# Leffler v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · August 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11123622

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11123622

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that pro se pleadings “are entitled to a liberal construction” and that “appropriate liberal construction requires active interpretation in some cases to construe a pro se petition ‘to encompass any allegation stating federal relief’”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

DAVID L.,

Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 1:25–cv–00068
Judge Douglas R. Cole
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff David L. challenges the denial of his application for Social Security benefits. For
the following reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s
Statement of Errors (Doc. 11) and AFFIRM the Social Security Commissioner’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND

Previously, Plaintiff successfully applied for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and was
found disabled for a closed period from December 12, 2016, through April 11, 2019. (R. at 79–
89). Roughly three years after the closed period expired, Plaintiff sought DIB again. This time,
he alleges disability as of March 6, 2021, due to a back injury, heart failure, depression, and
anxiety. (R. at 219–20, 264). After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration,
Administrative Law Judge Donald D’Amato (the “ALJ”) heard the case on December 11, 2023.
(R. at 53–75). Ultimately, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. (R. at 31–52). Next, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s ruling the Commissioner’s final
decision. (R. at 1–7).
Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se, filed this action. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner filed the
administrative record on April 7, 2025. (Doc. 10). Plaintiff timely filed a Statement of Specific
Errors (Doc. 11), and the Commissioner responded (Doc. 13). Plaintiff then filed a “Motion for
Summary Judgment.” (Doc. 14). The Undersigned construes this as a reply in support of his
statement of errors and has fully considered the arguments therein. The matter is ripe for review.
A. Relevant Statements to the Agency

The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s statement to the agency as follows:
[Plaintiff] reportedly sometimes forgets to take medications and needs reminders
to shower and shave (B7E/2–3). However, he is able to drive, go out alone, shop in
stores and by computer, pay bills, and count change (B7E/4), which suggests that
he is able to understand, remembering, and carry out a short sequence of tasks. ***

In the Third Party Function Report, [Plaintiff]’s spouse wrote that [Plaintiff]
sometimes “has issues with others and their attitudes” and occasionally appears
“distant” (B7E/6). Nevertheless, she also noted that [Plaintiff] spends time with
others on the phone and through email and texting, and is able to go to the store,
gas stations, and doctors visits (B7E), which tends to demonstrate that [Plaintiff] is
able to maintain appropriate relationships by communicating with others and
tolerate crowds and superficial interaction with unfamiliar people in the
community. He has never been fired or laid off from a job because of problems
getting along with others (B7E/7). ***

[Plaintiff]’s wife reported that he does not handle stress or changes in routine very
well (B7E/7). She added that he is “stress out, depressed and angry sometime about
his pain” (B7E/7). ***

He has noted some limitations in activities such as meal preparation and housework,
but it appears that he attributes them primarily to alleged physical symptoms and
limitations (B7E).

(R. at 37–39).
B. Relevant Medical Evidence and Medical Source Opinions
Discussed further below, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s medical records and symptoms
relating to his physical and mental impairments. (R. at 40–42). Also discussed below, the ALJ
summarized and evaluated the medical source opinions, including the opinions of Kathryn
Francescon, FNP; Travis Parkulo, MD; Christie Kincaid, PsyD; and April Gillespie, APRN. (R.
at 43–45 (citing R. at 367–370, 559–561, 604, 730–733)). The ALJ additionally summarized and
evaluated the prior administrative medical findings of the State agency medical and psychological
consultants. (R. at 45 (citing R. at 90–96, 99–108)). The ALJ finally noted the statements offered
by Plaintiff’s spouse in a Third Party Function Report. But he concluded that “she is not a medical
source and her statements concerning [Plaintiff]’s alleged limitations are not fully consistent with

the medical evidence including the objective findings and treatment history[.]” (R. at 45 (citing
R. at 292–299)).
C. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements through December 31, 2025.
(R. at 36). And he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 6, 2021, the alleged
onset date. (R. at 37). The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff has the following severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with right lower extremity
radiculopathy status post L5–S1 discectomy in 2017; degenerative disc disease of the cervical
spine; atherosclerotic heart disease, status post myocardial infarction and coronary artery bypass
graft (CABG); hypertension; recurrent left axilla abscess; and generalized anxiety disorder. (R. at

37). Still, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, either singly or in combination,
meets or medically equals a listed impairment. (Id.).
The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform simple routine tasks with
no more than occasional changes in the routine work setting; lift and/or carry 5
pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally; stand and/or walk with normal
breaks for 2 hours in an 8–hour workday, but requires the opportunity to stand for
15 minutes at one time before needing to sit for 2 minutes before resuming standing
so long as he is not off task; sit with normal breaks for 6 hours in an 8–hour
workday, but requires the opportunity to sit for 1 hour before needing to stand for
2 minutes before resuming sitting so long as he is not off task; can perform pushing
and pulling motions with the upper and left lower extremities within the
aforementioned weight restrictions for 2/3 of an 8–hour workday, but can only
occasionally do so with the right lower extremity; can perform activities requiring
bilateral manual dexterity for both gross and fine manipulation with handling and
reaching for 2/3 of an 8–hour workday; needs to avoid hazards such as moving
machinery and unprotected heights, but does not need to avoid hazards typically
found in the workplace such as boxes on the floor or ajar doors; no commercial
driving; job responsibilities do not include the use of hand–held vibrating or power
tools; needs to be restricted to a work environment with good ventilation that allows
him to avoid frequent concentrated exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, and
high humidity; and can occasionally climb stairs with handrails, stoop, crouch,
kneel, and crawl, but needs to avoid climbing ladders, scaffolds, and ropes.

