# Williams v. Dumkwu

> District Court, E.D. Texas · August 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121008

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Texas
- **Decided:** August 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121008

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reversing the denial of qualified immunity because the plaintiff’s allegations were “blatantly” contradicted by the video evidence

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
No. 6:23-cv-00281
Mongo J. Williams,
Plaintiff,
V.
Anthony Dumkwu et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mongo J. Williams, a prisoner confined within the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice proceeding pro se, filed
this civil-rights proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
case was referred to a magistrate judge. Doc. 2.
I. Procedural history
Plaintiff initiated this proceeding in June 2023. Doc. 1. After
plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 8), the magistrate
judge issued an order to answer and scheduling order (Doc. 10)
directing defendants to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff’s
amended complaint.
Defendants Bradley, Dumkwu, and Holman filed a motion to
dismiss (Doc. 15) that was granted only as to defendant Bradley;
plaintiffs claims against Bradley were dismissed with prejudice.
Doc. 23. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Dumkwu for
excessive force and defendant Holman for failure to protect
remained. /d. Defendants Dumkwu and Holman filed a motion for
summary judgment. Doc. 44.
After reviewing that motion, the pleadings, and the summary
judgment evidence, the magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation that defendants’ motion for summary judgment
be granted and that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be
denied. Doc. 64. In so doing, the magistrate judge determined that
the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Jd. at 23.

