# Jacobs Engineering Group Inc v. United States

> United States Court of Federal Claims · August 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127549

## Case

- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** August 26, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** David A. Tapp
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127549

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding evidence of qualitative assessments unreasonable 14 when they are not anchored to a quantitative valuation for apportionment principles in patent law
- stating that “agencies must evaluate proposals and make awards based on the criteria stated in the solicitation”
- stating that source selection authority may consider both quantitative and qualitative factors

## Opinion text

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-2053
Filed: August 8, 2025
Reissued: August 26, 2025 †

JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Robert J. Symon, with Nathaniel J. Greeson and Owen E. Salyers, Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings LLP, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff.

Elinor J. Kim, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of
Justice, Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Yaakov M.
Roth, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C., with Joshua Fix, Major, Judge
Advocate, Trial Attorney, Contract Litigation & Intellectual Property Division, U.S. Army Legal
Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAPP, Judge.

In procurement law, as with life’s missteps, a stumble is not always a fall. Based on this
premise, establishing prejudice is essential in bid protests because even if an agency erred, a
protester must show that it mattered. In this case, Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (“Jacobs”),
challenges its exclusion from further negotiations for architect-engineer services meant to
support National Guard facilities nationwide. Jacobs argues that the agency unreasonably
evaluated its submission under multiple criteria, resulting in its non-selection despite being rated
“highly qualified.” On review, Jacobs has not demonstrated sufficient grounds to disturb the
agency’s determination. Accordingly, Jacobs’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative
Record, (Pl.’s MJAR, ECF No. 20), is DENIED. The United States’ Cross-Motion for Judgment
on the Administrative Record, (Def.’s xMJAR, ECF No. 21), is GRANTED.

†
This Opinion was originally issued under seal, (ECF No. 30), and the parties were directed to
file a notice of redactions consistent with the Court’s instructions. The Court accepts all jointly
proposed redactions, (ECF No. 32). The sealed and public versions of this Opinion differ only to
the extent of those redactions, offeror names, the publication date, and this footnote.
I. Background

The National Guard Bureau (“NGB”) issued this underlying procurement under the
Brooks Act, 40 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., see Pub. L. No. 107-217, § 1, 116 Stat. 1062 (2002). The
Brooks Act governs how the federal government procures architect-engineer (“A-E”) services,
emphasizing the importance of qualifications over cost. 40 U.S.C. § 1101. The statute requires
agencies to select firms based on demonstrated competence, technical expertise, and relevant
experience, rather than based on the lowest price. Id. The process involves first identifying the
most qualified firms and then negotiating a fair and reasonable price with the top-ranked firm. §
1103. If an agreement cannot be reached, the agency moves to the next firm in the ranking. §
1104(b). This approach is designed to ensure that critical engineering and design work is
entrusted to professionals whose expertise meets the project’s needs, rather than risking subpar
performance through low bids. See Weston Sols., Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 311, 316
(2010) (discussing regulatory framework of the Brooks Act), aff’d, 440 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir.
2011).

Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) subpart 36.6 implements the Brooks Act,
establishing the procedures for acquiring A-E services, including public announcements of
contract opportunities, evaluation of technical qualifications, and negotiation protocols. 48
C.F.R. (FAR) § 36.602-1(a) (2025). Synopses under FAR 36.6 are reserved exclusively for A-E
services—including facility design, engineering analyses, mapping, and surveying—and require
that firms be evaluated on merit before cost considerations are addressed. FAR 36.600, 36.601-4,
36.602-1. In a FAR 36.6 synopsis, firms typically respond by detailing their qualifications,
relevant experience, and professional capabilities. FAR 36.603(b). Agencies then evaluate
submissions based on criteria such as specialized experience, past performance, capacity to
perform the work, geographic location, and other project-specific factors. FAR 36.602-1(a).
Once those evaluations are complete, the agency enters price negotiations only with the most
highly qualified firms, in line with the Act’s emphasis on quality and professional integrity. See
FAR 36.605.

In this bid protest, Jacobs is an incumbent contractor on a nationwide contract under
which NGB previously obtained horizontal and vertical A-E services from 2015 to 2022. 1
(Administrative Record (“AR”) 1312). 2 On November 9, 2023, the NGB issued this Synopsis for
a $255 million, multiple-award, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (“IDIQ”) contract
covering vertical A-E services across eight geographic regions and Guam. 3 (AR 2542). The
Synopsis sought A-E investigative and design services, including construction documentation,

1
Vertical A-E services pertain to facility design, including buildings and similar structures,
whereas horizontal A-E services encompass infrastructure planning, such as roads and highways.
(AR 1312–13).
2
The Administrative Record was uploaded to Justice Enterprise File Sharing System (“JEFS”)
and the parties later submitted a Joint Appendix with cited portions of the record, (ECF No. 26).
3
Synopsis No. W9133L24R6100 (“the Synopsis”). In contrast to other FAR Parts, A-E contracts
under FAR 36.6 are solicited via a text-based synopsis rather than standard solicitation forms.

2
engineering standards, interior design, and various technical and planning studies. (AR 2545,
2547). The Synopsis indicated NGB’s intent to award up to ten IDIQ contracts, including three
awards under the unrestricted category at issue in this protest. 4 (AR 2542). Task orders were
expected to range from $100 thousand to $15 million. (AR 2542–45). The Synopsis underwent
four amendments, with the final amendment issued on December 8, 2023. (AR 2542). NGB
received fifteen proposals under the unrestricted category; eleven proposals were deemed
“highly qualified,” including Jacobs. (AR 8805).

Following the factors established in FAR Subpart 36.6, the Synopsis iterated five primary
evaluation criteria and respective sub-criteria:

Primary Criteria Sub-criteria 5
A. Professional Qualifications necessary 1) Project Manager
for satisfactory performance of required 2) Architect
services 3) Civil Engineer
(“Professional Qualifications”) 4) Structural Engineer
5) Mechanical Engineer
6) Electrical Engineer
7) Fire Protection Engineer
8) Cost Estimator 6
9) Geotechnical Engineer
10) Security/Cyber Security Specialist
11) Environmental Engineer
B. Specialized Experience and Technical 1) Design experience for aircraft maintenance
Competence in the type of work required, facilities, including plans, specifications, cost
including, as appropriate, experience in estimates, and adherence to Unified Facilities
sustainable design, energy conservation, Criteria (“UFC”) and Guide Specifications.
pollution prevention, waste reduction, 2) Design of aircraft operations facilities (e.g.,
and the use of recovered materials squadron operations, simulators, control
(“Specialized Experience and Technical towers), with full documentation and
Competence”) integration of UFC standards.
3) Development of design plans for entry control
points, ranges, and support facilities,
incorporating UFC and Guide Specifications.
4) Master planning and related government
programming and planning documents.

4
Seven awards were reserved for small businesses; “unrestricted” awards refer to awards to
companies “Other than Small Businesses.” (AR 2542–43).
5
For brevity, the listed sub-criteria are summarized from, but do not replicate verbatim, those set
forth in the Synopsis. (See AR 2545–50). Relevant sub-criteria will be quoted directly from the
applicable section of the Synopsis as needed for the analysis.
6
The evaluations indicate that NGB placed more weight on the top eight sub-criteria. (See AR
6236 (bolded)).

