# Aguila v. RQM+ LLC

> District Court, S.D. Florida · August 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119239

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119239

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying shifting burden to determine whether court had personal jurisdiction over defendant through long-arm statute
- noting that a defendant’s unsubstantiated challenge as to the sufficiency of allegations in a complaint relating to long-arm jurisdiction must be treated as an admission that all facts are properly pled

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-24702-CIV-DAMIAN

RAFAEL AGUILA and ACCELERATED
DEVICE APPROVAL SERVICES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RQM+ LLC, HEADSAFE MFG PTY LTD,
CRYPTYCH PTY LTD, and GREG ROGER,

Defendants.
_________________________________________/

OMNIBUS ORDER ON DEFENDANTS CRYPTYCH AND GREG ROGER’S
MOTION TO QUASH IMPROPER SERVICE AND DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION [ECF NO. 37]
AND PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTE SERVICE
ON DEFENDANTS CRYPTYCH AND GREG ROGER [ECF NO. 35]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants Cryptych Pty Ltd (“Cryptych”) and
Greg Roger’s (“Roger”) Motion to Quash Improper Service and Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [ECF No. 37 (“Motion to Quash”)], filed
February 1, 2024, and on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Substitute Service on Defendants Cryptych
and Roger [ECF No. 35], filed January 29, 2024.
THE COURT has reviewed the above-referenced Motions, the parties’ briefing [ECF
Nos. 47 (“Response”) and 54 (“Reply”)] and supporting documents, the pertinent portions of
the record, and relevant authorities and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth
below, Defendants Cryptych and Roger’s Motion to Quash is due to be granted in part, and
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Substitute Service is due to be denied.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs, Rafael Aguila (“Aguila”) and Accelerated Device Approval Services
(“ADAS”), a sole proprietorship owned by Aguila, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), are in the
business of medical device evaluations. [ECF No. 1-3 at 6–56 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 4]. Aguila

resides in Miami, Florida, and ADAS, a Florida corporation, operates in Miami-Dade
County. Id. This action arises out of the business engagement among Plaintiffs and
Defendants, RQM+ LLC (“RQM+”), Headsafe Mfg. Pty. Ltd. (“Headsafe”), Cryptych, and
Greg Roger (collectively, “Defendants”), in connection with third-party medical device
review services. See generally Am. Compl.
Defendant Headsafe, an Australian corporation, is the developer and legal
manufacturer of NuroChek, a medical device used for electroencephalogram (EEG) analysis.
Id. ¶ 16. In January 2019, Defendant Cryptych, also an Australian corporation, engaged in a
partnership with Headsafe to co-develop the NuroChek device. Id. ¶¶ 8; 30. Defendant Roger,

an individual residing in Australia, is the Chief Executive Officer of Cryptych. Id. ¶ 9.
Plaintiffs allege that on April 16, 2019, Defendant Cryptych entered into a contract with
ADAS pursuant to which ADAS would provide third-party medical device review services to
Cryptych in connection with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) Center for
Devices and Radiological Health’s (“CDRH”) regulatory review of the NuroChek device. Id.
¶¶ 17, 30–31.
On September 26, 2023, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint in the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit Court in Miami-Dade County, Florida, against the Defendants. See generally

1 This Court previously laid out a more detailed summary of the factual background and
procedural history in its Order on Defendant Headsafe’s Motion to Quash Service of Process.
See ECF No. 72. The background information relevant to the Motions now before this Court
is set forth below.
ECF No. 1-2 at 5–11. While the action was pending in state court, Plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint, the operative pleading, alleging, inter alia, that the Defendants made false
representations to the CDRH about Plaintiffs’ business conduct, which allegedly led to the
revocation of Plaintiffs’ accreditation as a third-party medical device reviewer with the FDA.

