. He also allegedly experienced
confusion and distress at a post-arrest proceeding on November 15, 2024, when he
did not receive a functioning TTY (teletypewriter) device.
Plaintiff initially filed a complaint on October 23, 2024, which was amended
on January 22, 2025, and again on February 24, 2025. (Docs. 1; 6; 10). Plaintiff

asserts claims for a violation of Title II of the ADA (Count I), a violation of § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act (Count II), violations of §§ 413.08, 413.081, and 760.07, F.S.,
(Count III), and disability-based discrimination (Count IV). He requests both

1 The Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the second amended complaint for purposes
of ruling on the pending motion to dismiss. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.”). The Court is not required to accept as
true any legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 286 (1986).
injunctive relief and monetary damages. Defendants seek dismissal of all counts.
See (Docs. 17; 23; 35).
Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8(a) does not demand “detailed factual
allegations,” it does require “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, factual
allegations must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Id. at 570.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is generally limited to the four
corners of the complaint. Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 232, 233
(M.D. Fla. 1995). Furthermore, when reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a
court “must accept [a] [p]laintiff’s well pleaded facts as true, and construe the
[c]omplaint in the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Id. (citing Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). “[A] motion to dismiss should concern only the
complaint’s legal sufficiency, and is not a procedure for resolving factual questions
or addressing the merits of the case.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Mosaic
Fertilizer, LLC, 8:09-cv-1264-T-26TGW, 2009 WL 10671157, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(Lazzara, J.).
As Plaintiff in this case is proceeding pro se, the Court more liberally
construes the pleadings. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2018).
However, a pro se plaintiff must still conform with procedural rules and the Court

does not have “license to act as de facto counsel” on behalf of a pro se plaintiff.
United States v. Padgett, 917 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019).
Analysis
Defendants advance three primary arguments in support of dismissal: (1)
Plaintiff lacks standing to seek prospective injunctive relief; (2) the second amended
complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading; and (3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Defendants Chief Judge Shawn Crane and Jesus
Gonzalez additionally argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
Standing
Because standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, the Court addresses
it as a threshold matter. See Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris,
D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1250 (11th Cir. 2015). To establish Article III standing,
a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “Only an
alleged harm that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical’ is enough to show that a party ‘has a case or controversy
rather than, say, a strong and abiding interest in an issue, or a desire to obtain
attorney’s fees.’” Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 48 F.4th
1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190,
2206 (2021)).
Since injunctions “regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek

injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and
immediate . . . threat of future injury.” Wooden v. Board of Regents of Univ. System
of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). “In ADA cases,
courts have held that a plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief unless he
alleges facts giving rise to an inference that he will suffer future discrimination by
the defendant.” Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001). “District
courts must consider the totality of all relevant facts to determine whether a

plaintiff faces a real and immediate threat of future injury.” Longfellow v. Lee
Mem’l Health Sys., No. 2:14-CV-142-FTM-29, 2014 WL 4682080, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 19, 2014).
Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendants to provide him
with qualified ASL interpreters at all future proceedings, develop ADA and § 504
compliance policies, train all court and jail personnel on ADA requirements,

implement an on-call interpreter system, and employ 24/7 ASL interpreters. In
support of such injunctive relief, Plaintiff cites to various instances where he was
purportedly denied access to qualified interpreters or other auxiliary aids that
would allow him to effectively communicate, which he alleges Defendants are
responsible for providing. Defendants respond that the second amended complaint
only discusses the past conduct of Defendants and therefore fails to allege a “real
and immediate” threat, which is required for prospective injunctive relief. See
Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081.
“While past wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and immediate

threat of injury necessary to make out a case or controversy, the plaintiff's exposure
to illegal conduct in the past is nonetheless evidence bearing on whether there is a
real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets,
Inc., 733 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Still, the Court must evaluate standing “based on the facts alleged in the complaint,
and [it] may not ‘speculate concerning the existence of standing or piece together
support for the plaintiff.’” See Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Cone Corp. v. Fla.

Dept. of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1210 (11th Cir. 1991)).
In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege that he faces a real
and immediate threat of future harm. Specifically, he does not discuss whether any
of his cases are ongoing, and whether those cases are likely to have future court
dates. He also does not discuss any impending deprivation of access during his
detention or at upcoming training workshops. As a result, the Court finds that the

second amended complaint fails to establish standing to the extent it seeks
injunctive relief. The motions to dismiss are granted as to this ground. However, in
an abundance of caution, the Court will grant leave to amend, if Plaintiff may do so
in good faith.2 See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
2018).

