# Walker v. Whittington

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · August 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127881

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

LATRICE WALKER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0258

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

JULIAN WHITTINGTON, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court are three Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by
Defendant Jennifer Grimm (“Nurse Grimm”), Defendant Jennifer Johnson (“Nurse
Johnson”), and Defendant Molli Lyles (“Nurse Lyles”), (collectively, the “Nurse
Defendants”). See Record Documents 33, 34, & 35. Plaintiffs Latrice Walker and Holly
Rouse (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose all three Motions. See Record Documents 44, 45,
& 46. The Nurse Defendants replied. See Record Documents 51, 52, & 53. For the
reasons set forth below, all three Motions are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART. The Motions are GRANTED with respect to the § 1983 inadequate medical care
claim and the punitive damages claim. These claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Motions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the state law negligence claim.
This claim is STAYED pending resolution of the Medical Review Panel proceeding.
BACKGROUND
On or about March 2, 2024, the Bossier City police arrested Jerry D. McCoy
(“McCoy”) for “disturbing the peace by intoxication, having no lights on his bicycle,
resisting, being a fugitive from the Bossier Parish Sheriff, and having an outstanding
failure to appear bench warrant.” Record Document 27 at ¶ 7. At the time of his arrest,
McCoy had alcohol on his person and was intoxicated. See id. On or about March 3,
2024, Bossier City police transported McCoy to the Bossier Parish Maximum Security
Facility (“Bossier Max”) and allegedly informed the deputies at Bossier Max of his alcohol
abuse history. See id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiffs claim that no medical assessment for symptoms of

alcohol withdrawal was provided, despite the medical unit’s alleged knowledge of
McCoy’s potential for alcohol withdrawal. See id. at ¶ 9. Later that day, he was assigned
to HT11 and then moved to cell F-108. See id.
On March 4, 2024, McCoy was taken to sick call, but Plaintiffs allege no protections
against alcohol withdrawal were provided. See id. at ¶ 10. McCoy supposedly reported
heavy daily liquor use, and Nurse Lyles, along with the nursing staff, allegedly noticed a
tremor. See id. McCoy had a CIWA-Ar assessment of 2, and Plaintiffs assert that Nurse

Lyles’s documented nursing plan consisted of daily monitoring; however, the correctional
staff was not notified of this plan. See id.
On March 5, 2024, Officer Danny Soliz (“Officer Soliz”) moved McCoy from F-108
to cell G-113 due to McCoy’s perception of having enemies. See id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiffs
claim he repeatedly yelled for help and was sweating and nervous. See id. Officer Soliz,
Officer Blake Hines (“Officer Hines”), Officer Neysa Washington (“Officer Washington”),

Officer Ryan Kirkhart (“Officer Kirkhart”), Lieutenant Mark Lyons (“Lt. Lyons”), and Officer
Hunter Jenkins (“Officer Jenkins”), (collectively, the “Night Shift Deputies”), responded
and placed McCoy in isolation. See id. Plaintiffs allege that the Night Shift Deputies noted
McCoy “could not say where he was[,]…was agitated, profusely sweating, heavily
breathing with delusions, hallucinating and had a fever.” Id. He was displaying symptoms
of alcohol withdrawal and delirium tremens, which Lt. Lyons allegedly recognized. See id.
Additionally, McCoy began experiencing seizures, delirium tremens, and other bizarre
behavior. See id.

Plaintiffs argue the Night Shift Deputies did not provide any medical assistance
“although each was [supposedly] aware of McCoy’s serious medical condition arising
from alcohol withdrawal.” Id. They maintain the Night Shift Deputies failed to transport
him to a medical facility, which they claim is required by written policy. See id. Additionally,
Plaintiffs allege the Night Shift Deputies “failed to notify any medical personnel of [his]
alcohol withdrawal symptoms which was required to be done by the Sheriff’s written
policy.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue the standard of care with respect to alcohol withdrawal is well
known in the corrections industry. See id. at ¶ 12. They point to Fletcher v. Whittington, a
previous settlement agreement, dated October 22, 2022, in which Defendant Julian
Whittington (“Sheriff Whittington”) agreed to implement medical policies and training for
correctional staff on alcohol withdrawal. See id. They allege Sheriff Whittington was aware
of the need for the policy and training but failed to fully implement the agreement. See id.

