# Buyalova v. Cantrell

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · July 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11125851

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** July 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ELENA IVANOVNA BUYALOVA PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:25-cv-05077-CDC

SHERIFF JAY CANTRELL, Washington County,
Arkansas; RANDON MCCULLOUGH; HEARTSFIELD,
Fayetteville Police Department (FPD); GREG TABOR.
Washington County Detention Center (WCDC).
SAMUELS, FPD; CUNNINGHAM, WCDC; HOLMES,
WCDC; FULLER, WCDC; JOHNSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (JPD); CHIEF OF POLICE CHRIS KELLY,
JPD; REYNOLDS, FPD; GENTRY, FPD; FRANKLIN, FPD; LIDIA
KUREVICH; UBOLRAT XAYSANASY; KNWA, Fayetteville
and Rogers Branches; KIETH SMITH, JPD; NEWSON,
WCDC; ANDERSON, FPD; KNOTTS, FPD; CRAFTON,
FPD; DICUS, FPD; SUTLEY, FPD; PARKS, FPD; BAILEY,
FPD; and HARRIS, FPD DEFENDANT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Elena I. Buyalova,1 filed this action alleging civil rights violations under § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis.
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to magistrate jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s claims require
dismissal, the Court enters its findings as a Report and Recommendation and the case will
automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge Timothy L. Brooks. 28 U.S.C. §
636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02.

1 Plaintiff previously filed a case with this Court under the name Yelena I Goforth, Goforth v.
Ruth, et al., 5:11-cv-05169-TLB (W.D. Ark. July 9, 2019) (dismissed as frivolous and a strike
flag was placed on the case) (no appeal filed).
1
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No.
7) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
Upon review of original Complaint, it was determined that Plaintiff failed to state how each

of the multiple individually named Defendants personally violated her federal constitutional rights.
(ECF No. 6). For this reason, Plaintiff was ordered to file an Amended Complaint by June 24,
2025. Plaintiff was advised the Amended Complaint must contain short, plain statements telling
the Court: (1) the constitutional right she believed was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant
who violated the constitutional right; (3) exactly what the Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how
the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights; and (5) what specific injury she suffered because of that Defendant’s conduct. Id. She
was cautioned that she “must affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the
specific injury” and advised if she failed to do so, “the allegations against that Defendant will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.” Id.

Plaintiff timely filed her Amended Complaint on June 24, 2025. (ECF No. 7). On July
14, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a supplement to her Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8).
In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges that on March 16, 2025, she was taken into custody at the
City of Johnson exit from Interstate 49. (ECF No. 7 at 4). She indicates Defendant Smith, with
the Johnson Police Department (“JPD”), place the handcuffs on her “too tight” causing “purple
prints” on her wrists. Id. She was taken to the Washington County Detention Center (“WCDC”),
and Defendants Cunningham and Holmes saw the prints when she was in the medical room at the
WCDC. Id. She maintains both were smiling and just allowed her to be booked. Id.

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Next, Plaintiff alleges she was placed in a very cold cell without a blanket or shoes for
fifteen hours. (ECF No. 7 at 4). She maintains this constituted excessive cruelty. Id. She
indicates she was wearing thick socks, capri pants, and a t-shirt while she was forced to sit on a
“cement bench/floor.” Id. She also maintains Defendant Holmes was smiling when he asked

her if she knew where she was. Id.
While she was in the cell, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Newsom and Miller took “some” of
her toilet paper away as she tried to place it on the floor or bench. (ECF No. 7 at 4). Plaintiff
mentions she had been at the WCDC several times due to unjust charges of terroristic threatening
and violation of a protective order during which they would place handcuffs and ankle cuffs on
her in such a way that she could barely walk. Id.
Plaintiff alleges the March 16, 2025, arrest constituted her thirteenth unjust arrest. (ECF
No. 7 at 4). Because she was upset, Plaintiff states her blood pressure went up to 214/137 and
stayed that way. Id. After fifteen hours, she was taken to the emergency room. Id. Finally,
Plaintiff discusses periods of time in 2011 when she was incarcerated in the WCDC and attaches

a diary she kept at that time. Id. at 5.
In Claim Two, Plaintiff brings a conditions of confinement claim. (ECF No. 7 at 5). She
lists the dates of occurrence as March 16, 2025, and February 11 or 17, 2011, through
approximately September 23, 2011. Id. at 6. Plaintiff references having been sent for a mental
evaluation; a bad tornado in Joplin, Missouri; having kept a jail diary in 2011; filing a civil rights
case in federal court against multiple defendants in 2011; being harassed by inmates and deputies;
being denied medical care; and FPD officers remarking they were familiar with her background.
Id. With respect to her March 16, 2025, arrest she appears to allege a conspiracy between the

