# Griffith v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11125003

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STEPHANIE GRIFFITH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-01206-DWD
)
U.S. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )
SECURITY, )
)
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final agency
decision by the Defendant denying Plaintiff’s applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIBs”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). For the reasons explained
below, the Court AFFIRMS the final agency decision of Defendant. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff.
Procedural History
On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed her application for DIBs and SSI. (Doc. 15-5,
pgs. 5, 11). Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of February 6, 2021. (Doc. 15-5, pgs. 5,
11). Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date was later amended to November 7, 2021. (Doc.
15-2, pg. 19). Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied on March 16, 2022, and then again on
reconsideration on November 2, 2022. (Doc. 15-4, pgs. 13, 20). Following Plaintiff’s
written request, her claims were the subject of an evidentiary hearing on June 27, 2023.
(Doc. 15-2, pg. 37). In a decision dated October 6, 2023, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff was not disabled, resulting in a denial of her applications.
(Doc. 15-2, pg. 29). On March 4, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 2–4). Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is final for purposes of the
Court’s review. Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies and timely filed a
Complaint (Doc. 1).
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIBs or SSI, a claimant must be disabled. A disability is defined as
an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment that, inter alia, has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
claimant bears the burden of producing medical evidence to support the claims of
disability. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be considered to be under disability unless he

furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof.”). While a claimant’s
statements of pain or other symptoms are considered, those statements alone are not
conclusive evidence of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
To assess an alleged disability, the ALJ employs a “five-step sequential evaluation
process.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)(1), (2), (4); 416.920(a)(1), (4). The ALJ asks the

following questions: (1) whether the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that meets certain duration requirements or a combination of impairments
that is severe and meets the duration requirements; (3) whether the claimant has an
impairment that meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations and
satisfies the duration requirements; (4) whether, in view of the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) and past relevant work, he or she can perform past relevant
work; and (5) whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience, he or she can adjust to other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4);
416.920(a)(4); see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity under step 1, does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments as described at step 2, can perform past

relevant work under step 4, or can adjust to other work under step 5, then the claimant is
not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),(ii), (iv), (v); 416.920(a)(4)(i), (ii), (iv), (v). If
the claimant has an impairment that meets the requirements of step 3 or is incapable of
adjusting to other work under step 5, then he or she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),(v); 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (v). The claimant has the burden of proof at

steps 1-4. Mandrell v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2022).
A severe impairment under step 2 is defined as “any impairment or combination
of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do
basic work activities.” §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,
124 S. Ct. 376, 157 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2003). Impairments which are expected to result in death,

or those which have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve
months, qualify as severe under the duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii);
404.1509; 416.920(a)(4)(ii); 416.909. “[T]he step two determination of severity is ‘merely a
threshold requirement’” to “proceed to the remaining steps of the evaluation process.”
Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2010). Once an ALJ makes a finding that
one or more of a claimant’s ailments are severe, he must “consider the aggregate effect of

the entire constellation of ailments—including those impairments that in isolation are not
severe.” Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1523; and then collecting cases).
Impairments and related symptoms may cause physical and mental limitations
that affect what may be done in a work setting. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1);
416.945(a)(1). The RFC at issue in step 4 assesses the most that a claimant can do in a work

setting, notwithstanding those limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1);
accord SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2; Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872-73 n.7 (7th Cir.
2000). In this way, an RFC is an assessment of the claimant’s ability to perform sustained
work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing
basis, i.e., for eight hours a day and five days a week or an equivalent work schedule. See

Tenhove v. Colvin, 97 F. Supp. 2d 557, 568 (E.D. Wisc. 2013); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184,
*2; accord Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014). An RFC must be based on
all of the relevant medical and other evidence contained in the record. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a)(3); 416.945(a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *2-3, 5.
When completing an RFC, the ALJ must identify the claimant’s functional

limitations and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.
See Tenhove, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 569; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *1, 3; accord Lechner v.
Barnhart, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1036 (E.D. Wisc. 2004). The ALJ considers all impairments,
including those that are not severe, and the claimant’s ability to meet physical, mental,
sensory, and other requirements of work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), (4); 416.945(a)(2),
(4); see also Alesia v. Astrue, 789 F. Supp. 2d 921, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[T]he ALJ must

consider the combined effect of all impairments, ‘even those that would not be considered
severe in isolation.’”). “An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it
does not significantly limit [the] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). And, importantly, while a claimant’s statements of pain or other
symptoms are considered, they alone are not conclusive evidence of a disability. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529.