Beginning early on March 6, 2024, McCoy began hallucinating again and speaking
in a confused and disoriented matter. See id. at ¶ 13. He was moved to cell H-101. See
id. In H-101, he began hiding behind furniture for protection against imagined enemies
and swinging his blanket as though defending himself. See id. Lt. Lyons entered the room
and allegedly applied chemical spray to McCoy. See id. Plaintiffs claim no medical
assistance was provided. See id. McCoy was later moved to cell HT7. See id. Plaintiffs
assert that the Night Shift Deputies knew McCoy was experiencing a serious case of
alcohol withdrawal, thereby making the situation a medical emergency. See id. Plaintiffs
argue no nurses were on duty yet, no one summoned medical assistance, and no one
sought medical consultation, which allegedly went against established training and policy.
See id. They submit that McCoy should have been transported to an appropriate facility
when his symptoms were first observed. See id.

Plaintiffs aver that Bossier Max’s written procedures required the deputies to
request EMS to come to the facility and/or to transport the prisoner to a medical facility
under the circumstances when confronted with a medical emergency. See id. at ¶ 14.
They argue this protocol should have been followed beginning around 7:00 p.m. on March
5, 2024; however no medical help was requested, McCoy was not placed on a detox
protocol, and guards were not made aware that the failure to provide detoxification
protocol would risk serious injury or death. See id.

Plaintiffs allege that Nurse Lyles had intended for McCoy to be placed on an
alcohol withdrawal protocol, but the correctional officers were not notified of this plan. See
id. at ¶ 15. Instead of providing medical assistance, McCoy was placed in isolation and
later handcuffed behind his back. See id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiffs claim cell HT7 was abnormally
hot due to a malfunctioning air system, and the correctional officers were aware of this
malfunction. See id. Plaintiffs allege that none of the widely known and accepted medical

procedures were provided by the correctional officers. See id. at ¶ 19. Additionally, they
claim no jailer or nurse checked on McCoy any more than once an hour, and he was left
unattended in the isolation room in the restraint chair for more than an hour. See id.
The Nurse Defendants reported for duty around 5:30 a.m. on March 6, 2024 and
supposedly became aware of McCoy’s serious medical condition shortly thereafter. See
id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiffs claim the Nurse Defendants witnessed him shaking and seizing. See
id. Instead of providing immediate emergency medical care, Plaintiffs assert that the
Nurse Defendants returned to their normal duties for sick call. See id. Around 8:30 a.m.,
Nurse Lyles attempted to call emergency medical help but supposedly only after she saw
McCoy was unresponsive and no longer breathing. See id. Nurse Lyles allegedly

expressed to others around 6:00 a.m. that McCoy needed to be transported to a medical
facility; however, transport was not called until it was too late. See id. McCoy was
pronounced deceased around 9:30 a.m.1 See id. at ¶ 25.
Officer Jessie Bearden (“Officer Bearden”), Lieutenant Quinton Black (“Lt. Black”),
Seargeant John Carroll (“Sgt. Carroll”), and Seargeant Buck Boudreaux (“Sgt.
Boudreaux”), (collectively, the “Day Shift Deputies”), came on duty around 5:30 a.m. and
allegedly became aware of McCoy’s alcohol withdrawal and other serious medical

symptoms but failed to take appropriate action. See id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiffs argue Lt. Lyons
informed Lt. Black around 5:00 a.m. of McCoy’s serious medical condition, and Lt. Lyons
recommended medical treatment and examination; however, Plaintiffs claim no one
acted. See id. at ¶ 23. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that Lt. Black did not inform the
medical staff of McCoy’s condition. See id.
Plaintiffs submit that the Day Shift Deputies only attempted to discharge McCoy

from their custody to save Sheriff Whittington the expense of transporting him for
emergency medical services. See id. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Whittington, in
conjunction with the Bossier Parish Police Jury (“BPPJ”), has a practice or policy of saving

1 In Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, they allege McCoy died between 8:30-8:45 a.m.;
however, this timeline is contradicted by allegations made later on in paragraphs 20 and 25. After reviewing
the First Amended Complaint, in its entirety, and the arguments made in briefing, the Court concludes this
series of events surrounding McCoy’s death on March 6, 2024, occurred between 8:30-9:30 a.m. EMS
transportation was likely called around 8:30 a.m., and McCoy was pronounced deceased around 9:30 a.m.
the expense of providing medical services to inmates by undercutting and withholding
medical care. See id.