See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–29, 58–91.
On December 12, 2023, Defendant RQM+ removed the action to federal court. [ECF
No. 1]. In the Notice of Removal, RQM+ indicates that Defendant Roger confirmed that
neither he nor Cryptych have yet been properly served and that Defendants Roger and
Cryptych consented to removal without waiving their procedural due process right to service.
Id. ¶ 34. (citing an email from Roger as Exhibit F [ECF No. 1-7]).
On December 19, 2023, RQM+ filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of personal jurisdiction,
and, alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. [ECF No. 11]. RQM+’s Motion remains pending and will be addressed by separate
Order.
On January 26, 2024, Defendant Headsafe filed a Motion to Quash Service of Process
or, alternatively, Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. [ECF No. 34]. On August 12, 2025, this Court granted in part Headsafe’s Motion
and dismissed Headsafe, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), on grounds
Plaintiffs had not properly served Headsafe. See ECF No. 72.
Also on January 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Substitute Service on
Defendants Cryptych and Roger, requesting that the Court authorize substituted service on
these Defendants through the Florida Secretary of State. [ECF No. 35]. And, on February 1,

2024, Defendants Cryptych and Roger filed a Limited Notice of Appearance for the sole
purpose of filing the Motion now before the Court seeking to quash improper service or,
alternatively, to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
[ECF No. 37].
On July 10, 2024, this Court granted the Defendants’ Joint Motion for a temporary

stay of the proceedings and Defendant RQM+’s Corrected Motion to Stay Discovery and
temporarily stayed the case pending this Court’s ruling on the pending Motions. See ECF No.
70. Thus, the case has been stayed since that time.
In the Motion to Quash now before the Court, Defendants Cryptych and Roger seek
to quash service of process or, alternatively, to dismiss the First Amended Complaint against
them for lack of personal jurisdiction. See generally Mot. Plaintiffs filed a Response in
opposition to the Motion on February 16, 2024 [ECF No. 47], and Defendants Cryptych and
Roger filed a Reply on February 22, 2024. [ECF No. 54]. As noted above, Plaintiffs also filed
a Motion for Substitute Service [ECF No. 35]. The Motions are fully briefed and ripe for
adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motions To Quash Service Of Process.
Defendants seek to quash service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(5). Motions to quash filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) challenge the sufficiency
of service. Defendants must challenge sufficiency of the service of process in his or her answer
or in a pre-answer motion. See Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. Co., 902 F.2d 897, 900 (11th
Cir.1990). Here, Defendants’ Motion to Quash was filed in a pre-answer motion in which
Defendants specifically indicate that they were entering a limited appearance for the purpose

of challenging service and personal jurisdiction.
Generally, the serving party bears the burden of proving validity of service. Anderson
v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (citing Sys. Signs Supplies
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990)). When a defendant challenges the
validity of service of process, however, courts effectively apply a burden-shifting framework.

First, when a defendant challenges the validity of service, he “must describe with specificity
how the service of process failed to meet the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4.” Hollander v. Wolf, No. 09-80587-CIV, 2009 WL 3336012, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
14, 2009) (citing O’Brien v. R.J. O’Brien & Associates, Inc., 998 F.2d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1993)).
If the defendant successfully challenges service of process, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
set forth a prima facie case of proper service. Hollander, 2009 WL 3336012, at *3. If the plaintiff
provides prima facie evidence of proper service, the burden then shifts back to the defendant to
“bring strong and convincing evidence of insufficient process.” Id. (citing O’Brien, 998 F.2d at
1398). In determining whether the plaintiff properly effectuated service of process, a court

may look to affidavits, depositions, and oral testimony submitted by both parties. Hollander,
2009 WL 3336012, at *3 (citations omitted).
1. Service On Individuals And Corporations Located Abroad.
The procedural requirements for proper service of process on individuals and
corporations who are not located within the United States are set forth in Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 4(f) and 4(h). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) sets forth the procedural
requirements for effecting service upon individuals in foreign countries. In relevant part, the
Rule provides as follows:
(f) Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country. Unless federal law provides
otherwise, an individual–other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a
person whose waiver has been filed–may be served at a place not within any
judicial district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably
calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents;
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international
agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is
reasonably calculated to give notice:
(A) as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for service in that
country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;
(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory
or letter of request; or
(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country’s law, by:
(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to the individual personally; or
(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and
sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt;
or
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the
court orders.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). These provisions apply to service on corporations in foreign countries.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) (with the exception of when service effected by personal delivery
pursuant to Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(i)).
A plaintiff is not required to attempt service under subsections (1) and (2) before
requesting a court order authorizing service under subsection (3). Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Phazzer
Elecs., Inc., No. 6:16-cv-366-Orl-40KRS, 2016 WL 7137699, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2016).
See also, e.g., Brookshire Bros. Ltd. v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., No. 05-CIV-21962-COOKE, 2007
WL 1577771, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2007) (recognizing that “[t]he invocation of Rule
4(f)(3) . . . is neither a last resort nor extraordinary relief” (citation omitted)).
Courts have broad discretion in allowing service under Rule 4(f)(3). Trapenard v.
Clester, No. 6:22-CV-660-RBD-LHP, 2023 WL 2264177, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2023);
Taser, 2016 WL 7137699, at *2. Nonetheless, “alternate methods of service under Rule 4(f)(3)
must still fulfill due process requirements.” Seaboard Marine Ltd. v. Magnum Freight Corp., No.
17-21815-Civ-Scola, 2017 WL 7796153, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2017) (quoting Chanel, Inc.
v. Zhixian, No. 10-CV-60585, 2010 WL 1740695, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2010)). Due process

