# Ellis v. Chronister

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122937

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122937

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to disturb jury’s award of $150,000 in compensatory damages to plaintiff who was retaliated against under Title VII
- explaining that the quintessential example of direct evidence is often “a management memorandum saying” that the employee was fired because of engaging in a protected activity

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

JEREMY ELLIS,
Plaintiff,

V. Case No: 8:22-cv-2508-KKM-CPT

CHAD CHRONISTER in
his official capacity as SHERIFF
of HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY,
Defendant.

ORDER
Jeremy Ellis sued Chad Chronister, acting in his capacity as Sheriff of

Hillsborough County, for claims related to Ellis’s former employment at the

Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office. Sec. Am. Compl. (Doc. 88). The jury found

that the Sheriff’s Office retaliated against Ellis by terminating him after he filed a

charge of discrimination against the Sheriff’s Office and awarded Ellis damages,
both for lost wages and compensatory harm. Verdict (Doc. 101).

At trial, the Sheriff’s Office moved for judgment as a matter of law on the

issue of causation, which I denied. (Doc. 108) The Sheriff’s Office renews its Rule

50 motion, Mot. JMOL (Doc. 128), and Ellis opposes, Resp. (Doc. 136).
The Sheriff’s Office also moves for a new trial on the basis that (1) the jury’s
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence; (2) the jury instructions are

erroneous as to the retaliation claim; and (3) a miscarriage of justice would result if

the verdict was allowed to stand. Mot. New Trial (Doc. 129). Lastly, the Sheriff's

Office seeks a new trial or remittitur on the basis that the jury awarded Ellis excessive

compensatory damages. Id. Ellis opposes. Resp. (137).
I deny both motions for the reasons below.

I. BACKGROUND

In October 2007, the Sheriff’s Office hired Ellis as a community service

officer. Tr. (Day One) (Doc. 110) at 156-57. In 2010, the Sheriff’s Office promoted
Ellis to detention deputy, a position that he held until his termination in 2022. Id. at

158, 161.

The relevant events for purposes of his retaliation claim began in December

2021 when Ellis filed an EEOC charge of discrimination. Id. 158-59. In January
2022, the Sheriff’s Office placed Ellis on a “fitness for duty” evaluation because of its

“review of the [December 2021] charge of discrimination,” and Ellis was

subsequently “cleared fit for duty.” Tr. (Day Two) (Doc. 111) at 134, 136.

In May 2022, premised on Ellis’s’ EEOC complaint, the Sheriff’s Office placed
Ellis under an “Internal Affairs investigation” based on charges of “falsification of

[an] official document and public disparagement.” Tr. (Day One) at 162-63. After

notifying Ellis of the investigation, the Sheriff’s Office suspended him without pay.
Id. at 163-65.

In early July, the Sheriff’s Office notified Ellis that he may be subject to

termination because of the investigation of his December 2021 charge of

discrimination. Tr. (Day Two) at 141. About a week later, the Sheriff’s Office held a

“predetermination hearing” and recommended termination. Id. at 141-44. Ellis

appealed to the Complaint Review Board, which recommended terminating Ellis, as

did the Disciplinary Review Board. Id. at 40, 144-46; Tr. (Day Three) (Doc. 112) at

51, 93. The Sheriff’s Office then terminated Ellis on August 16, 2022, for “public
disparagement and falsification o[f] an official document.” Tr. (Day Two) at 68.

In November 2022, Ellis sued the Sheriff’s Office, see Compl. (Doc. 1),
bringing claims under both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a), and the

Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), § 760.10, Fla. Stat., see Am. Compl. (Doc. 16)

{4 44-71. In particular, Ellis alleged that the Sheriff’s Office retaliated against him

by terminating him after he filed his December 2021 EEOC charge of

discrimination. Sec. Am. Compl. 54-63. A jury returned a verdict for Ellis based

on his retaliation claim, awarding $125,000 in damages for lost wages and $125,000
in damages for compensatory, non-economic harm. Verdict.

