# Carlton v. Getachew

> District Court, D. Maryland · August 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127822

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** August 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127822

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “plaintiffs need to present more than their own unsupported speculation and conclusory allegations” to succeed on summary judgment
- stating that for an individual defendant to be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally to deprive the plaintiff of his rights

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DAVID L. CARLTON, *
Plaintiff, *
v. * Civil Action No. JRR-24-0514

SHANE WEBER, Warden, et al., *
Defendants. *
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff David L. Carlton, currently incarcerated at Western Correctional Institution
(“WCI”), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants have
caused delaysand denials of his necessary medical treatment. ECF No. 1. The operative pleadings
are the Amended Complaint and Supplement to the Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 14, 15.
Defendants Weber, Cartwright, Jenkins, and Woolford (“DPSCS Defendants”) filed a
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 46.
Carlton was granted an extension to respond to the Motion, but has not done so in the time
provided. ECF No. 77. The Court has reviewed the pleadings and papers, and finds a hearing
unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons stated below, DPSCS
Defendants’ Motion, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, will be granted.
In addition, DPSCS Defendants’ Motion to Seal, ECF No. 48, will be denied. The Motions
to Stay filed by Bartles, Berger, Ernst, Getachew, and Tesfaye will be denied. ECF Nos. 71, 72.
Carlton’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Responses to the dispositive motions filed by
Defendants Dereje Tesfaye (ECF No. 50), Bartles, Berger, Ernst, and Getachew (ECF No. 62),
and Kathuria (ECF No. 67) will be granted. ECF No. 76.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Carlton’s allegations against DPSCS Defendants are based on their handling of complaints
and grievances he filed pertaining to the alleged delay and denial of medical care. ECF 14 at 16-
18. He complains specifically that since June 8, 2020, he has not received adequate medical care

for Dupuytren Contracture disease, and this has left him unable to properly use his left hand and
left foot. Id. 7-14. Carlton further complains that since March 14, 2019, he has not received proper
medical care for pain and bone fragments in his right elbow. Id. at 14-15. Carlton also complains
that, although he should be receiving chronic care for his diagnosis of Hepatitis C, he is not. Id. at
15-16.
Carlton’s Supplement to the Amended Complaint includes exhibits that relate to his use of
the grievance process. ECF No. 15. On September 22, 2021, Carlton filed his first Request for
Administrative Remedy (“ARP”) number 1698-21. Id. at 16; ECF No. 15-14 at 2-5. In the ARP,
Carlton provides detailed information about his efforts to obtain medical treatment, described

below.
Carlton states that since July 8, 2020, he has been requesting medical treatment for his left
hand and left foot to no avail. Id. at 4. In the ARP, Carlton provides the details of his efforts to
obtain medical care for his left hand and left foot. He states that he submitted a sick call slip on
June 8, 2020, to request care on his left hand because his ring finger and pinky were “folding into”
his hand and he had two lumps on the inside of his hand. Id. One month later, on July 8, 2020, he
was seen by RN Hoenicka, who referred him to Dr. Getachew who then scheduled an x-ray for
July 9, 2020. Id. Having received no follow up, on August 2, 2020, Carlton submitted a second
sick call slip advising the medical department of his ongoing problem with his left hand and that
he was experiencing pain. Id. On August 10, 2020, he was again seen by RN Hoenicka. Id. On
August 27, 2020, he was seen by Dr. Mohammed for chronic care of Hepatitis C who advised
Carlton that a consultation request had been submitted for him to be seen by a hand surgeon. Id.
On November 27, 2020, Carlton again requested sick call because he still had no treatment plan or
pain medication. Id. Carlton did not receive a response to his sick call request. Id.