requires that “the method of service crafted by the district court . . . be ‘reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Taser, 2016 WL 7137699, at *2
(quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Rule 4 “is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as a party receives
sufficient notice of the complaint.” Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 902 F.2d 897, 900
(11th Cir. 1990); see also Banco Latino, S.A.C.A. v. Gomez Lopez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (S.D.
Fla. 1999) (“[O]nce a defendant has actual notice of the pendency of an action, the
requirements of [Rule] 4 are to be liberally construed.”). But service of process that is not in

“substantial compliance” with the requirements of the Federal Rules is ineffective to confer
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, even when a defendant has actual notice of the filing
of the suit. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (“A defendant’s actual
notice is not sufficient to cure defectively executed service.”); Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that, “even though
[the defendant] had actual notice of the filing of the suit, service of process was ineffective
because it was clearly not in substantial compliance with the requirements” of Rule 4(f)(2));
id. at 925 n.14 (explaining that other courts considering whether service of process was
adequate also concluded that “actual notice alone was not enough to allow the court personal

jurisdiction over the defendant”).
While actual notice of the lawsuit is not alone enough to confer personal jurisdiction
over a party, “receipt of actual notice is an important factor in considering whether service of
process is adequate.” Prewitt Enters., 353 F.3d at 925 n.14 (explaining that other courts
considering whether service of process was adequate “were careful to determine that service

of process was in substantial compliance with the formal requirements of the Federal Rules”).
2. Service On Nonresidents Pursuant To Florida’s Substituted Service Statutes.
Here, Plaintiffs did not attempt to serve Defendants Cryptych and Roger by using the
means available pursuant to Rule 4(f)(1) and (2). Instead, they have attempted to serve these
Defendants by substituted service pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 48.181. Section 48.181
permits Florida’s Secretary of State to accept service on behalf of nonresidents and foreign
business entities that engage in business in the state or conceal their whereabouts. Pursuant
to Section 48.181(2), an individual or entity who engages in or carries on a business or
business venture in the state of Florida may be served by substituted service on the Secretary

of State. See Fla. Stat. § 48.181(2); see also Pelycado Onroerend Goed B.V. v. Ruthenberg, 635 So.
2d 1001, 1003 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Put differently, Section 48.181(2) “provides that a
defendant may be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of the state without having been
personally served with process if the defendant operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a
business or business venture in Florida, or has an office or agency in Florida, and the cause
of action arose from these business activities.” Suroor v. First Inv. Corp., 700 So. 2d 139, 140
(Fla. 5th DCA 1997). In addition, pursuant to Section 48.181(4), any individual or foreign
business entity that conceals its whereabouts is deemed to have appointed the Secretary of
State as its agent to accept service of process “in any action or proceeding against it, or any

combination thereof, arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental
to any business or business venture carried on in this state by such individual or foreign
business entity.”
“In order to serve a nonresident pursuant to section 48.181, the complaint must allege
specific facts which show that the defendant is conducting business in Florida and that the

cause of action arose from business activities within this state.” Mane Ventures, LLC v.
Equestrian Int’l LLC, No. 24-80332-CV, 2024 WL 5077140, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2024)
(Middlebrooks, J.) (quoting Newberry v. Rife, 675 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). These
jurisdictional requirements necessitate that the “the defendant conducts business in Florida
and is either a (1) non-resident, (2) resident of Florida who subsequently became a non-
resident, or (3) resident of Florida concealing his or her whereabouts.” Pinero v. Yam Margate,
L.L.C., 825 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing § 48.181, Fla. Stat. (2011)).
The party seeking to effectuate substitute service bears the burden of pleading facts
sufficient to support the applicability of the substitute service statutes. See Green Emerald

