# Boston v. Brown

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121835

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121835

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that verbal sexual harassment, accompanied by suggestive gestures, that created a risk both from the harasser and fellow inmates, was sufficient to proceed beyond initial review

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NORRIS BOSTON, S07401, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-1525-DWD
)
JEREMIAH BROWN, )
M. BURTON, )
ROBINSON, )
JOHN DOE, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Norris Boston, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)
currently detained at Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence), brings this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.
(Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe violated his rights by refusing to honor
his request for a gender appropriate strip search as a transgender inmate, and Defendants
Robinson, Burton and Brown refused to assist with the situation. Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out
non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is
legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must
be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on May 6, 2025, Defendant John Doe escorted him to a shower
during a shakedown for a strip search. (Doc. 1 at 3-5). He informed John Doe that he
identified as transgender and that his institutional identification card specified he should
be strip searched by a female, but John Doe refused to honor this request and threatened
discipline if Plaintiff did not comply. Ultimately, John Doe forced him to strip and made

sexual comments during the visual inspection. Plaintiff further alleges that John Doe
touched his buttocks when he reached into the cell to reapply handcuffs. (Doc. 1 at 5).
Plaintiff alleges that shortly after the strip search, Defendant Burton saw him
crying and asked why he was upset. He informed Burton of the sexual harassment, but
Burton insisted that Lawrence Correctional Center does not accommodate transgender

inmates and that nothing would be done. Burton also allegedly threatened Plaintiff that
if he created problems, Burton would have other inmates physically attack Plaintiff.
(Doc. 1 at 5-6).
On May 6, 2025, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Brown (Warden) to seek assistance, and
on May 8, 2025, he wrote the governor’s office. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff alleges that Brown

responded by indicating he received the correspondence via the governor’s office, but
that the search was conducted in accordance with policy. (Doc. 1 at 6). In support of the
motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 2), Plaintiff attached an excerpt of the prison’s
Administrative Directives, which state that if an inmate has been identified as
transgender, then they shall be searched by the gender of staff designated on their
identification card. (Doc. 2 at 7).

On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff interacted with Defendant Robinson, a mental health
provider. (Doc. 1 at 6). He asked Robinson if there was a transgender mental health
group at Lawrence, but Robinson said that the prison does not honor transgender specific
treatment, and Plaintiff should not have come to Lawrence if that was one of his concerns.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the harassment, he suffers from nightmares and
he has been required to “get on medicine.” (Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff faults John Doe for

violating the Eighth amendment, the prison’s policy on searches, and for committing an
assault and battery under state law. (Doc. 1 at 7-8). He faults Defendants Brown and
Burton for failing to discipline John Doe or to ensure he was safe. Finally, he faults
Defendant Robinson for being deliberately indifferent to his need for mental health care
as a transgender inmate. (Doc. 1 at 8). Plaintiff seeks declaratory, compensatory, and

injunctive relief.
In support of the complaint, he submitted grievance documents which show that
multiple grievances about these issues were deemed emergencies, and that an internal
investigation was being conducted. (Doc. 1 at 13-22, 28-30). Plaintiff also submitted
affidavits of fellow inmates. (Doc. 1 at 26-27).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court will designate the following
claims:
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment claim against John Doe for the strip
search in May of 2025;
Claim 2: Assault and battery claim against John Doe for his conduct
during the strip search;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Burton and Brown for their handling of
Plaintiff’s reports about the strip search;

Claim 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendant Robinson for denying transgender specific
mental health care.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).
Analysis
Claim 1
A violation of the Eighth Amendment consists of two elements: (1) the injury must
be objectively serious enough to have deprived the inmate of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities, and (2) the prison official must have acted with deliberate
indifference to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct.
1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). “There is no question that strip searches may be unpleasant,
humiliating, and embarrassing to prisoners, but not every psychological discomfort a
prisoner endures amounts to a constitutional violation.” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936,
939 (7th Cir. 2003). Strip searches are generally permissible in the prison context if
conducted for a legitimate penological reason. See id. However, a strip search will
violate the Eighth Amendment if it is “totally without penological justification” or

“conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict psychological
pain.” Id.; see also Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2009) (strip searches
done in view of other inmates, in a cold room, by guards who did not regularly change
latex gloves, and who sometimes made demeaning comments, were sufficient to proceed
to a jury trial).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations plainly suggest that John Doe conducted a strip search

in an unnecessarily harassing and humiliating manner. He also indicates that as a result
of the search, he has nightmares and has been required to start some sort of medication.
It is also possible that John Doe’s behavior constituted improper verbal
harassment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Verbal harassment generally does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, though some harassment may be serious

enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th
Cir. 2015) (finding that verbal sexual harassment, accompanied by suggestive gestures,
that created a risk both from the harasser and fellow inmates, was sufficient to proceed
beyond initial review); Brand v. Oglesby, 2021 WL 4262447 at *1 (S.D. Ill. 2021) (finding a
claim insufficient where plaintiff alleged that a guard ran into his cell, verbally threatened

him, and indicated he would deploy pepper spray if plaintiff moved). Some threats may
rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. Dobbey v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 574 F.3d
443, 445 (7th Cir. 2009). “The test for what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is
an objective one. It is not the actual fear of the victim, but what a “reasonable victim”
would fear.” Id.