Il. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

When considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 50, a court must determine “whether the evidence is ‘legally
sufficient to find for the party on that issue.’” Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d

1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). In other words,
judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if the evidence provides no basis

“for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Cleveland v. Home

Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004). The standard that

applies to motions under Rule 50(a) “is precisely the same as the standard” that

applies to renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b).
Chaney, 483 F.3d at 1227 (quoting 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2537 (2d ed. 1995)).

A court “should review all of the evidence in the record and must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1192—

analyzing a renewed Rule 50 motion after a jury returns a verdict, the “court’s

sole consideration ... is to assess whether that verdict is supported by sufficient

evidence.” Chaney, 483 F.3d at 1227. “It is the jury’s task”—not a court’s—“to weigh
conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.”

Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186). A court must not second-guess the jury or substitute

its judgment for that of the jury. Id. If reasonable jurors could reach different results,

a court may not enter judgment as a matter of law. Id.

B. Motion for a New Trial

For a new trial, the Sheriff’s Office must show “the verdict ‘was against the

clear weight of the evidence or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’” Am. Builders

Ins. Co. v. $.-Owners Ins. Co., 71 F-4th 847, 859 (11th Cir. 2023) (alterations and

omission adopted)(quoting Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 890 F.3d 942, 948

(11th Cir. 2018)). “[I]t is critical that a judge does not merely substitute his judgment
for that of the jury.” Tracy v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 980 F.3d 799, 811 (11th Cir.

2020) (quoting Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183,

1186 (11th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, entitlement to a new trial on evidentiary
grounds requires the verdict to be “against the great—not merely the greater—weight
of the evidence.” Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984)
(quotation omitted).
C. Remittitur

“[A] remittitur order reducing a jury’s award to the outer limit of the proof is

the appropriate remedy where the jury’s damage award exceeds the amount

established by the evidence.” Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435,
1448 (11th Cir. 1985); accord Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc.,518 F.3d 1259,
1266 (11th Cir. 2008).
II. ANALYSIS

A. Rule 50 Motion

The Sheriff's Office contends there is insufficient evidence for a jury to find

that Ellis’s EEOC charge was the but-for cause of his termination. In the Sheriffs

Office’s view, Ellis was terminated for two reasons. First, the Sheriff's Office fired

Ellis for what he alleged in his EEOC charge. Mot. JMOL at 6. Second, and as an

independent basis, the Sheriffs Office fired Ellis for being “untruthful during the

administrative investigation and subsequent disciplinary appeal process, and he was

not apologetic for his actions.” Id. In pressing this argument, the Sheriffs Office

asks the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury as to whether the first

reason was the but-for reason for Ellis’s termination. I cannot do that. The jury had

sufficient evidence—and could make credibility determinations—to conclude that

Ellis would not have been terminated absent the contents of his EEOC charge and

that the Sheriff's Office would not have terminated him for his conduct in the

follow-on investigation and disciplinary process. The Sheriffs Office’s arguments to

the contrary fail for the below reasons.

A Title VII retaliation claim requires “proof that the desire to retaliate was

the but-for-cause of the challenged employment action.” Yelling v. St. Vincent’s

Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1340 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.

Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013); see Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360 (“Title VII

retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for

causation, not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000c—2(m).”). In other words,

a Title VII plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the

unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful
action or actions of the employer.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360. It is always “the

employee’s burden . . . to prove that ‘the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause’ of

the challenged action.” Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th

1296, 1305 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352).
If an employer’s proffered explanation for the adverse employment action is

one that might motivate a reasonable employer, “an employee must meet that reason

head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with

the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th
Cir. 2000) (en banc). “[A] reason is not pretext for [retaliation] unless it is shown

both that the reason was false, and that [retaliation] was the real reason.” Springer

v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam) internal citations omitted).
Under the “participation clause” of Title VI, it is unlawful for an employer to

retaliate against an employee for making a charge, testifying, assisting, or otherwise

participating “in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under” Title

VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171,
1174 (11th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, “under the participation clause, an employer

may not retaliate against an employee because the employee has made a charge.”
Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d at 1174 (quotation omitted); Pettway v. Am. Cast

Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969).' Even “false statements made in

the context of an EEOC charge (per the participation clause) are protected and

cannot be grounds for dismissal or discipline.” Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d at

1175. The participation clause affords statements an “extreme level of protection for

untruth” in the context of charges made before the EEOC. Id. But this protection
does not extend to an employee’s statements made in the context of the employer’s
internal investigation of discrimination. Id. at 1175-77.