Homes, LLC v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 224 So. 3d 799, 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (citing Mecca
Multimedia, Inc. v. Kurzbard, 954 So. 2d 1179, 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)); see also Dixon v. Blanc,
796 F. App’x 684, 687 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To support substituted service under [section]
48.161, ‘the plaintiff must allege in his complaint the ultimate facts bringing the defendant
within the purview of the statute.’”) (quoting Wiggam v. Bamford, 562 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla.
4th DCA 1990)); see also Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Where
a defendant challenges the applicability of the substitute service statutes by affidavit or other
proof, the plaintiff must then demonstrate sufficient evidence to bring the defendant within
the purview of the statutes. See, e.g., Gower v. Hemmerle, 779 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 5th DCA

2001) (reversing denial of motion to quash service where “by affidavit [defendant] made a
showing that he was not amenable to service under sections 48.161 and 48.171” and plaintiff
failed to carry burden in response) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499
(Fla. 1989) (applying shifting burden to determine whether court had personal jurisdiction
over defendant through long-arm statute)); McLean v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 538 F. Supp.
545, 547 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (“If the allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged with

affidavits or other evidence, the plaintiff must then establish by opposing affidavit, testimony
or documents, those material facts supporting the allegations which would justify service of
process under the long-arm statutes.”) (citing McNutt v. General Motors Corp., 298 U.S. 178
(1936)); see also 5B Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1353 (3d ed.) (“[W]hen the
defendant supports a motion to quash service with an affidavit denying the validity of service,
the plaintiff may present counter-affidavits, depositions, or oral testimony[.]”). “[T]he
obligation of the plaintiff is not simply to raise a possibility of jurisdiction, but rather to
establish jurisdiction with affidavits, testimony or documents. Underwood v. Univ. of Kentucky,
390 So. 2d 433, 434–35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (quoting Hyco Mfg. Co. v. Rotex Int’l Corp., 355 So.

2d 471, 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)).
Where a defendant fails to submit affidavits in opposition to the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint, those properly pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true
for purposes of determining whether the complaint’s allegations support substitute service of
process. See Labbee, 913 So. 2d at 681 (noting that a defendant’s unsubstantiated challenge as
to the sufficiency of allegations in a complaint relating to long-arm jurisdiction must be treated
as an admission that all facts are properly pled) (citing Electro Eng’g Prods. Co. v. Lewis, 352 So.
2d 862, 864 (Fla. 1977)). “Where the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting evidence conflict
with the defendant’s affidavits, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff.” Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir.
2002)).
If the jurisdictional requirements are met, a plaintiff relying on Section 48.181(4) to
serve an individual or entity concealing its whereabouts must then “demonstrate the exercise

of due diligence in attempting to locate the defendant.” Mane Ventures, LLC, 2024 WL
5077140, at *2 (quoting Alvarado-Fernandez v. Mazoff, 151 So. 3d 8, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
(internal citations omitted)). The test for due diligence is whether “the [plaintiff] reasonably
employed knowledge at [his or her] command, made diligent inquiry, and exerted an honest
and conscientious effort appropriate to the circumstances, to acquire the information
necessary to enable [him or her] to effect personal service on the defendant.” Id. (quoting
Wiggam v. Bamford, 562 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)).
If both the jurisdictional and due diligence requirements are met and substituted
service is authorized per Section 48.181, the methods of effectuating such service are set forth

in Florida Statutes Section 48.161. Under Section 48.161, “the plaintiff must (i) send notice
to the defendant, via certified or registered mail, that substitute service has been effected
through the Secretary of State, (ii) file the return receipt from the defendant, and (iii) file an
affidavit of compliance.” Dixon, 796 F. App’x at 687. Perfection under Section 48.161
“requires strict compliance with the statutory prerequisites because such service is an
exception to personal service.” Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Haese, 649 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 4th DCA
1995)). Unless a plaintiff strictly complies with Section 48.161, the Court does not have
jurisdiction. Shiffman v. Stumpff, 445 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (collecting cases).
B. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).

Motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). “A court must dismiss an action against a defendant over which it
has no personal jurisdiction.” Verizon Trademark Servs., LLC v. Producers, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d
1321, 1323–24 (M.D. Fla. 2011). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.
Virgin Health Corp. v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., 393 F. App’x 623, 625 (11th Cir. 2010). In other

words, “[t]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of alleging sufficient jurisdictional facts to make
a prima facie case; if the defendant rebuts with contrary affidavit evidence, the plaintiff
reassumes the burden.” Id. (citing United Techs. Corp v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir.
2009)). The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case if it “presents enough evidence to withstand
a motion for directed verdict.” Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state defendant,
federal courts undertake a two-step analysis. Verizon, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. First, a court
must determine whether, pursuant to state law, the applicable state long-arm statute is

satisfied. Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000);
see also Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir.
2006). Second, if the state long-arm statute is satisfied, the court must consider “whether the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Melgarejo v. Pycsa Panama, S.A.,
537 F. App’x 852, 858–59 (11th Cir. 2013). The Due Process Clause requires that the
defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state so that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Id. “Both parts [of the test] must be satisfied for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction

over a non-resident.” Am. Fin. Trading Corp. v. Bauer, 828 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA
2002).
At this stage, this Court accepts the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true,
to the extent they are uncontroverted by the Defendants’ affidavits. See Consol. Dev. Corp., 216
F.3d at 1291. If a defendant refutes personal jurisdiction by sustaining its burden of
challenging the plaintiff’s allegations through affidavits or other competent evidence, the

plaintiff must substantiate its jurisdictional allegations through affidavits, testimony, or other
evidence of its own. Future Tech., 218 F.3d at 1249. The Court construes all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs when dealing with conflicting evidence.
See PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2010) (“If
such inferences are sufficient to defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court
must rule for the plaintiff, finding that jurisdiction exists.”); see also Consol. Dev. Corp., 216 F.3d
at 1291.
C. Leniency Afforded Pro Se Litigants.
In addressing the merits of the pending Motions and relevant pleadings, this Court is

mindful that courts afford a liberal construction to the allegations of pro se litigants, holding
them to more lenient standards than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a
court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359,
1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d
701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). In addition, a pro se litigant is still “subject to the relevant law and
rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d
835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989).
III. ANALYSIS
With the foregoing in mind, this Court addresses the issues raised in Cryptych and
Roger’s Motion. As indicated above, Cryptych and Roger argue that the Court should quash
service of process on them on grounds substituted service on the Florida Secretary of State

was improper and that in any event Plaintiffs have not complied with the requirements of
substituted service. Alternatively, Cryptych and Roger argue the Court should dismiss them
from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.
A. Whether Plaintiffs Properly Served Defendants Cryptych And Roger.
The record in this case reflects that on December 27, 2023, the Clerk of Court issued
the Summonses for Defendants Cryptych and Roger. [ECF No. 20]. The Summonses
addressed to each Defendant list “c/o Secretary of State” in Tallahassee, Florida. See id. On
January 26, 2024, after purporting to serve the Defendants by substituted service, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion for Substitute Service requesting that this Court authorize substitute service on

Cryptych and Roger. [ECF No. 35]. In the Motion, Plaintiffs indicate that they “have
complied with the requirements for substitute service pursuant to [Section] 48.181” and that
substitute service was accepted for Cryptych and Roger by the Florida Department of State
pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 48.181. Id. ¶¶ 11–12, 26.
In their Motion, Defendants Cryptych and Roger argue that substituted service of
process on the Secretary of State was invalid because (1) Cryptych and Roger have not
engaged in any business or business venture in Florida, and (2) Plaintiffs have not complied
with the strict requirements of Florida’s substituted service statutes. See Mot. at 4–9. In their
Response, Plaintiffs disagree with the Defendants’ assertions in the Motion and contend that

Cryptych and Roger have engaged in business in Florida and that Plaintiffs have complied
with Florida’s substituted service statutes. See Resp. at 1–2.
1. Plaintiffs’ Failure To Obtain A Court Order Permitting Substituted Service.