2 The Court notes that it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff would be entitled to a broad
injunction overhauling Defendants’ training policies or compelling the creation of an “on-
Shotgun Pleading
Defendants also argue that the second amended complaint should be
dismissed because it is a shotgun pleading. A shotgun pleading is one where “it is

virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which
claim(s) for relief” and the defendant therefore cannot be “expected to frame a
responsive pleading.” See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. Of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty.
College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four
primary types of shotgun pleadings:
(1) complaints containing multiple counts where each count adopts
the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint;

(2) complaints that do not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all
preceding counts but are guilty of the venial sin of being replete
with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action;

(3) complaints that commit the sin of not separating into a different
count each cause of action or claim for relief; and

(4) complaints that assert multiple claims against multiple
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible for which actions or omissions, or which of the
defendants the claim is brought against.

call” interpreter system to be available to him 24/7. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
531-32 (2004) (“Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make
judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities. . . . It requires only ‘reasonable
modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided . . . [or]
impose an undue financial or administrative burden.”). Even if Plaintiff were afforded
injunctive relief, it would likely be limited to ensuring he has qualified interpreters or other
adequate methods of communication at future court proceedings. Plaintiff should therefore
think carefully consider the relief he is requesting in any future amended complaint.
See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir.
2015).
Defendants specifically contend that the second amended complaint qualifies

as a shotgun pleading under the second, third, and fourth categories because
Plaintiff appears to apply every stated fact to all Defendants, none of whom are
connected to any particular act or omission causing the purported violations. The
Court agrees.
Even though Plaintiff separates each of his four counts by statutory violation
and provides some factual context for those violations, dismissal is warranted
because Plaintiff does not specify the role each Defendant could have played in

causing each alleged violation. See Smith v. Knipe, No. 6:23-cv-1718-WWB-LHP,
2024 WL 988853, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2024), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 6:23-cv-1718-JSS-LHP, 2024 WL 1619412 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2024)
(dismissing complaint as a shotgun pleading where plaintiff failed to “delineat[e]
the roles or alleged wrongs attributable to each of the [] named Defendants.”); Pyatt
v. Gimenez, No. 1:20-CV-20827, 2020 WL 4003495, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2020)

(dismissing complaint where it “suffer[ed] from the second and fourth ‘sins’ of
asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of
the defendants is responsible for which acts or omissions and of alleging conclusory,
vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action”). The motions to dismiss are granted as to this ground. However, the court
will grant an opportunity to amend.
In any amended complaint, Plaintiff is directed to set out separately
numbered counts as to each of the different Defendants, indicating which Defendant
the count is against. Within each count, Plaintiff should assert a single theory of

recovery against only that Defendant, clearly identifying the acts and omissions he
believes that particular Defendant is responsible for committing.
Failure to State a Claim
Defendants next argue that each of Plaintiff’s counts fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Counts I and II
To establish a disability discrimination claim under Title II of the ADA or §

504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff must establish that he: (1) is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) was either excluded from participation in, or denied
the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) that the
exclusion or denial of benefit was because of Plaintiff’s disability.3 See Silberman v.
Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 2019). A defendant does not
need to accommodate a plaintiff who has meaningful access to the benefit at issue.

See Ambrose v. St. Johns Cnty. Sch. Bd., 664 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1331-32 (M.D. Fla.
2023) (citing Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, to
establish these claims, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he lacks “meaningful
access” to a public benefit to which he is entitled because of his disability. See id.

3 “Given the textual similarities between the two statutes, the same standards govern” Title
II and § 504 claims. Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir.
2019) (citing T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th
Cir. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted)).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, Plaintiff must also
plead and prove that Defendants engaged in intentional discrimination.4 See
Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1134 (citing Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d

334, 348 (11th Cir. 2012)). To prove intentional discrimination, Plaintiff must show
deliberate indifference – that Defendants “knew that harm to a federally protected
right was substantially likely” and “failed to act on that likelihood.” See id. (quoting
Liese, 701 F.3d at 344). This conduct must also independently violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157-58 (2006)
Nat’l Assln of the Deaf v. Florida, 980 F.3d 763, 771 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020). And to
hold a government entity liable, Plaintiff must allege that an “official who at a

minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the [entity’s] behalf” had “actual knowledge of
discrimination in the [entity’s] programs and fail[ed] adequately to respond.” See
Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1134.
The second amended complaint describes the various roles of Defendants and
the general ways in which Plaintiff contends they are responsible for ensuring his

access to court proceedings, among other things. But critically, Plaintiff never
alleges a lack of meaningful access. He does not allege that Defendants
intentionally failed to provide him interpreters. Nor does he allege that Defendants
had actual knowledge of discrimination and failed to respond. Indeed, Plaintiff fails

