# Doe v. City of Chicago

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · August 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11120098

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 13, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 1:23-CV-01679
)
v. )
) Judge Edmond E. Chang
CITY OF CHICAGO and )
JAMES E. GONZALES, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

After Jane Doe was assaulted on a Chicago subway platform in March 2021,
James Gonzales, a Chicago Police detective, was assigned to investigate the case.
R. 62, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17.1 But Doe alleges that Gonzales soon began making un-
wanted sexual advances towards her and ultimately forced her to have sex with him.
Id. ¶¶ 19–31. Doe felt unable to reject Gonzales’s sexual advances because she feared
for her safety and feared that the investigation into the earlier assault would be
halted. Id. ¶ 44. She also alleges that Gonzales later verbally abused and physically
assaulted her. Id. ¶¶ 40–43.
Based on these allegations, Doe sued the City of Chicago and Gonzales, bring-
ing three civil rights claims against Gonzales, as well as Monell municipal liability
and state law indemnification claims against the City.2 Id. at 7–19. Both the City and

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,
a page or paragraph number.

2The Court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Supplemental
jurisdiction applies to the state law indemnification claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Gonzales then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. R. 12, City
First Mot.; R. 34, Gonzales Mot. The Court denied Gonzales’s motion across-the-board
and denied the City’s motion to dismiss Doe’s Monell claim. R. 56, MTD Op. at 2. But

the Court did dismiss Doe’s indemnification claim, concluding that Gonzales was act-
ing outside the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted Doe. Id. at 2, 12–
13. Doe then amended her complaint, alleging additional facts related to her indem-
nification claim. Am. Compl. at 16–19. The City now moves to dismiss again, arguing
that Doe still fails to state a claim for indemnification and that she also fails to ade-
quately state a due process claim. R. 68. City Second Mot. Because the amendments
to the Complaint do not change the conclusion that Gonzales was not acting within

the scope of his employment, the indemnification claim is dismissed again. But be-
cause Doe successfully alleges that her bodily integrity was violated, the City’s motion
to dismiss the substantive due process claim is denied.
I. Background
The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Jane Doe, an African-American woman, was assaulted on a
Chicago Transit Authority Red Line subway platform on March 3, 2021. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 5, 16. James Gonzales, a Chicago Police detective, was assigned to investigate the
attack. Id. ¶ 17. After learning through his investigation that Doe was a survivor of
sex trafficking, Gonzales began engaging in a pattern of inappropriate behavior and
then outright nonconsensual sexual violence towards her. Id. ¶¶ 18–20.
2
The inappropriate behavior began on March 16, 2021, when Gonzales reached
out to Doe to meet about the assault investigation. Am. Compl. ¶ 23. That day, when
Gonzales first met Doe, he began non-consensually sexually grooming her by taking

her to dinner, giving her money, and hugging and kissing her. Id. ¶ 24. Gonzales then
began sending Doe sexually charged messages about the investigation and continued
making unwanted sexual advances towards Doe via text messages and phone and
video calls. Id. ¶¶ 26–29. Doe felt unable to reject Gonzales’s advances and unable to
stop communicating with him because she feared for her safety if she rejected him.
Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. On March 18, Gonzales came to the hotel room that Doe was staying at
and forced her to have oral and vaginal sex with him. Id. ¶ 31. He then paid her $100.

Id. ¶ 32.
Four days later, after getting Doe’s address through Chicago Police Depart-
ment records, Gonzales picked her up at her home. Id. ¶¶ 34–36. He then took Doe to
buy a cell phone so that he could keep her updated on the assault investigation. Id.
¶ 36. When they were at the cell phone store, Gonzales repeatedly groped Doe, despite
her asking him to stop. Id. ¶ 37. After leaving the store, Gonzales made several more

sexual advances towards Doe. Id. ¶ 38. When Doe rejected these advances, Gonzales
became angry, verbally abused Doe, and threatened to call the SWAT team to put her
in jail. Id. ¶ 40. Gonzales then assaulted Doe, twisting her neck, arm, and breast. Id.
¶¶ 41–43. After this assault, Doe feared that Gonzales would continue to retaliate
against her for refusing his advances, and she feared for her life. Id. ¶ 44.

3
So Doe sued Gonzales and the City of Chicago. R. 1, Compl. She brings three
§ 1983 claims against Gonzales: for using excessive force against her, unreasonably
seizing her, and violating her due process rights. Am. Compl. at 7–11. She also brings

a Monell municipal-liability claim and a state law claim for indemnification against
the City. Id. at 11–19. Gonzales and the City then moved to dismiss the claims against
them, asserting that Doe failed to adequately state a claim for relief. See City First
Mot.; Gonzales Mot. The Court denied Gonzales and the City’s motions, except that
the Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Doe’s indemnification claim, reasoning
that Gonzales was acting outside the scope of his employment when he sexually as-
saulted Doe. MTD Op. at 2.

Doe then amended her complaint, alleging additional facts with respect to her
indemnification claim. Am. Compl. The City now moves to dismiss once more. City
Second Mot. It argues that Doe’s Amended Complaint does nothing to change the
Court’s previous holding that Gonzales was acting outside the scope of his employ-
ment. And it contends that Doe fails to state a due process claim because she was not
arrested or convicted and did not have a trial. Id. at 3–8.

