# Blacher v. Gautreaux

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · July 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122061

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122061

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYMOND BLACHER (#435148) CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
24-1025-JWD-RLB
SID GAUTREAUX, ET AL.

NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the
Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served
with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 16, 2025.

S
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYMOND BLACHER (#435148) CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
24-1025-JWD-RLB
SID GAUTREAUX, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The pro se Plaintiff, a person formerly confined at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, filed
this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Sid Gautreaux and East Baton
Rouge Parish Prison, complaining that his constitutional rights were violated due to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
On May 12, 2025, the plaintiff was ordered to amend his Complaint.1 A review of the
record reveals that the plaintiff has not filed an amended Complaint.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, this Court is authorized to dismiss an
action or claim brought by a prisoner who is proceeding in forma pauperis or is asserting a claim
against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity if satisfied that
the action or claim is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. An action or claim is properly dismissed as frivolous if the claim lacks an arguable basis
either in fact or in law. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992), citing Neitzke v. Williams,

1 The Order to Amend (R. Doc. 7) detailed the relevant law and ordered the plaintiff to amend his Complaint by
adding additional defendants, if necessary, and factual allegations indicating how each defendant was personally
involved, for each claim for which he sought relief.
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1995). A claim is
factually frivolous if the alleged facts are “clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations
that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Id. at 32-33. A claim has no arguable basis in
law if it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005

(5th Cir. 1998). The law accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim which is based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
factual allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, supra, 504 U.S. at 32. Pleaded facts which are merely
improbable or strange, however, are not frivolous for purposes of § 1915. Id. at 33; Ancar v. Sara
Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). A § 1915 dismissal may be made any time,
before or after service of process and before or after an answer is filed, if the court determines
that the allegation of poverty is untrue; or the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116,

1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff’s Allegations

In his Complaint Plaintiff alleges the following: At the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison,
the plaintiff was denied the guarantees of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments due to
understaffed food preparation personnel, medical personnel, and security. A PREA incident was
not reported to the Secretary. The plaintiff’s living conditions were hazardous, unhealthy, unsafe
and unsanitary due to mold, rodents, rust, and raw sewage.
Juridical Person
First, with regards to defendant East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, section 1983 only
imposes liability on a “person” who violates another’s constitutional rights under color of law. In
accordance with Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Louisiana law governs
whether a person or entity can be sued. Under Louisiana law, to possess such a capacity, an entity

must qualify as a “juridical person.” This term is defined by the Louisiana Civil Code as an
“entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or partnership.” See La. Civ.
Code Ann. art. 24.
Defendant East Baton Rouge Parish Prison is not a “person” within the meaning of the
statute. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (a state is not a
“person” within the meaning of § 1983); See also Delta Fuel Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 485 F. App’x.
685 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of claim against Concordia Parish Sheriff’s Department
because it is not a legal entity capable of being sued); Castillo v. Blanco, 2007 WL 2264285
(E.D. La., Aug. 1, 2007) (holding that Elayn Hunt Correctional Center and Dixon Correctional

Institute are not persons within the meaning of § 1983); and Glenn v. Louisiana, 2009 WL
382680 (E.D. La., Feb. 11, 2009) (“[a] jail is merely a building, not a ‘person’ subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). As such, the plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim against this
defendant.
Personal Involvement
As the defendant Gautreaux, in his individual capacity, in order for a prison official to be
found liable under § 1983, the official must have been personally and directly involved in
conduct causing an alleged deprivation of an inmate's constitutional rights, or there must be a
causal connection between the actions of the official and the constitutional violation sought to be
redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Any allegation that the defendant
is responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or co-employees under a theory of vicarious
responsibility or respondeat superior is alone insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston, 356 F. App’x. 715, 716–17 (5th Cir. 2009)

(recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any
theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). Further, in the absence of direct personal
participation by a supervisory official in an alleged constitutional violation, an inmate plaintiff
must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred as a result of a subordinate's
implementation of the supervisor's affirmative wrongful policies or as a result of a breach by the
supervisor of an affirmative duty specially imposed by state law. Lozano v. Smith, supra, 718
F.2d at 768.
As to defendant Gautreaux, in his official capacity, a suit against a government official in
his official capacity is the equivalent of filing suit against the government agency of which the

official is an agent. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999).
Therefore, to determine whether the plaintiff has stated such a claim, the Court must conduct a
municipal liability analysis under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978). See Nowell v. Acadian Ambulance Service, 147 F.Supp.2d 495, 501 (W.D. La.
2001) (citing Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 fn. 10
(5th Cir. 2000)).
“Section 1983 offers no respondeat superior liability.” Pineda v. City of Houston, 291
F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). “Municipalities face § 1983 liability ‘when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury....” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). That is, “[a] municipality is liable
only for acts directly attributable to it ‘through some official action or imprimatur.’ ” Valle v.
City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237
F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).

To assert a claim of municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must adduce
sufficient factual matter to satisfy three elements: (1) the existence of an official policy or
custom; (2) a policymaker with final policymaking authority; and (3) a violation of constitutional
rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom. Davis v. Tarrant County, Tex., 565 F.3d
214, 227 (5th Cir. 2009).
In the instant matter, the plaintiff has not alleged personal involvement on the part of
defendant Gautreaux in his individual or official capacity. Although pro se complaints and
arguments must be liberally construed, see Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1994),
a plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action must plead specific facts, not “conclusory allegations.”

See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc); Biliski v. Harborth, 55 F.3d
160, 162 (5th Cir.1995); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 307 (5th Cir.1989). Here, as the plaintiff
was previously advised, the plaintiff’s assertions are entirely vague and conclusory. Plaintiff has
not made any factual allegations with regards to the “who, when, where, and how” for any claim
for which he seeks relief. The plaintiff was ordered to amend his Complaint to remedy the
foregoing, but he failed to do so. As such, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
defendant Gautreaux.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants, be dismissed, with
prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e) and 1915A.2
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on July 16, 2025.

S
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2 Plaintiff is advised that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides that, “In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section [Proceedings in forma pauperis] if the prisoner
has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a
court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11122061. Public record. Not legal advice.