3
JPD, the FPD, and the Joplin Police Department stating that all their “chiefs were aware of what
is going to happen.” Id. She indicates Defendants Tabor, Rynolds, and Cantrell as well as ex-
Sheriff Tim Helder, are the “most responsible ones-like” P. Kurevich and “my Jewish ex-husband”
with the arrests beginning in March of 2007 extending until March of 2025. Id. She maintains

it was a “planned abuse of harassment of a single person by US law enforcement and it has to
stop.” Id. She indicates she sees people all the time that commit crimes towards her, yet she is
the one penalized. Id. Plaintiff references various immigrants she has met including those from
Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. Id. at 6-7.
Next, Plaintiff says she was arrested six times due to a protective order obtained in March
of 2007. (ECF No. 7 at 7). She also indicates she was accused of terroristic threatening by her
ex-sister-in-law, her daughter, and a Mexican friend, Artiga. Id. Plaintiff denies she said the
“phrase” she was accused of using. Id.
In Claim Three, Plaintiff asserts she has been harassed by the FPD, the Washington County
Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”), JPD, Defendant McCullough, KNWA, Joplin Police Department, and

P. Kurevich and her friends. (ECF No. 7 at 7). Plaintiff lists the dates of occurrence as March
16, 2025, March 18, 2007, July 22, 2009, February 11, 2011, through approximately September
23, 2011, and November of 2008, which she indicates are the dates of her arrests that she can
recall. Id.
Plaintiff says that Defendant McCullough harassed her until he was arrested. (ECF No. 7
at 7). After his arrest, “his juveniles” harassed her with his vehicle. Id. Inevitably when she
would begin driving, Plaintiff says she would see a police vehicle behind her and receive yet
another ticket. Id. Plaintiff mentions Defendants Parks, Bailey, and Crafton and indicate they

4
“never penalized Nance, but gave him a ride to his place.” Id. Plaintiff indicates Defendant
Samuels refused to “help to transfer dying dog Apollo whom I watched to ER for animals but sent
a cat that followed me [in a] police’s car to Wedington Animal Clinic.” Id. at 8.
Next, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Sutley, Logue, Knotts, Hartsfield, Franklin, Dicus,

Oswalt, Partain, and Gentry all participated in the harassment which was “all approved by chief.”
(ECF No. 7 at 8). Plaintiff indicates she was issued 13 tickets and arrested 12 times by the FPD
and the WCSO. Id. She has attached as an exhibit a record she obtained from the FPD which
she maintains for some unknown reason does not show all the tickets she was issued. Id.
Plaintiff mentions she had a meeting with Defendant Tabor and then Mayor Jordan to stop the
harassment. Id. Eventually she says she was forced out of the area. Id. She indicates her
reputation was ruined; she could not obtain a job; the Russian Consulate would not intervene; and
the prolonged harassment resulted in multiple emergency room visits, high blood pressure, and
chest pain. Id. With respect to her inability to obtain employment, Plaintiff indicates her arrest
in July of 2014 over disciplining Black juveniles resulted in no employer wanting to hire her. Id.