II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-
fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

4
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).3 The Seventh Circuit has explained that this
rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on
the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of

court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police
of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). These allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,
rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
III. Analysis
A. Indemnification
The City begins by arguing that the indemnification claim should be dismissed

again because none of the amendments that she made to her Complaint disturbs the
Court’s previous conclusion that Gonzales was acting outside the scope of his

3This opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,
and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,
18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
5
employment when he sexually assaulted Doe. City Second Mot. at 3. That argument
succeeds.
In the Amended Complaint, Doe now asserts that Gonzales acted in the scope

of his job as a police officer to contact, groom, and then sexually assault her. For ex-
ample, Doe alleges that Gonzales “acted in the course and scope of his employment
with Defendant, City of Chicago, when he made contact with Jane Doe as a part of
his investigation against Jane Doe.” Am. Compl. ¶ 88. Similarly, Doe also alleges that
Gonzales “acted in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, City of
Chicago, when he would text Jane Doe’s cell phone number as a part of his investiga-
tion against Jane Doe.” Id. ¶ 95. Although Doe repeatedly asserts that Gonzales acted

within the scope of his employment, that is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation.
So it is not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. And the
facts that Doe does allege do not support that legal conclusion. Instead, although the
added facts in the Amended Complaint bolster the conclusion that Gonzales acted
under the color of law (which is an element of the § 1983 claims), they do not show
that he was acting within the scope of his employment for the indemnification claim.

As the prior opinion explained, whether an individual was acting under the
color of state law and whether he was acting within the scope of his employment “are
two separate, independent inquiries and are governed by different standards.” MSJ
Op. at 12. “An action is taken under color of state law if it involves a misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law.” Estate of Sims v. County of Bureau, 506 F.3d
6
509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). In contrast, the conduct of an employee “is not
within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far
beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to

serve” the employer. Pyne v. Witmer, 543 N.E. 2d 1304, 1308 (Ill. 1989) (cleaned up).
The fact that Gonzales initially got in contact with Doe through his investiga-
tion into the subway-platform assault and the fact that he would text her as part of
the investigation show that the sexual assault involved a misuse of power and was
made possible only because of Gonzales’s position as a police officer. But those facts
do not establish that Gonzales was serving his employer, the Chicago Police Depart-
ment, by committing the sexual assaults. As explained in the prior opinion, Illinois

courts have generally held that “acts of sexual assault are outside the scope of em-
ployment” because conduct “that is solely for the benefit of the employee” is not within
the scope of employment. Deloney v. Board of Educ. of Thornton Twp., 666 N.E.2d
792, 797–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (citing cases). That reasoning holds true here. Gon-
zales did not aim to benefit the Chicago Police Department by sexually assaulting
Doe; instead, he committed the sexual assaults solely for his own purposes. So Gon-

zales acted outside the scope of his employment.
Doe cites two cases in support of her position that Gonzales acted within the
scope of his employment: Doe v. Golding, 2022 WL 5027095 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2022)
and Hill v. Shaffer, 2022 WL 4448870 (S.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2022). But both cases are
distinguishable from this one. In both cases, the plaintiffs were detained in jail when
they were sexually assaulted by correctional officers, who were on duty. Doe, 2022
7
WL 5027095, at *1; Hill, 2022 WL 4448870, at *1. So in Doe and Hill, the officers
were actively doing their jobs and serving their employers during the time that they
committed the sexual assaults in question. There is thus a much tighter connection

between the officers’ employment and the sexual assaults in those cases than with
Gonzales. Though Gonzales used his position and authority as a police officer to fa-
cilitate the sexual assaults, he was not actively serving the Chicago Police Depart-
ment when he committed the sexual assaults against Doe. Because Gonzales’s actions
were outside the scope of his employment, the indemnification claim is dismissed.
B. Due Process
The City next asserts that Doe’s due process claim must be dismissed because

she was not arrested or convicted and because she never went to trial. City Second
Mot. at 7. This argument misunderstands Doe’s claim. Doe is not bringing a proce-
dural due process claim. Instead, she brings a substantive due process claim, alleging
that the sexual assaults “violated her right to bodily integrity” and “shock[ed] the
conscience.” Am. Compl. ¶ 59. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that claims like
can viably state a claim for relief.

For example, in Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753 (7th Cir. 2023), a student was
sexually assaulted by a police officer during a ride-along, so she brought several
claims against the officer, including a due process claim. Id. at 757. The Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the student had alleged a plausible due process claim, explaining
that “our precedents have recognized a substantive due process right against sexual
assault by state actors in cases where no search or seizure occurred.” Id. at 764. The
8
court went on the hold that where “a plaintiff plausibly alleges sexual assault by a
public official acting under color of law, that plaintiff has stated a claim for a violation
of her right to bodily integrity protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at

767. Doe has cleared that bar here. As explained in the previous opinion, Doe has
plausibly alleged that Gonzales sexually assaulted her, and in doing so, acted under
the color of law. MTD Op. at 5–7. Thus, it does not matter that Doe was not arrested
or convicted and never had a trial. She properly states a substantive due process
claim, and the City’s motion to dismiss is denied with regard to this claim. Also, to
the extent that Doe’s Monell claim is based on this due process violation, that claim
also survives the motion to dismiss.

IV. Conclusion
The City of Chicago’s motion to dismiss, R. 68, is denied as to the substantive
due process and Monell claims (Counts 3 and 4) and granted as to the indemnification
claim (Count 5). The indemnification claim is now dismissed with prejudice because
Doe has already had a chance to amend her complaint.
ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: August 13, 2025

9

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11120098. Public record. Not legal advice.