On January 16, 2021, Carlton submitted another sick call slip complaining that his pinky
finger was curled into his palm, and was very painful. Id. On January 19, 2021, Carlton was seen
by RN Stair who recognized that his hand had deteriorated, that medications needed to be renewed,
and that there was no resolution of the surgery request. Id. On February 8, 2021, Carlton was
evaluated in chronic care by Dr. O’Neil who agreed that he needed a referral to an orthopedic
surgeon. Id. On April 7, 2021, Carlton submitted another sick call slip again stating that his pinky
continues to curl into his palm and the pain is getting worse in all his knuckles. Id. On April 15,
2021, he was again referred to a provider for treatment, evaluation, and an x-ray.
On June 19, 2021, Carlton was seen by NP Clark for chronic care; NP Clark generated

another request for a consultation by a hand surgeon. Id. at 4-5. On June 22, 2021, x-rays were
again taken. Id. at 5. On July 8, 2021, Carlton was seen by RN Booth for a sick call slip he had
submitted. Id. Booth assessed that Carlton was at risk for injury and he was referred to the provider
for follow up. Id. On July 18, 2021, Carlton was seen by NP Clark who advised him that the
request to see the surgeon had been denied, and an appeal was submitted, which had also been
denied. Id. On August 1, 2021, Corizon Health again denied a surgery request. Id.
In the ARP, Carlton requests to be provided with the “recommended treatment plan,” a
consultation with the orthopedic surgeon, physical therapy after surgery, monetary damages, and
no retaliation for use of the grievance process. Id. On September 24, 2021, Defendant Cartwright,
ARP Coordinator, dismissed the ARP for “procedural reasons” as “not received within the
established timeframe.” ECF No. 14 at 17; ECF No. 15-14 at 2.
On October 28, 2021, Carlton filed his second ARP, number 1979-21, which included
photos of his left hand pinky. ECF No. 14 at 17; ECF No. 15-14 at 6-15. In the ARP, Carlton
states the medical department has continuously failed to treat his Dupuytren’s Contracture. Id. He

chronicles his requests for treatment dating back to July 8, 2020, and states this is an ongoing
medical issue for which he seeks relief to include orthopedic treatment, surgery, and physical
therapy. Id. at 6-9. On October 28, 2021, Cartwright denied this ARP as well, because it was
“[p]reviously resolved; is repetitive; or has been previously addressed” through the ARP process,
citing to the first filed ARP, number 1698-21. Id. at 6: ECF 14 at 17.
Carlton alleges that on November 22, 2021, he sent a letter to Defendant Warden Weber
and included a copy of the first and second ARPS and photos of his left hand pinky bent and
twisted. ECF No. 15-14 at 16-17; ECF No. 14 at 17. The letter, which is not dated, is addressed
to “WARDEN/TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN;” and is stamped as received on both December

3, 2021, and February 1, 2022, by the ARP/IGP unit. ECF No. 15-14 at 16-17. In this letter,
Carlton states he is appealing his first ARP 1979-21 and provides the inventory numbers for both
ARPS (0143703 and 0106664). Id. at 16. Carlton states there was no investigation on either ARP,
both ARPs were timely filed, and he has an ongoing unresolved issue. Id. Weber did not respond
to his letter. ECF No. 14 at 17.
On December 3, 2021, Carlton states that he appealed the ARP to the DPSCS HQ ARP
Coordinator, Defendant Sergeant Jenkins, with the same letter sent to the Warden. Id.; ECF No.
15-14 at 16-17. Jenkins sent Carlton a memorandum dated December 3, 2021, stating that the letter
will not be accepted for processing because “[w]e are unable to determine your intent.” ECF 15-
14 at 18. The memorandum advises Carlton that if he intends to appeal a decision, he should use
the appropriate appeal form for each ARP number, and include a copy of the original completed
ARP request. Id. Included in the record is Carlton’s appeal dated December 21, 2021, filed on a
DPSCS form, with a receipt stamp from the ARP/IGP unit dated February 1, 2022. ECF No. 15-
14 at 19-25. On February 1, 2022, Jenkins dismissed the appeal as untimely. ECF No. 14 at 17;

