# Winchester v. Social Security Administration

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · July 15, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121037

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 15, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121037

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “the ALJ clearly explained the shortcomings” in reasoning that ‘an ALJ is not always required to do an exhaustive point-by-point discussion’ of the evidence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

J. L. W. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2586

FRANK BISIGNANO, SECTION: “I” (3)
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff timely filed this action for judicial review1 after the Social Security
Administration (the “Administration”) issued a final denial of his claim for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “SSA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 423, et seq.2 Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits he seeks and remand this
matter for further administrative proceedings.3 The Administration, via
Commissioner Frank Bisignano (the “Commissioner”),4 urges the Court to affirm the
denial of benefits and dismiss this case.5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule
73.2(B), this matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate

1 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2 R. Doc. 1.
3 R. Docs. 10, 18.
4 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Bisignano should
be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to
continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
5 R. Doc. 17.
Judge. Having carefully considered the parties’ briefing and the administrative
record6 in the light of the applicable law, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s appeal be
denied and this complaint dismissed with prejudice.
I. Background
Plaintiff is a 43-year-old male.7 He has at least an associate’s degree and work

experience as a groundskeeper, loader operator, and operating engineer.8 In March
2022, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits asserting that Crohn’s
disease, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
substance addiction (drugs and alcohol) rendered him disabled as of March 12, 2019.9
After the Administration denied his application, a hearing to review the claim was
held before an ALJ at Plaintiff’s request.10 The ALJ issued a decision in May 2024

holding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the definition of the SSA11 between
March 12, 2019 and the last date on which Plaintiff met the status requirements for
disability insurance coverage (September 30, 2019).12
The ALJ conducted the five-step sequential analysis required by 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 to consider a claimant’s assertion of disability. As the Fifth Circuit has
explained:

6 R. Doc. 7.
7 Id. at 21.
8 Id. at 21-22, 262.
9 Id. at 14, 16-17, 264.
10 Id. at 14, 34-35, 188.
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d).
12 R. Doc. 7 at 11-23.
The five steps consider: (1) Is the claimant “doing substantial gainful
activity”? (2) If not, does the claimant “have a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment” of sufficient duration? (3)
If so, does her impairment(s) meet or equal a listing in Appendix 1 of the
applicable regulations? (4) If not, considering the claimant’s “residual
functional capacity,” can the claimant still do her “past relevant work”?
(5) If not, can the claimant adjust to other work given her residual
functional capacity, age, education, and work experience?

Vasquez v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 4381269, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2024) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920). At steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant to show
he is disabled. Shave v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 2001). If the claimant can
carry this burden through step three or four, he has established disability and the
inquiry is over. Id. Otherwise, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to
prove the claimant nonetheless retains sufficient functional capacity to adjust to
other employment. Id.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied steps one and two. First, Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of his
disability.13 Second, Plaintiff suffered from several medical impairments, including
Crohn’s disease, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and substance addiction (drugs and alcohol).14 The ALJ also concluded that
Plaintiff suffered from the non-severe impairments of gastroesophageal reflux
disease, paronychia of the left thumb, seizure disorder, and anemia.15 The ALJ

13 Id. at 16.
14 Id. at 16-18.
15 R. Doc. 7 at 16-17.
determined, however, that Plaintiff did not satisfy step three because none of these
impairments or any combination thereof met or equaled an impairment listed in
Appendix One.16
Continuing to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work with some limitations.17 The ALJ

determined that Plaintiff should avoid operating a vehicle and must avoid certain
hazardous or fast-paced work environments.18 But the ALJ found that Plaintiff can
nonetheless understand, remember, and apply both simple and routine instructions,
and is able to adapt to occasional changes in work setting.19 The ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff retained the functional capacity required to successfully adjust to other
work.20 Therefore, it held that Plaintiff was not disabled during the period for which

he claims entitlement to disability insurance benefits.21
Now petitioning this Court for review, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to
properly evaluate one of his proffered expert medical opinions.22 Plaintiff argues that
this non-harmless error requires vacatur and remand for further consideration by the

