# Harris v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11120975

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 14, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11120975

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------x

TRACEY HARRIS, LAWRENCE
O’ROURKE, and ANTHONY MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GAGLIANO, 22-CV-6612 (RPK) (JRC)

Plaintiffs,

v.

LOCAL 3, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS,

Defendant.

----------------------------------------------------x

RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Tracey Harris, Lawrence O’Rourke, and Anthony Gagliano—former employees
of Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”)—claim in this lawsuit that defendant Local 3,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“Local 3”), breached its duty of fair
representation under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Plaintiffs specifically
allege that Local 3 violated this duty by distributing money that the union received from Charter
as part of a settlement relating to a strike by Charter employees to Local 3 retirees, most of whom
had never worked for Charter. Local 3 moves for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed
evidence shows that Local 3 never received money as part of a settlement with Charter. Because
plaintiffs have failed to marshal any evidence suggesting otherwise, Local 3’s motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements and relevant portions
of the record and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
A. The Charter Strike and its Aftermath
Plaintiffs are former employees of Charter, and were also members of Local 3. Local 3
acted as the collective bargaining representative for Charter’s service technicians until 2022. See
Local 3 Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 19 (Dkt. #53). In 2017, Local 3 called a strike against Charter. Id.
¶ 4.

After the strike began, Charter continued to operate with replacement employees,
supervisors, and workers who crossed the picket line. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. The company also unilaterally
removed members of the Local 3 bargaining unit from a pension plan to which Charter had long
contributed. Id. ¶ 6. Specifically, Charter terminated Local 3 members’ participation in
multiemployer employee benefit pension and welfare plans run by the Joint Industry Board of the
Electrical Industry (“JIBEI”)—including the Pension Trust Fund of the Pension, Hospitalization
and Benefit Plan of the Electrical Industry (the “JIB Pension Plan”), a pension plan to which
essentially all employers that have a collective bargaining agreement with Local 3 contribute for
covered employees. Id. ¶¶ 7–9.

The strike against Charter lasted for more than five years. See id. ¶¶ 20–21. By 2022,
however, few workers remained on the picket line; many had taken other jobs, retired, or crossed
the picket line to work for Charter under terms the employer had unilaterally set. Ibid.
In 2022, Local 3 entered into an agreement through which it disclaimed interest in
continuing to represent Charter employees. The agreement settled all pending litigation, NLRB
charges, and disputes between the parties. See id. ¶¶ 25–27. As part of the settlement, Charter
agreed to pay backpay to several specific, named employees or former employees whom Charter
had allegedly subjected to unfair labor practices or discrimination. See ibid. However, the
settlement agreement did not provide for any payments to be made to Local 3. See Settlement
Agreement Between Loc. 3 & Charter (Dkt. #54-4); Decl. of Lance Van Arsdale ¶¶ 19–26 (Dkt.
#54).
That same year, Charter entered an agreement to pay withdrawal liability to the JIB Pension
Plan. Local 3 Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 31. Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
of 1980, an employer that effects a “complete withdrawal” from a multiemployer plan—meaning

“permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan” or “permanently ceases
all covered operations under the plan”—must generally pay “withdrawal liability” to the plan. 29
U.S.C. §§ 1381(a), 1383(a); see Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar
Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 196 (1997). The statute sets out a “complex scheme for calculating
withdrawal liability,” Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 196, the details of which are not relevant
here.
Charter had represented since its withdrawal from the JIB Pension Plan in 2017 that it
would “live up to its legal obligation” to the plan, but the company and the plan differed as to the
amount of Charter’s withdrawal liability. Local 3 Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 31; Letter Re: Your New

Wages & Benefits 2 (Dkt. #54-2). An arbitration hearing to resolve the amount was scheduled for
2022. See Decl. of Scott Feldman ¶¶ 5–9 (Dkt. #55); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1401 (providing for
arbitration to resolve disputes by the withdrawing employer over the amount of withdrawal
liability assessed by the plan). Before the hearing, however, Charter and the plan negotiated an
estimated $80 million settlement of withdrawal liability, which was finalized and executed in May
2022. Id. ¶¶ 10–11; see Dep. of Chris Erickson 30:8–12 (Dkt. #61-4); Dep. of Scott Feldman
25:21–26:11 (Dkt. #61-5); Settlement Agreement Between Charter & Pension Fund 1 (Dkt. #61-
7). As the plan and the union saw it, Charter settled its withdrawal liability “solely” with the plan,
and its ultimate agreement was “unrelated” to Charter’s union negotiations. Decl. of Lance Van
Arsdale ¶ 28; Decl. of Scott Feldman ¶¶ 16–17. Charter would have settled with Local 3 even if
it had not settled its dispute with the pension fund. Dep. of Lance Van Arsdale 19:25–20:24 (Dkt.
#61-3); Dep. of Chris Erickson 35:17–36:11.
B. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging that Local 3 had violated the NLRA by breaching its