Plaintiffs assert five causes of action in their First Amendment Complaint: (1) §
1983 Failure to Provide Medical Care against the Nurse Defendants and Officer Soliz,
Officer Hines, Officer Washington, Officer Kirkhart, Lt. Lyons, Officer Jenkins, Lt. Black,
Sgt. Boudreaux, Sgt. Carroll, and Officer Bearden (collectively, the “Deputy Defendants”)
in their individual capacities; (2) § 1983 Failure to Provide Medical Care against Sheriff
Whittington and BPPJ, in their official capacities; (3) Louisiana State Law Fault and
Negligence against all Defendants; (4) Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against
Sheriff Whittington and BPPJ; and (5) Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”) against Sheriff
Whittington and BPPJ. See id. at ¶¶ 26–50.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Pleading and Dismissal Standards.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) governs the requirements for pleadings
that state a claim for relief and requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
The standard for the adequacy of complaints under Rule 8(a)(2) is now a “plausibility”
standard found in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), and
its progeny. Under this standard, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level…on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555, 1965. If a pleading only contains

“labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,”
the pleading does not meet the standards of Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). “In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s complaint survives a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, [the court] is limited to reviewing: ‘(1) the facts set
forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matter for which
judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.’” Jordan Props., Ltd. v.
City of Cleveland, Miss., No. 23-60625, 2024 WL 3771453, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024)
(quoting Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F. 3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019)).

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d
413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); see Jordan Props., 2024 WL 3771453, at *1. Under the Rule
12(b)(6) standard, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1965 (2007). If a pleading only contains “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” the pleading is deficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A court does not evaluate a plaintiff's
likelihood for success but instead determines whether a plaintiff has pleaded a legally
cognizable claim. See Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F. 3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014).
Courts considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are only obligated to allow
those complaints that are facially plausible under the Iqbal and Twombly standards to
survive such a motion. See id. at 678–79, 1949–50. If the complaint does not meet this
standard, it can be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See id.

II. Qualified Immunity.
“Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability if his ‘conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Benavides v. Nunez, No. 24-20445, 2025 WL 1943949, at *2 (5th Cir. July
16, 2025) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). “To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show ‘(1)
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Id. If an officer defeats either prong,
he is entitled to qualified immunity. See id.
III. Summary of the Arguments.

(a) Nurse Grimm’s Motion (Record Document 33).
In her Motion, Nurse Grimm asserts that all individual capacity claims against her
should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not show a violation of any
constitutional right or clearly established law. See Record Document 33-1 at 12. Nurse
Grimm points out that the only allegations specifically directed towards her are found in

paragraphs 20, 21, and 27 of the First Amended Complaint. See id. at 13. In addition to
these specific allegations, she contends Plaintiffs also make general conclusory
allegations against all Defendants. See id. She submits that paragraph 27 of the First
Amended Complaint is nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action and should be ignored. See id. at 14.

Additionally, Nurse Grimm avers that Plaintiffs’ allegations against her are solely
based on her single isolated interaction with McCoy sometime during the morning of
March 6, 2024. See id. She advances that there is no allegation explaining how long she
interacted with McCoy. See id. Nurse Grimm submits that these allegations against her
fail to allege a claim for constitutionally inadequate medical care on the second and third
essential elements for a deliberate indifference claim. See id. She maintains there is no
allegation that she subjectively drew the inference that a substantial risk of harm to McCoy
existed. See id. at 16. Furthermore, she asserts there are insufficient allegations to
establish that she disregarded a substantial risk of harm to McCoy. See id.

Nurse Grimm argues all claims against her, in her individual capacity, for punitive
damages fail because she did not act with the requisite culpable mental state. See id. at
17. She asserts that there are no factual allegations showing that she was “motivated by
evil intent” or acted with “reckless or callous indifference” to McCoy’s constitutional rights.
Id. at 18. Therefore, Nurse Grimm ultimately asks the Court to grant her Motion and
dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claims under

§ 1983. See id. at 19. Alternatively, at a minimum, she requests Plaintiffs’ claims for
punitive damages be dismissed. See id.
Plaintiffs oppose, asserting that McCoy has a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process right to be free from punishment altogether. See Record Document 44 at 10.
Plaintiffs argue their inadequate medical care claim, as alleged, falls within the broad
scope of necessary, reasonable medical care and is actionable under § 1983 because
Nurse Grimm was aware of the delirium tremens and failed to provide medical care. See
id. at 11. They claim that no medical care was provided to McCoy until CPR was
administered as he was dying. See id. Plaintiffs submit that “the right to be free from
deliberate indifference to medical care for delirium tremens is clearly established,” and

the “right was violated by Nurse Grimm when she failed to call for emergency medical
transport.” Id. at 12.
Plaintiffs contend that information regarding McCoy’s serious medical condition
“was passed on to the medical staff[,] including [Nurse] Grimm at about 5:30-6am.” Id. at
14. They maintain that “[Nurse] Lyles considered the situation so serious that she at that
time discussed the situation with [Nurse] Grimm and [Nurse] Johnson and others; a
decision was reached with input from nurses Grimm and Johnson to call for emergency

