# Christopher Rogers v. Frank Strada

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · August 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121314

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 15, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Judges:** Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement Jr.
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

08/15/2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs July 8, 2025

CHRISTOPHER ROGERS v. FRANK STRADA ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 24-0314-IV Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor
___________________________________

No. M2024-01575-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence
expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his
sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply
credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date,
but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the
length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered
judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee
Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the
General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the
expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and
affirm its judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D.
MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J. and ANDY D. BENNETT, JJ., joined.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General; and
John H. Bledsoe, Deputy Attorney General, for the appellants, Frank Strada, Commissioner
of the Tennessee Department of Correction; Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and
Reporter; and the Tennessee Department of Correction.

Christopher Rogers, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 1992, Christopher Rogers pleaded guilty to first degree murder and
was sentenced to life in prison for an offense that he committed in September 1991.

In March 2024, Mr. Rogers commenced this action for declaratory judgment to
correct his sentence expiration date. Specifically, Mr. Rogers sought a declaration that the
sentence reduction credits he earned under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236 applied
to his sentence expiration date.1 The State responded by moving for summary judgment.

In September 2024, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Rogers. The
court found that Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236 allows for the application of
credits to sentence expiration dates and applies to all inmates unless specifically stated
otherwise. Because the General Assembly had not specifically exempted inmates
sentenced to life in prison for first degree murder committed between July 1, 1989, and
July 1, 1995, the court held that § 41-21-236 applied to Mr. Rogers. Thus, the court directed
the TDOC to correct Mr. Rogers’s information as stated in the Tennessee Offender
Management Information System (“TOMIS”).

This appeal followed.

ISSUES

The State raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether an inmate
sentenced to life in prison for first degree murder committed between July 1, 1989, and
July 1, 1995, may apply time credits earned under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-239
to reduce the expiration date of his or her sentence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[I]ssues of statutory construction are questions of law.” Ki v. State, 78 S.W.3d 876,
879 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 791 (Tenn. 2000)). We review
questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. (citing Walker v. Bd. of
Pro. Resp. of Supreme Ct. of Tennessee, 38 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Tenn. 2001); Reeves v.
Granite State Ins. Co., 36 S.W.3d 58, 60 (Tenn. 2001)).

1
Mr. Rogers also sought declarations regarding the length of his sentence and the application of
credits to his parole release eligibility date. The trial court granted Mr. Rogers relief on both grounds, and
those portions of the court’s judgment are not at issue on appeal.

-2-
ANALYSIS

The State argues that the trial court erred for two reasons. First, the State argues that
sentence reduction credits cannot reduce the length of a life sentence because § 41-21-
236(b) says that credits “shall affect release eligibility and sentence expiration dates in the
same manner as time credits affected parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates prior
to September 1, 1980.” According to the State, sentence credits never reduced the length
of a life sentence before that date. Second, the State asserts that release on parole is the
only type of early release allowed by § 40-35-501(h)(1).

When interpreting a statute, “[o]ur analysis naturally begins with the words used in
the statute,” Womack v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn. 2014), and we
must interpret those words under their “natural and ordinary meaning in the context in
which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose,” id. (quoting Mills v.
Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)).

I. SECTION 41-21-236

Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236 governs the award of “inmate sentence
reduction credits” for good behavior and satisfactory performance in educational and/or
vocational training programs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(a)(1)–(2). Inmates may
earn between one and sixteen days for each month served, and the credits “shall be used to
reduce the sentence imposed.”2 Id. 41-21-236(a)(2)(A). There is no language in § 41-21-
236 that expressly limits or prevents the award of sentence reduction credits to inmates
sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder.3

Still, the State contends that time credits cannot reduce the length of a life sentence
because § 41-21-236(b)(2) says that credits “shall affect” expiration dates “in the same
manner” as “prior to September 1, 1980.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236. And according
to the State, time credits did not apply to life sentence expiration dates before that date. We
conclude, however, that § 41-21-236(b) simply clarifies that time credits awarded under
the current statutory sentencing scheme have the same effect as time credits awarded under
earlier sentencing schemes.

Section 41-21-236(b) provides:

2
Time credits do not apply to the expiration dates for offenses committed after July 1, 2024. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(a)(2)(A)(i)(a).
3
“The determinate sentence for a life sentence is sixty years, as set for in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(1).” Brown v. Jordan, 563 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tenn. 2018).