3
5) Preparation of design-build bridging
documents for military, government, or
commercial use.
6) Submission of five project cost estimates for
design-bid-build efforts; comparison with
awarded construction costs; explanation of cost
management practices and variances exceeding
10%.
7) Experience designing and surveying for
environmental abatement, including asbestos,
lead-based paint, and other hazardous
substances.
8) Familiarity with National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”) processes and
documentation requirements under relevant
statutes, Council on Environmental Quality
(“CEQ”) regulations, Air Force guidelines, and
environmental analysis procedures.
9) Experience applying Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) regulations, Air
Installations Compatible Use Zones
(“AICUZ”) criteria, and Unified Facilities
Criteria (“UFC”) 3-260-01 design constraints.
10) Demonstrated capability in conducting facility
condition assessments.
C. Capacity to accomplish multiple task 1) Outline the quality management plan,
orders in the required time including quality assurance tools, processes,
personnel, and relevance to team composition.
2) Summarize prior collaboration between prime
and key sub-consultants, highlighting
coordination methods.
3) Provide the firm’s current capacity to execute
multiple Air National Guard (“ANG”) and the
Army National Guard (“ARNG”) task orders
nationwide.
D. Past Performance None
E. Location in the general geographical 1) Describe the team’s familiarity with design
area of the project and knowledge of the requirements applicable to these locations.
locality of the project areas 2) Provide your method for assessing
(“Location”) environmental and regulatory factors—
including hydrology, geology, seismic risks,
climate, building codes, and industry
standards.
3) Describe measures you take to adapt standard
design details to local industry/construction
trades standard practice.

4
(See AR 2545–50). Criteria A, B, C, and E were assessed using a color-coded scale ranging from
“Unacceptable” to “Outstanding.” (AR 6239). In relevant part, the color-coding indicated:

BLUE (Outstanding) – . . . Proposal meets requirements and indicates an
exceptional approach and understanding of the requirements and contains
multiple strengths, and the risk of unsuccessful performance is low.

PURPLE (Good) – . . . Proposal indicates a thorough approach and
understanding of the requirements and contains at least one strength, and the
risk of unsuccessful performance is low to moderate.

(Id.). 7 Criteria D, Past Performance, was evaluated on relevance and confidence. (AR 6240).
Each offeror received a rating of “Very Relevant,” meaning that “[p]resent/past performance
effort involved essentially the same scope and magnitude of effort and complexities this
solicitation requires[,]” and “Satisfactory Confidence,” meaning that “based on the offeror’s
recent/relevant performance record, the Government has a reasonable expectation that the offeror
will successfully perform the required effort.” (Id.).

Criteria were ranked by importance, along with their respective sub-criteria. (AR 2549).
Evaluation was intended to be conducted in two phases with two boards—the Pre-Selection
Board and the Final Selection Board. (AR 6237); see FAR 36.602-2. In the first phase, the Pre-
Selection Board relied on individual Pre-Selection Worksheets as working documents in the
development and finalization of the Pre-Selection Report. (AR 9730–31). In the second phase,
the Final Selection Board engaged in discussions and drafted the Final Selection Report, which
included proposal rankings and detailed ratings per the criterion. (AR 9731). The Final Selection
Report sets forth the Final Selection Board’s ultimate ratings and recommendations, including
each offeror’s overall ranking, detailed ratings under each primary evaluation criterion, and a
corresponding summary of the rationale for those ratings. (AR 9731; see AR 6317–19)

For the Final Selection Report, the Final Selection Board also compiled a table presenting
the adjectival ratings assigned to each offeror and ranked the eleven most qualified firms. (AR
6236, 6238). The concluding section summarized the rankings and highlighted the “Outstanding”
ratings and notable strengths of the top three most highly qualified offerors. (AR 6380–81).
Below is a breakdown of the top five rankings and their respective scores 8:

7
Because the top five offerors did not receive a rating lower than Purple (Good), the Court will
not discuss the remainder of the scale.
8
Information in this chart was compiled from the Selection Authority’s “Unrestricted Final
Selection Report for Vertical Multiple Region National Guard IDIQ for A-E Services” located at
Tab 114 of the Administrative Record. The offerors are listed in order of ranking. Although the
Synopsis includes Criteria F as a tie-breaking mechanism, there is no indication it was invoked;
accordingly, it is not reflected in the chart.

5
(1) Offeror (2) Offeror (3) Offeror (4) Offeror (5) Jacobs
#1 #2 #3 #4
A. Professional Blue Blue Purple Purple Purple
Qualifications (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Good) (Good) (Good)

B. Specialized Blue Blue Blue Blue Blue
Experience and (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding)
Technical
Competence

C. Capacity to Purple Purple Blue Blue Blue
accomplish (Good) (Good) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding)
multiple task
orders in the
required time

D. Past Very Relevant Very Relevant Very Relevant Very Relevant Very Relevant
Performance
Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory
Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence Confidence
E. Location Blue Blue Blue Blue Purple
(Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Outstanding) (Good)

(See AR Tab 114). As Jacobs was not among the top three offerors, NGB notified Jacobs on
August 7, 2024, that it was not selected for further negotiations. (AR 6391).

Jacobs filed an initial protest with the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) the
following week, contesting each rating it received below the highest level. (AR 8234–68). On
November 26, 2024, GAO denied all but one of Jacobs’s protest grounds and found no
competitive prejudice. (AR 10116–38). Specifically, GAO concluded that even with an
“Outstanding” rating under Criterion E, Jacobs would not surpass Offeror #3 in overall
qualification. (AR 10121–25). This protest followed. (Compl., ECF No. 1).

II. Analysis

Jacobs maintains that the Administrative Record reveals a range of shortcomings in
NGB’s evaluation process. According to Jacobs, NGB overlooked the importance of prioritizing
disciplines under Criterion A, failed to conduct a substantive assessment of that criterion, and
introduced unspoken factors into the evaluation. (Pl.’s MJAR at 1). Jacobs views the evaluation
of its proposal under Criterion A as inconsistent, unreasonable, and disparate. (Id.). Jacobs also
challenges the fairness of how its proposal was assessed under Criteria D and E. (Id.).
Furthermore, Jacobs argues that NGB did not follow the Synopsis requirements when ranking
offerors and that Jacobs was improperly placed as only the fifth most qualified candidate. (Id.).
The United States counters that Jacobs’s argument merely attempts to supplant the agency’s
discretion in distinguishing between “Good” and “Outstanding” ratings with its own subjective
views. (Def.’s xMJAR at 3). The Court agrees with the United States and concludes that Jacobs
has failed to carry its burden to disturb NGB’s decision.

6
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The Tucker Act provides that an interested party may file an action in the Court of
Federal Claims “objecting [(1)] to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a
proposed contract or [(2)] to a proposed award or [(3)] the award of a contract or [(4)] any
alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed
procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); see Aero Spray, Inc. v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl. 548,
559 n.18 (2021). 9 According to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4), the Court typically reviews agency
procurement decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under
the APA standard, “[i]n a bid protest case, the inquiry is whether the agency’s action was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law and, if so,
whether the error is prejudicial.” Glenn Def. Marine (ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d
901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Judicial review of agency action under the APA typically proceeds on two tracks; the
Court could find: (1) the agency’s decision lacked either a rational basis or support from the
administrative record or was arbitrary and capricious; and/or (2) the agency’s procurement
procedure involved a violation of regulation or statute. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575
F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To obtain relief, after showing that the procuring agency
violated the law or acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the protester must also show that the
agency’s violation was prejudicial. Glenn Def. Marine (ASIA), 720 F.3d at 907. This standard is
“highly deferential.” CHE Consulting, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2008). “Under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard[,] the scope of review is a narrow one. A
reviewing court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment[.]” Bowman Transp., Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974) (internal quotations omitted). The
Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Id. But the agency must
articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Even so, a “protestor’s burden is
particularly great in negotiated procurements because the contracting officer is entrusted with a
relatively high degree of discretion[.]” Banknote Corp. of Am., v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 377,
380 (2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

When reviewing an agency’s procurement decisions, the Court is expected to apply a
“presumption of regularity” and avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the agency. See
Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2018); R & W Flammann
GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Additionally, “[i]f the court finds a
reasonable basis for the agency’s action, the court should stay its hand even though it might, as
an original proposition, have reached a different conclusion as to the proper administration and
application of the procurement regulations.” Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).