(R. at 39).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record.” (R. at 40).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform his past relevant work as a customer
service representative or tractor trailer driver. (R. at 45). Relying on the vocational expert’s
(“VE”) testimony, the ALJ found that, considering his age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform
at the sedentary exertional level, such as a sorter, inspector or assembler. (R. at 46–47).
Consequently, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from March 6, 2021, through the date of this decision[.]” (R. at 47).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Commissioner’s findings of fact
must also be based upon the record as a whole. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir.
1985). To this end, the Court must “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from
[the] weight” of the Commissioner’s decision. Rhodes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-1147,
2015 WL 4881574, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

As Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his filings and arguments are construed liberally in his favor.
Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that pro se pleadings “are entitled to
a liberal construction” and that “appropriate liberal construction requires active interpretation in
some cases to construe a pro se petition ‘to encompass any allegation stating federal relief’”)
(citations omitted). However, “[l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure allegations
on a litigant’s behalf . . . .” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wells
v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, “[i]t is not sufficient for a party to
mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its
bones.” McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Construed generously, Plaintiff alleges six errors. (Doc. 11). Generally, the Commissioner
responds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and does not represent
reversible error. (Doc. 13). The Undersigned agrees with the Commissioner.
A. Dr. Jerry Tolbert’s Opinion
In what can best be construed as his first assignment of error, Plaintiff states:
The ALJ improperly discounted the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician. Dr.
Jerry Tolbert, who opined that Plaintiff is limited to specific limitations, sitting for
no more than 2 hours per day, lifting no more than 10 pounds, and requiring
frequent breaks due to pain. Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the ALJ must give
controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion if it is well–supported and not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence. The ALJ failed to provide “good
reasons” for assigning Sedentary Work to Dr. Jerry Tolbert’s opinion, instead
relying on state agency consultant reports or selective evidence. This error
prejudiced Plaintiff by resulting in an RFC that does not account for the full extent
of their limitations.

(Doc. 11 at 1).
As an initial matter, the Social Security rule that Plaintiff cites, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c),
does not apply to his case. Commonly known as the “treating physician rule,” the rule requires
the ALJ to “give controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and
severity of the claimant’s impairment(s) if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the case record.” LaRiccia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App'x 377, 384 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)) (citation modified). But this rule applies only to
claims filed before March 27, 2017. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; see also Nasser v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 22-1293, 2022 WL 17348838, at *1 (6th Cir. 2022). For a claim filed after March 27,
2017―like Plaintiff’s (R. at 34)―an ALJ evaluates medical opinions under the factors listed in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c and is not required to give more weight to treating physicians. See
Masterson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-5512, 2025 WL 317501, at *1 n.1 (6th Cir. 2025)
(“[U]nder the new rule, ALJ’s must evaluate all medical opinions under the same factors.”
(citations omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s decision must be overturned
because he failed to follow the treating physician rule is without merit.
Still, the Undersigned considers Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ did not properly

consider Dr. Tolbert’s opinion. But this presents its own problem. Namely, the Undersigned is
uncertain what medical opinion Plaintiff refers to when he speaks of Dr. Tolbert’s opinion “that
Plaintiff is limited to specific limitations, sitting for no more than 2 hours per day, lifting no more
than 10 pounds, and requiring frequent breaks due to pain.” (Doc. 11 at 1). Plaintiff does not cite
to the record or even specify when Dr. Tolbert wrote the opinion. In fact, the Undersigned cannot
locate a single medical record that Dr. Tolbert signed in the record that the ALJ considered.
While Plaintiff also submitted additional medical evidence from Dr. Tolbert to the Appeals
Council, these records do not offer much clarity into Plaintiff’s alleged error. (R. at 2 (“We find

this evidence does not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the
decision. We did not exhibit this evidence.”)). Neither record references the opined limitation
Plaintiff alludes to. (See R. at 26–30 (Dr. Tolbert’s March 2021 medical notes reporting Plaintiff’s
lumbar extension is limited and increases his pain; his radiculopathy seems to be worsening; and
lesions in his left axilla are consistent with hidradenitis suppurativa), 21–24 (Dr. Tolbert’s June
2021 medical notes reporting Plaintiff’s “coronary artery status is probably better than it has been
in years” and his “lumbar radiculopathy and sacral radiculopathy seem to be well controlled” with
medication)). Being unable to locate any pertinent record, the Undersigned cannot more fully
evaluate this assigned error.
Ultimately, this portion of Plaintiff’s filing is fatally vague, unclear, and asks the Court to

apply out-of-date law. Plaintiff’s first assignment of error should be overruled.
B. The ALJ’s Review of Plaintiff’s Symptom Severity
Plaintiff’s next assignment of error states:
The ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of their symptoms “not entirely consistent” with the evidence,
violating Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p. The ALJ failed to adequately
consider Plaintiff’s consistent reports of chronic pain, fatigue, shortness of breath
and mental health symptoms, which are corroborated by medical records, multiple
doctors notes third party statements, or treatment history. The ALJ’s reliance on
Plaintiff’s ability to perform limited daily activities to discredit their symptoms
misapplies the standard for evaluating subjective complaints, as sporadic or
minimal activities do not equate to the ability to sustain full-time work. See Smolen
v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,1284 (9th Cir. 1996). This error affected the ALJ’s RFC
assessment and the ultimate disability determination.
(Doc. 11 at 1–2 (cleaned up)).