As to physical abilities, the ALJ assesses the nature and extent of any physical
limitations, then determines the RFC for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b); 416.945(b). A limited ability to perform physical demands of
work activity, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling,
reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching may reduce the ability to do past work. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b); 416.945(b); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *5-6. Other
impairments affecting work abilities include, among other things, impairments imposing
environmental restrictions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(d); 416.945(d). If the symptoms,
signs, or laboratory findings for a severe impairment do not meet or equal those of a listed
impairment, the ALJ considers the total limiting effects of all impairments, including

medical and nonmedical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e); 416.945(e).
After the identification of the claimant’s functional limitations and the assessment
of his or her work abilities on a function-by-function basis, the RFC may be expressed by
exertional category, including “light.” See Tenhove, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 569; accord Lechner,
321 F. Supp. 2d at 1036; SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *3. To do a full range of work in an
exertional category, such as “light,” the individual must be able to perform substantially

all of the functions required at that level. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *5-6. Light work
involves “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b). Even the weight
lifted in a job is very little, a job is considered light work if it requires a good deal of
walking or sitting, or sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or
leg controls. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b). In the absence of additional limiting

factors like “loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time,” a person
considered capable of performing light work is also considered capable of performing
sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b); 416.967(b).
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s alleged disability under the five-step sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(1), (2), (4). At step one, the ALJ found
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the amended alleged
disability onset date, November 7, 2021. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 19). At step two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments, i.e., fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease,
hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety

order, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 19). The ALJ also found that the
following impairments for which Plaintiff claimed disability were not severe: diabetes
mellitus, diverticulosis, internal hemorrhoids, gastritis, trigger fingers status post
injections, a renal cyst, vertigo, right shoulder tendinosis, mild osteoarthritis, and
dyslipidemia. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 19–20). The ALJ acknowledged that the record noted
diagnoses of these impairments, but that none caused “more than a minimal limitation

of physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” (Doc. 15-2, pg. 20). With respect
to Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus, the ALJ explained that the record noted that she used an
insulin pump, her A1c was at goal and neuropathy screenings were negative. (Doc. 15-2,
pg. 19). The ALJ stressed that she considered all of Plaintiff’s medically determinable
impairments, including any that were non-severe, when assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc.
13-2, pg. 20).

At step 3, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of impairments
did not meet or medically equal the severity of the impairments listed in the regulations.
(Doc. 15-2, pg. 20). When doing so, the ALJ emphasized that she considered Plaintiff's
impairments both individually and in combination. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 20–22). Specifically,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia did not equal a listing

because no evidence indicated that Plaintiff “either requires an ambulatory aide that
requires use of both upper extremities or cannot perform fine and gross movements with
at least one upper extremity due to a combination of extremity-related limitations and
the use of a medically necessary mobility device.” (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 20–21). In support of
her determination, the ALJ highlighted the record noting that Plaintiff had a normal gait,

without the need for an assistive device. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 21). The ALJ further found that
Plaintiff’s diagnoses of hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea and obesity did not reach
listing level alone or in combination with another impairment. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 21). The
ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not “cause at least two ‘marked’
limitations or one ‘extreme’ limitation.” (Doc. 15-2, pg. 22). As such, the “paragraph B”
criteria was not satisfied. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 22). Finally, because the record did not establish

