# GLADU v. MAGNUSSON

> District Court, D. Maine · August 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127719

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** August 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127719

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an officer who seizes property does not offend due process “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available”
- finding a prison sex-offender treatment program’s rule barring particular inmates from possessing materials depicting nudity was reasonable
- holding same rule applies to Takings 2 Even though it may also be reasonable to interpret these allegations in the manner Mr. Stanley suggests, I must interpret the facts in a manner favorable to Mr. Gladu at this stage. Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Clause claims

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

NICHOLAS A GLADU, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:22-cv-00134-SDN
)
MATTHEW MAGNUSSON, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Nicholas Gladu sued various employees and administrators at the Maine
State Prison (“MSP”), where Mr. Gladu is incarcerated. He alleges they violated his rights
by preventing him from obtaining magazines and books with images of male nudity. After
I granted Mr. Gladu’s motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) with
new factual allegations and three newly named defendants, ECF No. 237, one of the new
defendants, Andrew Stanley, moved to dismiss, ECF No. 251. For the following reasons,
his motion is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I summarized the TAC’s factual allegations in my order granting Mr. Gladu’s
motion for leave to file it. See ECF No. 237 at 2–8. Here, I repeat only the alleged facts
relevant to Mr. Stanley’s motion to dismiss. Applying the appropriate standard, I
articulate the TAC’s well-pled factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in Mr. Gladu’s favor. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm.,
669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). Because Mr. Gladu represents himself, I interpret his
filings liberally. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Mr. Gladu is incarcerated at the MSP and openly identifies as “gay/queer.” TAC
¶ 1.1 According to Mr. Gladu, Maine Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) policy permits
prisoners at the MSP to possess printed materials depicting adult nudity, regardless of
the gender depicted. According to Mr. Gladu, however, MSP officers prevented him from
obtaining materials depicting male nudity out of personal animus toward gay people. For

example, one Media Review Officer—responsible for screening books and magazines sent
to prisoners—stated, “I didn’t sign-up for this job to look at magazines with dick all day”
and told other inmates that publications depicting male nudity “disgusted” him. Id. ¶¶ 51–
52. On March 9, 2022, Mr. Gladu filed a formal complaint against the Media Review
Officer with MSP Warden Matthew Magnusson for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and discriminatory application of MDOC policy. Id. ¶ 55.
On March 28, 2022, Mr. Gladu overheard Officer Andrew Stanley tell another
prisoner that Mr. Stanley had been assigned as the new Media Review Officer, so Mr.
Gladu spoke with him about MSP’s rejection of Mr. Gladu’s recent book orders. Id. ¶ 63.
Mr. Stanley initially claimed he had rejected the books because they came from non-
approved vendors and because he believed MDOC policy barred depictions of male

nudity.
Mr. Stanley told Mr. Gladu, “Look man, I don’t know what you did to piss them off,
but they defin[i]tely got it out for you right now,” in reference to Mr. Magnusson and other
prison staff’s feelings toward Mr. Gladu. Id. ¶ 65. Mr. Stanley further explained to Mr.
Gladu that Mr. Magnusson and his assistant had instructed Mr. Stanley to tell Mr. Gladu
the requested books “were rejected” for coming “from non-approved vendors,” but in fact

1 The Clerk’s Office entered Mr. Gladu’s proposed TAC, which the Court accepted, on the docket at ECF No.
238.
Mr. Magnusson and Mr. Hancox had placed Mr. Gladu on a “porn restriction” because
they did not approve of materials depicting male nudity. Id. ¶ 66.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Gladu filed his original complaint on May 9, 2022. ECF No. 1. He levied seven
claims: Count I alleges Defendants violated Mr. Gladu’s First Amendment rights by

intentionally restricting Mr. Gladu’s access to publications with adult male nudity,
without any legitimate penological interest for doing so. Count II alleges Defendants
denied Mr. Gladu equal protection on the basis of his sexual orientation in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Count III alleges Defendants denied Mr. Gladu due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by seizing his property without notice or
opportunity to be heard. Count IV alleges Defendants conspired to deprive Mr. Gladu of
his rights by engaging in a concerted effort to fabricate rationales for withholding access
to Mr. Gladu’s materials. Count V alleges Defendants violated the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment by seizing his books and magazines without compensation. Count VI
alleges Defendants violated the Maine Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him on
the basis of sexual orientation. Count VII alleges Defendants retaliated against him for