When a plaintiff alleges symptoms of disabling severity, the ALJ must follow a two–step
process for evaluating those symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; SSR 16–3p, 2016 WL
1119029, *3 (March 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must determine whether the individual has a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce
the symptoms alleged. Second, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and functional
limitations of those symptoms by considering objective medical evidence and other evidence,
including: (1) daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other
symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than
medication, received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures used to relieve pain
or other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to
pain or other symptoms. See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
In performing this assessment, the ALJ is not required to analyze all seven factors but must

show that he considered the relevant evidence. Roach v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 1:20–cv–01853–
JDG, 2021 WL 4553128, at *10–11 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2021). Indeed, the ALJ’s assessment of
an individual’s subjective complaints and limitations must be supported by substantial evidence
and be based on a consideration of the entire record. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (internal quotation
omitted). Nonetheless, it remains the province of the ALJ—not the reviewing court—to assess the
consistency of subjective complaints about the impact of a plaintiff’s symptoms with the rest of
the record. See id. “[A]bsent a compelling reason,” an ALJ’s credibility/consistency
determination will not be disturbed. Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Undersigned notes that once again Plaintiff’s assigned error is vague. He alleges that
the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s corroborated reports of symptoms but fails to cite any specific
record support. He merely states the ALJ failed to “adequately consider” his reports of “chronic
pain, fatigue, shortness of breath and mental health symptoms.” (Doc. 11 at 2). Regardless, the

Undersigned concludes that the ALJ sufficiently evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and
the relevant evidence.
The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff alleged his ability to work is limited due to a back
injury, heart failure, depression, and anxiety. (R. at 40 (citing R. at 263–270, 274–82, 286–91,
308–13)). He found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms. (Id.). But Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms did not match the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record. (Id.).
Relating to Plaintiff’s reported physical symptoms, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s history
of coronary artery disease. He considered that Plaintiff reported symptoms of chest pain or

discomfort, palpitations, shortness of breath, and lightheadedness. (R. at 40 (citing e.g., R. at 376,
381, 402–03, 468, 470, 704)). Yet, the ALJ highlighted that despite these reported symptoms,
Plaintiff’s physical examinations generally displayed normal heart rate and rhythm; no murmurs,
rubs or gallops; no lower extremity edema; normal respiratory effort; and normal oxygen
saturation. (Id. (citing e.g., R. at 377, 469, 686, 705)). In fall 2022, Plaintiff also had normal
Holter monitor results and echocardiogram results. (Id. (citing R. at 468, 519–22, 644–77)).
Though Plaintiff was recommended to take stress tests, the ALJ noted the record did not contain
any results of one. (R. at 40–41 (also noting Plaintiff “refused [a stress test] due to the minute
possibility of adverse reaction” and citing R. at 683)). Against this backdrop, the ALJ concluded
that “although [Plaintiff] has a significant cardiac history with some residual symptoms, his
allegations concerning the severity and limiting effects of his symptoms are not fully consistent
with the objective findings on examinations and other testing.” (R. at 41).
The ALJ also highlighted Plaintiff’s allegations that his back pain limits his ability to work.

(R. at 41). The ALJ considered that Plaintiff underwent microdiscectomy in 2017 after a 2016 x-
ray of his lumbar spine showed facet arthropathy and mild degenerative changes in L5-S1. (Id.
(citing R. at 804); see also R. at 367). On the other hand, the ALJ considered that the record
contained no other imaging of Plaintiff’s back. (R. at 41). Still more, examinations generally
showed Plaintiff had full range of motion, was not in acute distress, and had no noted focal
neurological deficits, such as antalgic gait or motor weakness. (Id. (citing R. at 352, 367–70)).
The ALJ also considered that Plaintiff used a cane at a consultative examination in December 2022
because of a recent fall. (Id. (citing R. at 559–61)). But he noted that despite weakness in his hip
flexors, Plaintiff was able to get on and off the examination table without help, had normal posture,
had full lower extremity strength, was able to sit and stand without difficulty, had normal sensation,

and was able to carry out purposeful movement. (Id. (citing R. at 559–61)). The ALJ also
highlighted that there are no other records of Plaintiff using an assistive ambulatory device. (Id.).
And Plaintiff did not have spinal surgery, injections, or other specialized back treatment during
the relevant period. (Id.). The ALJ also noted that medications improved his low back pain. (R.
at 41 (citing R. at 349, 353, 367)). Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s reported symptom
severity was “inconsistent with the objective findings of only mild abnormalities on imaging and
examinations as well as the [Plaintiff’s] positive improvement in symptoms with conservative
medication management.” (Id.).
The ALJ further considered Plaintiff’s allegation that “recurrent abscesses in the left axilla
limit his ability to work.” (R. at 42). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff sought care after experiencing
pain in the left axilla. (Id. (citing R. at 403)). At one appointment in July 2021, an examination
revealed two lesions. However, the ALJ noted the clinician did not recommend treatment. (Id.

