# Rylander v. Brown

> District Court, S.D. Texas · August 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119327

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** August 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119327

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment “also prohibits suits against state officials or agencies that are effectively suits against a state”
- noting that the district court’s determination of sovereign immunity was jurisdictional
- holding that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather a suit against the official’s office,” which is “no different from a suit against the state itself”

## Opinion text

□ Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 11, 2025
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
YUCOB RYLANDER, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-2079
§
JUDGE SUSAN BROWN, in her Official §
Capacity as Presiding Judge of the Eleventh §
Administrative Judicial Region §
Defendant. §
ORDER
Pending before the Court are several motions: (1) Defendant Susan Brown’s (“Brown”)
Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 8); (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Defer Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss,
(Doc. No. 14); (3) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Brown’s Reply in support of her Motion to Dismiss,
(Doc. No. 15); (4) Brown’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (Doc. No. 16); and (5) Plaintiff's Motion
to Compel and for Sanctions, (Doc. No. 20). After considering the law and arguments of the
parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant Susan Brown’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 8).
Plaintiff's suit is therefore DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed his Complaint against Defendant Susan Brown under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that
Brown, Judge of the 185th Criminal District Court of Harris County and the Presiding Judge of
the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, deprived him of due process and equal
protection rights by failing to recuse, “fabricat[ing a] referral process,” denying him a required
hearing, and “collud[{ing] with opposing counsel” to “extort attorneys’ fees” through fraudulent
means. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Brown entered two orders stating

that a referral from a recused judge had occurred, which Plaintiff alleges did not occur, and that
Judge Brown had no jurisdiction to enter these orders. (/d. at 6). Plaintiff also specifically alleged
in his Complaint that Judge Brown “acted under color of state law and in her official judicial
capacity.” (/d.). In response, Brown moved to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff had no standing
to sue, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged any of his claims, and any such claims are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity. (Doc. No. 8 at 3-4).
Il. Legal Standard
A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Similarly, a plaintiff may file a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a counterclaim. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 527 U.S. 1020 (1999). To
defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that
are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). The Court is not bound to accept factual
assumptions or legal conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, the court assumes their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief. Jd.
if. Analysis
The Court will start with the question of sovereign immunity because it goes to this Court’s
jurisdiction over the case. See City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (Sth Cir. 2019) (noting
that the district court’s determination of sovereign immunity was jurisdictional). Here, the Court
finds that sovereign immunity applies, and it is therefore without jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff s
claims.
“In most cases, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars private suits against
nonconsenting states in federal court.” City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (Sth Cir. 2019).
Here, Plaintiff's suit is against Brown in her official capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Eleventh
Administrative Judicial Region.' An administrative judicial region is a state entity created by
statute. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.042(1). As Brown is being sued in her official capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Administrative Judicial Region, Plaintiff's suit is properly construed as
against the State of Texas. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(holding that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the
official but rather a suit against the official’s office,” which is “no different from a suit against the
state itself”). As such, sovereign immunity would apply to Plaintiff's suit against Judge Brown in
her official capacity. See Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, Tex., 969 F.3d 460,
471 (Sth Cir. 2020) (holding that the immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment “also prohibits
suits against state officials or agencies that are effectively suits against a state”). Thus, because

Both Plaintiff and Defendant refer to Judge Brown as the Presiding Judge of the Second
Administrative Judicial Region, but the statute cited includes Harris County in the Eleventh Administrative
Judicial Region. Further, Judge Susan Brown’s later filings refer to her as Presiding Judge of the Eleventh
Administrative Judicial Region. (Doc. No. 16 at 1).

Plaintiff's claims against Brown are official capacity claims, the suit will be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment unless Texas has consented to the suit, or an exception applies.
First, Texas has not consented to suit. The only avenue for a suit against a governmental
entity here is the Texas Tort Claims Act, which contains a limited waiver of immunity. See Mission
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 $.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008). This immunity waiver,
however, only applies in Texas state courts and explicitly rejects any waiver of immunity for suits
against judges. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.053 (“(a) This chapter does not apply
to a claim based on an act or omission of a court of this state or any member of a court of this state
acting in his official capacity or to a judicial function of a governmental unit. ‘Official capacity’
means all duties of office and includes administrative decisions or actions.”). As such, Texas has
expressly rejected any waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against judicial officers.
Second, there is no exception to sovereign immunity applicable in this case. There are two
primary exceptions to state sovereign immunity. First, Congress may expressly abrogate state
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., AT&T Commc'ns v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643
(Sth Cir. 2001). Second, the Ex parte Young exception “permits suits for prospective . . . relief
against state officials acting in violation of federal law.” Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S.
431, 437 (2004). Here, neither party addresses the question of congressional abrogation so the
question is whether Plaintiffs request of declaratory and injunctive relief is sufficient for the Ex
parte Young exception to apply.
For Young to apply, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) A “plaintiff must name individual
state officials as defendants in their official capacities,” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328
(Sth Cir. 2013); (2) the plaintiff must “allege[ ] an ongoing violation of federal law,” Verizon Md.
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Ma., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002); and (3) the relief sought must be
“properly characterized as prospective.” Green Valley, 969 F.3d at 471. While Plaintiff does

request injunctive and declaratory relief, his requests do not seek to remedy a continuing violation
of federal law. Plaintiff's Complaint requests that the Court:
“(1) Declare that all judicial orders issued by Defendant Susan Brown related to Plaintiff's
recusal motion are void ab initio; (2) Enjoin Defendant from issuing further orders in
Plaintiff's pending state case or any related matter; (3) Award $5 million compensatory
damages for emotional distress, reputational harm, and attorney’s fees incurred in
attempting to enforce recusal rights. . .; (4) Impose punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to deter future misconduct by state judicial officers; (5) Award reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . . .; (6) Refer the matter to the Texas State
Commission on Judicial Conduct for disciplinary proceedings; (7) Grant any additional
relief this Court deems just and proper.”
(Doc. No. 1 at 20-21). The only prospective relief requested is an injunction preventing Brown
from issuing any orders in his case or “any related matter.” (Jd. at 20). Though prospective, the
form of the relief alone is insufficient to trigger Young—there must be a “continuing violation of
federal law.” Green Valley, 969 F.3d at 472. The requested injunction preventing Brown from
“issuing any orders” would not address any continuing violations of federal law. Rather, it asks
this Court to prevent Judge Brown from acting at all—even in legal and permissible ways—to
prevent a potential future violation of federal law. A prophylactic injunction to deter a potential
future unlawful act is not the sort of remedy available through Young. See Green v. Mansour, 474
U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary
to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law[,] . . . [b]ut compensatory or
deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.”). Since
Plaintiff has shown no prospective relief required to end a continuing violation of federal law, the
Young exception to sovereign immunity does not apply.
Finding that Plaintiffs suit is against a state actor in her official capacity, that Texas has
not consented to this suit, and that no exception to sovereign immunity applies, this Court is
without jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 997. As such, the Court
GRANTS Defendant Susan Brown’s Motion to Dismiss.

IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity rendering this Court without
jurisdiction over the case. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant Susan Brown’s Motion to
Dismiss, (Doc. No. 8), and DISMISSES Plaintiff's case for lack of jurisdiction.
xX
SIGNED this @ day of August, 2025. \ \
wo — — □□□
Andrew S. Hanen
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119327. Public record. Not legal advice.