ECF No. 15-14 at 19.
On March 6, 2022, Carlton filed a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”).
ECF No. 14 at 17; ECF No. 15-14 at 20-25. On April 29, 2022, Defendant Woolford, Deputy
Director, Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”), issued a dismissal referencing the first ARP (1979-
21) as “wholly lacking in merit” because the complaint is against the medical staff employed by
the private health care contractor and not against officials or employees of the Division of
Correction or the Patuxent Institution. ECF No. 15-14 at 26. Woolford explains that the IGO
cannot consider grievances against a private health care contractor or its employees, citing Md.
CODE ANN., CORR. SERV. § 10-206(a). Id.; ECF No. 14 at 17.

In this action, Carlton seeks declaratory and injunctive relief pertaining to medical care and
damages. ECF No. 14 at 21-22. On October 2, 2024, the Court dismissed Carlton’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims against the DPSCS Defendants, and determined that Eighth Amendment
damage claims may proceed against them in their individual capacities and Eighth Amendment
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief may proceed against them in their official capacities.
ECF Nos. 17, 18.
B. DPSCS Response
Defendant Warden Weber states that medical services at WCI are provided by a private
medical contractor and neither he nor WCI officers have authority to issue medical orders
regarding an individual’s medical care. ECF No. 46-2 at ¶ 2 (Decl. Weber). Weber is not a
licensed health care provider. Id. Weber is also not responsible for supervising or monitoring the
medical contractor or the medical department. Id. at ¶ 3. Weber relies on the reports, assessments,
and judgment of the contractor’s medical staff to prepare a response to any ARPs for his signature.
Id. at ¶ 4. Weber did not process either of Carlton’s ARPS, and was not aware that Carlton had

filed any ARPs pertaining to medical care. Id. at ¶ 6. An incarcerated individual can request sick
call from the medical contractor and neither he nor correctional staff have “control” over the
medical providers’ response to a sick call request. Id. at ¶ 8.
Defendant Cartwright, ARP Coordinator at WCI from January 2009 through August 21,
2022, similarly states that she is not a licensed health care provider and, when evaluating ARP
appeals, she relies on the medical providers’ reports, assessments, and judgments and does not
make determinations as to the medical providers’ response to a sick call slip. ECF No. 46-3 at ¶¶
3, 6, 7 (Decl. Cartwright). Cartwright did not investigate either ARP filed by Carlton, as she
procedurally dismissed Carlton’s first filed ARP 1698-21 as untimely, and dismissed his second

filed ARP 1979-21 as duplicative of the first ARP. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.
Defendant Jenkins, ARP Coordinator in the office of the Commissioner of Correction (HQ)
from November 2021 through February 2023, states it was her duty to process ARP appeals. ECF
No. 46-4 at ¶ 2(Decl. Jenkins). Similar to Defendants Weber and Cartwright, she is not a licensed
health care provider and relies on the medical providers’ reports, assessments, and judgments, and
does not make determinations as to the medical providers’ response to sick call slips. Id. at ¶ ¶ 3,
12, 13. If an ARP appeal complains about a procedural dismissal of an ARP, Jenkins determines
if the procedural dismissal was correct. Id. at ¶ 4. Carlton’s ARP 1979-21 had been dismissed as
repetitive of his first filed ARP and Jenkins determined the appeal was “not clear.” Id. at ¶ 6. On
December 3, 2021, Jenkins instructed Carlton to submit clarifying information, and Carlton
“waited more than 30 days,” and submitted the information on February 3, 2022. Id. Jenkins then
dismissed the appeal as untimely. Id. Even if the information was timely submitted, Jenkins would
have dismissed the appeal because the decision that it was repetitive was correct. Id. at ¶ 7.
Cartwright did not file a separate appeal of the first ARP 1698-21. ¶ 8.

