# Smith v. 1st Abundant Home Care L L C

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · August 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122713

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

In the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

CHASITY SMITH CASE NO. 2:25-CV-00021

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

1ST ABUNDANT HOME CARE L L C ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is a Motion for Default Judgment filed by plaintiff against
defendant 1st Abundant Home Care LLC (“1st Abundant”) under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55.
I.
BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §
201 et seq., against her former Alicia Williams and 1st Abundant on January 8, 2025.1 She
alleges that 1st Abundant and its operator, Ms. Williams, employed her and willfully failed
to pay the minimum and overtime wages owed to her under the FLSA from January 8,
2022, to the end of her employment in July 2023. Doc. 1.
Although plaintiff has been unable to serve Ms. Williams, 1st Abundant was served
on January 31, 2025. Docs. 3, 9. At plaintiff’s request, the clerk entered a default against

1 Plaintiff filed this suit as a collective action under the FLSA, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
employees, but the suit has not been conditionally certified as a collective action. Plaintiff only seeks a default
judgment for herself individually and does not seek collective relief or certification under this motion. Doc. 12, att. 1,
p. 3.
1st Abundant on July 15, 2025. Doc. 11. On August 7, plaintiff filed this motion seeking
default judgment against 1st Abundant on her unpaid overtime wages claim.2 Doc. 12.

II.
LAW & APPLICATION

A. Governing Law
There is a three-step process for securing a default judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 55. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996).
First, a default occurs when a party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” against an
action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The movant then establishes the default “by affidavit or
otherwise.” Id. After the clerk has entered a default, the movant may apply for a default
judgment. Id. at 55(b).
“Default judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules” and are
available “only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially
unresponsive party.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274,
276 (5th Cir. 1989). Default judgment “should not be granted on the claim, without more,
that the defendant had failed to meet a procedural time requirement.” Mason & Hanger–

Silas Mason Co., Inc. v. Metal Trades Council, 726 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1984). In
determining whether to enter a default judgment, courts in the Fifth Circuit consider: “1)
whether the entry of default judgment is procedurally warranted, 2) whether a sufficient
basis in the pleadings based on the substantive merits for judgment exists, and 3) what form
of relief, if any, a plaintiff should receive.” Graham v. Coconut LLC, 2017 WL 2600318,

2 Plaintiff did not seek a default judgment on her minimum wage claim. See doc. 12, att. 1.
at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 15, 2017) (Mazzant, J.) (citing Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886,
893 (5th Cir. 1998)). A court may conduct hearings when it needs to “establish the truth of

any allegation by evidence . . . or . . . investigate any other matter.” Wooten v. McDonald
Transit Assoc., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(C)).
B. Application
1. Procedural issues
In determining whether a default judgment is procedurally warranted, the court
considers:

[1] whether material issues of fact exist; [2] whether there has been
substantial prejudice; [3] whether the grounds for default are clearly
established; [4] whether the default was caused by a good faith mistake or
excusable neglect; [5] the harshness of a default judgment; and [6] whether
the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant's
motion.

Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893.
Because 1st Abundant has filed no responsive pleadings, plaintiff’s well-pled
allegations are deemed admitted and there are no material issues of fact. Nishimatsu Constr.
Co., Ltd. v. Hous. Nat’l Bk., 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). Additionally, the grounds
for default have been clearly established based on 1st Abundant’s failure to appear and
plaintiff is harmed by the continued delays in her case. Champion v. Phaselink Util.
Solutions, LLC, 2022 WL 3693461, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2022) (citing United States
v. Fincanon, 2009 WL 301988, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009)). There is nothing in the
record to suggest that the default is the result of a good faith mistake or excusable neglect.
The clear basis for a default and the failure to cure it “mitigate[] the harshness of a default
judgment.” J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mexican Restaurant, Inc., 126 F.Supp.3d
809, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). Given these circumstances, the

court cannot find any grounds on which it would later feel obligated to set aside the default.
Montoya Garcia v. Overnight Cleanse, LLC, 2021 WL 902494, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22,
2021). Accordingly, plaintiff has satisfied the procedural prerequisites for a default
judgment.
2. Merits of allegations
At the second step courts assume that due a defaulted defendant admits all well-

pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd., 515 F.2d at 1206.
However, a “defendant is not held to admit facts that are not-well pleaded or to admit
conclusions of law.” Id. To this end, the court “draw[s] meaning from the case law on Rule
8” and requires only that factual allegations in the complaint “be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint

are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Montoya Garcia, 2021 WL 902494 at *4 (quoting
Wooten, 788 F.3d at 497).
The FLSA requires that employers pay all nonexempt employees at least one and a
half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty per week. 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1). Employers who violate this provision of the FLSA are liable for “unpaid

overtime compensation . . . and an additional amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. §
216(b). An employee bringing an action under the FLSA for unpaid overtime compensation
must show: (1) that an employer-employee relationship existed during the unpaid overtime
periods claimed; (2) that the employee engaged in activities within the FLSA’s coverage;
(3) that the employer violated the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements; and (4) the amount
of overtime compensation due. Johnson v. Heckmann Water Res. (CVR), Inc., 758 F.3d