She states the injury to her reputation occurred because of reporting on KNWA and Heart
Television. Id. Although she was harassed by Defendant Xaysanasy multiple times, she says he
was never incarcerated like she was. Id.
In Claim Four, Plaintiff maintains that all the Defendants “misrepresented—true facts—
about me—starting [with] creating false protective order” and “falsely accusing me of a phrase I
never said.” (ECF No. 7 at 9). She asserts that Defendant Xaysanasy falsely reported that she
ran over her dog. Id. She says that Defendant Xaysanasy stalked and targeted her. Id.
Plaintiff says she asked both Defendant Tabor and former Sheriff Tim Helder for an explanation

5
of why they followed her and arrested her over a false protective order and never received an
honest answer. Id. at 10. She also questions why they started with “sexual pursuits towards me.”
Id.
In her supplement, Plaintiff contends that the harassment has continued towards her by the

JPD, and she has been given two false warnings so far. (ECF No. 8 at 1). The first warning
ticket was given by Defendant Smith. Id. at 2. Plaintiff indicates the JPD has started to involve
more people in her case. Id. Each time she would take her dogs to the dog park, Plaintiff states
something like a firetruck would start up and the dogs would start running. Id. Next, she was
stopped when she approached a yield sign before the field and another car started to drive towards
her. Id. Plaintiff indicates she was stopped while the other driver was not. Id. She maintains
she deserves rest from the harassment and compensation. Id. She indicates the harassment has
gone on since her divorce from Kurevich.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Additionally, she would
like all the Defendants removed from their jobs. Finally, she would like a paragraph removed

from “July 12-17, 2014”—about unjust, shameless arrest of me” from “KNWA, upi.com, khbs,
Google, Facebook” and “prohibit publishing it anymore.” Id.
II. APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-
iii).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
6
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987);
In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro
se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007)). However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim.
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 was enacted to provide a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected
civil rights.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To assert a claim under
§ 1983, Plaintiff’s must allege two elements: (1) the action occurred under color of law and (2) the

action is a deprivation of a federal statutory or constitutional right.
A. Excessive Force Claim against Defendant Smith
The Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard governs a claim that an officer
used excessive force “in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure.’”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1980); see also Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d
491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009). The test for assessing whether the violation of the right to be free from
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment is “whether the amount of force used was objectively

7
unreasonable under the particular circumstances.” Vester v. Hallock, 864 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir.
2017) (quotation marks omitted).
The Courts have recognized that to conduct an arrest, some degree of force is
necessary. Therefore, the fact that force is used during an arrest does not ipso facto establish a

Fourth-Amendment violation. Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized…the right to make an arrest…necessarily
carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Handcuffing inevitably involves some use of force,” Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062,
1067 (8th Cir. 2006), and it will almost always result in some irritation, minor injury, or discomfort
where the handcuffs are applied. See Chambers v. Pennycock, 641 F.3d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 2011)
(citing Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002)). Courts have found the
application of handcuffs, even when tightly secured, is not an unreasonable use of force. See
Crumley, 324 F.3d at 1008; Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir.

1990) (“allegations of pain as a result of being handcuffed without some evidence of more
permanent injury” are insufficient to support an excessive force claim). “For the application of
handcuffs to amount to excessive force, there must be something beyond minor injuries.” Hanig
v. Lee, 415 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Crumley, 324 F.3d at 1008).
Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of any injury other than some visible lines from the
handcuffing. This is insufficient to state a plausible excessive force claim against Defendant
Smith, and it is recommended that this be dismissed.

8
B. False Arrest and/or Malicious Prosecution Claims Against Defendant Smith
“It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an
individual’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Joseph v. Allen,
712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a

false arrest claim under § 1983 “fails as a matter of law where the officer had probable cause to
make the arrest.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001).
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). The Eighth Circuit has stated that “[p]robable cause
exists when “the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest ‘[is] sufficient to lead a
reasonable officer to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.”
Borgman v, Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010)). “The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th

Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state what why she was arrested. Instead,
she indicates only where she was arrested. Further, she makes no factual allegations specific to
Defendant Smith regarding the arrest on March 16, 2025, having been made by him without
probable cause or for a reason other than a violation of the law. For these reasons, she has failed
to allege a plausible “false” arrest claim against Defendant Smith.
As set forth by the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022), three
elements are necessary to set forth a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment.