Defendant Woolford states that Carlton has filed only filed two medical care grievances
with the IGO; case numbers 20220460 and 20220459. ECF No. 46-5 at ¶ 2 (Decl. Woolford).
Carlton’s grievance 20220459 related to Carlton’s second filed ARP 1979-21. Id. at ¶ 3. Woolford
dismissed the grievance because it did not pertain to any Division of Correction or Patuxent
employees. Id. at ¶ 3. Woolford also dismissed grievance 2022060, based on his first filed
grievance ARP 1698-21, for the same reason, although it also could have been dismissed because
he failed to establish that he appealed the institution’s response to the ARP to the Commissioner
of Corrections. Id. at ¶ 4; ECF No. 46-5 at 67. Woolford is similarly not a licensed health care
professional. Id. at ¶ 5.

Declarant Emerick, the administrative aide/litigation coordinator at WCI, states current
duties to include screening and keeping a daily log of all incoming mail from incarcerated
individuals and routing mail to appropriate departments to respond to the inquiry. ECF No. 46-6
at ¶ 2-3 (Decl. Emerick). Emerick states that the mail log for the Warden’s Office documents that
only one piece of correspondence came from Carlton from December 2021 through January 2022,
and it was noted to be in reference to Carlton’s request for permission to communicate with his
brother who was incarcerated at another facility. Id. at ¶ 4. There is no record on the Warden’s
mail log regarding an appeal of any ARP by Carlton from July 2021 through April 2022. Id.
“Typically” any letter expressing an intent to appeal an ARP or referencing an ARP would be
forwarded to the ARP Coordinator’s Office to handle. Id. at ¶ 6.
II. MOTION TO SEAL
DPSCS Defendants seek to seal portions of an exhibit submitted with their dispositive
motion and submit 121 pages to seal. ECF Nos. 47-48. They request to seal records due to privacy

concerns regarding Plaintiff’s health information. ECF No. 48 at 1. Counsel states that the records
filed under seal have already been redacted as to date of birth and age, but there is no alternative
to sealing the records to protect the other medical information from disclosure and permit the Court
and Plaintiff to see the evidence offered. Id. at 2.
The documents submitted for sealing include numerous pages already filed by counsel on
the public record. See, e.g., ECF 47-1 at 68-92 (sealed) filed at ECF 46-5 at 26-50 (not under seal).
Counsel has not designated only the records they request to seal, choosing instead to file a larger
quantity than is necessary or useful to the Court in reviewing the motion to seal.
Local Rule 105.11 states in relevant part: “[a]ny motion seeking the sealing of pleadings,

motions, exhibits or other documents to be filed in the Court record shall include (a) proposed
reasons supported by specific factual representations to justify the sealing and (b) an explanation
why alternatives to sealing would not provide sufficient protection.” Local Rule 105.11 (D. Md.
2023). The rule balances the public’s general right to inspect and copy judicial records and
documents, see Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978), with competing
interests that sometimes outweigh the public’s right, see In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235
(4th Cir. 1984). The common-law presumptive right of access may be rebutted by demonstration
that that “countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interest in access.” Doe v. Pub.
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265–66 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846
F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)). The right of access “may be restricted only if closure is
‘necessitated by a compelling government interest’ and the denial of access is ‘narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.’” Id. at 266 (quoting In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir.
1986)). “[S]ensitive medical or personal identification information may be sealed,” although not
where “the scope of [the] request is too broad.” Rock v. McHugh, 819 F. Supp. 2d 456, 475 (D.

Md. 2011).
The Court finds that in regard to the limited health records, not currently on the public
docket, the less restrictive approach of limiting access to these filings to the case participants
satisfies the need to maintain Carlton’s privacy to his medical information. Accordingly, the
Motion to Seal will be denied and the Clerk is directed to instead restrict the filing to case
participants. The documents in the restricted filing that are already on the public docket may be
viewed there.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss

DPSCS Defendants’ Motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. A motion styled in this manner implicates the Court’s discretion under Rule 12(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery
Cnty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436–37 (D. Md. 2011). Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters
outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v.
U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6), however, a court, in its
discretion, may consider matters outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does
so, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” but “[a]ll parties
must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); Adams Hous., LLC v. City of Salisbury, Maryland, 672 F. App’x 220, 222
(4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). As is the case here, when a movant titles its motion “in the
alternative” as one for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the
Court’s consideration, the parties are deemed on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may

occur; the Court “does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin v. Metro.
Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).
A district judge has “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the
submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.” 5
C Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE &PROC. § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.). This
discretion “should be exercised with great caution and attention to the parties’ procedural rights.”
Id. at 149. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material “is likely
to facilitate the disposition of the action,” and “whether discovery prior to the utilization of the

summary judgment procedure” is necessary. Id. at 165, 167.
B. Discovery
Ordinarily, summary judgment is inappropriate “where the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637
F.3d 435, 448–49 (4th Cir. 2011); see Putney v. Likin, 656 F. App’x 632, 638–39 (4th Cir. 2016)
(per curiam); McCray v. Maryland Dep’t of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). However,
“the party opposing summary judgment ‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted
without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that
more time was needed for discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d
214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th
Cir. 1996)). To raise adequately the issue that discovery is needed, the non-movant typically must
file an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), explaining why, “for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,” without needed
discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); see also Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244–45 (discussing affidavit

requirement of former Rule 56(f)).
“[T]o justify a denial of summary judgment on the grounds that additional discovery is
necessary, the facts identified in a Rule 56 affidavit must be ‘essential to [the] opposition.’” Scott
v. Nuvell Fin. Servs. LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (D. Md. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). A non-moving party’s Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery is properly denied
“where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trustees, Craven
Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995); see Amirmokri v. Abraham, 437 F. Supp. 2d 414,
420 (D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 266 F. App’x. 274 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 885 (2008).

If a non-moving party believes that further discovery is necessary before consideration of
summary judgment, the party fails to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit at his peril, because “‘the failure
to file an affidavit … is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery
was inadequate.’” Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted). Despite the absence of the
non-moving party’s Rule 56(d) affidavit, the Court shall not issue a summary judgment ruling that
is obviously premature. Although the Fourth Circuit places “‘great weight’” on the Rule 56(d)
affidavit, and holds that mere “‘reference to Rule 56(f) [now Rule 56(d)] and the need for
additional discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is
not an adequate substitute for [an] affidavit,’” the appellate court has “not always insisted” on a
Rule 56(d) affidavit. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Failure to file an affidavit may be excused “if the nonmoving party has adequately
informed the district court that the motion is premature and that more discovery is necessary” and
the “nonmoving party’s objections before the district court ‘served as the functional equivalent of

an affidavit.’” Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244–45 (internal citations omitted); see also Putney, 656
F. App’x at 638; Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 961 (4th Cir. 2008). Moreover, “[t]his is especially
true where, as here, the non-moving party is proceeding pro se.” Putney, 656 F. App’x at 638.
Here, Carlton has neither responded to DPSCS Defendants’ Motion nor made any request
for discovery.
C. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides
in pertinent part: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the
motion. “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
“The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). The
Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to … the nonmovant, and draw[s] all
inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility.”
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644–45 (4th Cir. 2002); see F.D.I.C.
v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2013).
The district court’s “function” is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Moreover, the trial court may not make credibility determinations on summary judgment. Jacobs
v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015); In re French, 499 F.3d 345, 352
(4th Cir. 2007); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis,
290 F.3d at 644–45. Therefore, in the face of conflicting evidence, such as competing affidavits,
summary judgment is generally not appropriate, because it is the function of the factfinder to
resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness credibility.
Nevertheless, to defeat summary judgment, conflicting evidence, if any, must give rise to
a genuine dispute of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48. If “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” then a dispute of material
fact precludes summary judgment. Id. at 248; see Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718 F.3d
308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence “is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 252. And, “the mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id.
Because Carlton is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That notwithstanding, the Court must abide the “‘affirmative
obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding
to trial.’” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt,
999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24
(1986)).
IV. DISCUSSION
DPSCS Defendants seek dismissal of the Amended Complaint, or summary judgment in