4 As previously discussed, Plaintiff fails to establish standing to seek injunctive relief under
these statutes. See Wood v. President and Trs. of Spring Hill Coll. in City of Mobile, 978
F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1992).
to make any allegations about the acts or admissions of any particular Defendant,
which is wholly insufficient.
Furthermore, the Court notes that it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff can

bring a damages suit against Chief Judge Crane, who appears to have been acting
exclusively in his official judicial capacity. See Shapiro v. Ingram, 207 F. App’x 938,
940 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from
damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless
they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”). It is also not clear to the Court
that Chief Judge Crane is the proper defendant for this type of suit, but because the
motions did not raise this argument, the Court does not further address it.

In sum, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for damages in Counts I and II, and
motions to dismiss are therefore granted as to this ground. The Court will
nevertheless permit amendment, if Plaintiff may do so in good faith.
Count III
In Count III, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for violations of §
413.08, F.S., which broadly covers the rights of disabled persons and prohibits

discrimination in “public accommodations;” § 413.081, F.S., which applies to
interference with a service animal; and § 760.07, F.S., which provides various
remedies for unlawful discrimination subject to the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Again, Plaintiff fails to specifically identify the actions or omissions of
any single Defendant that caused the alleged violations, which makes it difficult – if
not impossible – to determine whether he has stated a claim for relief under any of
these statutes. Plaintiff does not say when, how, and by whom these specific
statutes were violated and instead leaves the Court to speculate as to the facts that
may support these claims. For example, Plaintiff mentions nothing at all about a

service animal within his pleadings. Consequently, Count III fails to state a claim,
and the motions to dismiss are granted, but the Court will grant leave to amend. In
any amended complaint, Plaintiff must specify which Defendants violated which
statutes and how they did so.
Count IV
Regarding Count IV, the Court finds it duplicative of Counts I through III.
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging discrimination under Title II of the ADA, § 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act, or any Florida statutes, he should include the relevant
factual details and allegations in the counts specifically pertaining to those
statutory violations. As pled, the Count does not appear to raise an independent
claim for relief. The motions to dismiss are granted as to this ground, with leave to
amend.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants Chief Judge Crane and Jesus Gonzalez additionally argue for
dismissal on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
pursuant to the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq., which states in relevant part that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To exhaust his administrative remedies, an
inmate must properly comply with all steps or processes set up by the agency so
that it can address issues raised by the inmate on the merits. See Halpin v. Crist,

405 F. App’x 403, 407 (11th Cir. 2010).
However, the Supreme Court recently clarified that “PLRA exhaustion is ‘not
jurisdictional.’” Perttu v. Richards, 145 S. Ct. 1793, 1801 (2025) (quoting Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)). In so doing, the Supreme Court further
emphasized that exhaustion “is not a ‘pleading requirement,’ which is why ‘inmates
are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaint.’”
Perttu, 145 S. Ct. at 1801 (quoting Jones, 549 U.S at 216). The motion to dismiss is

therefore denied as to this ground. This does not preclude Defendants from raising
this issue as an affirmative defense. See Perttu, 145 S. Ct. at 1801 (“PLRA
exhaustion is a standard affirmative defense.”).
Pro Se Warning
Finally, Plaintiff is advised that even pro se plaintiffs must conform with
procedural rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules

of the Middle District of Florida. Litigation − particularly in federal court − is
difficult, and Plaintiff should consider hiring an attorney. If he is unable to afford
counsel, she should consider the resources available to pro se litigants, including the
Legal Information Program operated by the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Federal Bar
Association, and the Middle District of Florida’s guide to assist pro se litigants
proceeding in federal court, which is located on the Court’s website.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 17; 23; 35) are hereby GRANTED
IN PART. The motions are granted to the extent that the second
amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice as set forth herein,
with leave to amend.
2. The motions are otherwise DENIED.
3. Plaintiff Jay Harris is DIRECTED to file a third amended complaint on
or before September 16, 2025. Failure to file a third amended complaint
will result in this Order becoming a final judgment.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 26th day of
August, 2025.

VAP. BAL.
TOMBARBER iiss—S
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11128014. Public record. Not legal advice.