transport.” Id. However, the Nurse Defendants did not call for emergency transport until
8:30 a.m. See id. Plaintiffs advance that “[Nurse] Grimm permitted precious time to save
McCoy’s life to slip by in order for Sgt. Carroll on the day shift to make calls to the Bossier
City Police Department for the release of a hold.” Id. at 14–15. Plaintiffs argue the Nurse
Defendants were aware of McCoy’s condition by information supplied by the Night Shift
Deputies and by their own personal observations. See id. at 15. They maintain Nurse
Grimm was subjectively aware of the serious medical condition which carried a
substantial risk of death to McCoy and the immediate need for emergency medical
transport. See id. at 16.

Plaintiffs submit that “[b]ecause the First Amended Complaint specifically provides
the facts of the symptoms and describes the condition of McCoy which was personally
observed by defendant nurses and sets forth the training and standards of care of which
the nurses were aware, and the failure to act then no qualified immunity is available.” Id.
at 16–17. Plaintiffs contend that the conduct of the Nurse Defendants “was objectively
unreasonable as alleged because [Nurse Grimm] had the knowledge and the awareness
of the substantial risk of serious injury including death due to delirium tremens if McCoy

was not transported to a medical facility immediately.” Id. at 17–18.
As to their claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs submit that the standard for
punitive damages in the Fifth Circuit is embodied in the pattern jury instructions and
accompanying footnotes. See id. at 20–21. Plaintiffs assert they have alleged facts which
meet the standard for deliberate indifference, which has the same elements to support an
award of punitive damages. See id. at 21. With respect to their state law claims, Plaintiffs
state they have brought separate medical malpractice claims against the Nurse

Defendants which are pending before the Patient Compensation Fund. See id.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs request the opportunity to amend their First Amended
Complaint. See id. at 21. Plaintiffs claim they can allege more details as to Nurse Grimm’s
knowledge. See id. at 22. Additionally, they assert they can allege, in good faith, that the
Nurse Defendants went to McCoy’s cell around 6:00 a.m. and observed his symptoms.
See id.

In her reply, Nurse Grimm asserts that Plaintiffs’ opposition improperly relies on
the knowledge and actions of other Defendants and allegations that have not been pled
in the First Amended Complaint. See Record Document 51 at 3. She contends that
allegations and arguments about what other Defendants knew and did are irrelevant to
Plaintiffs’ claim against Nurse Grimm. See id. at 4. Furthermore, she reiterates that all
individual capacity claims against her should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations
against her do not show a violation of any constitutional right or of clearly established law.
See id. at 5. She submits that “[w]hile it is acknowledged that alcohol withdrawals present
a risk of serious harm, there are no factual allegations explaining whether, and if so, how
Nurse Grimm, interacting with McCoy for the first time sometime between 5:30 a.m. and

8:30 a.m., subjectively drew the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm to McCoy
existed.” Id. Additionally, Nurse Grimm avers that all claim against her, in her individual
capacity, for punitive damages should be dismissed because she did not act with the
requisite mental state. See id. at 8.
(b) Nurse Johnson’s Motion (Record Document 34).

In her Motion, Nurse Johnson argues all individual capacity claims against her
should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations against her do not show a violation of
any constitution right or clearly established law. See Record Document 34-1 at 12. She
points out that only paragraphs 20, 21, and 27 of the First Amended Complaint contain
specific allegations towards her. See id. Additionally, however, she contends that Plaintiffs
make general conclusory allegations against all defendants in paragraph 27, which
should be ignored. See id. at 13.

Nurse Johnson avers that Plaintiffs’ allegations are solely based on her single
isolated interaction with McCoy sometime during the morning of March 6, 2024. See id.
at 14. She submits these allegations fail to allege a claim for constitutionally inadequate
medical care on either of the second or third essential elements of a claim for deliberate
indifference. See id. While it is acknowledged that alcohol withdrawal presents a serious
risk of harm, Nurse Johnson asserts there are no factual allegations explaining whether,
and if so how, she, interacting with McCoy for the first time between 5:30 a.m. and 8:30
a.m., subjectively drew the inference that a substantial risk of harm to McCoy existed.
See id. at 15. She advances that there are no allegations about when this interaction took
place, how long it lasted, or any specific factual details about her interaction with McCoy.
See id.