At trial, there was ample evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for the jury

to find that Ellis was retaliated against (in the form of termination) for what he

included in the charge of discrimination. Direct evidence is “evidence, which if

believed, proves existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Wright

v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Indeed, Ellis’s notice of termination is compelling direct evidence, stating that “[t]he
REASON for the action [of dismissal] is” that Ellis filed “a Charge of

Discrimination with the [EEOC]... [that] knowingly utilized false information to

make the claim,” which in turn violated “HCSO Rules and Regulations” 3.1.06,

‘In Bonner v. City of Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all
decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit prior to the
close of business on September 30, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

4.1.09, and 4.8.04. Not. of Discipline (Doc. 41-2) at 3; see Merritt v. Dillard Paper
Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the quintessential
example of direct evidence is often “a management memorandum saying” that the

employee was fired because of engaging in a protected activity). Title □□□□□

participation clause bars this action by employers. See Total Sys. Servs., 221 F.3d at

1175 (“[F]alse statements made in the context of an EEOC charge... are protected
and cannot be grounds for dismissal or discipline.”).
There is also circumstantial evidence suggesting that retaliation was the real

reason for Ellis’s termination. Only a couple of weeks after Ellis filed his EEOC

charge, the Sheriffs Office’s responded by subjecting Ellis to a “fitness for duty”
evaluation. Tr. (Day Two) at 134. The documents implementing the evaluation state

that it was in response to Ellis’s EEOC charge, indicating some kind of

disagreement or concern about what Ellis espoused in his charge. Id. at 134-35. A

couple of months after that—and only one day after Ellis’s 90-day window to file

suit expired—the Sheriffs Office’s initiated an internal affairs investigation, having
charged Ellis with “falsification of [an] official document and public disparagement”
because of what he wrote in the EEOC charge. Tr. (Day One) at 161-62. In the

Sheriffs Office’s own words, “the investigation was initiated to address untruthful

10

statements in [Ellis’s] charge of discrimination.” Mot. JMOL at 18-19. A reasonable

jury could infer that the timing of these events suggested that the EEOC charge by
Ellis motivated the Sheriffs Office’s decision to terminate him.

Considering the direct and circumstantial evidence of retaliation, there was

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that retaliation was the but-for

reason for Ellis’s termination. See Chaney, 483 F.3d at 1227.

The Sheriffs Office contends that Ellis failed to rebut evidence that Ellis’s

conduct throughout the investigation and disciplinary proceeding was a but-for

reason for his termination and, as such, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

According to the Sheriffs Office, because Ellis’s termination was independently
reviewed by the Discipline Review Board and other removed decision-makers, the

causal link between any animus and Ellis’s termination is severed. Mot. JMOL at 8-

9. The Sheriffs Office cites Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, where the Eleventh

Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to show discriminatory animus in her employer’s
decision to terminate her because her termination was reviewed by an independent
board that made a “fair and independent decision.” 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.

1999) (per curiam). This situation is similar to Stimpson, according to the Sheriffs

Office, because Chief Deputy Luscynski made the final decision to terminate Ellis

11

based on her independent review and concluded that Ellis lied during the

investigation and was unapologetic for his actions. Mot. JMOL 9-11. Specifically,
the Sheriffs Office points to Luscynski’s testimony that her decision to terminate

Ellis was based on the error of Ellis’s hiring date in his charge and the following
inconsistency in his testimony, her belief that Ellis lied about being inebriated when

submitting the charge, and Ellis’s “refus[al] to apologize and take responsibility for

his actions.” Id. at 11.