In Dobbey, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a guard hanging a noose in view of
an inmate and glaring at the inmate did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment
because the incident was promptly investigated and was not accompanied by other
threatening conduct. Dobbey, 574 F.3d at 445-46. By contrast, the Dobbey Court cited to
cases that included threats of violence accompanied by physical acts. Notably, in Irving
v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2008), a court found that repeated threats of harm,

accompanied by offers to inmates of money and bribes to assault a fellow inmate, were
sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim. The
Irving Court emphasized that the “repeated and credible” nature of the threats played a
factor in the determination that the threats were actionable under the Eighth
Amendment. In decisions after Beal and Dobbey, courts have focused on the frequency of

harassment, the likelihood that it created a risk among the prison population, and the
existence of a prompt investigation into the matter. See e.g., Elkins v. Quinn, 2022 WL
602982 at * 3-6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2022) (finding that vulgar and inappropriate comments
made by a guard to an inmate in a private setting on a single day were not sufficient to
establish an Eighth Amendment claim); Robinson v. Budde, 2021 WL 1722857 (N.D. Ill.

April 30, 2021) (granting summary judgment to the defendants where the plaintiff alleged
he felt humiliated, had insomnia, and isolated himself in his cell for a couple of days as a
result of harassment, but there was no evidence the plaintiff sought psychological care,
he did not fear a physical attack, and there were no repeated incidents of abuse); Jackson
v. Stolworthy, 2017 WL 4122786 at *8-9 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2017) (allowing a harassment
claim beyond 1915A review that was premised on repeated harassment over a period of

30 days or more that included allegations about plaintiff’s sexuality and included
physical gestures).
In addition to having a claim about the harassing nature of the strip search, it is
also possible Plaintiff could make out a valid verbal harassment claim due to the nature
of the verbal remarks, and the fact that they were accompanied by an alleged physical
touching. By contrast, to the extent that Plaintiff claims John Doe violated PREA or

internal prison policy, this aspect of his claims cannot proceed because these are not valid
claims under § 1983. For now, Plaintiff may proceed on Claim 1 against John Doe under
the Eighth Amendment.
Claim 2
In addition to the Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John

Doe’s conduct amounted to assault and battery under state law. In Illinois, a defendant
can be liable for contacts that are “relatively trivial ones which are merely offensive and
insulting.” Cohen v. Smith, 269 Ill.App.3d 1087, 207 Ill.Dec. 873, 648 N.E.2d 329, 332
(1995) (citation omitted). For now, Plaintiff may proceed on Claim 2, but if the Court later
dismisses Claim 1, it will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.

Claim 3
Plaintiff faults Defendants Burton and Brown for their responses to his alleged
attempts to report John Doe’s conduct. He claims Burton dismissed his concerns and
threatened physical violence if Plaintiff made a big deal out of the incident. While some
verbal harassment is actionable, the Court does not find that Burton’s alleged comments
rise to the level of actionable remarks where they were stated in isolation and were not

accompanied by any physical gestures. The comments, if true, were surely unacceptable,
but they simply do not reach the level of a constitutional violation. To the extent that
Burton refused to accept Plaintiff’s PREA report, there is no private right of action under
PREA, so this is not actionable. See e.g., Sims v. Doe, 2018 WL 4027632 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22,
2018); Bentley v. Baenen, 2018 WL 1108701 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2018) (“The PREA does not
create a private cause of action in federal court.”); Poslof v. Martel, 2018 WL 3019916, n.5

(S.D. Cal. June 18, 2018) (The PREA “authorizes the reporting of incidents or rape and
sexual abuse in prison, but it does not give rise to a private cause of action by a
prisoner.”). Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff complains that Burton failed to
follow procedures in the Illinois Administrative Code related to his PREA report,
violations of state laws or prison rules or regulations do not give rise to a claim under §

1983. See e.g. Scott v. Edinburgh, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (Section 1983 protects
inmates from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws, prison regulations, or
prison policies). Thus, the Court finds no claim against Burton.
As for Brown, Plaintiff alleges Brown was informed of the situation but simply
insisted in a memo that the search was performed consistent with policy. This statement

about the propriety of the search is contradicted by the Administrative Directive, but a
violation of the Administrative Directives does not equate to a constitutional claim. It
also appears that despite that single memo, Brown was otherwise responsive to Plaintiff’s
grievances, deeming them emergencies, allowing an internal investigation, and sending
memos indicating mental health providers would contact Plaintiff. All of these steps
weigh against a finding that Brown was deliberately indifferent in this situation, as

opposed to merely negligent in a single responsive memorandum when he made a
misstatement about the search following policy. As such, the Court finds Claim 3
insufficient to proceed against Brown or Burton.
Claim 4
Finally, Plaintiff faults Defendant Robinson for refusing to offer transgender
mental health groups and making remarks about transgender care at Lawrence. Though

these remarks were likely offensive, they do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. Plaintiff’s grievance documents attached to the complaint and motion for a
preliminary injunction clarify that there are not transgender specific groups at Lawrence
(though one may be under development), but that Plaintiff was regularly seen by mental
health providers. His ability to access care seems confirmed by his statement he received

medication to cope with his distress over the search. Without any further specific
information about Plaintiff’s need for care, he does not have a viable claim against
Robinson for deliberate indifference.
In sum, Claims 1 and 2 may proceed against John Doe, and Claims 3 and 4 are
dismissed against Defendants Burton, Brown, and Robinson.