627, 630 (5th Cir. 2014).
i. Employment status
In FLSA actions, courts apply a broader definition to “employer” than the one
traditionally used under the common law. McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877
(5th Cir. 1989). An “employer” includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The court examines

the totality of the relationship in light of economic realities. Ho v. Xpress Pho, LLC, 2015
WL 1810339, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2015) (citing Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610,
620 (5th Cir. 2010)). This test “includes inquiries into whether the alleged employer (1)
has the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work
schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment,

and (4) maintained employment records.” Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1553 (5th Cir.
1990). “No single factor is determinative” and each is instead “a tool used to gauge the
economic dependence of the alleged employee” which “must be applied with this ultimate
concept in mind.” Hopkins v. Cornerstone America, 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis in original).

Plaintiff alleges as follows: 1st Abundant employed her “as a domestic service
employee who provided companionship services in the homes of Defendants’ clients.”
Doc. 1, ¶ 2. Through its owner, defendant Alicia Williams, 1st Abundant set her rate of pay,
assigned her work, disciplined her, and exercised the power to hire and fire her. Doc. 1, ¶
22; doc. 12, att. 4, ¶¶ 7–14. Accepting these allegations as true, the court finds that 1st
Abundant controlled the economic aspects of the business. There is no indication that

plaintiff had the power to negotiate her wages or control any other aspect of her
employment, such that she might instead be considered an independent contractor.
Accordingly, the first element of her claim is satisfied.
ii. Activities within coverage of FLSA
Consistent with Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, the FLSA
mandates minimum wage and overtime compensation for employees who are (1) ‘engaged

in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce’ (individual coverage) or (2)
‘employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce’ (enterprise coverage).” Landeros v. Fu King, Inc., 12 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1022
(S.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)). Under the FLSA, “commerce” is
defined as “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the

several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b).
“Either individual or enterprise coverage is enough to invoke FLSA protection.” Martin v.
Bedell, 955 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).
Congress empowered the Secretary of Labor to “define[] and delimit[]” the scope
of workers exempted from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA.

Barnes v. Res. For Human Dev., Inc., 2024 WL 4566113, at *2 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 24, 2024)
(citing Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, § 29(b), 88 Stat. 76. Under Department
of Labor regulations, “companionship services means the provision of fellowship and
protection for an elderly person or person with an illness, injury, or disability who requires
assistance in caring for himself or herself.” 29 C.F.R. 552.6(a). The minimum wage and
overtime requirements generally do not apply to “any employee employed in domestic

service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of
age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). But “[t]hird
party employers of employees engaged in companionship services within the meaning of
§ 552.6 may not avail themselves of the minimum wage and overtime exemption provided
by section 13(a)(15) of the Act, even if the employee is jointly employed by the individual
or member of the family or household using the services.” 29 U.S.C. § 552.109(a).

Plaintiff was engaged as a companion, but by third parties for the service of their
clients. Accordingly, her work does not fall under § 213(a)(15)’s exemption. Further,
“services performed by employees such as companions . . . home health aides, [and]
personal care aides” qualify as “domestic service employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 552.3.
“Congress in section 2(a) of the [FLSA] specifically found that the employment of persons

in domestic service in households affects commerce.” 29 C.F.R. § 552.99. Accordingly,
individual coverage applies to her allegations.3
iii. Violation of FLSA overtime wage requirements
As stated above, the FLSA requires that employers pay non-exempt employees one
and a half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty per week. 29 U.S.C.