-3-
(b) (1) The allowances that can be awarded pursuant to this section shall be
referred to as inmate sentence reduction credits.

(2) For sentences of less than (2) years or for offenses committed before
July 1, 2024, sentence reduction credits shall affect release eligibility
and sentence expiration dates in the same manner as time credits
affected parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates prior to
September 1, 1980.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236.

Before September 1, 1980, inmates could earn three types of credits: “good time,”
“honor time,” and “incentive.” See Byrd v. Bradley, 913 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995); Jones v. Reynolds, No. 01A01-9510-CH-00484, 1997 WL 367661, at *3–4 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 2, 1997). Good time credits date back to 1870, when prison superintendents
had to keep a “good time account” to record the conduct of inmates. See Act of Feb. 5,
1870, ch. 59, § 7, 1869–1870 Tenn. Pub. Acts 74, 76. All inmates who demeaned
themselves “uprightly” would have their sentences reduced by “one month for the first
year, two months for the second year, three months for the third year, and three months for
each subsequent year, to the tenth year inclusive, and four months for each remaining year
of the time of imprisonment.” See id. Starting in 1915, inmates placed in “honor grade”
could reduce their sentences by an additional “two months for each year of his term of
imprisonment.” See Act of May 17, 1915, ch. 163, § 2, 1915 Tenn. Pub. Acts 452, 452–53.
And beginning in 1972, inmates who participated in academic and vocational classes or
performed “above average” in their job placement could reduce their sentences by an
additional 30 days during the first year, 60 days during the second through tenth year, and
90 days during the eleventh and subsequent years. See Act of April 4, 1972, ch. 705, § 1,
1972 Tenn. Pub. Acts 758, 758–59.

“Good time,” “honor grade,” and “incentive” credits were available to all inmates
until 1979, when the General Assembly passed the Class X Felonies Act of 1979. See ch.
318, § 2, 1979 Tenn. Pub. Acts 696, 696–97. The Act stated that sentences for Class X
felonies would “not be subject to reduction for good, honor or incentive or other sentence
credit of any sort.” Id. Class X felonies included, inter alia, first- and second-degree
murder; first degree criminal sexual conduct; aggravated kidnapping; robbery with deadly
weapon; and aggravated arson. Id.

In 1980, the General Assembly consolidated “good time,” “honor grade,” and
“incentive” credits into two new categories. “Good time” and “honor time” credits were
replaced with “good conduct sentence credits,” and “incentive” credits were replaced with
“prisoner performance credits.” See Act of April 17, 1980, ch. 805, § 1, 1980 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 942, 942–46. Significantly, the 1980 Act contained language substantially similar to
that now codified in § 41-21-236(b)(2):

-4-
SECTION 1. (a) Prisoners admitted after July 1, 1981, shall accrue good
conduct time . . .

. . .

(c) The allowances which can be earned pursuant to this section
may be referred to as good conduct sentence credits and shall
affect parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates in the
same manner as good and honor time credits affected such
dates prior to the effective date of this statute.

. . .

SECTION 2. (a) Those persons committed to the custody of the Department
of Correction shall be assigned to work and/or educational and/or vocational
training programs, when positions in such programs are available. Each
inmate who performs within a program shall earn time credits toward the
sentence imposed . . .

. . .

(b) The allowances which can be earned pursuant to this section
shall be referred to as prisoner performance sentence credits
and shall affect parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates
in the same manner as incentive time credits affected such
dates prior to the effective date of this statute.

Act of April 17, 1980, ch. 805, §§ 1 and 2, 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts 942, 944–46 (emphasis
added).

According to the State’s proposed interpretation of § 41-21-236(b), the language
emphasized above would mean that “good conduct” and “prisoner performance” credits
earned after 1980 would apply to the same offenses and have the same effect as before
1980. The immediate problem with this construction is that the pre-1980 “good time”
credits were calculated differently from the “honor grade” credits. Yet the 1980 amendment
combines these credits into one. This raises the question of what benefit “good conduct
sentence credits” would have provided: Would they be granted on a graduated schedule
like credits for “good time” in 1870? Or would the award be a flat two months for each
year as provided to “honor grade” inmates in 1972? The answer is neither. Instead, the
1980 Act stated that “good conduct” credits would accrue “in the following manner:”

(1) Class I prisoner shall receive thirty (30) days credit for each month of the
sentence served;

-5-
(2) Class II prisoner shall receive twenty-two (22) days credit for each month
of the sentence served;

(3) Class III prisoner shall receive ten (10) days credit for each month of the
sentence served; and

(4) Class IV prisoner shall receive no credit on his sentence and shall serve
his sentence day for day.