duty of fair representation to plaintiffs and others. As relevant to the summary judgment motion,
plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that in resolving the strike, Charter had made a payment to
Local 3 that “was intended, by Charter, to be paid to those who had gone out on strike.” Second
Am. Compl. ¶ 13 (Dkt. #18). Instead, plaintiffs claimed, Local 3 paid this money to “[a]ll Local
3 retirees” in the form of a $1500 pension bonus, “whether or not they were former Charter
employees.” Id. ¶ 14; see Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 1–2 (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) (Dkt. #61)
(“The central allegation here is that the union got money out of Charter Communications, i.e., the
withdrawal liability payment of $80 million, in return for disclaiming jurisdiction over the Charter
Communications bargaining unit, and that that money was used to benefit the 20,000 or so retirees

then collecting pensions, only a few of whom were Charter employees.”).
On Local 3’s motion to dismiss, the Court ruled that plaintiffs’ case could proceed based
on this allegation. See generally Mem. & Order (Dkt. #27). The Court explained that a claim for
breach of the duty of fair representation has two elements: (i) the union’s conduct must be
“arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,” and (ii) there must be “a causal connection between the
union’s wrongful conduct and [the plaintiffs’] injuries.” Id. at 6 (quoting White v. White Rose
Food, 237 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2001)) (alteration in original). The Court noted that while a
union’s actions would qualify as arbitrary only if “the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide
range of reasonableness,’ as to be irrational,” id. at 7 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill,
499 U.S. 65, 68 (1991)), plaintiff’s allegations regarding distribution of settlement payments
adequately pleaded such conduct, id. at 9.
Local 3 indicated its intent to move for summary judgment. See Local 3 Mot. for Pre-Mot.
Conf. (Dkt. #31). Over Local 3’s objection, plaintiffs were permitted to engage in discovery into
settlement and pension payments by Charter before that motion practice. See June 10, 2024 Min.

Entry & Order; June 17, 2024 Min. Entry & Order. Local 3 then moved for summary judgment,
arguing that plaintiff had failed to adduce any evidence that Local 3 had engaged in an arbitrary
distribution of any settlement proceeds. See Def.’s Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
(“Def.’s Mot.”) (Dkt. #52).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue
of fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Frost v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation

marks omitted). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Ibid. (citation and quotation marks omitted). In determining whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact, a court evaluates the whole record, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. See ibid. A nonmoving party can survive
summary judgment only if there is sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find in
that party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Local 3 is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs have not adduced evidence to
support their theory of arbitrary distributions.
The undisputed evidence in the summary judgment record shows that Charter never made
a payment to Local 3 related to the settlement agreement ending the strike and that Charter’s

payments to the separate JIB Pension Plan were a settlement of the company’s withdrawal liability
to the Plan. See Def.’s Mot. 19–25. Local 3 supports its arguments regarding Charter’s payments
with witness testimony, see Decl. of Scott Feldman ¶¶ 16–17; Decl. of Lance Van Arsdale ¶ 28;
see also Dep. of Lance Van Arsdale 19:25–20:24 (explaining that the strike settlement and
Charter’s withdrawal liability were “two different issues”); Dep. of Chris Erickson 35:17–36:11
(testifying that Local 3 would have settled the Charter strike even “without resolution of the
withdrawal liability”), and documentary evidence showing, among other things, that Charter’s
statutorily mandated withdrawal liability arose from its 2017 withdrawal from the pension plan
and thus was always owed, regardless of how the Charter strike ended. See Decl. of Lance Van

Arsdale ¶ 27; Letter Re: Your New Wages & Benefits 2; Settlement Agreement Between Charter
& Pension Fund 1; Notice & Demand for Payment of Withdrawal Liab. 1–2 (Dkt. #55-1); Decl.
of Scott Feldman ¶¶ 5–10.
Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that
Local 3 obtained any funds from Charter that it then directed to non-Charter retirees. In response
to Local 3’s twenty-five page memorandum explaining why plaintiffs’ claims are not supported
by the factual record, plaintiffs submitted a five-page letter. See Pls.’ Opp’n. To the extent the
letter cites the record, it does so by simply listing several attached exhibits, without any explanation
of their relevance to plaintiffs’ arguments. See id. at 2–3.
Plaintiffs principally oppose summary judgment on the theory that Local 3 has failed to
explain the $80 million payment that Charter made to the JIB Pension Plan to settle its withdrawal
liability. See id. at 1–2 (describing it as “astounding” that there is “[n]ot one word about the $80
million payment” in Local 3’s summary judgment motion). Indeed, plaintiffs appear to concede
that summary judgment would be appropriate if Local 3 officials had represented that this payment

was separate from Charter’s settlement agreement with the union, stating that “had union officials
asserted that the payment of $80 million had no relationship to their decision to abandon the strike
. . . we might have had a hard time proving otherwise.” Id. at 2. But Local 3 officials have asserted
just that—repeatedly. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. 23–24, Local 3 Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 46–47; Decl.
of Lance Van Arsdale ¶ 28; Decl. of Scott Feldman ¶¶ 16–17.
Against this evidence, plaintiffs’ rank speculation that Charter’s settlement with the
pension plan must have been “in return for [Local 3’s] abandoning Plaintiffs and their class,” Pls.’
Opp’n 2, cannot defeat Local 3’s motion for summary judgment. See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d
159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true

nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” (brackets and citation omitted)).
Because Local 3 has successfully demonstrated the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact,
Local 3 is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Local 3’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk
of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Rachel Kovner
RACHEL P. KOVNER
United States District Judge

Dated: August 14, 2025
Brooklyn, New York

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11120975. Public record. Not legal advice.