§ 207. From the pleadings, it does not appear that any exemptions apply to plaintiff. See

3 To establish enterprise coverage, plaintiff must also show that the employer has an annual gross of at least
$500,000.00. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Plaintiff alleges that 1st Abundant meets this benchmark and “employed
between 45-55 employees during the relative time period.” Doc. 12, att. 1, p. 8; see doc. 1, ¶ 17. The court need not
reach the issue, however, because individual coverage is already established.
29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a). She alleges, and submits payroll records to verify, that she was
paid overtime for the two pay periods in January 2021 but only occasionally thereafter until

the end of her employment in July 2023. See doc. 12, att. 2. During this time she made
between $7.25 and $9.00/hour and regularly worked over 60 hours per week. Id.
Accordingly, plaintiff has shown a clear violation by 1st Abundant of the FLSA’s overtime
requirements.
iv. Amount of overtime compensation due
The amount of overtime compensation due depends on the appropriate lookback

period. Normally, a claim for unpaid overtime under the FLSA must be brought “within
two years after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). When the cause of action
arises from a “willful violation,” however, it “may be commenced within three years after
the cause of action accrued.” Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that an
employer’s violation was willful and that a three-year statute of limitations is therefore

appropriate. Patterson v. O’Bar Wrecker Service, LLC, 685 F.Supp.3d 387, 398 (N.D. Tex.
2023) (citing Cox v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1990)).
“An FLSA violation is willful if the employer ‘knew or showed reckless disregard
for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by statute.’” Mohammadi v. Nwabuisi,
605 F. App’x 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486

U.S. 128, 133 (1988)). “[M]erely negligent or unreasonable conduct” falls short of this
burden. Clay v. New Tech Glob. Ventures, LLC, 2019 WL 1028532, at *6 (W.D. La. Mar.
4, 2019) (citing McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135 n. 13). “Courts across the country have found
the following evidence sufficient to support an inference of willfulness: ‘(1) admissions
that an employer knew its method of payment violated the FLSA prior to the accrual of the
action; (2) continuation of a pay practice without further investigation after being put on

notice that the practice violated the FLSA; (3) earlier violations of the FLSA that would
put the employer on actual notice of the [r]equirements of the FLSA; (4) failure to keep
accurate or complete records of employment; and (5) prior internal investigations which
revealed similar violations.’” Patterson, 685 F.Supp.3d at 398 (quoting Bingham v.
Jefferson County, Tex., 2013 WL 1312563, at *14 (E.D. Tex. 2013), report and
recommendation adopted as modified, 2013 WL 1312014 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2013)).

Plaintiff alleges that 1st Abundant “knew Plaintiff [was] non-exempt and entitled to
an overtime premium,” but nevertheless “knowingly, willfully, or in reckless disregard of
the law” refused to pay overtime compensation. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 49–50. Payroll records show
that overtime hours were recorded for most pay periods, and that overtime was even paid
for some pay periods early in plaintiff’s employment. The fact that 1st Abundant recorded

plaintiff’s overtime hours but ceased to compensate her for them, combined with plaintiff’s
allegations that it was aware that she was non-exempt and entitled to same under federal
law, supports a finding of willfulness. Accordingly, the court will apply the three-year
lookback from the date this action was filed on January 8, 2025.
Plaintiff has calculated the unpaid overtime based on a half-rate of $3.63 from

January 8 to August 24, 2022, when her wage was $7.25/hour, and $4.50 from August 25,
2022, through July 26, 2023, when her wage was $9.00/hour. During this time plaintiff
worked approximately 1937.26 hours of overtime without the additional compensation
due. See doc. 12, atts. 2–3. Based on the above dates and rates, her unpaid overtime
amounts to $8,023.57. Id.

3. Award
a. Compensatory and liquidated damages
A defendant’s default only concedes the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations
on liability—not damages. J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mexican Restaurant, Inc.,
126 F.Supp.3d 809, 816 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (citing Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 151, 524-
25 (5th Cir. 2002)). On a default judgment, a hearing is unnecessary to establish damages

if the amount can be determined with a mathematical calculation by reference to the
pleadings and supporting documents. Wattiker v. Elsenbary Enterprises, Inc., 2023 WL
5167023, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 2023) (citing James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th
Cir. 1993)). The plaintiff has the burden of providing an evidentiary basis for the damages
sought. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Bostock Billiards & Bar Assoc., 2013 WL 12126268, at