Additionally, Nurse Johnson argues Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional inadequate
medical care claim also fails the second step of the qualified immunity analysis because
Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing that Nurse Johnson violated clearly
established law. See id. at 17. She also submits that all claims against her, in her
individual capacity, for punitive damages fail because she did not act with the requisite
culpable mental state. See id. Nurse Johnson contends that there are no factual
allegations showing she was “motivated by evil intent” or acted with “reckless callous

indifference.” Id. at 17–18. Therefore, Nurse Johnson requests that all of Plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claims under § 1983 against her be
dismissed. See id. at 18. Alternatively, at minimum, she asks that Plaintiffs’ claims for
punitive damages against her be dismissed. See id.
Plaintiffs oppose, presenting similar arguments as in their opposition to Nurse
Grimm’s Motion. See Record Document 45. With respect to their § 1983 inadequate

medical care claim, Plaintiffs assert that Nurse Johnson violated clearly established law
when she failed to call for emergency medical transport around 6:00 a.m. on March 6,
2024. See id. at 13. Instead of summoning emergency transport or arranging for transport
in-house, Plaintiffs contend that “[Nurse] Johnson permitted precious time to slip by that
could have been used to save McCoy’s life in order for Sgt. Carroll on the day shift to
make calls to the Bossier City Police Department for the release of a hold.” Id. at 15.
Plaintiffs maintain that the Nurse Defendants were aware of the need to transport McCoy
immediately upon display of the symptoms of alcohol withdrawal and/or delirium tremens.
See id. at 16.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs submit that no qualified immunity is available since their
First Amended Complaint “specifically provides the facts of the symptoms and describes
the condition of McCoy which was personally observed by defendant nurses and sets
forth the training and standards of care of which the nurses were aware….” Id. at 17. They
contend that the Nurse Defendants’ conduct “was objectively unreasonable because the
nurses had the knowledge and the awareness of the substantial risk of serious injury
including death due to delirium tremens if McCoy was not transported to a medical facility
immediately.” Id. at 18. Plaintiffs assert “they have put forth facts from which a jury could

reasonable determine that McCoy had a serious medical need, his dangerous delirium
tremens, [Nurse] Johnson was aware of the significant risk of death without prompt
transport and that Nurse Johnson acted with deliberate indifference in not providing any
medical treatment for that need and delaying transport for non-medical reasons.” Id. at
20.
With respect to their punitive damages claim, Plaintiffs contend that the standard

for punitive damages in the Fifth Circuit is embodied in the pattern jury instructions and
accompanying footnotes. See id. at 21. As to their state law claims, Plaintiffs provide they
have brought separate medical malpractice claims against the Nurse Defendants, which
are pending before the Patient Compensation Fund. See id. at 22. Alternatively, Plaintiffs
request an opportunity to amend their First Amended Complaint. See id. at 22–23.
Nurse Johnson replies, asserting similar arguments as Nurse Grimm. See Record
Document 52. She avers that Plaintiffs’ opposition improperly relies heavily on the
knowledge and actions of other Defendants, and their allegations have not been
sufficiently pled. See id. at 3. She contends that allegations and arguments about what

other Defendants knew and did are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claim against her. See id. at 4.
Additionally, Nurse Johnson maintains that all individual capacity claims against her
should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not show a violation of any
constitutional right or of clearly established law. See id. at 5. Furthermore, she reiterates
that all claims against her, in her individual capacity, for punitive damages fail because
she did not act with the requisite culpable mental state. See id. at 8.
(c) Nurse Lyles’s Motion (Record Document 35).

In her Motion, Nurse Lyles asserts that all individual capacity claims against her
should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations do not show a violation of any
constitutional right or of clearly established law. See Record Document 35-1 at 12.
Plaintiffs’ specific allegations against Nurse Lyles are contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 15,
20, 21, 25, and 27 of the First Amended Complaint. See id. at 13. In addition to these
specific allegations, she argues Plaintiffs make general conclusory allegations against all

defendants in paragraph 27. See id. at 13–14. She contends that paragraph 27 is nothing
more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action and should be
ignored. See id. at 14.
Nurse Lyles avers that the allegations against her are based on two interactions
she had with McCoy on March 4, 20242 and sometime during the morning of March 6,
2024. See id. She maintains that the allegations of her March 4 encounter do not satisfy
the three elements for deliberate indifference. See id. at 15. As to the March 6 encounter,