their favor, on the following grounds: Eleventh Amendment Immunity; failure to allege personal
involvement; failure to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim; qualified immunity; and failure to
exhaust administrative remedies for which he seeks injunctive relief. ECF Nos. 46, 46-1. DPSCS
Defendants also assert that the Court should deny injunctive relief. Id.
As already discussed, on October 2, 2024, the Court dismissed Carlton’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims against the DPSCS Defendants, and permitted his Eighth Amendment damage
claims to proceed against DPSCS Defendants in their individual capacities, and his Eighth
Amendment claims for declaratory and injunctive relief to go forward against DPSCS Defendants
in their official capacities. ECF Nos. 17-18. Accordingly, DPSCS Defendants’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity and Fourteenth Amendment arguments are unnecessarily presented and
will not be addressed as they have already been resolved.
A. Eighth Amendment Damage Claims
DPSCS Defendants assert that Carlton fails to allege either personal involvement or
supervisory liability which is a required element of a § 1983 action. ECF No. 46-1 at 9-11.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may file suit against any person who, acting under
color of state law, deprives her “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws” of the United States. See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012); see also Owens
v. Balt. City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Balt.
City Police Dep’t v. Owens, 575 U.S. 983 (2015). However, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of
substantive rights,’ but provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3
(1979)); see Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017). In other words, § 1983 allows “a
party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 also requires a showing of personal fault based upon a defendant’s personal
conduct. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that for an individual
defendant to be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that
the official acted personally to deprive the plaintiff of his rights). In other words, there is no
respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because
vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”);
see also Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766,

782 (4th Cir. 2004).
To state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983 based on a subordinate’s conduct,
the plaintiff must allege that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that the
subordinate’s conduct “posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens
like the plaintiff;” (2) the supervisor responded in a manner that was so inadequate that it showed
“deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization” of the subordinate’s conduct; and (3) there was
“an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction” and the plaintiff’s constitutional
injury. Timpson by & through Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., 31
F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).
There is no dispute of fact that Defendants Cartwright, Jenkins, and Woolford reviewed
Carlton’s filings pursuant to the ARP process and did not investigate his concerns, but instead
dismissed his complaints for procedural reasons. Cartwright and Jenkins based their dismissals on
timeliness and repetition of complaints; Woolford based her dismissal on the Department of
Corrections having no jurisdiction over private health care contractors. ECF No. 15-14 at 2, 6, 26;

ECF No. 14 at 17; ECF No. 46-5 at 3, 67. There is also no dispute of fact that Cartwright and
Jenkins are not licensed health care professionals, do not have responsibility for assuring that
medical care is provided to prisoners, and do not oversee medical personnel. See generally,
Cartwright Decl., ECF No. 46-3; Jenkins Decl., ECF No. 46-4. It is further undisputed that
Woolford is not a licensed health care professional and has no ability to order any particular
medical treatment. ECF No. 46-5 at ¶ 5.
In view of the undisputed facts, Cartwright, Jenkins, and Woolford’s limited role does not
establish personal liability for unconstitutionally inadequate medical care. None of these
Defendants investigated Carlton’s substantive complaints regarding his medical care or was

otherwise involved with the provision of medical care. See Chukwurah v. Corizon Health Care,
No. CV PX-22-212, 2023 WL 4268556, at *6 (D. Md. June 29, 2023)(citing Gallagher v. Shelton,
587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (allegation that warden “rubber stamped” grievances was
not enough to establish personal participation) (citing Whitington v. Ortiz, 307 F. App’x 179, 193
(10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (“denial of the grievances alone is insufficient to establish personal
participation in the alleged constitutional violations.”)), aff'd, No. 23-6716, 2024 WL 1405885
(4th Cir. Apr. 2, 2024).
The Court turns next to Carlton’s allegations against Warden Weber. Officials like Warden
Weber may be found liable if the plaintiff shows the official “acted personally in the deprivation
of the plaintiff[’s] rights.” Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bennett
v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Md. 1971)). See also Kelly v. Miller, No. CV ELH-20-
2531, 2022 WL 2703827, at *22 (D. Md. July 12, 2022) citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841,
850 (4th Cir. 1985) (additional citations omitted) (receipt of letters by prison officials may be
evidence of personal knowledge).