9
Standing is an integral part of jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
It is not contested in this case. Because of this, and because Jacobs is an incumbent A-E awardee,
the Court finds that Jacobs has standing for purposes of this protest.
7
officer and board chair to justify Jacobs’s “Good” rating under Criterion A. 12 (Id. at 17). The
contracting officer explained that each discipline was assessed based on qualifications rather than
individual résumés, and while Jacobs’s proposal exceeded requirements, it did not do so
significantly. (Id. (citing AR 8808–09)). As the United States characterizes it, the board chair
added that the rating was not determined by tallying scores, noting Jacobs received seven
“Good” and four “Outstanding” sub-criteria ratings, emphasizing that no discipline dominated in
importance and the mixed results did not support an upgrade to “Outstanding.” (Id. (citing AR
8816)).

Ultimately, the Court disagrees with Jacobs’s proposition that a proper sequencing of
disciplines by NGB, in accordance with the stated prioritization, would have warranted an
“Outstanding” rating under Criterion A. While the Synopsis indicated that disciplines were listed
by relative importance with a focus on the top eight disciplines, it did not provide a specific
weighting scheme. (See AR 2547). In such cases, the Court affords deference to the agency’s
interpretation and evaluative methodology, particularly where the procurement’s framework
lacks prescribed metrics. CHE Consulting, 552 F.3d at 1354. Consequently, the argument that
Jacobs would have received a higher rating had NGB assigned concrete weight to the sub-criteria
is speculative and unsupported by the record.

The Court therefore relies on the evaluation criteria NGB employed. According to the
Synopsis, Criterion A was evaluated as follows:

Evaluation of each discipline will consider education, registration,
demonstrated experience, certifications, and longevity with the firm.
Evaluation will be based on an assessment by the board of the firm’s ability
to effectively address the professional qualifications as described above. A
firm that provides resumes for key personnel with greater levels of discipline
specific education, experience, and certifications as well as longevity with
the firm will be considered more highly qualified than one that provides less
qualified personnel, with less discipline specific education and experience as
well as a shorter duration with the firm. Professional disciplines are listed in
priority order based on anticipated workload and benefit to project success.

12
These documents are part of the Administrative Record based on the record before the GAO.
(AR 10130 (citing AR 8810, AR 8816–19)). Except in limited circumstances, courts generally
deem post hoc declarations inadmissible when evaluating claims based solely on the
administrative record. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S.
Ct. 1891, 1908–09 (2020) (directing that “judicial review of agency action is limited to the
grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action” and concluding that “[a]n agency must
defend its actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted,” while post hoc rationalizations for
agency action are “impermissible” (internal quotations omitted)); see Superior Waste Mgmt. LLC
v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 239, 277 (2024). As the Court determines that the record supports a
reasonable inference regarding Jacobs’s rating under this criterion, it finds no need to consider
the submitted declarations.
13
(AR 2547). The information relayed in the chart above evinces that the Final Selection Board
took each of the relevant factors into account when assigning an adjectival rating. (AR 6317–19).
The details NGB lists for each rating consider each proposed individual’s level of education,
certifications, tenure at the firm, and project experience. This is exactly what the Synopsis
dictates.

However, Jacobs also takes issue with the methodology underlying these calculations,
referring to it as a “mechanical tabulation” not warranted by the Synopsis. (Pl.’s MJAR at 8). A
harsh truth of government procurements is that numerical factors inevitably play a role due to the
structured nature of evaluation protocols. While the evaluation may have employed a numerical
scoring methodology when determining adjectival ratings, such an approach does not contravene
the terms of the Synopsis. Although Jacobs may view this methodology as being mechanically
tabulated, the Synopsis expressly provides that qualifications will be assessed and weighted
according to discipline-specific factors and prioritized by anticipated workload and project
relevance. Thus, the evaluator’s assigned scores based on personnel résumés was consistent with
the Synopsis’s stated criteria and further demonstrates that the evaluation process reflected the
required considerations. Accordingly, even if the scores were “mechanically applied,” the
resulting scores are consistent with the Synopsis and demonstrate that NGB considered the
appropriate factors in its assessment.

ii. Failure to Make Qualitative Analysis

A recurring theme in Jacobs’s briefing, like its objection to NGB’s tabulation method, is
that NGB evaluators employed a mechanical rating approach without conducting the required
qualitative assessment. (Pl.’s MJAR at 10). In other words, Jacobs contends that NGB’s
methodology treated offerors as figures on a score sheet, rather than as professional entities with
distinct capabilities. In support of this argument, Jacobs points to the Evaluation Summary Table,
which it claims reflects a superficial emphasis on the numerical distribution of ratings,
particularly in the top eight disciplines designated as priority areas. (Id. (citing AR 6236)).
According to Jacobs, the discipline-level assessments consist primarily of checkbox-style lists
describing résumé attributes and do not document comparative or qualitative discussion of the
résumés’ relative strength or merit. (Id. (citing AR 6317–20; 6254–56; 6241–43; 6329–30)).
Jacobs argues that the lack of deeper reasoning reflects a departure from the criteria prescribed in
the Synopsis and materially undermines Jacobs’s rating and competitiveness. (Id.). This
argument gives short shrift to the agency’s evaluation; Jacobs’s characterization of NGB’s
analysis as solely quantitative fails to account for the qualitative assessment it also generated.

In government contracting, qualitative and quantitative analyses represent two
complementary methods for evaluating the merits of proposals. See Myriddian, LLC v. United
States, 168 Fed. Cl. 353, 359 (2023) (discussing significance of source selection authority’s
comparison of qualitative and quantitative assessments). That said, the methodologies tend to
overlap in practice to provide a holistic picture of a proposal’s merits. The interplay between
qualitative and quantitative factors is inherent in all rating and balancing assessments, with each
informing and reinforcing the other. See e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Unisys Corp., 98 F.3d 1325, 1327–28
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that source selection authority may consider both quantitative and
qualitative factors); Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809
F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding evidence of qualitative assessments unreasonable

14
when they are not anchored to a quantitative valuation for apportionment principles in patent
law); Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1278, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussion
of quantitative ratios being used as part of overall qualitative analysis in a non-contracting
context). Stated differently, numbers give shape to a narrative, while the narrative gives meaning
to the numbers. For instance, an evaluator might assess the adequacy of a project schedule
qualitatively, but that assessment is grounded in the measurable duration of tasks or resource
allocation. Similarly, and relevant here, the strength of proposed personnel may be judged based
on degrees held, years of experience, or specific certifications. These aspects are clearly
quantitative in nature but ultimately inform a qualitative assessment.