16 Id. at 17-18; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
17 Id. at 18.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 21-22. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant
work as a groundskeeper, loader operator, and operating engineer but determined
that Plaintiff’s capacity, age, education, and work experience qualified him to perform
other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
21 Id. at 23.
22 R. Doc. 18 at 1-3.
ALJ.23 In opposition, the Commissioner argues the ALJ applied the proper legal
standards in evaluating the record evidence and that its decision must be affirmed as
supported by substantial evidence.24
II. Standard of Review
This Court’s review of a denial of social security benefits “is exceedingly

deferential and limited to two inquiries: whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s decision, and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards when
evaluating the evidence.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012).
“Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). This must

constitute “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence but may be “less than a
preponderance.” Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court “may
not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its]
judgment . . . even if [the Court concludes that] the evidence preponderates against”
the ALJ’s findings. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1988). “A finding
of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or
medical findings to support” the denial of benefits. Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417

(5th Cir. 2000) (citing Johnson, 864 F.2d at 343-44). If supported by substantial

23 Id.
24 R. Doc. 17.
evidence, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson,
402 U.S. at 390 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s determination that he was not disabled is
unsupported by substantial evidence because the ALJ “failed to properly evaluate”

the medical opinion of Michael McCormick, M.D..25 As directed by 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b), the ALJ must consider all record medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings based on: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) the
physician’s relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) any other factors
that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical
finding. Because supportability and consistency are the most important factors, the

ALJ must explain its consideration of those factors in weighing and evaluating each
medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
The supportability factor evaluates how “relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). “[S]upportability looks
internally to the bases presented by the medical opinion itself.” Sharon H. v. Kijakazi,
No. 5:21-CV-167-H, 2022 WL 3951488, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2022).26 Thus, “[i]n

25 R. Doc. 18 at 1.
26 See also Guillory v. Kijakazi, No. 22-4135, 2023 WL 9751083, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept.
1, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 711604 (E.D. La. Feb. 21,
2024).
articulating how they considered the supportability factor, ALJs may note that the
physician’s own treatment notes do not support the physician’s opinion, that the
physician’s opinion stems from a checklist, [and] that the physician did not consider
certain evidence, did not examine the claimant, or did not provide a detailed
explanation for [their] opinion.” Guillory, 2023 WL 9751083, at *3 (quoting Starman

v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-CV-00035-SRC, 2021 WL 4459729, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29,
2021) (collecting sources)).
Consistency, on the other hand, is the “extent to which the opinion is consistent
with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.”
Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-
01, 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). “[C]onsistency is an external inquiry that juxtaposes a

medical opinion to other evidence in the record, including opinions of other medical
professionals.” Sharon H., 2022 WL 3951488, at *3. The greater a medical opinion’s
consistency with other medical sources or record evidence, the greater its persuasive
value. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider Dr. McCormick’s opinion and
failed to “explain how [he] considered the supportability and consistency factors . . .
in [his] determination or decision.”27 Thus, Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s decision lacks

substantial supporting evidence and is insufficient with respect to both supportability

27 R. Doc. 18 at 2-3; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(2).
and consistency.28 In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to a handful of cases
in which district courts have reversed and remanded an ALJ’s decision because an
inadequate explanation of the consistency and supportability factors would “require
the [c]ourt to merely speculate about the reasons behind the ALJ’s persuasiveness
finding or lack thereof.” Miles v. Kijakazi, No. CV 23-7327, 2025 WL 39790, at *11

(E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2025) (citing Wallace, No. 3:22-CV-0820-X-BH, 2023 WL 2795854,
at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2023) (citing Cooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 587 F. Supp. 3d
489, 499 (S.D. Miss. 2021) (internal citations omitted)). In those cases, however,
remand was necessary because the ALJ failed to provide specific evidence indicating
why a medical opinion in its entirety was not completely persuasive, rendering the
district court unable to perform even its highly deferential review of the ALJ’s

decision. See id.; but see Padgett v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV 23-1468, 2023 WL
8369248, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 4, 2023); Silva v. Kijakazi, No. 22-51045, 2023 WL
3723628, at *1 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir.
2007) (finding that “the ALJ clearly explained the shortcomings” in reasoning that
‘an ALJ is not always required to do an exhaustive point-by-point discussion’ of the
evidence).
The ALJ’s discussion here, by contrast, is not so inadequate. The discussion of