that Plaintiff had only “a minimal capacity to adapt to changes in the [Plaintiff’s]
environment or to demands that are not already part of the [Plaintiff’s] daily life,” the
ALJ concluded that the “paragraph C” criteria was not satisfied either.
Before proceeding to step 4, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following RFC:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except: She could occasionally climb ramps and
stairs. She should avoid climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
She could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. She
should avoid extreme cold, extreme vibration, and exposure
to concentrated fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor
ventilation. She should avoid hazards such as unprotected
heights and dangerous machinery. She is able to complete
simple, routine tasks with minimal changes in job duties and
setting. She should avoid fast-paced production work, for
example avoid hourly quotas. She can occasionally interact
with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors.
(Doc. 15-2, pg. 23).
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably
have been expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s statements on the
symptoms’ intensity, persistence and limiting effects were “not entirely consistent” with
the evidence. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 24). First, the ALJ recounted Plaintiff’s diagnoses and
statements from her Adult Disability Report and function reports that she could not lift
or carry over 10 pounds or stand more than fifteen minutes at a time, and she would need
to lie down during an eight-hour workday. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 23). Plaintiff alleged difficulties
with sitting, walking, bending, reaching, kneeling and climbing stairs, as well as daily
back pain. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 23). As for mental impairments, Plaintiff alleged that she had
depression and mania on any given day and sometimes had suicidal thoughts. She also

stated that she had problems with memory, task completion, concentration,
understanding and following instructions, but that she could drive, go out alone, shop in
stores, cook and care for herself, and perform some housework, such as laundry and
dishes. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 24).
Next, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s treatment related to her impairments.
Between February 2022 and May 2022 Plaintiff sought medical examination complaining

of fibromyalgia, chronic pain and hypertension. However, it was noted on multiple
occasions that Plaintiff was ambulating normally, and her hypertension was controlled
while on her medications. The ALJ found this evidence to be inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
alleged severity of pain or limitations with sitting, standing, walking, lifting, or carrying.
(Doc. 15-2, pg. 24). The ALJ then noted that between June 2022 and August 2022 Plaintiff

made multiple emergency room visits regarding pain radiating down both her lower
extremities, and ultimately underwent a lumbar laminectomy, partial facetectomy, and
discectomy. The ALJ found that the evidence of these procedures supported the lifting
and carrying limitations of a light exertional level, with postural and environmental
limitations. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 24–25). Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ

described the findings of examinations of Plaintiff as “relatively normal or mild” and not
consistent with the alleged severity of symptoms and limitations. Nonetheless, the ALJ
ultimately included mental limitations in the RFC based significantly on Plaintiff’s
subjective allegations. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 25). Finally, the ALJ considered the medical
opinions and prior administrative medical findings without deference to those opinions
or findings or giving them any specific evidentiary weight. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 25–26). Based

on this evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC provided above. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 23).
At step 4, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.
(Doc. 15-2, pg. 27). The ALJ noted that the vocational expert testified Plaintiff had past
relevant work as a medical receptionist and food service manager, and that such work
would exceed Plaintiff’s RFC.
Finally, at step 5, the ALJ found, in addition to Plaintiff’s past relevant work and

in consideration of her age, education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff could perform
other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 27–
28). In doing so, the ALJ noted Plaintiff, at 50-years-old, was closely approaching
advanced age. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 27–28). Plaintiff also has at least a high school education.
(Doc. 15-2, pgs. 27–28). The ALJ’s finding for this step was based on testimony from the

vocational expert stating that Plaintiff could perform the requirements of occupations
such as cleaner, hand packer, and production worker. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 28). As such, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff was “not disabled” from November 7, 2021, through the
date of the decision. (Doc. 15-2, pgs. 28–29). As a result, Defendant denied Plaintiff’s
application for DIBS and SSI. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 29).
Analysis1
The Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is “extremely limited” and “very
deferential.” See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008)). Findings of fact, supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); accord Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869.
The Court will reverse the ALJ’s decision only if the findings of fact were not supported
by substantial evidence or the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. See Clifford, 227 F.3d
at 869; accord Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020). In this context, “substantial

evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’” See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773. If reasonable minds could differ
about whether a claimant is disabled and the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, then the Court will affirm the denial of claims. Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773

(quoting Elder, 529 F.3d at 413). When assessing the evidence, the Court reviews the entire
record, but does not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide credibility questions,
or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869; accord Lopez ex
rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The ALJ is not required to address
every piece of evidence or testimony presented, but he must build a ‘logical bridge’

between the evidence and his conclusions. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009);
see also Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2021) (“The ALJ’s summary does not