But unlike in Stimpson, the final decision maker’s official decision merely
repeated the unlawful reasoning for terminating Ellis. The official reason for Ellis’s

termination, written and signed by Luscynski, was that Ellis filed “a Charge of

Discrimination with the [EEOC] ... [that] knowingly utilized false information to

make the claim,” which in turn violated “HCSO Rules and Regulations” 3.1.06,
4.1.09, and 4.8.04. Not. of Discipline at 3. Again, terminating an employee for false

statements made in an EEOC charge is unlawful under precedent. Pettway, 411

F.2d at 1007. And the explanation of the reasons for termination does not fully

capture the other concerns that Chief Deputy Luscynski testified about, although
she claims to have had those concerns when she made the final determination to

terminate Ellis. See generally Not. of Discipline. Whether or not to believe
12

Luscynski’s testimony is a credibility determination, which is the jury’s province.
Shannon, 292 F.3d at 715. In the light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could have

concluded that the reasons the Sheriffs Office articulated for terminating Ellis

outside of the content of the EEOC charge were not a but-for cause of his

termination, and that retaliation was.

B. Motion for a New Trial

The Sheriff’s Office’s argument for a new trial is twofold. First, it repeats the

arguments made in its motion for judgment as a matter of law that there is

insufficient evidence for the jury to have found for Ellis on the issue of causation.

Second, the Sheriff’s Office argues that the jury instructions regarding Ellis’s

retaliation claim were erroneous.

1. Evidence Regarding Causation

The Sheriff’s Office expressly acknowledges that it “relies on, and

incorporates,” the arguments in its motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding
causation. Mot. New Trial at 3 n.3. As I explained above, supra at 7, there was ample
evidence for the jury to find that the Sheriff’s Office terminated Ellis because of his

EEOC charge, and therefore the verdict was not against the great weight of the

evidence on this issue.

13

2. Jury Instructions

In deciding motions for a new trial on the basis of an allegedly erroneous jury
instruction, a court considers whether the jury understood the issues or was misled.

Christopher v. Cutter Lab’ys, 53 F.3d 1184, 1190-91 (11th Cir. 1995). Courts must

examine jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately
addressed the issue and correctly stated the law. Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan

Allen, Inc., 991 F.2d 1533, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1993). A district court has broad

discretion in formulating jury instructions. Id.

The Sheriffs Office attempts to relitigate the scope of protection for an

employee under the “participation clause,” an issue that I addressed at summary
judgment, in the jury instructions, and throughout trial. See Order on Mot. Summ.

J. (Doc. 54) at 21-26; Tr. (Day One) at 8-12, 120-32, 178-87; Tr. (Day Three) at

126-28, 138-39. My view of what binding precedent requires on that matter has not

changed, so I find no basis to grant the motion for a new trial.

The instructions on retaliation correctly applied binding precedent. Under

Pettway, Title VII’s participation clause protects an employee’s right to file an EEOC

charge, and an employer therefore cannot terminate an employee based on its

determination that the allegations in the charge were incorrect. 411 F.2d at 1007; see

14

Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d at 1175 (explaining participation clause activity is

given an “extreme level of protection for untruth”); Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp.
2d 1180, 1200 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“Pettway [] is binding authority in this circuit.”).
Accordingly, the jury was instructed that “[a]n employer may not terminate an

employee because of anything written in an EEOC charge, regardless of whether an

employer believes the content of the EEOC Charge is true or false.” Jury Instructions

(Doc. 103) (JIs) at 8.

The Sheriff’s Office’s first argues that the law itself is incorrect. The Sheriff’s

Office contends there is no textual basis for Pettway’s expansive protection of

statements made in an EEOC charge. Mot. New Trial at 8-11. Those arguments are

best directed to the en banc Eleventh Circuit, not this lower court.

The Sheriff’s Office also argues that Pettway is inconsistent with post- Nassar

caselaw on but-for causation, explaining that it “preclude[s] the full application of

Nassar’s but-for test.” Id. at 16. In essence, that Nassar abrogated Pettway. I disagree,
for reasons I have explained in this case already. In Nassar, the Supreme Court held

that causation in Title VII retaliation cases must be proved using the “but-for” test,
which requires the fact-finder to remove the factor in question and determine

whether the outcome would be the same. 570 U.S. at 362; see Bostock v. Clayton
15

Caty., 590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020). Accordingly, the jury was instructed that, as to

causation, they must decide whether Ellis was terminated “because of” Ellis’s

protected activity—in other words, the jury must decide whether Ellis’s “protected
activity was the main reason” for his termination. JIs at 8.