engaging in protected conduct.
Since Mr. Gladu filed his original complaint, this case has involved a whirlwind of
amendments, motions, and objections, not to mention an interlocutory appeal. With each
amendment, Mr. Gladu raised the same seven substantive claims, although he supported
them with updated factual allegations. For the sake of resolving this motion to dismiss,
what matters is this: Mr. Gladu’s original complaint and First Amended Complaint did
not name Mr. Stanley. Three other defendants moved to dismiss Counts I–V of the First
Amended Complaint, contending claim preclusion barred those counts because Mr.
Gladu had already lost a prior case raising similar claims against other MSP officials. See
Gladu v. Waltz, No. 18-CV-00275, 2020 WL 6385618 (D. Me. Oct. 30, 2020) [hereinafter
Gladu I], R&R adopted, 2020 WL 7344706 (Dec. 14, 2020), aff’d, No. 21-1010, 2022 WL
20437774 (1st Cir. Oct. 24, 2022).
In this case, the Court rejected the claim preclusion argument in part, concluding

that Mr. Gladu’s First Amendment, equal protection, and due process claims (Counts I–
III) were premised on sufficiently distinguishable facts such that the prior judgment did
not bar Mr. Gladu from raising them. See ECF No. 96. The Court dismissed the remaining
claims based on issue preclusion (as to Count V), failure to state a claim (as to Counts IV
and VII), and lack of supplemental jurisdiction (as to Count VI). However, Mr. Gladu later
sought to revive those claims by including new allegations in his TAC. See ECF No. 238.
Because the Defendants did not oppose amendment as to those claims, the Court
permitted Mr. Gladu to revive Counts IV–VII but noted that Defendants could address
the merits of those claims at a later stage. The Court also permitted Mr. Gladu to add Mr.
Stanley as a defendant for all claims in the TAC. Now, Mr. Stanley moves to dismiss those
claims against him. ECF No. 251.

DISCUSSION
Mr. Stanley moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. To survive this motion, Mr. Gladu’s complaint must allege “enough
facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This entails a two-step process. First, I “isolate and ignore
statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely
rehash cause-of-action elements.” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Second, I “take the complaint’s
well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable
inferences in the pleader’s favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.” Id. In
doing so, my role is not to “attempt to forecast a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the
merits,” but to determine whether “the inference of liability . . . from the facts alleged” is
reasonable. Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).
I. Failure to State a Claim

Mr. Stanley argues that, as a general matter, Mr. Gladu does not allege any “actual
involvement” by Mr. Stanley in the conduct giving rise to any of Mr. Gladu’s claims. In
particular, Mr. Stanley argues that there “is no allegation that Officer Stanley rejected or
seized any of the books.” ECF No. 251 at 5. Mr. Stanley focuses on the fact that the TAC
uses the passive voice in alleging that Mr. Stanley told Mr. Gladu the books had been
rejected, without saying whether Mr. Stanley was the one who rejected them.
This reading of the TAC draws an inference against Mr. Gladu, which I am not
permitted to do at this stage. See Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. In context, taking the TAC’s
allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Gladu, as I must,
the TAC plausibly alleges that Mr. Stanley himself rejected some books. On March 25,
2022, Mr. Gladu learned that a book delivered by mail four days earlier had been rejected.