*3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2013).
Plaintiff has established her entitlement to unpaid overtime in the amount of
$8,023.57 through detailed affidavits and payroll records. She also seeks liquidated
damages and attorney fees. “Under the FLSA, an employer who violates the overtime
provisions is liable not only for the unpaid overtime compensation, but also for ‘an

additional equal amount as liquidated damages.’” Gallegos v. Equity Title Co. of Am., 484
F.Supp.2d 589, 598 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The district court may
only reduce or eliminate the liquidated damages award if “the employer first sustains its
burden of showing that its failure to obey the statute was in good faith.” Montoya Garcia,
2021 WL 902494 at *6 (quoting Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir.
1999)). Because 1st Abundant has failed to respond to the suit, and nothing else in the

record supports a finding of its good faith, the court will award liquidated damages in the
amount of $8,023.57 for a total damages award of $16,047.14.
b. Attorney fees
Finally, the FLSA also allows plaintiff to recover her reasonable costs and attorney
fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Fifth Circuit generally calculates the attorney fee award
under the FLSA using the lodestar method. Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prod. Co., 448 F.3d

795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006); Strong v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 137 F.3d 844, 850 (5th Cir.
1998). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
on the case by an appropriate hourly rate, which is the market rate in the community for
this work. Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir.
2012). The party seeking the fee award must establish both the hours expended and the

reasonableness of the rate at which they were billed. Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457
(5th Cir. 1993). The court uses this time as a benchmark and then excludes any time it finds
to be excessive, duplicative, unnecessary, or inadequately documented. See id. The
remaining hours are those reasonably expended. Saizan, 448 F.3d at 800.
The district court may then decrease or enhance the lodestar based on the twelve

factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th
Cir. 1974).4 The lodestar may not be adjusted due to a Johnson factor, however, if the

4 The Johnson factors are: (1) “time and labor required” for the litigation; (2) “novelty and difficulty of the questions”
presented; (3) “skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;” (4) “preclusion of other employment;” (5) whether
the fee is “customary;” (6) “[w]hether the fee is fixed or contingent;” (7) “[t]ime limitations imposed by the client or
creation of the lodestar award already took that factor into account. Heidtman v. County of
El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1043 (5th Cir. 1999). Further, “[t]he lodestar ... is presumptively

reasonable and should be modified only in exceptional cases.” Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457.
Plaintiff is represented by Philip Bohrer and Scott Brady of Bohrer Brady, LLC, a
firm based out of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The primary focus of the firm is wage and hour
litigation. Mr. Bohrer is in his thirty-ninth year of practicing law while Mr. Brady is in his
twenty-seventh, and both are admitted to numerous state and federal courts at the trial
appellate levels. Mr. Bohrer is also admitted to practice before the United States Supreme

Court. Mr. Bohrer’s customary rate in Louisiana is $600/hour while Mr. Brady’s is
$550/hour. Doc. 12, atts. 5 & 6. For this matter, however, they seek hourly rates of
$450/hour for both attorneys, $100/hour for paralegals, and $75/hour for staff. Doc. 12, att.
1, p. 11.
“Hourly rates are to be computed according to the prevailing market rates in the

relevant legal market.” Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 279 (5th Cir. 2000). The relevant
legal market is where the district court sits generally. E.g., Calix v. Ashton Marine LLC,
2016 WL 4194119, at *3 (E.D. La. July 14, 2016). Out-of-district counsel may use his
home district as the basis for the lodestar “under certain limited circumstances,” such as
when “abundant and uncontradicted evidence” show the necessity of turning to out-of-

district counsel. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Becerra, 681 F.Supp.3d 631, 643 (N.D. Tex.

the circumstances;” (8) “amount involved and the results obtained;” (9) “experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys;” (10) “‘undesirability’ of the case;” (11) “nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;”
and (12) “[a]wards in similar cases.” Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–719.
2023) (quoting McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2011)).
However, “a district court ‘is itself an expert’ on the issue of fees and ‘may consider its

own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an
independent judgment with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.’” Winget v. Corp.
Green, LLC, 2011 WL 2173840, at *6 (M.D. La. May 31, 2011) (quoting Campbell v.
Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)).
Plaintiff cites recent cases from the Middle District of Louisiana showing that rates
between $400 and $500/hour have been approved for Mr. Bohrer and Mr. Brady. But Baton