The Sheriff’s Office does not appear to argue that this was an erroneous jury
instruction but protests the wisdom of Pettway and its distinction between

participation and opposition clause activity. Mot. New Trial at 13-15. The Sheriff’s

Office cites several inapposite cases that concern Title VII’s opposition clause,

ignoring the underlying reasoning for the difference in protection under the clauses.

Id. at 13-14; see Total Sys. Servs.,221 F.3d at 1175 (explaining that the difference

in levels of protection for the clauses is due to the fact that they protect entirely
different activity). Further, the Sheriff’s Office’s argument ignores that the but-for

test allows for the possibility of multiple but-for causes. Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos., 93

F-4th 1181, 1200 (11th Cir. 2024). By instructing the jury that one cause is unlawful,
that does not forbid them from considering other lawful causes. See Yelling, 82 F.4th

at 1338-39. The jury was instructed to determine whether retaliation was the “main

reason,” JIs at 8 (emphasis added), not whether it was the only reason. ‘Therefore,

16

Pettway’s prohibition of terminating an employee based on the content of an EEOC

charge does not preclude application of the but-for test in Nassar.

In sum, the jury instruction on retaliation was not erroneous.

C. Remittitur

“[A] remittitur order reducing a jury’s award to the outer limit of the proof is

the appropriate remedy where the jury’s damage award exceeds the amount

established by the evidence.” Goldstein, 758 F.2d at 1448. To recover more than

nominal damages for emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove actual injury. Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978). Compensatory damages “need not be proven
with a high degree of specificity,” but “may be inferred from the circumstances as well

as proved by the testimony.” Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 476 (11th Cir.

1999) (quoting Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983)).
“A plaintiff may be compensated for intangible, psychological injuries as well

as financial, property, or physical harms.” Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 408

1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005). “The standard of review for awards of

compensatory damages for intangible, emotional harms is ‘deferential to the fact

finder because the harm is subjective and evaluating it depends considerably on the

17

demeanor of the witnesses.” Ferrill, 168 F.3d at 476 (quoting Patterson v. PH.P.

Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 937-38 (5th Cir. 1996)).
“[A] plaintiff’s testimony, standing alone, can support an award of

compensatory damages for emotional distress.” Akouri, 408 F.3d at 1345.

“[C]onclusory statements” are not enough; the testimony must “sufficiently
articulate[|” “demonstrable emotional distress.” Id. (quoting Price v. City of

Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996)). But “[e]videntiary shortcomings ‘go

more to the amount, rather than the fact, of damage.’” Ferrill, 168 F.3d at 476

(quoting Marable, 704 F.2d at 1220).
The Sheriff’s Office argues that the jury’s compensatory damages award for

Ellis in the amount of $125,000 is “clearly excessive” because Ellis’s claim is “a simple
garden-variety emotional distress claim.” Mot. New Trial at 23. Specifically, the

Sheriff’s Office contends that Ellis’s evidence was conclusory because he did not

present any “corroborating evidence” of his injuries. Id. at 24.

As described in the order denying the Rule 50(b) motion regarding Ellis’s

entitlement to compensatory damages, Ellis testified about the myriad ways his

termination affected him. (Doc. 119) at 7-10. Regarding emotional effects, Ellis

explained at trial how “horrible” it was to have his livelihood taken away from him,
18

Tr. (Day One) at 174-75, and how the “uncertainty” caused by the termination

weighed on him because he “[did not] have a Plan B,” id. Moreover, the termination

“definitely” decreased his confidence because he was “alienated” from “people that

[he had] known for over a decade.” Id. at 175-76. And there were physical effects

that Ellis testified to as well. Ellis indicated that the termination impacted his sleep,
explaining that he “was having issues ... getting good sleep and good rest, and [he]

was treated for it.” Id. at 175. While describing the overall impact that his

termination had on him, Ellis referenced his alcoholism and depression. Id. After his

suspension, Ellis continued outpatient treatment at an alcohol treatment facility for

“a couple [of] months,” indicating it might have continued through his termination.

