# THE ESTATE OF KRISTEN MCCARTNEY v. SETON HALL UNIVERSITY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11124485

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 20, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11124485

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing “the necessity for independence of a university in dealing with the academic failures, transgressions or problems of a student” and assessing a “problem … involving academic standards”

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ESTATE OF KRISTEN MCCARTNEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 24-6179 (SDW) (JRA)

v. OPINION

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY, et al., August 20, 2025

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court is Defendants Seton Hall University (“Seton Hall”), Seton Hall’s Board
of Trustees, and Seton Hall’s Board of Regents’ motion to dismiss (D.E. 36) Plaintiffs Estate of
Kristen McCartney, Donna Dockery, and Sean McCartney’s amended complaint (D.E. 31 (“Am.
Compl.”)). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Venue is proper pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1391. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 78. For the reasons stated herein, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties are presumed to be familiar with this matter and may refer to this Court’s
January 7, 2025 opinion (D.E. 29) for a summary of the factual background. In that opinion, this
Court granted two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Id.) Plaintiffs amended the complaint
on February 6, 2025. (Am. Compl.) The amended complaint asserts claims for breach of contract
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id. at ¶¶ 123–81.) Defendants
moved to dismiss the amended complaint on March 13, 2025 (D.E. 36); Plaintiffs opposed (D.E.
38 (“Opp.”)),1 and Defendants timely replied (D.E. 40).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, federal courts “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and … determine whether [the]
plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v.
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). Determining whether a complaint’s allegations are
“plausible” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should be dismissed
for failing to show “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Breach of Contract
Count I alleges that Defendants breached implied and express contracts that they had with
Plaintiffs. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 124, 148, 157.) As outlined in this Court’s prior opinion, under New

1 Plaintiffs’ opposition brief was filed well after the filing deadline, and only after prompting by this Court. (See D.E.
37.) Plaintiffs did not explain or acknowledge their untimeliness. (Opp.) Plaintiffs also failed to comply with Local
Civil Rule 15.1(b) when filing their amended complaint, as well as this Court’s related August 12, 2025 order. (See
D.E. 44.)
Jersey law, “‘the relationship between a private university and its students can not be described
either in pure contract or associational terms,’ and the role of the court in reviewing such contract
claims is limited.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 790 F. App’x 379, 385 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Mittra
v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 719 A.2d 693, 696–97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)).
Attendance or payment of tuition at a university does not automatically create a contract. See, e.g.,

Keles v. Bender, Civ. No. 17-1299, 2021 WL 568105, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2021), aff’d, No.
21-1497, 2022 WL 840311 (3d Cir. Mar. 18, 2022); Mittra, 719 A.2d at 696 (quoting Napolitano
v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)).
The standard applied to alleged contracts between universities and their students “depends
on the context.” Powell v. Seton Hall Univ., Civ. No. 21-13709, 2022 WL 1224959, at *9 (D.N.J.
Apr. 26, 2022). When a university is not acting in a specialized role, and its actions do not “go to
the core of the university’s pedagogical mission,” a traditional contractual analysis applies.
Dougherty v. Drew Univ., 534 F. Supp. 3d 363, 383 (D.N.J. 2021) (applying traditional contract
analysis to fee-based claims involving university’s capacity “more as a building proprietor or

business entity than an academic institution”). When a university makes an “administrative or
business judgment,” courts will not intervene absent “a showing of bad faith, arbitrariness or lack
of prompt notice.” Beukas v. Bd. of Trs. of Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 605 A.2d 776, 781–82 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (emphasis omitted). When a university exercises academic judgment
or makes a decision concerning student discipline or dismissal pursuant to university policy, courts
“typically limit[] their review … to a consideration of whether (1) the university substantially
departed from its own rules and regulations, (2) the procedures employed by the university were
fundamentally fair, and (3) the university’s decisions were supported by sufficient evidence.”
Powell, 2022 WL 1224959, at *9; Beukas, 605 A.2d at 781 (contrasting standards used in cases
“involv[ing] the exercise of academic, rather than administrative or business judgment”).
Each of Plaintiff’s alleged contracts is discussed below, but overall, Plaintiffs’ claims do
not fit naturally into a contract analysis, even one altered by the standards specific to contracts
between universities and students. The claims are much better suited for negligence, but as this