Rouge is not the relevant legal market for this analysis. The court is aware that there are
numerous practitioners within this district who litigate FLSA cases. Recently, a court in
the Shreveport division of this district approved a $365/hour rate customarily billed by one
such attorney with twenty-two years of experience as within prevailing market rates, “albeit
on the upper end.” Revell v. Prince Preferred Hotels Shreveport, LLC, 2024 WL 3625214,

at *4 (W.D. La. Aug. 1, 2024). In a survey that included cases from both the Western
District and Middle District, another court noted that attorneys with over twenty years of
experience regularly receive between $300 and $375/hour. Olive v. Tubbs, 2023 WL
6420794, at *8 (W.D. La. Sep. 29, 2023). The undersigned has also approved a rate of
$395/hour for a local attorney with over thirty years of litigation experience in a

construction dispute. ADB Commercial Constr. (La.) LLC v. St. Charles Housing LP, 2023
WL 8263433, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 29, 2023). Based on these results, the court determines
that rates of $325/hour for Mr. Brady and $375/hour for Mr. Bohrer are warranted. The
rates ($100/hour and $75/hour, respectively) requested for paralegals and staff are
reasonable within this market and require no further reduction. Accord Revell, 2024 WL
3625214 at *4 (approving $95/hour for paralegal services); Olive, 2023 WL 6420794 at *2

(same); Lee v. Boyd Racing LLC, 2025 WL 913462, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 25, 2025)
(approving $125/hour for paralegal services).
Plaintiff’s counsel billed a total of 32.3 hours on this matter, divided as follows:
Philip Bohrer 1.25 hours
Scott Brady 11.05 hours
Paralegal 5.00 hours
Support Staff 15.00 hours

Doc. 12, att. 7. The time entries are reasonably detailed and not excessive for the tasks
described. The bulk of the tasks on this matter were done by the paralegal and support staff.
Accordingly, the court finds that the hours expended were reasonable. Multiplying these
hours by the above rates (1.25 Bohrer hours x $375, 11.05 Brady hours x $325, 5.00
paralegal hours x $100, and 15.00 support staff hours x $75) yields a fee of $5,685.00. The
court has considered the Johnson factors and finds no reason to make an adjustment of this
amount, especially considering that the fee awarded amounts to only about one third of
plaintiff’s total damages.
c. Costs
Plaintiff makes a claim for $636.22 in costs. These include her filing fee, a Federal

Express expense for the demand letter sent to defendant Alicia Williams, and the fee for a
private process server to attempt service on Ms. Williams. Generally, federal courts may
only award those costs articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 “absent explicit statutory or
contractual authorization to the contrary.” Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d
1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Recoverable costs under § 1920
are limited to:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically
recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and
disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and
the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily
obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
and (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 1920. The scope of taxable costs under § 1920 is “narrow” and “limited to
relatively minor, incidental expenses[.]” Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S.
560, 573 (2012).
FLSA itself provides no authorization for recovery of costs beyond § 1920. See
Fernandes v. Northline Enters., Inc., 2022 WL 3229510, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 25, 2022)
(quoting Gagnon, 607 F.3d at 1045) (“In FLSA cases, the only costs that can be awarded
are those listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 unless ‘explicit statutory or contractual authorization’
provides for recovery of others.”). Plaintiff brings no other causes of action that might
allow for recovery under other statutes. Her $405 filing fee is recoverable under § 1920.
28 U.S.C. § 1920(5); Alejandro v. Prop. Care Sols. LLC, 2022 WL 3223176, at *7 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 9, 2022). The court can find no authority for the recovery of mailing fees for the
demand letter. Costs for private process servers are not recoverable under § 1920, absent
exceptional circumstances. Zastrow v. Houst. Auto M. Imports Greenway, Ltd., 695 F.
App'x 774, 780 (5th Cir. 2017). The court notes that this default is against 1st Abundant,
rather than Ms. Williams, and plaintiff has not argued that exceptional circumstances exist.
Accordingly, the recovery of costs is limited to the $405 filing fee.

d. Interest
Lastly, plaintiff requests pre- and post-judgment interest. Doc. 1, p. 10. Pre-
judgment interest is not available for FLSA claims, like this one, that seek compensation
for unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages. Champion, 2022 WL 3693461 at *10
(citing Knowlton v. Greenwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 957 F.2d 1172, 1183 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Plaintiff is, however, entitled to post-judgment interest “calculated from the date of the

entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity
Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for
the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” Melendez v. DJJRN, Inc., 2020 WL
7774940, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2020). Post-judgment interest will therefore be
awarded, running from the date of judgment at the court’s published rate for the week prior

to the date of judgment until the date paid. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1961).
Ii.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Default Judgment [doc. 12] will be
GRANTED and judgment will be entered for plaintiff against defendant 1*t Abundant
Home Care LLC on plaintiff’s claim for unpaid overtime wages under 29 U.S.C. § 207.
Plaintiff is awarded $16,047.14 in damages, $5,685.00 in attorney fees, and $405.00 in
costs, with post-judgment interest.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on the 13th day of August, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 17 of 17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122713. Public record. Not legal advice.