TAC ¶ 62. Three days later, on March 28, 2022, Mr. Gladu heard Mr. Stanley say that he
had been appointed the new Media Review Officer. TAC ¶ 63. It is reasonable for me to
infer from these allegations that Mr. Stanley was the Media Review Officer responsible
for rejecting Mr. Gladu’s book. Mr. Stanley’s response when Mr. Gladu asked about his
“recent book orders being censored” further supports that inference: Mr. Stanley told Mr.
Gladu that “he thought that content with male nudity may not have been allowed under
departmental policy, but either way the books had come from non-approved vendors.”
TAC ¶ 64. Then, Mr. Stanley admitted that Mr. Magnusson and Mr. Hancox had told Mr.
Stanley to tell Mr. Gladu a pretextual rationale for rejecting the books, when in fact they
had placed Mr. Gladu on a “porn restriction.” TAC ¶ 66. It is reasonable to infer from these
statements that Mr. Stanley was describing his own thought process in rejecting the
recent book orders.2
Mr. Stanley also argues that even if he did help “carry out the directive” of the so-

called “porn restriction,” the directive came from other employees, not Mr. Stanley. ECF
No. 251 at 5. In his view, that protects him from liability. I previously rejected this
argument, ECF No. 237 at 23–25, so I address it again only briefly. “A person ‘subjects’
another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if
he [or she] does an affirmative act, [or] participates in another’s affirmative acts . . . .”
Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 560 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Springer
v. Seaman, 821 F.2d 871, 879 (1st Cir. 1987)). Therefore, even assuming Mr. Stanley
merely executed a directive handed down by his fellow employees, such conduct
constitutes “participat[ing] in another’s affirmative acts.” Id. Accordingly, I will not
dismiss the claims against Mr. Stanley on this basis.
Mr. Stanley also raises specific arguments for dismissal on Count III (due process),

Count IV (conspiracy), Count V (takings), and Count VII (retaliation). He argues the due
process and takings claims fail because Mr. Gladu did not allege that any state law post-
deprivation remedy was inadequate. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)
(holding that an officer who seizes property does not offend due process “if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available”); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720–21 (1999) (holding same rule applies to Takings

2 Even though it may also be reasonable to interpret these allegations in the manner Mr. Stanley suggests,
I must interpret the facts in a manner favorable to Mr. Gladu at this stage. Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55.
Clause claims); see Gladu I, 2020 WL 6385618, at *6 (D. Me. Oct. 30, 2020) (concluding,
in Mr. Gladu’s earlier case, that prisoners’ ability to appeal their grievances through state
courts constitutes a meaningful post-deprivation remedy). Mr. Stanley argues the
conspiracy claim fails because Mr. Gladu does not allege any class-based, discriminatory
animus. And he argues the retaliation claim fails because Mr. Gladu does not allege that

his filing of an internal grievance was a “substantial or motivating factor for the adverse
action,” Staples v. Gerry, 923 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2019) (quotation modified), given that
prison officials denied Mr. Gladu access to his books both before and after he filed a
grievance.3
Mr. Gladu does not respond to these arguments at all in his opposition brief, so I
need not address them further. “Judges are not expected to be mindreaders,” so “a litigant
has an obligation ‘to spell out [their] arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever
hold [their] peace.’” United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting
Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988)). When a plaintiff fails to
respond to a defendant’s reasoned argument on a motion to dismiss, the Court may treat
any opposition as waived and grant the motion on those grounds. See Wilson v. Dep’t of

Veterans Affs., No. 20-CV-00019, 2021 WL 1840753, at *3 (D. Me. May 7, 2021), aff’d,
No. 21-1498, 2022 WL 2135269 (1st Cir. June 14, 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1054
(2023). “And while pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard, they are not
immune from these requirements.” Watson v. Trans Union LLC, 223 F. App’x 5, 6 (1st
Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Perez v. Medeiros, No. 18-CV-10158,

3 The Court previously granted other defendants’ motions to dismiss based on these same arguments as to
the conspiracy and retaliation claim. ECF Nos. 64, 96. I then permitted Mr. Gladu to revive the claims by
amending his complaint. As explained further below, with the chance now to explain how his new
allegations support those claims, Mr. Gladu declines to do so.
2020 WL 7130020, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2020) (“The court considers the unbriefed
grounds waived.”). Accordingly, because Mr. Gladu did not oppose the motion to dismiss
Counts III, IV, V, and VII on these grounds, those claims are dismissed.
II. Qualified Immunity
As for the remaining claims—Count I (First Amendment), Count II (equal