Id. at 176.

Even without Ellis providing “corroborating evidence,” “a plaintiff’s testimony,
standing alone, can support an award of compensatory damages.” Akouri, 408 F.3d

at 1345. Based on this evidence, I cannot find that “the verdict was against the clear

weight of the evidence” or that there was “a miscarriage of justice.’” Am. Builders

Ins. Co., 71 F.4th at 859 (alteration adopted) (quoting Chmielewski, 890 F.3d at

948); Davis v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 612 F. App’x 983, 987 (11th Cir.

2015) (denying motion for new trial or remittitur because the plaintiff’s evidence
19

that she was embarrassed, suffered weight fluctuations, and lost friends was sufficient

to support her award of damages).
Nor are Ellis’s damages excessive in relation to the evidence. The amount Ellis

received in compensatory damages appears reasonable in the light of the above

testimony. See, e.g., Harris v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3:00-CV-1297-J-12TEM,
2004 WL 7321381, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2004), affd, 139 F. App’x 156 (11th
Cir. 2005) (declining to disturb jury’s award of $150,000 in compensatory damages

to plaintiff who was retaliated against under Title VII).
The Sheriff’s Office cites several cases for support, but none of them require
ruling that Ellis’s damages are excessive. In Stone v. GEICO General Insurance Co.,
for example, the court granted the defendant’s motion for remittitur in part, finding
that the jury award of $200,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering
should be reduced to $50,000. No. 8:05-C V-636-T-30TBM, 2009 WL 3720954, at

*6 (M.D. Fla. 2009). In reaching that conclusion, the court cited the factors in Price.

See id. As I explained in the order denying the motion for judgment as a matter of

law regarding compensatory damages, (Doc. 119) at 10-11, the Eleventh Circuit’s

citation to those factors in Akouri was not necessary to the holding of the case, 408

F.3d at 1345 n.5, and therefore I am not required by precedent to consider them. See
20

McDonald’ Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 1998) (Carnes, J.,
concurring specially) (“[D]icta in our opinions is not binding on anyone for any
purpose.”).
On the facts, Stone is distinguishable because there was evidence that the

plaintiff’s emotional state improved only days after her termination, see 2009 WL

3720954 at *5—unlike here, where Ellis’s depression and alcoholism only worsened.

See Tr. (Day One) at 174-76. Akouri too is distinguishable because there the plaintiff
“made no attempt to describe any kind of harm” from his termination, and in any

case, the court was not deciding whether to remit the damages but whether the

plaintiff was entitled to them at all. 408 F.3d at 1345. The Florida state cases, see

Mot. New Trial at 22-23, cited by the Sheriff’s Office likewise lend no reason to

remit the jury’s determination of compensatory damages in this Title VII case.

In sum, the evidence supported the jury’s finding of $125,000 of compensatory
damages for Ellis.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Sheriff’s Office is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the

evidence was “legally sufficient” for the jury to find that retaliation was the but-for

cause of Ellis’s termination. Chaney, 483 F.3d at 1227.
21

The Sheriff’s Office is also not entitled to a new trial. The jury’s verdict was

not against the great weight of the evidence, Am. Builders Ins. Co., 71 F.4th at 859

(quoting Chmielewski, 890 F.3d at 948), nor were the jury instructions erroneous,
Christopher, 53 F.3d at 1190-91.

Finally, because the jury’s compensatory damages award does not “exceed[] the

amount established by the evidence,” Goldstein, 758 F.2d at 1448, the Sheriff’s

Office is not entitled to remittitur.

Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 128) is

DENIED.

2. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or Remittitur (Doc. 129) is DENIED.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 18, 2025.

Jahren Kimball Mrsot
Kathryn’Kimball Mizelle
United States District Judge

22

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122937. Public record. Not legal advice.