Each prisoner shall be designated as a Class III prisoner for the first calendar
year of his sentence commencing with his sentence effective date. In the
second calendar year of a prisoner’s sentence, a prisoner shall be classified
as a Class II prisoner. From the eleventh calendar year of a prisoners’
sentence through the remainder of his sentence, a prisoner shall be classified
as a Class I prisoner.

Act of April 17, 1980, ch. 805, § 1, 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts 942, 943.

Similarly, the Act of 1980 awarded “prisoner performance credits” in a different
manner than the manner in which “incentive” credits had been awarded. As explained,
before 1980, inmates could earn 30 days of incentive credits during the first year, 60 days
during the second through tenth year, and 90 days during the eleventh and subsequent
years. See Act of April 4, 1972, ch. 705, § 1, 1972 Tenn. Pub. Acts 758, 759. The 1980 Act
allowed inmates to earn “between one (1) day and fifteen (15) days a month” of prisoner
performance credits “in accordance with the criteria established by the department
depending upon the program to which he [was] assigned.” Act of April 17, 1980, ch. 805,
§ 2, 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts 942, 945.

Had the General Assembly intended for post-1980 credits to apply exactly as before,
there would have been no need to specify how the credits applied after 1980.

A definitional provision like that in § 41-21-236(b)(2) was also included in the
Comprehensive Correction Improvement Act of 1985, which further consolidated “good
conduct” and “prisoner performance” credits into one category, “prisoner sentence
reduction credits”:

SECTION 12. . . .

(a) (1) Those persons committed to the custody of the Department of
Correction shall he assigned to work and/or educational and/or
vocational training programs, when positions in such programs
are available.

-6-
(2) Each inmate who exhibits good institutional behavior and/or
who exhibits satisfactory performance within a program
may be awarded time credits toward the sentence imposed . . .

. . .

(b) The allowances which can be awarded pursuant to this section
shall be referred to as prisoner sentence reduction credits and
shall affect release eligibility and sentence expiration dates in the
same manner as time credits affected parole eligibility and
sentence expiration dates prior to September 1, 1980.

Comprehensive Correction Improvement Act of 1985, ch. 5, § 12, 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts
(1st Ext. Sess.) 22, 24 (emphasis added). Significantly, the 1985 Act made prisoner
sentence reduction credits generally available to all inmates, including inmates who had
committed Class X felonies. Id. at 25. Again, had the General Assembly intended for the
new prisoner sentence reduction credits to apply in the exact same way that good conduct
and prisoner performance credits applied before 1980, there would have been no need to
specify who was eligible.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that § 41-21-236(b)(2) clarifies that “inmate
sentence reduction credits” have the same general effect on sentence expiration dates that
past credits had, i.e., a reduction. For this reason, we conclude that § 41-21-236(b)(2) does
not prevent application of sentence reduction credits to Mr. Rogers’s sentence expiration
date.

II. SECTION 40-35-501

The State also argues that Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1) prevents
the application of sentence credits to reduce Mr. Rogers’s sentence. Section 40-35-
501(h)(1) provides:

Release eligibility for a defendant committing the offense of first degree
murder on or after November 1, 1989, but prior to July 1, 1995, who receives
a sentence of imprisonment for life occurs after service of sixty percent
(60%) of sixty (60) years less sentence credits earned and retained by the
defendant, but in no event shall a defendant sentenced to imprisonment for
life be eligible for parole until the defendant has served a minimum of
twenty-five (25) full calendar years of the sentence, notwithstanding the
governor’s power to reduce prison overcrowding pursuant to title 41, chapter
1, part 5, any sentence reduction credits authorized by § 41-21-236, or any
other provision of law relating to sentence credits.

-7-
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(h)(1). “The release eligibility date provided for in this
section is the earliest date an inmate convicted of a felony is eligible for parole.” Id. § 40-
35-501(n).