9
These elements are: (1) the proceeding was instituted without probable cause; (2) the motive for
instituting the suit was malicious that is for a purpose other than bringing Plaintiff to justice; and
(3) the prosecution terminated in an acquittal or discharge of the Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff has
included no allegation that the charge or charges stemming from the March 16, 2025, arrest were

resolved in her favor. She has failed to allege a plausible malicious prosecution claim against
Defendant Smith.
C. Claims Against Private Parties
“Only a state actor can face § 1983 liability.” Doe v. North Homes, Inc., 11 F.4th 633, 637
(8th Cir. 2021) (citing Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001)).
“Private individuals who commit torts, i.e., civil wrongs, against other private parties are generally
not acting under color of state law when they commit those acts.” Blair v. Anderson, No.
4:04cv3229, 2006 WL 2128010, *2 (D. Neb. July 26, 2006). But “in a few limited circumstances,”
a private entity [or private individual] “can qualify as a state actor,” including “when the private
entity [or individual] performs a traditional, exclusive public function,” “when the government

compels the private entity [or individual] to take a particular action” and “when the government
acts jointly with the private entity [or individual].” Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 587
U.S. 802, 809 (2019).
“[T]he mere furnishing of information to a law enforcement officer, even if the information
is false, does not constitute joint activity with state officials.” Gibson v. Regions Fin. Corp., 557
F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Wickersham v. City of Columbia, 481 F.3d 591, 598 (8th
Cir. 2007) (“[T]he mere invocation of state legal procedures, including police assistance, does not
convert a private party into a state actor”). In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants

10
McCullough, Kurevich, and Xaysanasy were involved in furnishing false information to the police,
including obtaining a protective order through false allegations, or were equally guilty but not
charged. These allegations fall far short of establishing any type of joint action or conspiracy with
the law enforcement Defendants. Similarly, the allegations against KNWA are that it broadcast
a news report that included information about the Plaintiff.2 No joint action or conspiracy with

the law enforcement Defendants is alleged to exist. No plausible claims are asserted against
Defendants McCullough, Kurevich, Xaysanasy, and KNWA.
D. General Allegations of Abuse and Harassment
While Plaintiff insists, she has been lied to, falsely arrested, harassed, embarrassed, and
threatened by various of the Defendants, her Amended Complaint is virtually devoid of factual
statements to support her allegations. “Verbal threats do not constitute a constitutional violation.”
Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). Similarly, taunts, name calling, and the
use of offensive language does not state a claim of constitutional dimension. McDowell v. Jones,
990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (claims of general harassment and of verbal harassment were

not actionable under section 1983). “‘The Constitution does not protect against all intrusions on
one's peace of mind. Fear or emotional injury which results solely from verbal harassment or idle
threats is generally not sufficient to constitute an invasion of an identified liberty interest.’” King
v. Olmsted Cty., 117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7
(1st Cir. 1991)). The Eighth Circuit has held that a threat “constitutes an actionable constitutional
violation only when the threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as to shock the conscience, or if the

2 The Court also notes the claims against KNWA stem from a broadcast in July 2014. Even if
KNWA was considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983, the claims would be barred by the
statute of limitations.
11
threat exerts coercive pressure on the plaintiff and plaintiff suffers the deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants
intended to act, or did act, on the alleged threats.
The alleged pattern of tickets and arrests spans three decades with multiple years between

many of the incidents. The alleged pattern involves multiple police departments, including out of
state police departments, and various private parties. The only arrests that appear to be connected
at all are those based on the existence of the protective order. Plaintiff does maintain the
protective order was obtained using false statements; however, those statements were made by the
private parties seeking the order and cannot be attributed in any way to the law enforcement
Defendants. Once the protective order was issued by the Court, the law enforcement Defendants
were required to enforce it when called upon to do so.
Plaintiff makes a passing reference to the harassment as being sexual in nature in
connection with Defendant Tabor and former Sheriff Helder. The Courts have recognized that
sexual harassment “can never serve a legitimate penological purpose and may well result in severe

physical and psychological harm, such abuse can, in certain circumstances” violate the
constitution. Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997) (Eighth Amendment case)
(cleaned up). In an unpublished decision, Howard v. Everett, 208 F.3d 218, *1 (8th Cir. 2000)
(table), the Eighth Circuit noted that although “sexual comments and gestures were reprehensible,”
that “sexual harassment, absent contact or touching, does not constitute the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Id. Although Plaintiff mentions the harassment as being sexual in
nature, she does not allege Defendant Tabor or former Sheriff Helder engaged in any conduct that

12
would be violative of the constitution. No plausible claims are stated based on the alleged
harassment.
E. Statute of Limitations
Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitation. Instead, causes of action under