It must be true that, to be effective, evaluations should rely on the relationship between
quantitative and qualitative assessments to ensure that decisions are rational and balance data-
driven objectivity with informed professional judgment. See AcmeSolv, LLC v. United States,
174 Fed. Cl. 748, 756 (2025) (finding that quantitative analysis informed overall confidence
rating). In this case, the record reflects that the NGB’s evaluators reviewed proposed personnel
credentials using a structured framework that included both quantitative benchmarks and
discipline-specific assessments. (See AR Tab 114). Although the Evaluation Summary Table
organized adjectival ratings by discipline and priority level, that format does not, on its own,
establish that the evaluators failed to conduct the substantive analysis required under the
Synopsis. The record contains narrative annotations and résumé-specific evaluations addressing
qualifications cited in the Synopsis, including education, experience, certifications, and tenure.
Although concise, the assessments do not constitute procedural error. (AR 9957–10101).

FAR Subpart 36.6 allows for professional judgment without exhaustive justification,
provided the methodology remains transparent and internally consistent. That Jacobs disagrees
with the depth of analysis NGB implemented does not engage with this Court’s standard of
review. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, challenges to the technical scoring involve the
“minutiae of the procurement process,” “discretionary determinations of procurement officials
that a court will not second guess.” COMINT Sys. Corp. v. United States, 700 F.3d 1377, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 77 F.3d 445,
449 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)). Agencies “are entrusted with a good deal of discretion
in determining which bid is the most advantageous to the Government.” Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co. v. Bentsen, 4 F.3d 955, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Tidewater Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v.
United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 69, 83, 573 F.2d 65 (1978)). Accordingly, the Court concludes that
NGB’s approach to evaluating Criterion A was consistent with the Synopsis, compliant with
FAR 36.602-3, and within the bounds of reasonable discretion. Jacobs has not demonstrated that
the evaluation was arbitrary, capricious, or procedurally defective.

iii. Evaluation of Criterion B Participation by Criterion A Disciplines

Jacobs contends that NGB’s evaluation under Criterion A was procedurally flawed and
inconsistent with the express terms of the Synopsis. (Pl.’s MJAR at 10). Contrary to the
Synopsis, Jacobs argues that NGB improperly focused on the number of projects associated with
each labor discipline, referencing information submitted under Primary Criterion B. (Pl.’s MJAR
at 10–12 (citing AR 6240–42; 6241–43; 6254–56; 6329–30)). Criterion B was specific to
“Specialized Experience and Technical Competence in the type of work required, including, as
appropriate, experience in sustainable design, energy conservation, pollution prevention, waste

15
reduction, and the use of recovered materials[.]” (AR 2547). As Jacobs sees it, this cross-
criterion analysis constitutes the application of unstated evaluation criteria because the Synopsis
did not require that personnel have experience with specific projects, nor did it indicate that such
experience would be weighted more favorably. (Id. at 11). The United States contends that
Jacobs’s allegation is unsupported by the record. (Def.’s xMJAR at 18). Citing the previous
GAO decision, it argues that NGB’s correlation of personnel between Criteria A and B did not
affect the rating assigned under Criterion A. (Id. (citing AR 10130–31)). The Court agrees that
Jacobs’s argument is without merit.

It is well established that an agency cannot evaluate proposals on unstated criteria. See
Banknote, 56 Fed. Cl. at 386 (stating that “agencies must evaluate proposals and make awards
based on the criteria stated in the solicitation”). To prevail on a claim that an agency improperly
utilized unstated evaluation criteria, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) “the procuring agency
used a significantly different basis in evaluating the proposals than was disclosed;” and (2) “the
protester was prejudiced as a result—that it had a substantial chance to receive the contract
award but for that error.” NEQ, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 38, 48 (2009) (quoting
Banknote, 56 Fed. Cl. at 387). Jacobs fails on both elements.

First, Jacobs suggests a significant reliance on the correlation of projects submitted under
Criterion B. The relationship between Criteria A and B is mentioned for some individual
disciplines, but it is not stated as a basis for a rating. However, even if NGB did cross-reference
Criterion A personnel with Criterion B projects, the Court finds that it would not matter and
could not cause prejudicial error. Courts have found that while agencies may not consider
unstated criteria per se, “a solicitation need not identify criteria intrinsic to the stated evaluation
factors, and agencies retain great discretion in determining the scope of a given evaluation
factor.” Summit Techs., LLC v. United States, 151 Fed. Cl. 171, 180 (2020) (quoting
PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 520, 536 (2010)); see Sys. Implementers, Inc. v.
United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 754, 769 (2022). It is nonsensical, and there is no case law to support
the proposition, that agencies cannot account for the interaction of factors across a solicitation.
The Synopsis required that ratings of “Good” and “Outstanding” reflect proposals that exceeded
qualification requirements, emphasizing discipline-specific education, experience, certifications,
and longevity with the firm. (AR 2547, 2551). The Synopsis specifies that experience is
considered, though it does not detail to what capacity. Because Criterion B relates to experience,
it cannot be said that NGB relied on unstated criteria when considering relevance to Criterion A.

iv. Internal Consistency

Jacobs also argues that if Criterion B was properly considered, it renders NGB’s Criterion
A evaluation internally inconsistent. (Pl.’s MJAR at 12–24). Jacobs first supports this argument
iterating that it received an “Outstanding” rating under Criterion B for its proposed projects,
therefore it should have also received an “Outstanding” rating on Criterion A due to employing
personnel involved with Criterion B projects. (Id. (citing AR 6319; AR 6237–82)). The Court is
not convinced. This argument fails to consider extraneous factors such as the personnel’s level of
involvement in the prior project, the overall success of the project, and other external factors that
may affect how experience is considered when assessing a rating. The Court interprets Jacobs’s
argument as a disagreement with NGB’s evaluation process—the minutiae of procurement. The
Court will not intervene in such matters unless there is evidence that NGB’s actions were

16
arbitrary or capricious. Mortg. Contracting Servs. v. United States, 153 Fed. Cl. 89, 126 (2021)
(“The court must especially defer to the agency’s technical evaluations, past performance
ratings, and other minutiae of the procurement process . . . which involve discretionary
determinations of procurement officials.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

This Court consistently recognizes that contracting officers enjoy “broad discretion with
respect to evaluation of technical proposals[,]” and the Court typically does not “second guess
the technical ratings that the source selection committee gave to each offeror.” Info. Scis. Corp.
v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 70, 104 (2006) (quoting Omega World Travel, Inc. v. United States,
54 Fed. Cl. 570, 578 (2002)). Even so, the Court has cautioned that “unsuccessful offerors
repeatedly ignore this.” AccelGov, LLC v. United States, 170 Fed. Cl. 508, 518 (2024). “The goal
of bid protests is to ensure fairness and transparency in the procurement process, not to provide a
forum for bidders to challenge every minor disagreement with an agency’s evaluation.” Warrior
Focused Sols., LLC v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 416, 427 (2025). These restrictions enhance
efficiency while ensuring a clear separation between the judiciary and routine government
contracting oversight. As a result, agencies maintain broad discretion in defining the scope of an
evaluation factor. See Summit Techs., 151 Fed. Cl. at 180; PlanetSpace, 92 Fed. Cl. at 536. As
the disappointed offeror, Jacobs bears the heavy burden of showing that NGB’s evaluation
lacked a rational basis. See Galen Med. Assocs., 369 F.3d at 1330 (addressing burden of proof in
negotiated procurements). “[T]he test for reviewing courts is to determine whether the
contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, .
. . and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no
rational basis.” Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324,
1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although Jacobs
broadly invites the Court to improperly second-guess NGB’s evaluation, the Court declines to do
so. Nevertheless, it analyzes Jacobs’s arguments solely to assess whether the decisions were
reasonable.