she advances that the factual allegations fail to allege a claim for constitutionally
inadequate medical care with respect to the second and third elements of such a claim.
See id. at 16.
Furthermore, Nurse Lyles contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy their
burden of overcoming her qualified immunity defense. See id. at 17. While the Court may
be able to infer from Plaintiffs’ allegations that she was aware of facts that a substantial
risk of serious harm existed to McCoy, and she subjectively drew the inference that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed to McCoy, she called for medical transportation.
See id. At most, Nurse Lyles claims Plaintiffs’ specific factual allegations suggest she got
busy with other medical tasks and simply failed to call for medical transport soon enough.
See id. While such actions may constitute negligence, she submits they do not satisfy the
extremely high standard of establishing deliberate indifference. See id. at 17–18.
Nurse Lyles also asserts that all claims against her, in her individual capacity, for

punitive damages fail because she did not act with the requisite culpable mental state.
See id. at 21. She avers there are no factual allegations showing she was “mutative by
evil intent” or acted with “reckless or callous indifference” to McCoy’s constitutional rights.
Id. at 22. Therefore, Nurse Lyles requests that Plaintiffs’ federal Fourteenth Amendment

2 In her brief, Nurse Lyes lists the first interaction occurring on March 4, 2025. The Court assumes this is a
typographical error, and she meant to state that the first interaction occurred on March 4, 2024.
inadequate medical care claims under § 1983 be dismissed. See id. at 23. Alternatively,
at minimum, she asks that Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages be dismissed. See id.

Plaintiffs oppose, asserting arguments similar to those in their oppositions to Nurse
Grimm’s Motion and Nurse Johnson’s Motion. See Record Document 46. Plaintiffs submit
their inadequate medical care claim, as alleged, “falls within the broad scope of
necessary, reasonable medical care and is actionable under § 1983, particularly when
[Nurse Lyles] [was] aware of the delirium tremens and fail[ed] to provide medical care.”
Id. at 11. They advance that instead of summoning emergency transport or arranging for
transport in-house, “[Nurse] Lyles permitted precious time to save McCoy’s life slip by in
order for Sgt. Carroll on the day shift to make calls to the Bossier City Police Department
for the release of a hold.” Id. at 14. Thus, Plaintiffs submit that the Nurse Defendants

“violated a clearly established right of [] McCoy by failing to provide medical care with
knowledge of his serious medical condition.” Id.
Additionally, Plaintiffs aver qualified immunity is not available since their First
Amended Complaint “specifically provides the facts of the symptoms and described the
condition of McCoy which was personally observed by defendant nurses and sets forth
the training and standards of care of which the nurses were aware, and the[n] fail[ed] to

act….” Id. at 15. They argue Nurse Lyles “was aware of the potential deadly effect of
alcohol withdrawal and that immediate emergency transport to a hospital was required.”
Id. at 16–17.
With respect to their punitive damages claim, Plaintiffs argue this standard is
embodied in the Fifth Circuit’s pattern jury instructions. See id. at 19. Plaintiffs contend
since they have alleged facts which meet the deliberate indifference standard, they have
also met the punitive damages standard. See id. at 20. As to their state law claims,
Plaintiffs claims “against Nurse Lyles arise under medical malpractice and are being
pursued under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act before the Patient Compensation
Fund.” Id. Alternatively, as mentioned above, Plaintiffs ask for an opportunity to amend

their First Amended Complaint. See id.
In her reply, Nurse Lyles submits arguments similar to those in Nurse Grimm’s and
Nurse Johnson’s replies. See Record Document 53. Nurse Lyles contends that Plaintiffs
put forth allegations and arguments about what other Defendants knew and did, which
are irrelevant to their claim against Nurse Lyles. See id. at 4. She advances that all
individual capacity claims against her should be dismissed because Plaintiffs’ allegations
do not show a violation of any constitutional right or of clearly established law. See id. at

5. She maintains that there is no specific allegation that she knowingly disregarded a
substantial risk of serious harm to McCoy after having subjectively drawn that conclusion.
See id. at 6. At most, Nurse Lyes states she may have been negligent. See id. Moreover,
she reiterates that all claims against her, in her individual capacity, for punitive damages
should be dismissed because she did not act with the requisite culpable mental state.
See id.