protection), and Count VI (Maine Civil Rights Act)—Mr. Stanley argues qualified
immunity shields him from liability. Qualified immunity protects government officials
from liability when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Lopera v. Town
of Coventry, 640 F.3d 388, 396 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009)). The First Circuit follows a two-step approach to such claims: The Court
must “first ask whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right. If so, [the Court] then ask[s] whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Haley v. City of Bos., 657 F.3d
39, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (quotation modified). However, if “‘it is plain that a constitutional
right is not clearly established,’ a court may grant the requested immunity” without

addressing the first question. Id. (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237).
A prisoner’s First Amendment right to obtain publications depicting nudity is not
clearly established. To the contrary, a regulation restricting a prisoner’s access to such
materials may be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Indeed, numerous courts of appeals have held that prisons
may ban sexually explicit material. E.g., Jones v. Salt Lake Cnty., 503 F.3d 1147, 1155–56
(10th Cir. 2007); Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 214–18 (3d Cir. 1999). This Court
reached the very same conclusion in Mr. Gladu’s prior case. Gladu I, 2020 WL 6385618,
at *5. Accordingly, because Mr. Gladu’s asserted First Amendment right to possess his
materials is not clearly established, Mr. Stanley is entitled to qualified immunity on Count
I.
As for Count II, the allegations in the TAC do not make out an equal protection
claim. “Plaintiffs claiming an equal protection violation must first identify and relate

specific instances where persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated
differently, instances which have the capacity to demonstrate that plaintiffs were singled
out for unlawful oppression.” Calvary Chapel Belfast v. Univ. of Me. Sys., No. 24-CV-
00392, 2025 WL 71701, at *5 (D. Me. Jan. 10, 2025) (quotation modified).
“[D]istinguishing or mitigating circumstances . . . render the comparison inutile.” Cordi-
Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 251 (1st Cir. 2007). Though Mr. Gladu alleges he is “the
only prisoner” at MSP to be restricted from possessing materials depicting nudity, TAC
¶ 73, he has not alleged “specific instances” where other prisoners convicted of similar
crimes were treated differently than Mr. Gladu, Calvary Chapel, 2025 WL 71701, at *5.
Insofar as Mr. Gladu’s equal protection claim is of the “class of one” variety—that
is, if he argues “the government singled him out for differential treatment for reasons

unique to him, rather than because of his membership in any group,” Snyder v. Gaudet,
756 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2014)—then he must allege that there is “no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.” Id. (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000)). As described above, there may be legitimate penological rationales that form a
rational basis to restrict Mr. Gladu in particular—who is serving a sentence for various
sex crimes involving a minor, including possession of sexually explicit materials, Gladu I,
2020 WL 6385618, at *2—from now possessing sexually explicit materials in prison. See
id. at *5 (finding “the concerns of prison officials about the potential impact of the content
on the government’s rehabilitation efforts” for Mr. Gladu justified a policy barring him
from possessing materials depicting nudity); Hopkins v. Grondolsky, 759 F. Supp. 2d 97,
102 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding a prison sex-offender treatment program’s rule barring
particular inmates from possessing materials depicting nudity was reasonable). In light
of those potential rationales, it was not objectively unreasonable for Mr. Stanley to restrict

Mr. Gladu’s access to sexually explicit materials. Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150,
154 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[O]nly those officials who should have known that their conduct was
objectively unreasonable are beyond the shield of qualified immunity . . . .”). Accordingly,
Mr. Stanley is entitled to qualified immunity on Count II.
Finally, I dismiss Count VI, Mr. Gladu’s Maine Civil Rights Act claim, under the
same qualified immunity standard. Comfort v. Town of Pittsfield, 924 F. Supp. 1219, 1236
(D. Me. 1996) (“The Maine Civil Rights Act . . . employs the federal standard for qualified
immunity.”).
CONCLUSION4
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Stanley’s motion is GRANTED. ECF No. 251. The
claims against Mr. Stanley are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 26th day of August, 2025.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4 Because the foregoing analysis disposes of all Mr. Gladu’s claims against Mr. Stanley, I do not address the
parties’ other arguments.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127719. Public record. Not legal advice.