Carlton alleges in his verified complaint that on November 22, 2021, he sent a letter to
Defendant Weber and included a copy of the first and second ARPS and photos of his left hand
pinky bent and twisted. ECF No. 15-14 at 16-17; ECF No. 14 at 17. The copy of the letter and
attachments, provided by Carlton, addressed to “WARDEN/TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,”
states that Carlton is appealing his second filed ARP, references the inventory numbers for both
ARPs, and is stamped as received on December 3, 2021, and also on February 1, 2022, by the
ARP/IGP unit. ECF No. 15-14 at 10-16.
It is undisputed that Warden Weber did not process either of Carlton’s ARPs or was aware
that Carlton had filed any ARPs pertaining to medical care. ECF No. 46-2 at ¶ 6. Emerick, the

current administrative aide/litigation coordinator at WCI confirms without opposition by Carlton
that there is no record on the Warden’s mail log regarding any appeal of an ARP by Carlton from
July 2021 through April 2022, which is during the time Carlton alleges he sent his letter to the
Warden. ECF No. 46-6 at ¶ 2-3 (Decl. Emerick). Further, it is undisputed that any letter expressing
an intent to appeal an ARP or referencing an ARP would have been forwarded to the ARP
Coordinator’s Office to handle. Id. at ¶ 6. Emerick asserts, without opposition by Carlton, that
the mail log for the Warden’s Office documents only one piece of correspondence came from
Carlton from December 2021 through January 2022, and it was noted to be in reference to
Carlton’s request for permission to communicate with his brother who was incarcerated at another
facility. Id. at ¶ 4. This, too, is undisputed.
The undisputed record evidence is that Carlton’s letter addressed to “WARDEN/TO
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN” was processed as an appeal the ARP denial. This document is
stamped as received on both December 3, 2021, and February 1, 2022, by the ARP/IGP unit. ECF

No. 15-14 at 16-17. In this letter, Carlton states he is appealing his first ARP 1979-21 and provides
the inventory numbers for both ARPS (0143703 and 0106664). Id. at 16; ECF No. 14 at 17.
Jenkins, the ARP Coordinator, sent Carlton a Memorandum dated December 3, 2021, stating that
the letter will not be accepted for processing because “[w]e are unable to determine your intent.”
ECF 15-14 at 18.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) places the burden on the party responding to a motion
for summary judgment to show that a fact is genuinely disputed by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record [or] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the

fact.” FED. R.CIV. P. 56(c). On the record before the Court, there is no opposition to Weber’s
statement that he did not process either of Carlton’s ARPs or was even aware that Carlton had filed
any ARPs pertaining to medical care. ECF No. 46-2 at ¶ 6. Although Carlton states that he sent
the letter/ARP appeal to the Warden, there is no evidence that the letter was received or reviewed
by Weber of that Weber was in any way aware of Carlton’s medical needs. Carlton has failed to
generate a dispute of fact on these material matters. See Robinson v. Priority Auto. Huntersville,
Inc.,70 F.4th 776, 780 (4th Cir. 2023) (stating that “plaintiffs need to present more than their own
unsupported speculation and conclusory allegations” to succeed on summary judgment).
Further, as expressed above, Carlton fails to allege personal involvement of Warden
Weber. In addition, although addressed by Defendants, Carlton does not allege Weber is
responsible under a theory of supervisory liability. Indeed, Carlton makes no allegations to this
effect.
Weber, Cartwright, Jenkins, and Woolford’s motion for summary judgment will be granted