Dr. McCormick’s opinion is brief, but detailed:
Michael McCormick, M.D., completed a Mental Impairment
Questionnaire for the claimant in 2024, indicating marked and extreme

28 R. Doc. 18 at 2-3.
limitations in several areas. He indicated that it was more probable than
not that the claimant was not able to work, and he noted that he began
treating the claimant in 2016. However, Dr. Winchester’s opinion
considers time frames outside the period at issue, was offered without
support, and is inconsistent with evidence from the relevant period
under review as discussed above. Therefore, it is unpersuasive.29

Thus, with regard to the supportability factor, the ALJ explained that it found Dr.
McCormick’s opinion unpersuasive because it fell outside the period of issue (March
12, 2019, to September 30, 2019) and is inconsistent with evidence from that time
period.30 The ALJ also noted that, while evidence contained in the record was
considered, no deference or specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
could be given to any prior medical opinion or administrative medical finding that
failed to address the period at issue.31 In evaluating the opinion’s supportability, “the
pertinent question is not whether the ALJ presented an arbitrary level of detail, it is
whether the decision contains a sufficient articulation to identify the evidentiary
choices made by the finder of fact.” See Padgett, 2023 WL 8369248, at *5.
As for the consistency factor, the ALJ explained that the record evidence Dr.
McCormick cited in his report was inconsistent with other evidence received at the
hearing level and did not in fact establish the limitations he assessed to Plaintiff as
it relates to him generally, let alone the period at issue.32 This explanation suffices

29 R. Doc. 7 at 21.
30 Id. at 20-21.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 20-21. The Court notes that, as stated supra, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) does not
empower a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s “even if the
evidence preponderates against” the ALJ’s decision. Johnson, 864 F.2d at 343. While
for the Court to perform the limited and deferential review of the ALJ’s decision
permitted under 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Remand for reevaluation of Dr. McCormick’s
opinion is not necessary here.
The ALJ found that the record evidence overall indicates Plaintiff responded
well to medical treatment following his rectal procedure in January 2019.33 It found

of greater consistency and supportability, and thus greater persuasive value, the
proffered progress notes from the Veterans’ Administration, which established the
inconsistency in statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of the symptoms contained within the other medical evidence in the record.34 It
pointed to evidence that, during the period at issue, Plaintiff “described his life as
‘pretty good’ with no stress . . . had not experienced a seizure since 2017 . . . tolerat[ed]

all pain well, and [that] his gait was normal,” in addition to overall unremarkable
reports of normal medical results upon physical examination.35 This is thus not a case
where “no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support” the ALJ’s

the record evidence cited in Dr. McCormick’s report may be reasonably interpreted
as consistent with his medical opinions, on its exceedingly deferential review, this
Court finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s conclusion that the record did not
establish the limitations he assessed to Plaintiff. See Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602.
33 R. Doc. 7 at 20-21. The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s usage of over-the-counter medications
for both constipation and residual abdominal pain relief. Id.
34 Id. The ALJ acknowledged that the progress notes supported that Plaintiff’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of
the alleged symptoms but found that residual functional capacity was appropriately
assessed considering exertional and postural limitations for Plaintiff’s complaints of
pain and restrictions regarding bathroom use for his history of Crohn’s disease.
35 Id. at 20.
decision. Harris, 209 F.3d at 417. The ALJ’s denial of benefits to Plaintiff is supported
by substantial evidence and must be affirmed.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs appeal be denied and that this matter
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party
has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 14380 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 15 day of July, 2025.

c Bas DOSSIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121037. Public record. Not legal advice.