(citing R. at 405–07)). A year later, Plaintiff complained of a cyst in the left armpit, but an
examination revealed “no substantial abscess.” (Id. (citing R. at 387, 412)). And a few times
throughout 2023, Plaintiff took antibiotics for a mass in his left axilla. (Id. (citing R. at 726, 738–
45, 786–88)). Again, examinations showed no weakness or limitation of range of motion in the
upper extremity or any other abnormalities. (Id. (citing R. at 726, 787)). The ALJ ultimately
concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations concerning recurrent cysts/abscesses are inconsistent with
the infrequency of his complaints, the positive improvement with antibiotics, the lack of any
surgical intervention or incision and drainage for the cysts, and the absence of associated objective
findings such as reduced upper extremity strength or limited range of motion. (Id.).
Relating to Plaintiff’s reported mental impairment symptoms, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff

testified that “he does not consider himself depressed and he did not describe more than minimal
symptoms or limitations related to depression.” (R. at 37; see also R. at 61 (Plaintiff statement at
the disability hearing that “I don’t consider myself depressed.”)). That said, the ALJ examined
Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms related to anxiety. He noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with and
treated with medication for anxiety and associated symptoms like worrying and racing thoughts.
(R. at 38 (citing R. at 730–733)). The ALJ also considered that “high levels of anxiety” contributed
to at least one of Plaintiff’s emergency room visits. (Id. (citing R. at 402–03)). And Plaintiff’s
wife reported that Plaintiff handled stress and changes poorly and was “stress[ed] out, depressed
and angry . . . about his pain.” (Id. (citing R. at 290). Yet the ALJ also observed that Plaintiff
spent time with others over the phone and was able to go out in public and maintain doctor’s
appointments. (Id. (citing R. at 289)). The ALJ further noted that despite his symptoms, Plaintiff
is “mostly independent” in his daily activities including personal care, errands, and managing
finances. (Id. (citing R. at 292–299)).

The ALJ additionally highlighted that Plaintiff was cooperative during a 2023 consultative
psychological examination and presented with normal speech, logical though processes, and did
not have difficulty paying attention. (R. at 41 (citing R. at 730–33)). The ALJ also noted that the
examiner reported Plaintiff “denied having any significant social issues.” (R. at 38 (citing R. at
731)). And, Plaintiff’s other mental examinations were “routinely . . . within normal limits
showing that he was oriented in all spheres and had normal attention, speech, and behavior.” (R.
at 41 (citing R. at 352–53, 469, 686, 741)). The ALJ further emphasized that Plaintiff “has not
required inpatient psychiatric care for acute anxiety or other mental health symptoms, and there
are no records showing that he has participated in specialized treatment with a psychiatrist,
psychologist, or other mental health professional.” (Id.). He concluded that “[t]he objective

evidence and treatment history tends to show that [Plaintiff’s] anxiety is not as severe, frequent,
or limiting as he claims.” (Id.).
The Undersigned finds no error in the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
of pain and symptoms. The ALJ did not, as Plaintiff’s says, rely only on Plaintiff’s “ability to
perform limited daily activities” to discredit Plaintiff’s allegations of the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of his symptoms. (Doc. 11 at 1–2). While true that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s
daily routine, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s allegations against the objective evidence in the
record and other considerations outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). Simply put, the ALJ took
account of the whole record when making his findings. At base, Plaintiff has not presented a
“compelling reason” to disturb the ALJ’s credibility determination. Smith, 307 F.3d at 379.
C. Plaintiff’s RFC
The Undersigned next considers Plaintiff’s allegation that the residual functional capacity

finding was not supported by substantial evidence:
The ALJ’s RFC determination that Plaintiff can perform, light work with certain
limitations is not supported by substantial evidence . . . . At Step Four, the ALJ
erroneously concluded that Plaintiff could perform work as a sedentary worker,
despite evidence that Plaintiff’s impairments preclude the physical and mental
demands of that job . . . . As a result, the ALJ’s findings at Steps Four and Five are
flawed and warrant reversal.

(Doc. 11 at 1–2).

Yet again, Plaintiff merely gestures at this error without record support, leaving the
Undersigned to fill the gaps for him. (See also Doc. 14 at 2 (“The ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s
[RFC] did not align with the medical evidence.”)). Upon review, the Undersigned finds the ALJ
appropriately considered the record in crafting Plaintiff’s RFC, and he built a logical bridge
between the evidence and his conclusion.
A plaintiff’s RFC “is defined as the most a [plaintiff] can still do despite the physical and
mental limitations resulting from [his] impairments.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x
149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). When determining the
RFC, the ALJ must evaluate several factors, including medical evidence, medical opinions, and
the plaintiff’s testimony. Henderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08–cv–2080, 2010 WL
750222, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2010) (citing Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633
(6th Cir. 2004)). In doing so, the ALJ must resolve conflicts in the record. King v. Heckler, 742
F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984). To that end, an ALJ “is only required to include in the residual
functional capacity those limitations he finds credible and supported by the record.” Beckham v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19–cv–576, 2020 WL 5035451, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2020)
(quoting Lipanye v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F. App’x 165, 170 (6th Cir. 2020)). And an ALJ is
not required to adopt a medical opinion verbatim. See, e.g., Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Although
the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the

medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”). In the end,
the ALJ’s opinion—read as a whole—must build a logical bridge between the evidence and the
ALJ’s conclusions. Davis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19–CV–265, 2019 WL 5853389, at *5
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:19–CV–265, 2020 WL
1482318 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2020).
Here, the ALJ’s assessed RFC was extensive. Among other things, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff was limited to lifting or carrying 5 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally; to
standing and/or walking with normal breaks for 2 hours in an 8-hour workday but with the
opportunity to stand for 15 minutes at one time before needing to sit for 2 minutes before resuming
standing so long as he is not off task; and to sitting with normal breaks for 6 hours in an 8–hour

workday but with the opportunity to sit for 1 hour before needing to stand for 2 minutes before
resuming sitting so long as he is not off task. (R. at 39). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was
limited to performing simple routine tasks with no more than occasional changes in the routine
work setting. (Id.).
In building Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the medical evidence and opinions related
to Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments. In addition to the discussion of record evidence
above, the ALJ considered an October 2021 consultative examination performed by Kathryn
Francescon, FNP that opined Plaintiff “may have difficulty with standing for extended periods of
time” but “would likely be able to sit for extended periods of time.” (R. at 43 (citing R. at 370)).
The ALJ found this opinion somewhat persuasive, noting that FNP Francescon’s statements were
speculative and vague, and she failed to record significant objective findings or observations that
would support the limitations. (Id.). But the ALJ also noted that the medical evidence, as a whole,
was consistent with the standing, walking, and sitting restrictions articulated in the RFC. (Id.).

The ALJ considered a December 2022 consultative exam by Dr. Travis Parkulo that opined
Plaintiff “is limited in the ability to sit, stand, or ambulate secondary to his right leg pain.” (Id.
(citing R. at 561)). The ALJ concluded that this limitation was “too vague to be more than
modestly persuasive because the degree or amount of limitation is not quantified.” (Id.). Yet the
ALJ found the Dr. Parkulo’s opinion related to Plaintiff’s hip flexor weakness supported some
limitation to standing and walking. (Id.). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Parkulo’s observations that
Plaintiff had an antalgic gait and used a cane were due to a recent fall and did not support greater
standing or walking restrictions. (Id. (citing R. at 559–60)). The ALJ further concluded that
despite the doctor finding no limitation related to Plaintiff’s manipulative abilities, other evidence
in the record required some restriction to Plaintiff’s handling and reaching during the workday.

(R. at 44 (citing R. at 561, 565)). Finally, the ALJ highlighted that Plaintiff reported to Dr. Parkulo
that he had a ten-pound lifting restriction placed on him by his cardiologist. (R. at 44–45 (citing
R. at 559)). But the ALJ could not locate such a restriction in the written record. (Id.). Despite
this, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s symptoms of back pain, leg pain, chest pain, and shortness of
breath “are reasonably consistent with a restriction to sedentary work, which involved
lifting/carrying a maximum of 10 pounds only on an occasional basis.” (R. at 45).
The ALJ also considered APRN April Gillespie’s suggestion that Plaintiff engage in no
heavy lifting or strenuous activities for one week. (R. at 44 (citing R. at 604). But he noted that
the opinion was minimally persuasive because APRN Gillespie’s opinion was limited in duration
and did not accurately reflect his long-term work-related abilities and limitations. (Id.).
Rounding out the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s physical impairment records, the ALJ
spoke to the prior administrative findings of the state agency medical consultants. (Id. (citing R.
at 90–96, 99–108)). There, the state agency consultants opined that Plaintiff remained capable of

light work with some postural restrictions. (R. at 90–96 (opining Plaintiff can stand or walk for a
total of 4 hours per day and can sit for a total of 6 hours per day), 99–108 (same)). The ALJ found
these opinions no more than moderately persuasive. (R. at 45). He concluded that Plaintiff’s
physical impairments are more severe and cause greater limitations. (Id.).
In considering the opinion evidence related to Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ
attended to Plaintiff’s May 2023 examination with consultative psychologist Christie Kincaid,
PsyD. (R. at 44 (citing R. at 730–733)). In that record, Dr. Kincaid opined that Plaintiff “is likely
able to understand instructions but may have trouble recalling them” and “may have difficulty
completing tasks in a timely manner due to concentration issues.” (Id. (citing R. at 732)). She
further opined that Plaintiff had marked impairments in understanding, retaining, and following

simple instructions; a moderate impairment in sustaining concentration and completing tasks
presented in a normal time; and a moderate impairment in adapting and responding to the pressures
of normal day-to-day work activities. (Id. (citing R. at 733)). The ALJ found these opinions only
mildly persuasive. (Id.). He highlighted that Dr. Kincaid’s assessment of Plaintiff’s marked
limitation in understanding simple instructions was inconsistent with her statement that he can
likely understand instructions. (Id.). The ALJ also observed that during the examination,
Plaintiff’s remote memory was intact, he was fully prepared to participate in the interview, he
understood instructions, and he provided coherent responses, suggesting no more than a moderate
limitation in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out information. (R. at 44 (citing R. at
732–33)). And Dr. Kincaid’s opinion that Plaintiff has a moderate limitation in sustaining
concentration and completing tasks was premised not on Plaintiff’s inability to do those things,
but rather on Plaintiff not attempting one of the examination tasks. (Id. (citing R at 732–33). Of
her other conclusions, the ALJ found those consistent with the evidence in the record. (Id.).