Jacobs’s more specific arguments relate to positions ultimately evaluated as “Good” but
were overshadowed and filled with personnel that had prior experience with Criterion B
projects—its Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, and Geotechnical engineers as well as its Fire
Protection of Engineer and Security/Cyber Security Specialist. (Pl.’s MJAR at 14). Each of these
personnel were in the top eight positions that NGB deemed to be “heavy hitters,” so to speak.
According to the protest, Jacobs’s personnel possessed superior discipline-specific education,
experience, certifications, and tenure with the firm, yet received “Good” ratings while other
offerors with comparable or lesser qualifications were rated “Outstanding.” (Id. at 15–17).
Jacobs contends that NGP failed to adequately document or properly assess whether Jacobs’s
proposed personnel exceeded the required qualifications, instead relying on superficial
summaries. (Id. at 16). For Jacobs, this alleged failure resulted in unfair and disparate treatment
across several disciplines and violated the terms of the Synopsis. (Id.).

As to its proposed civil engineers, Jacobs believes NGB failed to properly evaluate them
by disregarding the extent to which their qualifications exceeded the Synopsis’s criteria. (Pl.’s
MJAR at 16). Despite Jacobs’s team demonstrating substantial experience, it believes that NGB
rated them “Good” without adequately weighing these strengths. (Id.). In contrast, Offeror #1’s
Civil Engineers, possessing nearly identical qualifications and slightly more firm tenure, were
rated “Outstanding,” suggesting disparate treatment. (Id. at 17 (citing AR 6318, 6236, 8816–17)).

17
The Court finds this unavailing because, although the proposed engineers demonstrated
substantial experience and firm tenure, NGB concluded that their education and
registrations/certifications merely satisfied—but did not notably surpass—the requirements set
forth in the Synopsis. This is squarely within their discretion. See Info. Scis. Corp., 73 Fed. Cl. at
104. Additionally, the United States notes that Jacobs’s claim that Offeror #1 received an
“Outstanding” rating is incorrect; Offeror #1’s Civil Engineers were also rated “Good.” (Def.’s
xMJAR at 20 (citing AR 6318, 6254–55)). Accordingly, Jacobs’s disparate treatment argument
fails.

Jacobs contends that its proposed Mechanical Engineers significantly exceeded the
Synopsis requirements, with thirty-eight and eighteen years of experience, including over fifteen
years at the firm and several years of NGB-specific work. (Pl.’s MJAR at 18 (citing AR 4132,
4149–50, 2546)). Jacobs argues these qualifications warranted a higher rating and that NGB’s
failure to holistically evaluate these strengths was inconsistent with the Synopsis’s stated criteria.
However, as the United States points out, Jacobs only focuses on levels of experience and
longevity with the firm but fails to account for levels of discipline-specific education,
registrations, and certifications sufficient to receive an “Outstanding” rating. (Def.’s xMJAR at
20; see AR 6318, 6236, 8817).

Jacobs goes on to argue that NGB failed to properly evaluate its proposed Electrical
Engineers by disregarding extensive qualifications, including a combined sixty-three years of
experience, over fifteen years with the firm, substantial NGB-specific experience, and LEED
certification. (Pl.’s MJAR at 19 (citing AR 4132, 4151–52, 8817)). As Jacobs puts it, NGB
focused narrowly on education and failed to assess supplemental factors. (Id.). Jacobs contends
that such an evaluation was disparate, as Offeror #2’s Electrical Engineers were rated
“Outstanding” with fewer years of experience and less tenure while Jacobs’s personnel were
rated “Good.” (Id. at 19–20 (citing AR 2819–22, 6242, 6318)). Again, there is nothing in the
record that supports this theory. As the United States notes, educational qualifications
contributed to Offeror #2’s higher rating, as one of its proposed Electrical Engineers held a
master’s degree, whereas Jacobs’s proposed engineers held only bachelor’s degrees. (Def.’s
xMJAR at 21 (citing AR 6242, 6318, 8817)). Educational qualifications significantly influence
outcomes in the procurement process. Accordingly, Jacobs has not shown that these ratings were
unreasonable.

As to Jacobs’s Fire Protection Engineers, Jacobs insists that the evaluation did not show
how Jacobs’s team exceeded the Synopsis’s five-year relevant experience requirement, nor did it
address the significance of their tenure or certifications, despite their qualifications. (Pl.’s MJAR
at 20). However, agencies are not obligated to explain unless the presumption of regularity is
challenged by evidence indicating the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Impresa
Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1338. The record reflects that Jacobs’s Fire Protection Engineers were
acknowledged for their experience, firm tenure, and certifications. (AR 6318, 6236, 8818).
However, NGB determined these qualifications did not justify an “Outstanding” rating, as the
collective résumés failed to exceed the standards for discipline-specific education or
certification. Without additional evidence, it cannot be said that this finding was not arbitrary or
capricious.

18
Jacobs characterizes NGB’s evaluation of its proposed Geotechnical Engineer as arbitrary
and based on undefined, post-hoc criteria. (Pl.’s MJAR at 20–23). According to Jacobs, NGB
improperly invoked an “industry standard” not included in the Synopsis, which only required
professional registration. (Id. at 21). Jacobs argues NGB failed to support this standard with
objective references and instead relied on vague, informal interpretations. (Id.). Jacobs maintains
that its candidate—who holds multiple registrations, specialized software training, a master’s
degree in Geotechnical Engineering, and twenty-eight years of experience—exceeded the
Synopsis requirements. (Id.). Nevertheless, Jacobs asserts NGB rated its engineer as merely
“Good” while awarding an “Outstanding” rating to a similarly qualified competitor. (Id. at 22).
Further, Jacobs argues its Environmental Engineer was rated lower than an equally qualified
candidate from Offeror #1, despite similar experience, education, and certifications. (Id. at 24).

Jacobs’s disparate treatment claims concerning its Geotechnical and Environmental
Engineer proposals do not meet the threshold of substantial indistinguishability required to
support such claims. It is not unreasonable for agencies to evaluate differing proposals
differently. Allicent Tech., LLC v. United States, 166 Fed. Cl. 77, 110 (2023); Off. Design Grp. v.
United States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Jacobs contends that its Geotechnical
Engineer’s qualifications were comparable to Offeror #1’s, yet the record shows the latter held
professional registrations in twice as many states, which would be desirable in a multi-region
contract. (AR 3043, 4156). NGB reasonably concluded this distinction warranted differing
ratings. (See AR 8108). Per E.W. Bliss, such discretionary judgments are not for courts to
second-guess. 77 F.3d at 449. Likewise, for the Environmental Engineer discipline, Jacobs’s
candidate held limited certifications compared to Offeror #1’s proposed candidate, whose team
included an Industrial Hygienist certified in four states. (AR 3045, 4159). The Court finds that
the record supports NGB’s rating decision, and that Jacobs fails to show the proposals were
substantially indistinguishable. (AR 8819–20).

Finally, Jacobs contends that its Security/Cyber Security Specialist was underrated
despite exceeding Synopsis requirements, citing seventeen years of experience, advanced
certifications, and a relevant degree. (Pl.’s MJAR at 23 (citing AR 4133, 4157)). Jacobs argues
NGB overlooked key qualifications, focusing narrowly on education and firm tenure, which it
claims violates the Synopsis’s evaluation criteria. (Id.). This challenge does not render the
agency’s assessment unreasonable. The Court agrees with the United States; “[t]he record
supports the NGB’s estimation that the education level and longevity with the firm for this
discipline on balance with the other three factors (demonstrated experience, registration, and
certifications) did not merit rating Jacobs an overall [O]utstanding . . . rating.” (Def.’s xMJAR at
21 (citing AR 6318–19, 6236, 8818–19)).