Initially, this Court points out that because Plaintiffs served (or attempted to serve) the
Defendants after the case was removed to this Court, federal law governs the validity of
Plaintiffs’ attempted service. See Mochrie v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:16–cv–306–FtM–
38CM, 2016 WL 6681062, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1448; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 81(c)(1)). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs state that Defendants Cryptych and
Roger are both located in Australia (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9), and Defendants do not dispute
this allegation. Therefore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) governs service on these
Defendants.
As explained above, Rule 4(f) offers three options for service on defendants located
overseas: (1) service by internationally agreed means, such as pursuant to the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (“Hague
Convention”); (2) by means prescribed by the foreign country’s laws; or (3) “by other means

not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (emphasis
added). Although Australia is a signatory to the Hague Convention, Plaintiffs opted not to
proceed pursuant to the Hague Convention, and, therefore, Rule 4(f)(3) governs. Plaintiffs
have chosen to proceed by “other means” here – that is, by substituted service pursuant to
Florida Statutes Section 48.181. To proceed by such other means, Plaintiffs must first obtain
a court order permitting the use of such other means to effect service. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(f)(3); De Gazelle Grp., Inc. v. Tamaz Trading Establishment, 817 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 806 (9th Cir. 2004)). Although Plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Substitute Service on January 26, 2024, that Motion was filed after Plaintiffs

purported to proceed with service by substituted service. Service was not, therefore,
undertaken “as the court order[ed]” and is, for that reason alone, inadequate. See Symington
v. BVAJ Marine, Ltd., No. 0:20-cv-60761-RS, 2021 WL 8939965, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 14,
2021) (deeming alternative service inadequate as plaintiff failed to obtain leave of court prior
to serving defendant under Rule 4(f)(3)); Robinson v. Turner, No. 8:23-CV-626-SDM-SPF,
2024 WL 665103, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2024) (same).

Nevertheless, because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, this Court will afford them
leniency and proceed to consider whether service pursuant to Florida’s substituted service
statute was otherwise effective.
2. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Regarding Defendants’ Business Activities In Florida.
Florida law permits substituted service on a nonresident individual or entity through
the Florida Secretary of State if the individual or entity “has appointed or is deemed to have
appointed the Secretary of State as [the individual’s or entity’s] agent for service of process.”
Fla. Stat. § 48.161(1). Florida Statute Section 48.181(2) explains that a foreign individual or
entity is deemed to have appointed the Florida Secretary of State as the individual’s or entity’s

agent for service of process when that individual or entity accepts “the privilege extended by
law to nonresidents to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture”
in Florida and the action or proceeding against the individual or entity “aris[es] out of any
transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture . . .
.” Fla. Stat. § 48.181(2). Similarly, any individual or foreign business entity that conceals its
whereabouts is deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as its agent on whom service
of process may be served “in any action or proceeding against it, or any combination thereof,
arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to any business or
business venture carried on in this state by such individual or foreign business.” Fla. Stat. §

48.181(4).
In order to serve a nonresident defendant pursuant to Section 48.181, a plaintiff must
allege specific facts which show that the defendant is conducting business in Florida and that
the cause of action arose from business activities in this state. Ure v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 122
F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (citing Newberry v. Rife, 675 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1996)). As explained above, the burden of pleading facts that support the applicability
of substituted service falls on the party seeking to invoke the provisions of the substituted
service statute, and that burden is not simply to raise a possibility of jurisdiction, but rather
“to establish jurisdiction with affidavits, testimony or documents.” See Underwood, 390 So. 2d
at 434-35; Labbee, 913 So. 2d at 681. The undersigned notes that prior to January 2023, a
plaintiff was required to allege the facts supporting the applicability of the substituted service
statute in their complaint, but the Florida service statutes were amended effective January 2,
2023,2 and now provide that the facts that justify substituted service must be alleged in an
affidavit of compliance and need not be alleged in a complaint. See Fla. Stat. § 48.161(2).