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Further, because plaintiff has no cause of action upon which relief
may be granted, the magistrate judge dismissed the plaintiff’s sole
remaining claim against defendant Ragsdale. Id.
Specifically, the magistrate judge found that the Hudson
factors ultimately weighed in favor of the defendants. Id. at 9–18
(citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Though
plaintiff insists that he was a victim of a vicious attack and was
“slammed” against the wall in the hallway at the Beto Unit,
Doc.66 at 2, the magistrate judge determined that such allegations
were plainly contradicted by the video in this case. Doc. 64 at 17.
Therefore, the court held that the surveillance video discredits
plaintiff’s version of the events and found that defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 21–23. Additionally, the
plaintiff provided no facts that defendant Ragsdale’s failure to
check on plaintiff amounted to a constitutional violation. Id. at 23.
Because Ragsdale, head warden on the day in question, ensured
plaintiff received a medical evaluation for his injuries, Ragsdale’s
failure “to check on” plaintiff or “investigate” further than the
produced incident report, does not amount to a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See Doc. 48-8 at 2; Doc. 8 at 3; Doc. 64 at
23. Plaintiff filed timely objections to the report and
recommendation. Doc. 66.
II. Plaintiff’s objections
Plaintiff insists that he was attacked by defendant Dumkwu
and suffered injuries on December 12, 2022. Doc. 66. He claims
that he was walking away when defendant Dumkwu “ran up from
behind towards” him and then slammed him against the window
and walls—consisting of a brutal and “vicious attack.” Id. at 2. He
insists that he has not conducted interrogatories of the defendants
and maintains other camera angles exist. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff states
that he was “simply walk[ing] away” before he was attacked. Id.
at 2.
As to defendant Holman, plaintiff objects to the report and
recommendation by insisting Holman watched the allegations set
forth against Dumkwu above occur and “did not run to plaintiff’s
aid when . . . [plaintiff’s] life was in danger.” Id. at 1.
As to defendant Ragsdale, plaintiff provides no factual
objections, but continues to assert his claims against Ragsdale
should proceed. Id. at 3.
III. Discussion and analysis
When timely objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation are filed, the court reviews them de novo.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3); see also Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1420 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).
Plaintiff’s objections confirm the accuracy of the report and
recommendation.
It is well-established that the use of excessive physical force
against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). Because prison
officials—when confronted with prison disturbances—have the
difficult job of balancing “the threat unrest poses to inmates,
prison workers, administrators, and visitors against the harm
inmates may suffer if guards use force,” the core question is
whether the force used against a prisoner was applied in a “good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” inside the prison or,
conversely, whether the force was applied “maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 6–7; see
also Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts
consider the Hudson factors to determine whether prison guards
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain in violation of a
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, including: (1) the extent of the injury
suffered, (2) the need for the application of force, (3) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force used,
(4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,
and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response. Baldwin, 137 F.3d at 839. Each factor is neither exclusive
nor determinative; “each case must be judged on its own facts.”
Id.
When video footage exists that “blatantly contradicts the
plaintiff’s allegations,” this court should not adopt the plaintiff’s
version of the facts but, instead, should view the facts in the light
depicted by the footage. Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 845–46
(5th Cir. 2024) (“The video contradicted the plaintiff’s claim of
‘a genuine dispute that his constitutional rights had been
violated,’ entitling the defendants to QI.” (citing Livingston v.
Texas, No. 22-40719, 2023 WL 4931923, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 2,
2023)).
Plaintiff’s allegations that he was violently, brutally, and
viciously attacked are wholly contradicted by the surveillance
footage of the incident. Doc. 44 Ex. C. The footage does not
depict defendant Dumkwu running up from behind plaintiff and
then slamming plaintiff against the wall. Id. Similarly, it does not
show running or an “ambush” as plaintiff insinuates. Id. Plaintiff
states that he was beaten and slammed on the wall, but the footage
shows no such thing. Id. In fact, the footage reveals that no
punches were actually thrown. Id.
Though plaintiff filed his complaint containing his facts sworn
to penalty of perjury, the surveillance footage depicts defendant
Dumkwu and plaintiff arguing in the prison hallway before
plaintiff begins to walk away from Dumkwu after Dumkwu gave
him an order to return to his housing area. Id. at 2:04–13. Dumkwu
attempts to grab plaintiff’s arm as he is walking away, and plaintiff
then pulls away aggressively. Id. at 2:14–15. Dumkwu then places
plaintiff against the wall, and plaintiff is ultimately handcuffed. Id.
at 2:15–25.
Given the footage demonstrating Dumkwu and plaintiff
arguing before plaintiff begins to walk away, plaintiff’s contention
that Dumkwu “ran up” on him “from behind” before he walked
away is disingenuous. Doc. 66 at 2. The magistrate judge correctly
determined that the court should discredit plaintiff’s version of
events because the surveillance footage directly contradicts his
claims. Doc. 64 at 21; see also Craig v. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 409
(5th Cir. 2022) (reversing the denial of qualified immunity
because the plaintiff’s allegations were “blatantly” contradicted
by the video evidence).
Plaintiff’s actions—refusing to comply with a direct order and
then pulling away from an officer—necessitated the use of force
even though plaintiff suffered an injury to his finger. See
Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 254 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (explaining that though the force incident
resulted in some injury, “[a]s to the second and third [Hudson]
factors, Waddleton’s sudden movement created a need for the use
of force and the relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used was appropriate.”); McCoy v. Esquivel, 798
F. App’x 818, 819–20 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (placing emphasis on McCoy’s refusal to comply
with orders and his “pulling away” from officers in concluding
the force used was not unreasonable).
Plaintiff discounts the severity of his refusal to comply:
walking away from a direct order and pulling away from an officer
in a prison setting. Johnson v. Hill, 514 F. Supp. 3d 958, 968 (S.D.
Tex. 2021) (“Disobeying orders poses a threat to the order and
security of an institution.”); see also Minix v. Blevins, 2007 WL
1217883, at *24 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) (recognizing that, even
where a prisoner believes an order is unjustified or improper, that
“does not give him the right to disobey them at his whim.”).
Plaintiff insists that the “force” was unreasonable. But, as the
magistrate judge concluded, the surveillance footage of the
incident proves otherwise. Doc. 64 at 21. The video does not
document an ambush or a beating. Rather, the video depicts a
small amount of force in which Dumkwu placed plaintiff against
the wall after he walked away while simultaneously disobeying
Dumkwu’s direct order. Doc. 44 Ex. C; see also Hobart v. Estrada,
582 F. App’x 348, 351–52 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“This
court has further said that it assigns greater weight, even at the
summary judgment stage, to facts evident from video recordings
taken at the scene.”); see also Meadows v. Gibson, 855 F. Supp. 223,
225 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (“Prisoners may not pick and choose
which prison rules they will obey.”).
The Hudson factors ultimately weigh in favor of defendants,
especially considering the surveillance footage, and defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity. Since the “force” placed on
plaintiff by Dumkwu did not amount to a constitutional violation,
plaintiff cannot maintain a bystander action against defendant
Holman for watching constitutional conduct. Martinez v. City of
Rosenberg, Texas, 123 F.4th 285, 290 (5th Cir. 2024) (“district
court properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] bystander liability claim
because it cannot stand absent an underlying constitutional
violation.”). Plaintiff identifies no error in the magistrate judge’s
report.
Further, due to plaintiff’s lack of factual allegations in his
amended complaint (Doc. 8), plaintiff’s own admission that
warden Ragsdale ensured a “use-of-force report” (Doc. 48-8),
including a medical evaluation, was completed, and the lack of
substantive objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendations as to defendant Ragsdale, plaintiff’s claims
against defendant Ragsdale are dismissed. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236
F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001) (when a different defendant
“establishes that plaintiff has no cause of action . . . this defense
generally inures also to the benefit of [the] defaulting defendant”
even though the defaulting defendant did not join the summary
judgment motion).
For the reasons given above, the court accepts the magistrate
judge’s report and overrules plaintiff’s objections. Docs. 64, 66.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44) is granted.
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 46) and motion to dismiss defendants’ reply
(Doc. 58) are denied. Claims against defendant Dumkwu and
defendant Holman are dismissed with prejudice. All claims
against defendant Ragsdale are dismissed with prejudice. Any
pending motions are denied as moot.
So ordered by the court on August 14, 2025.

ji CAMPBELL BARKER
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11121008. Public record. Not legal advice.