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
In the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2), Plaintiff briefly recaps the
factual allegations from the complaint and then requests a transfer to a different prison
and placement in protective custody. He claims this is necessary because his rights were
violated by the search on May 6, Defendants Burton and Brown did not do anything
about it, he has not been interviewed as he believes he should have been per the

Administrative Directives, and he believes his rights will continue to be violated. The
Motion is supported by affidavits and grievance documents, as well as excerpts of the
Administrative Directives.
To seek a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: a likelihood of success
on the merits of his claim; no adequate remedy at law; and, irreparable harm without the
injunctive relief. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). As for the first

requirement, the Court must determine whether “plaintiff has any likelihood of success—
in other words, a greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM General Corp. v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002). “A movant’s likelihood of success
on the merits must be strong.” Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2020). A strong
showing typically entails a demonstration of how the applicant intends to prove key

elements of his case. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2020);
Doe v. University of Southern Indiana, 43 F.4th 784, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2022) (the court is not
required to make inferences in the movant’s favor for preliminary injunctive relief).
The Court must also decide whether an adequate remedy at law exists and
whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. Irreparable

harm is harm which cannot be repaired. Graham v. Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 296
(7th Cir. 1998) (“Irreparable harm is harm which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down
again, atoned for. The injury must be of a particular nature, so that compensation in
money cannot atone for it.”). The Court must then weigh “the balance of harm to the
parties if the injunction is granted or denied and also evaluate the effect of an injunction
on the public interest.” Id.; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). “This

equitable balancing proceeds on a sliding-scale analysis; the greater the likelihood of
success of the merits, the less heavily the balance of harms must tip in the moving party’s
favor.” Korte, 735 F.3d at 665.
An injunction that seeks an affirmative act by the respondent is a mandatory
preliminary injunction and should be sparingly issued. Mays, 974 F.3d at 818. If
injunctive relief is warranted, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that the

injunction must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the
harm . . . ,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(2). Injunctive relief must be related to issues in the underlying lawsuit. See e.g.,
Tatum v. Hunter, Case No. 22-2411 (S.D. Ill. 2023) (Doc. 16) (denying injunctive relief,
where the injunctive relief sought was not narrowly tailored and did not align with the

claims in the case) aff’d in Tatum v. Hunter, Case No. 23-2253 (7th Cir. May 16, 2024);
Daniels v. Dumsdorff, et al., Case No. 19-cv-394 (S.D. Ill. 2019).
A prison transfer is an extraordinary form of relief that delves into the day-to-day
control of the prison environment. Plaintiff indicates he has only been exposed to a single
strip search that he alleges was improper. He does not indicate that he regularly

encounters the defendant who performed the search, nor does he indicate he has had any
subsequent issues. At most, he indicates the search had a negative impact on his mental
health, but he also admits he received medication for that issue. Furthermore, the
likelihood of success of a claim about the propriety of a strip search is incredibly hard to
determine early in a case with very few facts in the record, and the burden of a prison
transfer on the prison system is quite high. As such, the Court does not find this an

appropriate scenario for immediate injunctive relief. There is no obvious risk of ongoing
harm, the prison appears to be investigating the issue, and Plaintiff stated he has received
medication to address the mental impact of the incident. Thus, the Motion (Doc. 2) is
DENIED.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1 and 2 of the Complaint (Doc. 1)

survive against Defendant John Doe (the officer who performed the May 6, 2025 strip
search). By contrast, Claims 3 and 4 are dismissed without prejudice against Defendants
Burton, Brown, and Robinson. The Clerk shall TERMINATE Defendants Burton and
Robinson, but Brown shall remain in official capacity only to help identify John Doe.
Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a notice within 21 days giving the Court as much

descriptive information (nicknames, hair color, height, etc.) as possible about John Doe
so that the Warden can assist in identifying this person by name. Once Plaintiff submits
his notice, the Court will set a deadline for Brown to respond with identifying
information.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendant Jeremiah Brown

(Warden—official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum
and Order to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant
fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30
days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect

formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be
maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later
than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this
action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case
because it will involve the exchange of medical records.
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2) is DENIED for reasons
explained above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 15, 2025
/s David W. Dugan
________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your
lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,
the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will
likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,
but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants
have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important
information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles
that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but
it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening
only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some
relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged
actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is
the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121835. Public record. Not legal advice.