Court has already decided, Plaintiffs failed to file their negligence claims within the statute of
limitations.2 (See D.E. 29 at 6–12.) Plaintiffs attempt to cast this lawsuit as a contractual one to
avail themselves of a longer statute of limitations, but they have failed to establish a valid contract.
1. Implied Contract
The amended complaint states that “[a]lthough matriculation as a student and payment of
tuition at a university does not always create a contract, in some instances courts in New Jersey
have recognized an implied agreement between them.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 125.) Plaintiffs do not
explain what those kinds of instances are or why this case is one of them. Their only allegations
in support of the implied contract are Ms. McCartney’s matriculation and attendance at Seton Hall,

which are concededly insufficient. (See id. at ¶¶ 33, 128 (“Seton Hall’s acceptance of [Ms.
McCartney] … despite her Epilepsy disability, explicitly, or at least tacitly, acknowledged Seton
Hall’s ability to ensure the health and safety of [Ms. McCartney] as a student with a disability at
Seton Hall, which [her] parents relied upon ….”); Opp. at 12 (alleging that implied contract is
based on the “student/university relationship” and exists because Ms. McCartney “was a paying,
matriculated student, with a known disability, and … Defendants were responsible for her health

2 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims truly arise under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for
which Plaintiffs have also failed to meet procedural requirements. (D.E. 36-1 (“Mot.”) at 6–8.) As Plaintiffs concede
(Opp. at 8), they do not bring an ADA claim.
and safety”).3) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants were responsible for Ms. McCartney’s health and
safety “based merely on the fact that she was a student at Seton Hall,” citing no authority. (Opp.
at 12.)
Even generously construing Plaintiffs’ filings, they have failed to support the existence of
an implied contract. They do not explain or offer any case law supporting why accepting a student

with a disability creates an implied contract that a university will ensure that student’s safety. The
cases Plaintiffs rely on concern academic or disciplinary decisions and thus call for a standard not
applicable here. Mucci v. Rutgers, Civ. No. 08-4806, 2011 WL 831967, at *19–20 (D.N.J. Mar.
3, 2011) (reviewing breach of contract claim based on academic dismissal); Mittra, 719 A.2d at
694 (“At issue is whether a university’s … handbook … creates a contractual relationship between
the school and its students in the context of a dismissal for academic reasons); Napolitano, 453
A.2d at 273 (recognizing “the necessity for independence of a university in dealing with the
academic failures, transgressions or problems of a student” and assessing a “problem … involving
academic standards”); D.E. 29 at 14 (“The events here have nothing to do with academic or

disciplinary judgment ….”).
Even if Plaintiffs’ cited cases were relevant, they do not establish—as Plaintiffs suggest
(Opp. at 12 & n.44)—a blanket rule that implied contracts always exist between students and
universities. They support that such contracts can exist but are highly contextually dependent, and
attendance alone does not create them. Mucci, 2011 WL 831967, at *19 (quoting Mittra, 719 A.2d
at 694); Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 272. Because Plaintiffs fail to offer any factual support for finding
one in this case, aside from Ms. McCartney’s attendance and residence at Seton Hall, they have
failed to allege an implied contract.

3 The opposition brief does not identify which paragraphs in the amended complaint support the implied contract
allegation. (Opp. at 12.)
In any event, this Court has already decided that the standard applicable to Seton Hall’s
challenged conduct, including designating a dorm room for Ms. McCartney after she tested
positive for COVID-19, is the Beukas standard. (D.E. 29 at 14.) Even if Plaintiffs had pled the
existence of an implied contract, the question would therefore be whether Defendants acted
arbitrarily, without notice, or in bad faith.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “acted arbitrarily, by forcing [Ms. McCartney] into
isolation … without having a legitimate plan of how to care for her health and safety if she were
to have emergency complications from her Covid-19 or seizure disability,” failed to provide
Plaintiffs with “‘prompt notice’ that they were incapable of caring for [Ms. McCartney] as
promised,” and “acted in bad faith … by proceeding to force [Ms. McCartney] into mandatory
isolation, with knowledge of her Covid-19 diagnosis, and her seizure disability, without planning
to provide her with the health care and essential services that they promised her.” (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 151–53.)4 Seton Hall’s actions were not arbitrary—it designated an isolation room for Ms.
McCartney pursuant to a plan that was created to comply with a state requirement. (Mot. at 17.)

Nothing indicates that Ms. McCartney was not on notice that she would be spending the night
alone in the dormitory room or that she was unable to communicate that to her parents. (See Am.
Compl. ¶ 91 (indicating that Ms. McCartney was able to make video calls from the room).) And
Plaintiffs’ allegation of bad faith is conclusory; no facts support that Defendants designated the

4 Despite this Court’s prior determination that the Beukas standard applies, between Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
and opposition brief, they argue that all three possible contract standards apply. In the amended complaint, they allege
that “the contract between [Ms. McCartney] and the University should be viewed as a traditional contractual
relationship” but argue in the alternative that they have sufficiently alleged breach of contract under Beukas. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 146, 150.) Plaintiffs’ opposition brief then applies the Powell standard. (Opp. at 13–14.) The opposition
brief, in its section concerning breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, briefly states that “the
above facts and arguments clearly show that Plaintiffs have met [the Beukas standard]” (id. at 15), but nowhere earlier
in the brief do Plaintiffs argue that Defendants acted arbitrarily, without prompt notice, or in bad faith. Because this
Court has already held that neither a traditional contractual analysis nor the Powell standard applies to Plaintiffs’
breach of contract allegation, this Court addresses only Plaintiffs’ arguments under Beukas.
dormitory room for Ms. McCartney in bad faith. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not pled that
Defendants’ conduct would have breached any implied contract.
2. Express Contracts
Plaintiffs allege that they entered various express contracts with Defendants, including the
Restart Plan, which outlined operating procedures during the pandemic, and several