The Synopsis was clear that each of the personnel were required to have “a bachelor’s
degree, professional registration in the role they are assigned in, and at least five years of
relevant experience in the role they are assigned in [and] [e]valuation of each discipline will
consider education, registration, demonstrated experience, certifications, and longevity with the
firm.” (AR 2547). Furthermore, “key personnel with greater levels of discipline specific
education, experience, and certifications as well as longevity with the firm will be considered
more highly qualified than one that provides less qualified personnel.” (Id.). The Court finds that

19
NGB’s evaluation of these seven disciplines was reasonable, consistent with the Synopsis, and
supported by the Administrative Record.

As its final, wide-ranging shot at Criterion A, Jacobs contends that NGB’s evaluation was
internally inconsistent and arbitrarily applied across disciplines. (Pl.’s MJAR at 24–25). Despite
the Synopsis requiring evaluators to consider discipline-specific qualifications such as education,
experience, certifications, and longevity, Jacobs asserts that personnel with comparable or
superior credentials were rated “Good” while others with lesser qualifications received
“Outstanding” ratings. (Id. at 24). Jacobs states that several “Good”-rated individuals
demonstrated well beyond the minimum required experience—ranging from twenty to over
forty-five years—while an “Outstanding”-rated Cost Estimator had seventeen years of
experience. (Id. (citing AR 6236)). Similarly, disciplines with master’s degrees were rated
“Good,” while Project Managers with bachelor’s degrees received “Outstanding” ratings. (Id.).
Jacobs argues this inconsistency undermines the objectivity of NGB’s evaluation and results in a
disparate assignment of strengths. (Id. at 24–25). However, NGB was not required to do a side-
by-side comparison for the résumés and each of the cited instances have other differences within
experience, certification, etc. Individual assessments must account for the entirety of a person’s
qualifications and characteristics, which naturally results in varied evaluations. Jacobs has not
carried its burden to show that NGB arbitrarily or capriciously evaluated Criterion A.

C. Criterion D | Past Performance

Next, Jacobs argues that NGB’s assignment of weaknesses under Primary Criterion D
was unreasonable and contrary to the Synopsis’s requirement that only credible, documented,
and recent past performance information be considered. (Pl.’s MJAR 25–28 (citing AR 2549)).
Specifically, Jacobs challenges NGB’s reliance on three “Marginal” Contractor Performance
Assessment Reporting System (“CPARS”) ratings—each reflecting either temporal staleness or
resolved deficiencies. 13 (Id. at 25). The United States contends that the three marginal ratings in
question had no impact on Jacobs’s evaluation; NGB excluded them, resulting in a “Satisfactory
Confidence” rating based on stronger performance across other projects. (Def.’s xMJAR at 23).
It further argues that since all top offerors received the same rating under a less significant
criterion, Jacobs cannot show competitive prejudice. (Id.). The United States is correct; Jacobs’s
Criterion D challenge fails because the NGB excluded the marginal ratings and applied a
consistent confidence assessment across top offerors.

The Synopsis required offerors to submit past performance information, including
reference contact details; it permitted the inclusion of supplemental materials such as client
commendations, descriptions of prior issues, and corrective actions taken in response to any
unfavorable CPARS evaluations. (AR 2549). In return, the evaluation board would assess
offerors’ past performance—drawing from CPARS and other sources—based on quality, cost
control, and timeliness, with consideration limited to credible, recent, and relevant information,

13
CPARS refers to a web-based platform used to collect, evaluate, and manage contractor
performance data for government contracts and agreements. Contractor Performance Assessment
Reporting System, https://www.cpars.gov/cparsweb/home [https://perma.cc/B3R5-E57Z] (last
visited July 20, 2025).

20
while neutral treatment would apply to offerors lacking such data. (Id.). The Synopsis
specifically states that “[c]redible, documented information on past performance will be
considered, except for adverse performance information to which the firm has not had an
opportunity to respond.” (Id.).

In evaluating Criterion D, Jacobs contends that NGB’s reliance on three isolated
“Marginal” CPARS ratings was procedurally flawed in light of the Synopsis’s directive to rely
on recent and credible past performance data. 14 (Pl.’s MJAR at 25). Jacobs emphasizes that each
of the cited ratings was either stale or superseded, including one that was approximately six years
old, another from five years prior, and a third that had since been upgraded to “Very Good.” (Id.
at 26–27). Further, Jacobs contends that these CPARS ratings represented only a fraction of the
1,199 evaluation factors available, while Jacobs consistently received “Very Good” or
“Exceptional” ratings in more than half of the total record. (Id. at 27). In Jacobs’s view,
assigning a lower confidence rating based on such outliers ignores its long-standing pattern of
successful performance and imposes an unwarranted penalty. (Id.).

The United States responds that Jacobs’s objections were previously rejected at the GAO
and that this Court should follow suit. (Def.’s xMJAR at 23 (citing AR 10134, 6327)). The
United States further contends that the three identified ratings were not negatively weighted in
NGB’s evaluation, as shown by the Final Selection Report’s deliberate exclusion of those ratings
from consideration. (Id. at 24). Moreover, the United States asserts that the bulk of Jacobs’s
performance ratings were satisfactory or better, and when combined with the ten projects
submitted in its proposal, NGB reasonably assigned a “Satisfactory Confidence” rating based on
the aggregate data. (Id.).

As an initial point, the Court owes no deference to GAO determinations and affords it
none here. See Assessment & Training Sols. Consulting Corp. v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 123,
127 (2024) (“The GAO’s earlier decision in this procurement is not binding on this Court.”);
Scott Techs., Inc. v. United States, 168 Fed. Cl. 705, 714 n.5 (2023) (“The Court is not bound by
GAO decisions, and it follows that the parties are not bound to arguments advanced before the
GAO either.”); VS2, LLC v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 738, 766 (2021) (“Federal Circuit
precedent does not require that this Court simply defer to GAO’s decision . . . or the Agency’s
reliance upon it.”). Based on the record before it, the Court finds in favor of the United States.
The evaluation confirms that the three “Marginal” ratings were not adversely weighted in the
evaluative process. The evaluation board compiled the Criterion D ratings in the following chart:

14
The first rating, associated with the , is nearly six years old and
represents the only “Marginal” Cost Control rating among 288 reviewed contracts. (AR 6327,
6362). Similarly, the second “Marginal” rating, from the , is five
years old and the sole “Marginal” Management rating in the dataset. (AR 6326, 6327). The third
rating, from the , was issued during an interim evaluation
but later upgraded to “Very Good” in subsequent reporting. (AR 6326).

21
(AR 6327). The Final Selection Report and associated documentation reflect that NGB
deliberately determined to exclude those ratings from consideration and instead relied on a
broader record—including 288 CPARS entries and ten proposal projects—to assign a
“Satisfactory Confidence” to Jacobs. (Id.). This approach aligns with the Synopsis’s directive to
consider credible and recent performance data and reflects a reasoned judgment within the
agency’s discretion. (See AR 2549). Given this, the Court concludes that NGB’s evaluation
methodology was procedurally sound, not arbitrary or capricious, and consistent with applicable
procurement regulations.