Finally, the ALJ considered the state agency psychologist’s opinion that Plaintiff was
limited in his ability to carry out detailed instructions; to maintain attention and concentration; to
perform a normal workday at a consistent pace without interruptions from symptoms; to respond
appropriately to changes in the work setting; and to interact appropriately with the general public.
(R. at 45 (citing R. at 101, 105–06)). The ALJ explained that the state agency psychologist offered
little explanatory support for her conclusions. (Id.). And she failed to resolve conflicts between
her opinion and other record evidence she reviewed. (Id.). Ultimately, the ALJ found that the
record supported some restrictions to simple routine tasks with no more than occasional changes
to the work setting. (Id.).
The Undersigned again underscores that Plaintiff fails to cite specific records opining the

limitations that he says the ALJ erred by not including in the RFC. (See Doc. 11 at 1 (stating only
Dr. Tolbert opined Plaintiff is restricted to sitting for no more than 2 hours per day; lifting no more
than 10 pounds, and requires frequent breaks but not providing more details about the record), 2
(stating the ALJ failed to incorporate Plaintiff documented limitations including the need for
frequent breaks but not providing record citations)). And Plaintiff’s conclusory gesture to omitted
“sitting/standing/walking” and “mental health-related” limitations does not provide the
Undersigned with much guidance either. (Id. at 2). But the discussion above demonstrates the
ALJ’s RFC conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ walked through the
relevant medical opinions and explained why he found each persuasive or not persuasive. In other
words, he adequately built a logical bridge between the evidence and his conclusion, as he is
required to do. See Davis, 2019 WL 5853389, at *5.
Fundamentally, Plaintiff wishes “the ALJ had interpreted the evidence differently.”
Glasgow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-CV-1831, 2016 WL 2935666, at *7 (S.D. Ohio May

20, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-CV-01831, 2016 WL 4486936 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 26, 2016), aff’d, 690 F. App’x 385 (6th Cir. 2017). The law prohibits the Court from
reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Reynolds v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v.
Webb, 49 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1995)) (“This court reviews the entire administrative record, but
does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of
credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.”).
In sum, the ALJ properly accounted for the medical opinions and prior administrative
medical findings in this case, his reasoning is easily traced, and his ultimate RFC finding was
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Undersigned finds no error.

D. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony
Plaintiff next alleges errors with the ALJ’s treatment of the Vocational Expert’s testimony:
The ALJ failed to resolve conflicts between the vocational expert’s (VE) testimony
and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), as required by SSR 00–4p. At
Step Five, the ALJ relied on VE testimony that Plaintiff could perform other jobs
in the national economy, such as assembler or sorter, but the hypothetical posed to
the VE did not incorporate all of the Plaintiff’s documented limitations, including
the courts own statements for the need for frequent breaks, restrictions on
sitting/standing/walking, or mental health–related limitations.

(Doc. 11 at 2 (cleaned up)).
In determining whether a plaintiff can perform his past relevant work, the Social Security
Administration “will ask [a plaintiff] for information about work [they] have done in the past,”
and it “may use the services of vocational experts or vocational specialists . . . to obtain evidence”
to determine whether a plaintiff “can do [their] past relevant work, given [their] residual functional
capacity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). As this provision makes clear, an ALJ does not err by
relying on a vocational expert to develop the record regarding a plaintiff’s past relevant work

experience. The Undersigned generously construes this portion of Plaintiff’s filing as alleging two
distinct errors related the VE’s testimony and the ALJ’s treatment of the same.
1. The ALJ’s Hypothetical
Plaintiff first pushes back on the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE at the December
2023 disability hearing. In that hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual
with Plaintiff’s age, education, and past work experiences had workplace limitations that were
nearly identical to Plaintiff’s ultimate RFC. (R. at 69–71; compare id. with R. at 39 (Plaintiff’s
RFC including all the limitations from the hearing hypothetical but omitting the Agency’s
definition of “occasionally”)); see also SSR 83-10 (defining “occasionally” as “from very little up
to one-third of the time”). In response to the ALJ’s asking if such an individual could do Plaintiff’s

past work as generally or actually performed, the VE responded that past-relevant work is
eliminated because “[Plaintiff]’s past work was semi–skilled or skilled, and this hypothetical is
limited to unskilled work activity.” (R. at 71). The VE testified that the hypothetical individual
could perform the following sedentary, unskilled jobs: sorter, Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”) code 521.687–086, approximately 28,000 positions nationally; inspector, DOT code
669.687–014, approximately 33,000 positions nationally; and assembler, DOT code 713.687–018,
approximately 15,000 positions nationally. (R. at 71–72). In response to the ALJ’s subsequent
hypotheticals that included additional scheduled breaks, off task time of greater than 15 percent,
or missing two workdays per month due to symptoms, VE noted those limitations were work
preclusive. (R. at 73).
Of this exchange, Plaintiff states “the VE did not incorporate all of Plaintiff’s documented
limitations, including the court’s own statements for the need for frequent breaks, restrictions on

sitting/standing/walking, or mental health-related limitations.” (Doc. 11 at 2 (cleaned up)). The
Undersigned takes this to mean Plaintiff faults the ALJ for excluding from his first
hypothetical―which was adopted as Plaintiff’s RFC―work preclusive limitations such as off-
task time and frequent breaks. However, the ALJ is not required to incorporate all limitations in
his hypothetical questions posed to the VE―only those he finds credible and supported by the
record. See Winslow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 566 F. App’x 418, 421 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting an
ALJ’s “hypothetical questions were proper because the ALJ incorporated all of the functional
limitations that she deemed credible”); Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230,
1235 (6th Cir. 1993) (“It is well established that an ALJ may pose hypothetical questions to a [VE]
and is required to incorporate only those limitations accepted as credible by the finder of fact.”).