IV. Analysis.
(a) Section 1983 Inadequate Medical Care Claim.
Plaintiffs allege the Nurse Defendants, along with the Deputy Defendants, failed to
provide medical assistance to McCoy and violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 27. They claim McCoy had an obvious and
serious medical condition that these Defendants were aware of. See id. Plaintiffs assert
that these Defendants “were aware that McCoy required immediate emergency medical
attention but none was provided and that failure to provide medical care presented a
substantial risk of serious injury and excessive pain up to and including death.” Id. They

allege these defendants “acted with deliberate [in]difference being aware of the serious
medical conditions but failing to take well established actions to avoid serious bodily injury
including death.” Id.
A § 1983 inadequate medical care claim “occurs only when the conduct amounts
to ‘deliberate indifference to [the prisoner’s] serious medical needs’ that ‘constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Sencial v. Lopinto, No. 23-3351, 2025 WL
1371822, at *8 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2025) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976) (internal quotation omitted)). The Fifth Circuit has held that “‘[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment requires that state officials not disregard the “basic human needs” of pretrial
detainees, including medical care.’” Id. (quoting Reed v. Krajca (Estate of Henson), 440
Fed. Appx. 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2011)). Under the deliberate indifference standard, “a prison
official is not liable unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Id. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Bradley v. Puckett,
157 F. 3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). This standard “is an extremely high standard to
meet.” Belcher v. Lopinto, No. 18-7368, 2018 WL 5847822, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2018).
“‘[A] plaintiff must show that public officers were aware of facts from which an inference

of a substantial risk of serious harm to an individual could be drawn; that they actually
drew the inference; and that their response indicates subjective intention that the harm
occur [sic].’” Id.
A cognizable claim requires a plaintiff to “allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of
decency.’” Sencial, 2025 WL 1371822, at *8. The “mere disagreement with medical
treatment is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference.” Id. “In some

circumstances, even delay in providing needed medical treatment may amount to a
constitutional violation.” Cosey v. Gusman, No. 05-3990, 2007 WL 2710804, at *4 (E.D.
La. Sept. 12, 2007). “However, the delay must be caused by the defendant’s deliberate
indifference if it is to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Id. With respect to
alcohol withdrawal, the Fifth Circuit, in dicta, has suggested “that ‘ignoring the dangers of
alcohol withdrawal and waiting for a “manifest emergency”’ could constitute deliberate
indifference in certain circumstances.” Freeland v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 789 Fed. Appx. 406,
409 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F. 3d 447, 458 (5th Cir.
2001)). However, “‘[m]edical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and
medications may rebut an inmate’s allegations of deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting

Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F. 3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995)).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible § 1983 inadequate
medical care claim against the Nurse Defendants. Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts
demonstrating that the Nurse Defendants were personally aware of McCoy’s serious
medical needs. See Abraugh, 2023 WL 6055491, at *6. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
demonstrated a link connecting the Nurse Defendants “with any wrongdoing based on

their ‘direct participation.’” Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Young Cnty., 866 F. 3d 274, 281 (5th
Cir. 2017)). While Nurse Lyles was supposedly aware of McCoy’s potential for alcohol
withdrawal and noticed an initial tremor from McCoy, there are no sufficient factual
allegations demonstrating she was aware of his worsening symptoms. In fact, Plaintiffs’
assertions specifically provide that the Night Shift Deputies summoned no medical
assistance, and the Nurse Defendants did not directly observe McCoy’s symptoms
worsening throughout the night. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 13.

Plaintiffs’ general and speculative allegations that the Nurse Defendants became
aware of his serious medical condition the morning of March 6, without more factual
support, is insufficient. See id. at ¶ 20. Once Nurse Lyles noticed McCoy was not
responding and no longer breathing, she called for emergency medical help around 8:30
a.m., and McCoy was pronounced decease around 9:30 a.m. See id. at ¶¶ 20, 25. Even
though there is a period of time between when EMS was called and when McCoy was
pronounced deceased, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that this “delay” was caused

by the Nurse Defendants’ deliberate indifference towards McCoy.
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not demonstrate that the Nurse Defendants knew of
McCoy’s serious medical condition and acted with deliberate indifference. The Night Shift
Deputies never reported his worsening condition to the Nurse Defendants. Besides
Plaintiffs’ general allegation that the Nurse Defendants became aware of McCoy’s serious
medical condition the morning of March 6, there are no other sufficient factual assertions

demonstrating their awareness. Plaintiffs have failed to meet the deliberate indifference
standard and plausibly pled a § 1983 inadequate medical care claim against the Nurse
Defendants.
Therefore, the Nurse Defendants’ Motions (Record Documents 33, 34, & 35), with
respect to the § 1983 inadequate medical care claim, are GRANTED. This claim is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Additionally, because the Court has found that the
Nurse Defendants did not show reckless and callous disregard and indifference to McCoy,
Plaintiffs are not permitted to recover punitive damages against the Nurse Defendants.