D. Criterion E | Location

Jacobs argues that NGB improperly rated its proposal under Criterion E by ignoring the
ranked importance of sub-criteria. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28–29). Despite receiving top ratings on the
most critical elements, its overall score was lowered, allegedly distorting the evaluation
framework and harming its competitive standing. (Id. at 28). The United States counters that the
Board used a qualitative, holistic review—not weighted averages—and that Jacobs suffered no
prejudice even if a rating error occurred. (Def.’s xMJAR at 25–26). The Court agrees that even if
NGB incorrectly evaluated Criterion E, it would have resulted in a race for fourth place. Because
there were only three crowns, Jacobs was not competitively prejudiced by the evaluation
outcome.

All contract work was to be performed across the lower forty-eight states, the District of
Columbia, and the Territory of Guam. (AR 2549–50). Offerors were meant to describe and
demonstrate the team’s familiarity with design requirements applicable to these locations. (AR
2549). The three sub-criteria included:

22
(1) In SF330 Part I, Section H, describe and demonstrate the team’s
familiarity with design requirements applicable to these locations.

(2) Submit information addressing your methodology for obtaining
knowledge of hydrology, soil conditions, seismic conditions, weather
conditions, state/local building codes, and construction industry standards.

(3) Describe measures you take to adapt standard design details to local
industry/construction trades standard practice.

(AR 2550). Evaluation would focus on how effectively the firm and its key sub-consultants
demonstrate knowledge of locality; those who did so more convincingly would be rated more
highly. (Id.).

Jacobs contends that NGB failed to reasonably evaluate its submission under Primary
Criterion E by disregarding the prioritized structure of the sub-criteria. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28).
According to Jacobs, its proposal received “Outstanding” ratings for the top two most heavily
weighted sub-criteria, and only a “Good” rating for the least important third sub-criterion. (Id.
(citing AR 6236)). Yet, NGB assigned Jacobs an overall rating of “Good” for Criterion E
without accounting for the relative significance of each component. (See AR 6236). Jacobs
maintains that this approach undermines the evaluative framework outlined in the Synopsis,
which expressly ranked sub-criteria in descending order of importance. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28). The
procedural error, Jacobs argues, led to an inaccurate overall rating and unfairly diminished the
qualitative strengths of its proposal, which prejudiced its standing in a highly competitive field.
(Id. at 29).

The United States responds that Jacobs’s position mischaracterizes the evaluation
methodology employed by the Final Selection Board. (Def.’s xMJAR at 25). While the sub-
criteria were considered in assigning ratings, the United States argues that the Board did not
apply a mathematical weighting or averaging scheme. (Id.). The government also purports that,
even if NGB erred in assigning a lower rating, Jacobs suffered no competitive prejudice. (Id. at
26 (citing AR 10123–24)).

Notably, Jacobs won this battle at GAO but ultimately lost the war. GAO found that
NGB did not evaluate Criterion E in accordance with the priority assigned in the Synopsis. (AR
10122). Despite this error, GAO concluded that Jacobs suffered no competitive prejudice, citing
NGB’s assertion that an improved adjectival rating under Criterion E would not have altered
Jacobs’s overall ranking. (AR 10124). Jacobs disputes GAO’s findings, emphasizing that the
Synopsis prioritized qualitative strengths over adjectival scores, and that the margin between the
third, fourth, and fifth-ranked offerors was narrow. (Pl.’s MJAR at 28). Jacobs maintains that,
had its strengths been properly considered under Criterion E, its proposal would have been more
favorably rated and included among those selected for negotiation. (Id. at 28–29).

The Court notes a striking reversal in the parties’ interpretive stances regarding Criterion
E. Throughout the broader dispute, Jacobs consistently advocated for a holistic review of
proposals while the United States emphasized strict adherence to the weighted structure of
evaluation criteria. Yet when addressing Criterion E, their positions invert—Jacobs now insists

23
on a weighted assessment aligned with sub-criteria rankings, while the government advocates for
a holistic judgment. At any rate, the Court finds no need to assess NGB’s methodology because
Jacobs cannot establish competitive prejudice. Such positional inconsistency is, nevertheless,
always troubling.

Even if Jacobs had received an “Outstanding” rating under Criterion E, it cannot establish
that the overall ranking would have changed. Jacobs was ranked fifth overall, with only the top
three firms selected for price negotiations. (AR 6380). Criterion A was designated the most
important evaluation factor, and Jacobs did not establish error or prejudice in that area. Both
Jacobs and Offeror #3 received “Good” ratings under Criterion A, but Offeror #3 had five sub-
criteria rated as “Outstanding” compared to Jacobs’s four. (Compare AR 6317–19 with AR
6328–30). Jacobs was not rated higher on any shared discipline, and Offeror #3 additionally
received an “Outstanding” rating for fire protection engineering (Compare AR 6317–19 with AR
6328–30). Both firms had equal overall ratings for Criteria B, C, and D. (Compare AR 6319–27
with AR 6330–41). Offeror #3 earned “Outstanding” marks across Criterion E and all sub-
criteria. (Compare AR 6327–28 with AR 6341–42). Even if Jacobs had received an
“Outstanding” under Criterion E, Offeror #3’s superior performance under Criterion A would
have made its proposal stronger overall (See AR 6317–42). A revision to Jacobs’s rating under
Criterion E could potentially move the firm into fourth position; however, only the top three are
eligible for award consideration. Because Jacobs fails to demonstrate that any error under
Criterion E materially affected its competitive standing, the Court concludes that it cannot be a
basis for disturbing NGB’s decision.

E. Ranking

Jacobs contends that NGB unreasonably ranked it as the fifth most qualified offeror,
despite being equally qualified with third-place Offeror #3 under the most important evaluation
factor, Criterion A. (Pl.’s MJAR at 33–34). Jacobs further argues that its proposal was
demonstrably stronger than Offeror #3’s under Criterion B, the second most important criterion,
and that these comparative strengths warranted a higher ranking. (Id. at 34–36). The United
States argues that the Final Selection Report met all regulatory requirements prescribed by the
FAR. (Def.’s xMJAR at 26–34). The Court agrees with the United States and finds that NGB did
not violate the terms of the Synopsis or FAR 36.6.

Jacobs argues that NGB failed to comply with FAR 36.602-3(d) and the evaluation
framework in the Synopsis by ranking offerors based solely on adjectival ratings without
conducting a meaningful qualitative comparison of proposed personnel. (Pl.’s MJAR at 29–30).
Jacobs emphasizes that the Synopsis required evaluators to consider which firms provided
résumés demonstrating “greater levels” of discipline-specific education, experience,
certifications, and longevity with the firm—particularly in higher-priority disciplines. (Id.).
According to Jacobs, NGB overlooked these substantive qualifications and instead mechanically
counted the number of disciplines that received “Outstanding” ratings, without assessing the
relative strength or priority of those ratings. (Id.). Jacobs asserts that this method failed to
distinguish between firms with similarly rated personnel and deprived its proposal of recognition
as one of the most highly qualified, thereby prejudicing its competitive standing. (Id. at 30–31).

24
The United States counters that Jacobs’s prescribed methodology is not required by FAR
Subpart 36.6 or the Synopsis. (Def.’s xMJAR at 30–31). The United States argues that the Final
Selection Report met all regulatory requirements by recommending the three most highly
qualified firms and explaining the basis for the rankings through documented strengths and
ratings. (Id.). According to the government, the Synopsis never required exhaustive textual
comparisons across offerors, and any challenge to that omission should have been made before
the close of bidding. (Id. at 32). The United States asserts that NGB’s ranking was procedurally
sound, reflecting internal consistency, discipline priorities, and qualitative strengths, while
Jacobs’s interpretation introduces evaluative obligations unsupported by law or regulation. (Id. at
31–33).