§ 1983 are governed by “the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations.” Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). In Arkansas, this is the three-year personal injury statute of
limitations, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105(3). See Mountain Home Flight Serv., Inc. v. Baxter Cty.,
Ark., 758 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2014).
A large portion of the incidents allegedly violating Plaintiff’s constitutional rights occurred
more than three years prior to April 10, 2025. In other words, Plaintiff’s claims stemming from
incidents occurring prior to April 10, 2022, are barred by the statute of limitations.
F. Conditions of Confinement
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a pretrial detainee's constitutional rights are violated
if the detainee's conditions of confinement amount to punishment.” Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d

805, 809 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). There are two ways to
determine whether conditions of confinement rise to the level of punishment. First, “a plaintiff
could show that the conditions were intentionally punitive.” Stearns v. Inmate Servs. Corp., 957
F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). Alternatively, “if there is no
expressly demonstrated intent to punish, the plaintiff could also show that the conditions were not
reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose or were excessive in relation to that
purpose.” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39).

13
In considering pretrial detainee conditions of confinement claims, moreover, courts view
the “totality of the circumstances of [plaintiff's] confinement and not any particular condition in
isolation.” Stearns, 957 F.3d at 909. However, “[n]ot every disability imposed during pretrial
detention amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense.” Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268

(8th Cir. 1996). “There is a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not
concerned.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s only conditions of confinement claims which are not barred by the statute
of limitations are those related to the March 2025 arrest. In connection with that arrest, Plaintiff
alleges she was placed in a very cold cell without a blanket or shoes for fifteen hours. (ECF No.
7 at 4). However, she indicates she was fully clothed “wearing thick socks, capri pants, and a t-
shirt.” Id. There are no allegations that any of the Defendants intentionally lowered the
temperature in the cell she was placed in; no allegations that the temperature was at an
unreasonably cold setting; only that Plaintiff felt “very cold.” Plaintiff remained in the cell for
approximately fifteen hours. At most, this was a “de minimis level of imposition with which the

constitution is not concerned.” Smith, 87 F.3d at 268. This is also true of the fact that two of the
Defendants Newsom and Miller removed a portion of her toilet paper. No plausible claim is
stated.
G. Equal Protection
Recognizing that pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, the Court views the
Amended Complaint to be asserting an equal protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause generally requires the

14
government to treat similarly situated people alike.” Klinger v. Dep't. of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731
(8th Cir. 1994). A Plaintiff must show she is similarly situated to those whom she compares
herself to in “all relevant respects.” Carter v. Arkansas, 392 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2004) (cleaned
up). The first step in an equal protection case, therefore, “is determining whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that she was treated differently than others who were similarly situated to her.” Id.;
see also Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 1999) (the court's analysis of equal protection
claims begins by asking whether the plaintiff has shown that he has been treated differently than
others similarly situated). “Absent a threshold showing that [the plaintiff] is similarly situated to
those who allegedly receive favorable treatment, the plaintiff does not have a viable equal
protection claim.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that in a variety of situations she was arrested while others
either equally guilty in her eyes or those who were guilty were not. However, as with many of
her claims, most of the incidents she refers to are barred by the statute of limitations. With respect
to the March 2025 arrest, she alleges only that it was part of the general pattern of harassment that

began in 2007. No plausible equal protection claim has been stated.
H. Personal Liability
Liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement in the constitutional violations.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Clemmons
v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal
link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights”). Despite having been specifically
instructed to describe exactly what each Defendant did or failed to do which violated her

15
constitutional rights, Plaintiff has not done so. Instead, she has merely listed most of the
Defendants in her broad conclusory allegations which are unsupported by factual detail.
I. Johnson Police Department
Finally, the Johnson Police Department is not a proper Defendant. Police departments are
not subject to suit under § 1983. See e.g., Ketchum v. City of W. Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th
Cir. 1992) (municipal departments like jails, police departments, and sheriff's offices are not legal
entities subject to suit).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended that:
e All federal claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and for lack of jurisdiction.
e The Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status of Referral: The referral terminates upon the filing of this Report and
Recommendation.
RECOMMENDED this 24" day of July 2025.

CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11125851. Public record. Not legal advice.