as to Carlton’s damage claims.1
B. Eighth Amendment – Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Carlton seeks a declaration that his rights have been violated under federal law, and an
injunction ordering Defendant Weber and the Medical Defendants to provide him with access to
an orthopedic specialist to be evaluated for his left hand, left foot contractures, and removal of
fragments in his right elbow, to include any operations, braces, and physical therapy. ECF No. 21.
Defendants assert that Weber is “not capable” of executing a Court order to this effect, ECF No.
46-1 at 16, and further that Carlton has failed to exhaust administrative remedies for medical
treatment except as pertains to Dupuytren disease in his left hand. Id. at 17.

For the reasons expressed above, the damage claims against Defendant Weber are resolved
in Weber’s favor; and, similarly, for the reasons articulated above, Carlton’s claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief against Weber will be resolved in Weber’s favor. Carlton’s request for
declaratory and injunctive relief remains pending against the medical providers.
V. PENDING MOTIONS
A. Medical Defendants’ Motion for a Stay
Defendants Dr. Dereje Tesfaye, Dr. Asresahegn Getachew, Dr. Michael Berger, Dr.
Mandip Bartels, and Mignon Ernst filed two motions to stay this proceeding and a supplemental

1Accordingly, the court need not reach DPSCS Defendants’ qualified immunity argument.
reply based on proceedings pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Texas in In re Tehum Care Services, Inc. (f/k/a Corizon Health, Inc.), Case No. 23-
90086 (CML). ECF Nos. 71, 72, and 78. These Defendants state that the Bankruptcy Court held
a hearing on YesCare’s Motion to Enjoin on July 2, 2025, and a decision on the motion is
forthcoming, which will determine if Carlton will be enjoined from further litigating this case

against these Defendants who are former employees of YesCare. See Bankruptcy Case, ECF No.
2266; 2332. ECF No. 78 at 1.
Pursuant to the docket in the bankruptcy proceedings, on August 7, 2025, the Bankruptcy
Court issued a decision on YesCare’s Motion to Enjoin. ECF No. 2160. The Bankruptcy Court
Ordered, in part, that certain plaintiffs are enjoined from continuing to litigate against any
expressly named released party. Id. The Bankruptcy Court specifically determined that Carlton
is not a plaintiff enjoined from continuing to litigate his pending case in this Court against
Defendants. Id., see Exhibit B. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to stay will be denied and
Carlton may continue to litigate this case against Dr. Dereje Tesfaye, Dr. Asresahegn Getachew,

Dr. Michael Berger, Dr. Mandip Bartels, and Mignon Ernst.
A. Carlton’s Motion for an Extension of Time
Carlton has filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to dispositive motions
pending by Defendants Dr. Dereje Tesfaye (ECF No. 50), Dr. Asresahegn Getachew, Dr. Michael
Berger, Dr. Mandip Bartels, Mignon Ernst (ECF No. 62), and Dr. Sudhir Kathuria (ECF No. 67).
ECF No. 76. Carlton’s motion will be granted. ECF No. 76. Carlton will be provided 60 days
from entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to respond to all three motions.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, DPSCS Defendants’ Motion, construed as a Motion for
Summary Judgment, will be granted and judgment is granted in movant Defendants’ favor and
against Plaintiff. ECF No. 46. The DPSCS Motion to Seal, ECF No. 48, will be denied, and the
documents will instead be filed as restricted to the parties. The Motions to Stay filed by Bartles,

Berger, Ernst, Getachew, and Tesfaye will be denied. ECF Nos. 71, 72. Carlton’s Motion for
Extension of Time to File Responses to the pending dispositive motions filed by Defendants Dereje
Tesfaye, ECF No. 50, Bartles, Berger, Ernst, and Getachew, ECF No. 62, and Kathuria, ECF No.
67 will be granted. ECF No. 76.
A separate Order follows.
/S/
_____________________________
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127822. Public record. Not legal advice.