Jacobs has not demonstrated that the rankings, ratings, or documented strengths were
inconsistent or inadequately explained. Nor has it shown that the Synopsis required the level of
comparative rigor it now demands. 15 Unlike FAR Part 15’s best value procedures, the architect-
engineer selection process under FAR 36.6 calls for a ranking of the most highly qualified firms
based on professional qualifications and narrative justification, not a granular comparative
analysis of every résumé and sub-criterion. The Final Selection Report complied with FAR
36.602-3(d) by recommending the most highly qualified firms and providing a rationale for those
rankings. (AR 6237–82). Based on the record and the governing legal framework, the Court
finds in favor of the United States. Jacobs’s proposed methodology entails exhaustive textual
comparisons across all disciplines and evaluation factors and is not required by the FAR or the
Synopsis. The Court concludes that NGB’s evaluation methodology and ranking system were
reasonable, aligned with FAR 36.6 and the Synopsis, and not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to
law.

As it applies to Jacobs’s comparison to Offeror #3, Jacobs and the United States present
fundamentally divergent interpretations of how the evaluation and ranking process should have
been conducted under Primary Criteria A and B. (Pl.’s MJAR at 32–37; Def.’s xMJAR at 33–
34). Jacobs contends that, even assuming no procedural flaws elsewhere, its proposal was
demonstrably superior to Offeror #3’s and deserved a higher ranking. (Pl.’s MJAR at 32–37).
Under Criterion A, Jacobs and Offeror #3 received nearly identical adjectival ratings, differing
only in the Fire Protection Engineer discipline. (Id. at 33). Jacobs argues that when considering
the substance of the résumés, particularly for top priority roles, it offered personnel with higher
levels of education, experience, certifications, and tenure. (Id.). It maintains that NGB was
required under the Synopsis to perform a qualitative comparison of these underlying credentials
and prioritize strengths according to discipline importance. (Id. at 34). Further, under Criterion
B, Jacobs asserts its proposal outperformed Offeror #3’s by receiving two more “Outstanding”
ratings and submitting more relevant project experience in key sub-criteria. (Id. at 35–36). Jacobs

15
Because it finds no error in NGB’s evaluation/ranking process, the Court does not analyze
whether Jacobs waived its argument by failing to challenge the terms of the Synopsis. However,
insomuch as Jacobs found the evaluation framework insufficient, its remedy likely would have
been to challenge the terms of the Synopsis before the close of bidding.

25
concludes that, taken together, its superiority in the most critical disciplines and sub-criteria
warranted a higher overall ranking than Offeror #3. (Id. at 36–37).

The United States responds that Jacobs’s argument hinges on a subjective reassessment
of the proposals and misreads both the Synopsis and the regulatory framework under FAR
Subpart 36.6. (Def.’s xMJAR at 33–34). The government emphasizes that NGB’s technical
experts applied consistent evaluative standards and that Offeror #3’s proposal reasonably
demonstrated strengths—such as more certifications and recent project experience—that justified
its ranking. (Id. at 33). The United States also rebuts Jacobs’s emphasis on Criterion B, noting
that Criterion A was accorded greater weight under the Synopsis. (Id. at 34). The United States
effectively argues that, even if Jacobs was marginally stronger under Criterion B, Offeror #3’s
superior performance in the more heavily weighted Criterion A reasonably supported its higher
ranking. (Id.). The United States concludes that Jacobs seeks to reweigh the criteria according to
its own preferences and that NGB’s judgment falls squarely within its discretion. (Id.).

Based on the record and applicable procurement regulations, the Court finds in favor of
the United States on the issue of Jacobs’s challenge to NGB’s ranking decision. Jacobs’s
contention that its proposal was demonstrably superior to Offeror #3’s under Primary Criteria A
and B rests on a selective and subjective comparison of individual credentials and evaluative
factors. While Jacobs and Offeror #3 received nearly identical adjectival ratings under Criterion
A, NGB reasonably assessed the proposals in their entirety, accounting for certifications,
demonstrated experience, tenure, and discipline-specific value. (Compare AR 6317–19 with AR
6328–30). In disciplines where Jacobs claims superiority, such as Project Manager and Architect,
NGB’s technical evaluators concluded that Offeror #3’s personnel held comparative or superior
qualifications based on the totality of factors, including more extensive professional registrations
and recent project experience. (Compare AR 6317 with AR 6329). Jacobs’s proposal included
additional personnel in certain categories, but the Synopsis did not require or reward quantity
over quality, nor did it obligate NGB to aggregate qualifications across multiple individuals.

Concerning Criterion B, although Jacobs received more “Outstanding” ratings than
Offeror #3, those ratings pertained to a lower-priority sub-criterion. The Synopsis explicitly
ranked Criterion A as more important than Criterion B, and it was within NGB’s discretion to
determine how much weight to assign each criterion and sub-criterion. (AR 2549). Jacobs’s
suggestion that its proposal should have received a “more Outstanding” rating than Offeror #3’s
disregards the evaluative scheme set forth in the Synopsis and inappropriately substitutes its own
preferred weighting for NGB’s reasoned judgment. The Court declines to second-guess technical
evaluations, particularly in a procurement governed by FAR subpart 36.6, which affords the
agency substantial discretion in subjectively selecting the most highly qualified firms. See FAR
36.603(b). Jacobs has not demonstrated that NGB’s ranking methodology was arbitrary,
capricious, or inconsistent with law, nor has it shown that NGB failed to apply the evaluation
criteria as stated. Accordingly, the Court concludes that NGB’s decision to rank Offeror #3
above Jacobs was reasonable and supported by the record.

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F. Prejudice and Injunctive Relief

Jacobs has failed to demonstrate any error in NGB’s decision and likewise cannot
establish prejudice from any alleged mistake. This equally applies to its request for injunctive
relief. Injunctions are a “drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a
matter of course.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010) (citation
omitted). To obtain permanent injunctive relief, a party must demonstrate: (1) success on the
merits; (2) irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue; (3) the balance of harm favors the
movant; and (4) that the injunction serves the public interest. See PGBA, LLC v. United States,
389 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Amazon Web Servs., Inc. v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl.
146, 153 (2020). Although “[n]o one factor, taken individually, is necessarily dispositive . . . the
absence of an adequate showing with regard to any one factor may be sufficient, given the
weight or lack of it assigned the other factors, to justify the denial.” FMC Corp. v. United States,
3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Because Jacobs has failed to establish success on the merits,
there is no need for further analysis. Jacobs’s request for a permanent injunction is denied.

III. Conclusion

Jacobs failed to establish that a prejudicial error occurred in this procurement for A-E
services. Accordingly, Jacobs’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, (Pl.’s
MJAR, ECF No. 20), is DENIED. The United States’ Cross-Motion for Judgment on the
Administrative Record, (Def.’s xMJAR, ECF No. 21), is GRANTED. 16

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. The parties shall meet and
confer and file a Joint Status Report proposing redactions to this Memorandum Opinion within
fourteen (14) days of its entry to allow the Court to file a public version of the Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Tapp
DAVID A. TAPP, Judge

16
The Court previously ruled on these motions. (ECF No. 29). This Opinion presents the Court’s
analysis and directs the entry of judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11127549. Public record. Not legal advice.