As explained above, the ALJ did not find the limitations Plaintiff desires supported by the record.
And the RFC is supported by substantial evidence. This error is without merit.
2. Resolution of Conflicts

Plaintiff’s other relevant assigned error alleges the “ALJ failed to resolve conflicts between
the [VE’s] testimony and the DOT, as required by SSR 00-4p.” (Doc. 11 at 2). The policy
interpretation ruling Plaintiff cites states that before relying on a VE’s evidence to support a
disability determination, the ALJ must identify and obtain a “reasonable explanation” for conflicts
between the VE’s occupational evidence and information in the DOT. SSR 00-4p. The ALJ must
also explain how any conflicts that were identified were resolved. Id.
At the disability hearing, the ALJ asked the VE if her testimony was consistent with the
DOT and, if not, what variables she based on her professional experience. (R. at 73). The VE
responded that there are differences which the DOT “just does not address.” (Id.). Specific to
limitations related to standing and walking with the opportunity to sit or stand, the VE noted that

the DOT “does not specify all of the demarcations across the continuum, and it does not address a
sit/stand option at all.” (R. at 73–74). The VE further noted that the DOT does not make certain
distinctions related to using one’s upper and lower extremities to push and pull. (R. at 74). Nor
does it make distinctions between using bilateral hands or one hand to perform occupations or
between types of climbing. (Id.). She also stated the DOT does not rate commercial driving, the
use of handheld assistive devises, absenteeism, or off-task time. (Id. (calling the ALJ’s attention
to their previous conversation about the last three)). The VE concluded that all those aspects of
her testimony were based upon her education, training, and work experience as a certified
rehabilitation consultant. (Id.).
In considering whether jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform

given his age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ noted his conversation with the VE.
(R. at 46–47). The ALJ acknowledged that the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT
except for aspects she based upon professional knowledge and experience. (R. at 47). Ultimately,
the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony in concluding that Plaintiff is capable of “making a successful
adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id.).
The Undersigned concludes that the ALJ properly considered the VE’s testimony in
compliance with SSR 00-4p, and he resolved any perceived conflicts between the VE’s testimony
and the DOT. He correctly explained the factors not addressed in the DOT that the VE spoke to
based upon her professional knowledge and experience. (R. at 47). Fatally, Plaintiff does not
identify any specific conflict the ALJ failed to resolve in this discussion. See, e.g., Kennedy v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 87 F. App’x 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ssues which are ‘adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed
waived.’” (citation omitted)). As such, the Undersigned finds no reversible error.

E. Weight of Prior Opinion
Plaintiff’s next assignment of error alleges:
The ALJ improperly assigned little weight to the opinion of the court in [Plaintiff’s
previous case] from 2017 thru 2019, the ALJ must consider opinions from non-
acceptable medical sources and articulate the weight given to such opinions. The
ALJ’s cursory dismissal of this evidence, without adequate explanation, violates
regulatory requirements and undermines the RFC determination.

(Doc. 11 at 2). Again, Plaintiff’s assignment of error is not a model of clarity. But, reading it
generously, the Undersigned construes it as finding fault with the ALJ’s treatment of a prior
administrative decision.
In Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Sixth Circuit held that “[w]hen the
Commissioner has made a final decision concerning a claimant’s entitlement to benefits, the
Commissioner is bound by this determination absent changed circumstances.” 126 F.3d 837, 842
(6th Cir. 1997). In that case, a claimant’s initial claim for SSI was denied when an ALJ found that
she was capable of sedentary work. Id. at 838. When the claimant later re-filed her disability
claim, a second ALJ found that she was capable of medium-level work—unlike the sedentary RFC
finding of the first ALJ—and denied the re-filed claim. Id. at 839. After explaining that “[r]es
judicata applies in an administrative law context following a trial type hearing,” the Sixth Circuit
held that the second ALJ was bound by the sedentary RFC determination of the first ALJ because
there was no new or additional evidence of an improvement in the claimant’s condition. Id. at
841–842. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “[j]ust as a social security claimant is barred from
relitigating an issue that has been previously determined, so is the Commissioner.” Id. The Social
Security Administration subsequently issued an Acquiescence Ruling explaining how the ruling
in Drummond would be applied to claims in the Sixth Circuit:
When adjudicating a subsequent disability claim with an adjudicated period under
the same title of the Act as the prior claim, adjudicators must adopt such a finding
from the final decision by an ALJ or the Appeals Council on the prior claim . . .
unless there is new and material evidence relating to such a finding or there has
been a change in the law, regulations or ruling affecting the finding or the method
for arriving at the finding.