(b) Louisiana Fault and Negligence Claim.
Plaintiffs submit that all Defendants, including the Nurse Defendants, violated

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 32. Plaintiffs attempt to
reserve a medical malpractice claims against the Nurse Defendants. See id. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants’ “failure to provide adequate medical assistance to [McCoy] under
the circumstances was below the standard of care of jailers in a jail setting.” Id. at ¶ 33.
Rather than transporting McCoy to a “health care provider,” he was placed in a WRAP
which allegedly aggravated his symptoms. See id.

Addressing Plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims against the Nurse Defendants
would be premature, as Plaintiffs have not fully exhausted these claims before the state
Medical Review Panel. See Abraugh, 2023 WL 6055491, at *10. “Though the process is
underway, it is not yet final.” Id. In their oppositions, Plaintiffs confirm their medical
malpractice claims against the Nurse Defendants are still pending before the Patient
Compensation Fund. See Record Documents 44 at 21, 45 at 22, & 46 at 20.

“Under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, ‘[n]o action against a health care
provider … may be commenced in any court before the claimant’s proposed complaint
has been presented to a medical review panel.’” Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8).
“This process applies to state-law medical malpractice claims filed in federal court.” Id.
On this basis, Plaintiffs’ state negligence claims against the Nurse Defendants cannot
proceed until there has been a resolution of the Medical Review Panel proceeding. See
id.

“Federal district courts in Louisiana faced with similar situations have determined
that stays are warranted in the interest of judicial economy.” Id. See, e.g., Phoenix c.
Lafourche Parish Gov’t, No. 19-13004, 2021 WL 184909, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2021)
(holding that a stay was appropriate pending completion of the medical review panel in a
case where the plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ deliberate indifference led to a
detainee’s suicide). In the instant case, Plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims arise from
McCoy’s death while he was detained at Bossier Max. See id. Therefore, “‘[d]iscovery

will…apply to all interrelated claims. Additionally, the medical review panel’s
determination may be admissible (though not conclusive) at any trial of this matter.’” Id.
The Court finds a stay is warranted pending resolution of the Medical Review Panel
proceeding. See id. Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims against the Nurse Defendants
“largely depend on the alleged medical negligence, so the Court will refrain from
addressing those claims at this time.” Id. Pending the lifting of the stay, all three of the
Nurse Defendants’ Motions (Record Documents 33, 34, & 35), with respect to the state-
law negligence claim, are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

As to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages, “Louisiana law prohibits ‘punitive or
other “penalty” damages … unless expressly authorized by statute.’” Mallet v. Geans, No.
19-00427, 2020 WL 548764, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 3, 2020). Since Plaintiffs have failed to
identify a Louisiana statutory provision that authorizes a punitive damages award for their
state law claim, they are not permitted to recover punitive damages against the Nurse
Defendants as a matter of law. See id.
(c) Amendment.

Federal Rule 15(a) “provides that ‘leave to amend shall be freely given when
justice so requires,’ but only ‘applies where plaintiffs “expressly requested” to amend.’”
U.S. ex rel. Jamison v. Del-Jen, Inc., 747 Fed. Appx. 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2018). Moreover,
“a district court is justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff has ‘fail[ed] to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.’” Id. Here, the Court will not give
Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their First Amended Complaint.
On May 8, 2025, Magistrate Judge Hornsby stayed all discovery and allowed

Plaintiffs until May 27, 2025 “to file an amended and restated complaint that pleads their
best case with respect to the claims against the individual defendants (in anticipation of
their qualified immunity defense) and with respect to any other claims, including those
challenged by the [old] pending Rule 12 motions.” Record Document 22 at 1–2. In May
of 2025, all defendants filed motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims and asserted similar
arguments to the instant Motions. See Record Documents 9, 10, 11, & 14. These
previously filed motions to dismiss were handled by a joint order entered by the
undersigned; however, Plaintiffs were put on notice and cautioned that they needed to
assert more specific allegations and anticipate the qualified immunity defense. See

Record Documents 22 & 32.
Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint once again to cure the same problems
previously pointed out by this Court. Even though Plaintiffs have alleged they can provide
additional facts to support their arguments, these facts are uncorroborated and should
have been included in their First Amended Complaint. The Court finds further amendment
would be futile; therefore, Plaintiffs are not permitted to amend their First Amended
Complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons listed above,

IT IS ORDERED that all three of the Nurse Defendants’ Motions (Record
Documents 33, 34, & 35) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. All three
Motions are GRANTED with respect to the § 1983 inadequate medical care claim and
punitive damages claim. All three Motions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the
state law negligence claim. This claim is STAYED pending resolution of the Medical
Review Panel proceeding.

An Order consistent with this Ruling shall issue herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 25th day of August,
2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127881. Public record. Not legal advice.