1 The portions of the evidentiary record relevant to Plaintiff's arguments and the Court's resolution of the case are
incorporated into the analysis below.
mention every detail. But it need not.”). An ALJ is not permitted to “cherry pick evidence
from the record” to support a conclusion without engaging with evidence weighing

against it. Plessinger v. Berryhill, 900 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court will not
decline to engage in a critical review to act as a rubber stamp. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869.
Plaintiff presents a single argument against the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ “provided an objectively flawed analysis of Ms. Griffith’s diabetes and
neuropathy.” (Doc. 17, pg. 5–7). In support of her argument, Plaintiff points to two visits
with her treating podiatrist and states that the ALJ “completely fails to mention the

diagnosis of diabetic neuropathy from a treating podiatrist.” (Doc. 17, pgs. 6–7). Plaintiff
claims that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s foot health is “objectively erroneous”
because she fails to explain her finding that Plaintiff’s foot-related diagnoses are “mild.”
(Doc. 17, pg. 7).
As noted above, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s diabetes diagnosis when

determining which of her medically determinable impairments were severe. (Doc. 15-2,
pg. 19). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s medical records indicated that Plaintiff’s diagnosis
was managed with an insulin pump and her hemoglobin A1c level was at goal. (Doc. 15-
2, pg. 19). The ALJ further stated that Plaintiff was without diabetes-related complications
generally, had negative screenings for neuropathy and only recently had issues with foot

ulcers that were noted as mild after examination. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 19).
The existence of a diagnosis or condition does not require an ALJ to find that a
claimant suffers from a disabling impairment; the inquiry is focused on the claimant’s
ability to work. Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 845 (7th Cir. 2007); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529. The record cited in the ALJ’s decision provides ample evidence supporting
the classification of Plaintiff’s diabetes-related foot issues as “mild.” It was not, as Plaintiff

suggests, “objectively erroneous.” (Doc. 17, pg. 7); see Elder, 529 F.3d at 413-14 (“[O]nly
when the ALJ’s determination lacks any explanation or support that we will declare it to
be ‘patently wrong.’”) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff was examined by her endocrinologist in January and April of 2022.
Records from both visits note that Plaintiff was not experiencing neuropathy, and that
control of her diagnosis was “excellent.” (Doc. 15-12, pgs. 311, 318, 325, 332). Plaintiff also

saw her primary care provider in April of 2022. Notes from that examination indicate that
Plaintiff’s hemoglobin A1c level was at goal, she was ambulating normally, and a foot
exam completed in the last 12 months was negative. (Doc. 15-12, pg. 204). Plaintiff takes
issue with the ALJ’s statement that “[n]europathy screenings were negative,” claiming
that the ALJ confused it with the section of the record indicating that a nephropathy

screening was negative. (Doc. 17, pg. 6). But even if the ALJ confused neuropathy and
nephropathy in the decision, the same record clearly indicates that Plaintiff had a foot
exam with negative results sometime in the preceding 12 months. (Doc. 15-12, pg. 204).
The ALJ also cited and considered records from Plaintiff’s visits with her treating
podiatrist in September and October of 2022. (Doc. 15-2, pg. 19 (citing Exhibit 44F,

docketed in this case as Doc. 15-14, pgs. 538–565)). Records from both visits are
inconsistent in that it states that Plaintiff “denies foot pain, numbness, tingling,” but also
reports “tingling and numbness in toes and feet.” (Doc. 15-14, pgs. 538, 544, 546, 551).
While Plaintiff’s podiatrist lists diabetic peripheral neuropathy in his assessment, the
notes indicate that conservative treatments were emphasized and that he discussed shoe
and orthotic recommendations with Plaintiff that can prevent worsening of her condition.
(Doc. 15-14, pgs. 545, 552). The ALJ’s classification of Plaintiff's foot issues as mild is
further supported by another examination shortly after her October podiatrist
appointment, where records indicate that Plaintiff was ambulating normally. (Doc. 15-14,
pg. 342). As such, the record provides substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s
assessment. Therefore, the Court cannot say that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff's
diabetes and neuropathy non-severe at step 2 of the analysis.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the final agency decision of Defendant. The
Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendant and against Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 21, 2025

DAVIDW.DUGAN
United States District Judge

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