The State’s argument is based on the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, which means that “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.”
Effler v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 614 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting Rich v.
Tennessee Bd. of Med. Examiners, 350 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tenn. 2011)). The State reasons
that sentence credits cannot be used to reduce Mr. Rogers’s sentence expiration date
because “the only type of release that the statute offers” is release on parole.

We find the principle of expression unius is not applicable here. Under expressio
unius, “[o]missions are significant when statutes are express in certain categories but not
in others.” Richards v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., 706 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tenn. 2025)
(quoting Carver v. Citizen Utilities Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1997)). For example, in
Effler v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 614 S.W.3d 681 (Tenn. 2020), the Tennessee Supreme Court
considered whether district attorneys had standing to sue under the Drug Dealer Liability
Act. Id. at 684. The statute listed the categories of persons who could file suit, and district
attorneys were not on that list. Id. at 688. Applying the principle of expressio unius, the
Court held that “the absence of the District Attorneys from an enumerated list of parties
who may bring a claim under the Act shows that the Legislature did not intend for the
District Attorneys to have standing to sue under the Act.” Id. at 689.

Here, § 40-35-501(h)(1) identifies one category of defendants to which it applies:
those who committed the offense of first-degree murder on or after November 1, 1989, but
before July 1, 1995, and who received a life sentence. These defendants are ineligible for
release on parole until serving 25 to 36 years, depending on sentence credits earned and
retained. Application of exressio unius simply leads to the conclusion that the limits on
release eligibility in § 40-35-501(h)(1) apply to only the identified category of defendants.

Although “[o]ur General Assembly has designated a few offenses for which neither
parole nor sentence reduction credits are available,” Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751, 758
(Tenn. 2010), first-degree murder is not one of them, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523(b)
(requiring child sexual predators, aggravated rapists, multiple rapists, and child rapists to
“serve the entire sentence imposed by the court undiminished by any sentence reduction
credits”); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i)(3) ( “Nothing in this subsection (i) shall
be construed as affecting, amending or altering § 39-13-523 . . . .”). If the General
Assembly intended to exempt life sentences from the generally applicable sentence
reduction statute, it could have done so expressly. See Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 757 (“[T]he
legislature’s failure to limit the use of offender classification and release eligibility as plea
bargaining tools evinced the legislature’s intent to permit the practice.” (quoting
McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tenn. 2000))).

-8-
Still, the State maintains that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown v
Jordan, 563 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 1996) and State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022)
confirm that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder and subject
to § 40-35-501(h)(1) has no right to use time credits to reduce his or her sentence expiration
date. We disagree. Neither Brown nor Booker addressed the application of credits to the
sentence expiration dates of inmates whose sentences are governed by § 40-35-501(h)(1).

In Brown, the Court clarified that defendants subject to § 40-35-501(i)—now
codified at § 40-35-501(h)(2)—“may be released after service of at least fifty-one years if
the defendant earns the maximum allowable sentence reduction credits.” 563 S.W.3d at
202. And in Booker, the Court held that application of § 40-35-501(h)(2) to juvenile
offenders is unconstitutional. See 656 S.W.3d at 68 (plurality) and 77 (J., Kirby,
concurring). To fix the defect, the Court applied § 40-35-501(h)(1), under which juvenile
offenders “remain sentenced to a sixty-year term” but are “eligible for, although not
guaranteed, supervised release on parole after serving between twenty-five and thirty-six
years.” Id. The Court did not, however, discuss whether the sixty-year term would still be
subject to the generally applicable sentence reduction statute in § 40-21-236.

Finally, the State argues that allowing a defendant convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to life in prison to apply time credits to his sentence expiration date could
result in the expiration of the defendant’s sentence before his release eligibility date. This
is incorrect. Under § 40-35-501(h)(2), an inmate is eligible for parole after serving between
25 and 36 years, depending on credits earned and retained. Under § 41-21-236(a)(2)(A)(ii),
an inmate can earn up to 16 days of sentence reduction credits for each month served. Thus,
a person sentenced to life in prison with a determinate sentence of 60 years could reduce
his or her sentence expiration date by about 30% or 20 years.

For these reasons, we agree with the trial court’s declaration that Tennessee Code
Annotated § 41-21-236 applies to inmates sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder
whose sentences are subject to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1) and affirm
its judgment requiring the State to apply Mr. Rogers’s sentence credits to his sentence
expiration date.

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded with costs
of appeal assessed against the appellants.

________________________________
FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

-9-

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121314. Public record. Not legal advice.