representations on Seton Hall’s website. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137–43, 148.) Plaintiffs also allege that
Ms. McCartney “signed a Housing License Agreement with Seton Hall,” but they do not provide
that agreement or suggest anything about its contents. (Id. at ¶¶ 58, 135; Opp. at 10.)
i. Restart Plan
The Restart Plan provided that students who tested positive for COVID-19 would be
housed in dormitory rooms designated by Seton Hall. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 137.) Seton Hall would
also provide “food service … health monitoring … and other essential services” to those students
under the Restart Plan. (Id. at ¶ 138 (omissions in original).)
Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the Restart Plan was an express contract breached by

Defendants. “An enforceable agreement requires mutual assent, a meeting of the minds based on
a common understanding of the contract terms.” Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 137 A.3d 1168,
1180 (N.J. 2016); Aliments Krispy Kernels, Inc. v. Nichols Farms, 851 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir.
2017). Plaintiffs do not allege having assented to the terms of the Restart Plan. It is not clear that
they had even accessed the Restart Plan before Ms. McCartney passed away, as they requested it
from Seton Hall on September 21 and 22, 2021. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169, 171.) They could not have
assented to terms of an agreement they had not seen. In any event, this Court has already
determined that if the Restart Plan could be construed as a contract, Seton Hall’s implementation
thereof would be assessed under the Beukas standard. (D.E. 29 at 14.) For the same reasons that
Plaintiffs have failed to allege a breach of an implied contract under the Beukas standard, they
have failed to allege that Defendants breached any express contract created by the Restart Plan.5
(See supra pp. 6–7.)
ii. Representations on Website
The alleged representations on Seton Hall’s website include statements that “Student safety

is [Seton Hall’s] top priority,” that Seton Hall has a “mission … to support students in achieving
… success by providing compassionate, comprehensive healthcare services that prioritize their
physical and mental well-being,” that “[t]hrough accessible healthcare, … [it] ensure[s] that
students remain healthy,” that it seeks to “collaborate with [students’ parents] in order to continue
a supportive, caring environment for … student[s],” that it is dedicated to “keeping students
healthy,” that it will “[p]rovid[e] for [its] [s]tudents’ [b]asic [n]eeds,” and that it will assign
students with disabilities “appropriate and accessible room[s].” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 129–30, 132,
134, 136.)
The representations on Seton Hall’s website are not contracts between Seton Hall and any

of the Plaintiffs. There are no allegations concerning Plaintiffs’ assent to these statements. See
Morgan, 137 A.3d at 1180; Aliments Krispy Kernels, 851 F.3d at 290. The representations are
also vague; they lack “sufficient clarity” to bind Seton Hall to take any specific actions. NAACP
of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011);
Cioni v. Globe Specialty Metals, Inc., Civ. No. 10-1388, 2014 WL 2965707, at *7 (D.N.J. July 1,
2014) (finding statement in employee manual that “business should be conducted at all times
according to the highest standards of integrity and honesty” was “too vague to give rise to any

5 Plaintiffs did not distinguish which of Seton Hall’s actions were breaches of which alleged contracts, and they have
failed to plead that Seton Hall acted arbitrarily, in bad faith, or without prompt notice in connection with any of the
alleged contracts. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 151–53.)
contractual obligation”), aff’d, 618 F. App’x 42 (3d Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs contend that these
representations were “detailed contractual assurances by Defendants as to [Ms. McCartney’s]
health and safety on campus,” but in support, they only repeat the representations. (Opp. at 9.)
In any event, the representations on Seton Hall’s website, and Seton Hall’s related conduct,
would be assessed under the Beukas standard because Seton Hall is acting in a more specialized

role than that of a “building proprietor or business entity,” but not one concerning academic or
disciplinary dismissal. Dougherty, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 374, 383. Because Plaintiffs have not met
the Beukas standard, they fail to allege a breach of an express contract based on the representations
on the website. (See supra pp. 6–7.)
B. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Count II alleges that Defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in connection with their contracts with Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶ 179.) The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is part of every contract in New Jersey. Fields v. Thompson
Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2004). Without a valid contract, there can be no claim

for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche
Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). Because Plaintiffs have not adequately
alleged the existence of any contract, there is no basis for their claim of breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. While the events giving rise to this case are tragic, they
do not support the claims in the amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’
amended complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ Susan D. Wigenton x
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk
cc: Parties
José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11124485. Public record. Not legal advice.