AR 98-4(6), Effect of Prior Findings on Adjudication of a Subsequent Disability Claim Arising
Under the Same Title of the Social Security Act – Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 1998
WL 283902, at *3 (June 1, 1998).
The Sixth Circuit further addressed the scope of Drummond in Earley v. Commissioner of
Social Security by reiterating that res judicata applies to administrative proceedings. 893 F.3d 929
(6th Cir. June 27, 2018). The Earley Court explained that when a claimant files a later application
covering the same period as an earlier application, res judicata applies absent good cause to revisit
the earlier determination. Id. at 933. But the Earley Court explained that res judicata does not
apply when a claimant files a subsequent application seeking benefits for a different period.
Instead, “[w]hen an individual seeks disability benefits or a distinct period of time, each
application is entitled to review.” Id. The Earley Court cautioned, however, that “fresh review is
not blind review.” Id. at 934. Although an ALJ evaluating a subsequent application is not bound
to follow a previous determination, the ALJ may “nevertheless consider what an earlier judge did
if for no other reason than to strive for consistent decision making.” Id.
Since then, this Court has said that Earley “clarified” the Drummond decision. Teasley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv-1079, 2019 WL 2559514 at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2019). “The
Sixth Circuit explained that ‘the key principles protected by Drummond—consistency between
proceedings and finality with respect to resolved applications’—do not prohibit the Social Security
Administration ‘from giving a fresh look to a new application containing new evidence or
satisfying a new regulatory threshold that covers a new period of alleged disability while being
mindful of past rulings and the record in a prior proceeding.’” Id. (citing Earley, 893 F.3d at 933).

Therefore, as this Court has noted, “it is fair for an administrative law judge to take the view that,
absent new and additional evidence, the first administrative law judge’s findings are a legitimate,
albeit not binding, consideration in reviewing a second application.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff previously filed an application for DIB alleging disability beginning on
December 12, 2016. (R. at 79). The ALJ in that case, ALJ Prince, concluded Plaintiff was under
a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from that day through April 11, 2019. (R. at
87). ALJ Prince further found Plaintiff’s disability ended on April 12, 2019, and, as of the decision,
he had not become disabled since. (R. at 89 (decision issued January 9, 2020)).
ALJ D’Amato discussed this prior opinion. He stated:
The undersigned has considered the findings in the prior administrative law judge
decision (B1A) and declines to adopt them because there is new and material
evidence (see Drummond v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir.
1997) and Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6) (SSA must adopt a finding of a claimant’s
residual functional capacity or other finding required under the applicable
sequential evaluation process for determining disability that was made in a final
decision by an ALJ or Appeals Council on a prior disability claim unless new and
additional evidence or changed circumstances provide a basis for a different finding
of the claimant’s residual functional capacity); Dennard v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Svcs., 907 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1990) and Acquiescence Ruling 98-3(6) (SSA
must adopt a finding of the demands of a claimant’s past relevant work made in the
final decision by the ALJ or Appeals Council on the prior disability claim); Earley
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018) (prior ALJ findings are a
legitimate consideration but are not binding on a different time period in the
absence of new and material evidence)).

(R. at 36 (cleaned up)). The Undersigned finds that this discussion is consistent with the duty
imposed on the ALJ by the Regulations and by the caselaw explained above. The ALJ considered
the prior favorable decision, which covered a different time period than Plaintiff’s claim here, but
concluded there was new and material evidence. The ALJ scrutinized this new evidence in detail
throughout the remainder of his decision, as discussed above. To the extent Plaintiff would like
the ALJ to more strongly weigh the prior decision even in light of changed circumstances, that is

not consistent with Sixth Circuit precedent. In other words, consistent with Earley, the ALJ took
a fresh look at Plaintiff’s new application and considered evidence relevant to it. The Undersigned
finds no error.
F. Transfer and Hearing Method
Plaintiff finally states that the fact that he was not provided an “in person Court
[appearance] to face the personnel assigned to this case” is a reversible error. (Doc. 11 at 2; see
also Doc. 14 at 4; but see R. at 34 (noting Plaintiff’s agreement to appear by telephone), 58 (the
ALJ asking at the disability hearing “I just want to confirm that you have no problem proceeding
with this hearing today by telephone. Is that correct, sir?” and Plaintiff responding “I do not have
any problem with proceeding”), 186–87 (remote hearing agreement form on which Plaintiff’s

counsel agreed to a telephone hearing and asserted his selection accurately reflected Plaintiff’s
voluntary determination)). Plaintiff also finds fault that his case “was transferred to Livonia, MI
offices for processing,” but the Social Security Administration “did not cite reasons for the
transfer.” (Id.).
Plaintiff cites no rule, regulation, or caselaw for the proposition that the Court must reverse
an ALJ’s finding of non-disability on these grounds. The Undersigned additionally finds that
Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel at his disability hearing (Doc. 53), had ample
opportunities to be heard and present his case. Cf. Ferriell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 614 F.3d 611,
620 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (“In the context of a social security hearing, due process
requires that the proceedings be ‘full and fair.’”). The record shows Plaintiff appeared at the
hearing before the ALJ and was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and state his position
through his counsel. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450. This alleged error is without merit.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s
Statement of Errors (Doc. 11) and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.
Date: August 19, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11123622. Public record. Not legal advice.