Thus, this Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Amended Complaint and in the
affidavits submitted in support of substituted service to determine whether Plaintiffs have
demonstrated that the Defendants are nonresidents and “operate, conduct, engage in, or carry
on a business or business venture in Florida.” As discussed above, Plaintiffs must allege
sufficient facts bringing the defendant within the purview of the statute. See Dixon, 796 F.
App’x at 687 (internal citations omitted).
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do allege that Defendants Cryptych and
Roger reside outside the United States. As to Cryptych, Plaintiffs allege it is an international

2 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on September 26, 2023, and all attempts at service of
process occurred after that date. See ECF No. 1-2. No party has identified any reason why the
January 2023 Amendments should not apply to Plaintiffs’ efforts to serve process here.
corporation with its main office in New South Wales, Australia. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. And as to
Mr. Roger, Plaintiffs allege that he resides in New South Wales, Australia. Id. ¶ 9. Defendants
do not dispute that they are foreign residents.3 As Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants
Cryptych and Roger are nonresidents of Florida, the determinative question is whether these

Defendants’ actions and presence in Florida are sufficient to satisfy the, “operat[ing],
conduct[ing], engag[ing] in, or carry[ing] on a business or business venture” requirement of
Section 48.181. What constitutes doing business is “doing a series of similar acts for the
purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit.” McCarthy v. Little River Bank & Tr. Co., 224
So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs include the barebones allegation that
Defendant Cryptych is an international corporation “operating within Miami-Dade County,
Florida.” Am. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs also broadly allege that “Defendants have engaged in
significant business and regulatory activities in Florida, particularly in Miami-Dade County”
and that Defendants have engaged in “activities, directed towards, and having significant

impact within the state,” including “forming contractual agreements, exchanging emails and
engaging in phone communications with the Plaintiffs, initiating advertising campaigns, and
conducting multiple business transactions within Florida.” Am. Compl. ¶ 14. These
jurisdictional allegations are not, however, specific to any particular Defendant but, instead,
address the Defendants collectively. As an initial observation, this sort of pleading is

3 Plaintiffs also suggest that Defendant Roger was concealing his whereabouts, but because
Plaintiffs have adequately shown that the Defendants are a foreign individual and entity,
Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that anyone was concealing their whereabouts. Whether the
Defendant is a foreign entity or concealing their whereabouts, the Plaintiffs would still be
required to demonstrate that the Defendants are operating or carrying on a business venture
in Florida from which the cause of action arises (see Sections 48.181(2) and (3)), and, as
explained herein, Plaintiffs have not done so.
inadequate. See W. Coast Roofing & Waterproofing, Inc. v. Johns Manville, Inc., 287 F. App’x 81,
86 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In a case with multiple defendants, the complaint should contain specific
allegations with respect to each defendant; generalized allegations ‘lumping’ multiple
defendants together are insufficient.”).

Although Plaintiffs do very generally allege that Defendant Cryptych is operating
within Miami-Dade County, Florida, this allegation is conclusory and not supported by any
other allegations demonstrating that these Defendants “operate, conduct, engage in, or carry
on a business or business venture in the state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.181(2). Rather, Plaintiffs only
allege that, in December 2018, Ms. Angela Roche, an employee of Defendants Cryptych and
Roger, reached out to Plaintiffs seeking information about “the specifics and costs associated
with the CDRH’s third-party review program for evaluating their new medical device.” Am.
Compl. ¶ 17. Review of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Substitute Service and Response to the Motion
to Quash does not provide any additional support for Plaintiffs’ claim that the Defendants
were doing business in Florida.

Defendants Cryptych and Roger argue that they are not subject to substituted service
under Section 48.181 because they do not “operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business
or business venture in this state.” Mot. at 7 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 48.181(2)). In support of their
Motion, Cryptych and Roger submitted the sworn Declaration of Greg Roger, the Managing
Director of Cryptych. [ECF No. 37-2 (“Roger Decl.”)]. In his Declaration, Mr. Roger avers
that he resides in New South Wales, Australia, and manages Cryptych from there. Id. ¶ 7, 9.
Mr. Roger states that Cryptych has no offices in Florida, no employees or independent
contractors in Florida, and no executives or top levels of leadership based in Florida. Id. ¶¶ 5–
7. Mr. Roger also states that Cryptych does not maintain any bank accounts in Florida, does

not direct its operations from Florida, has no clients or customers in Florida, and does not
advertise, market, or otherwise promote its products in Florida. Id. ¶¶ 8–11. Lastly, Mr. Roger
avers that the last time he was physically present in Florida was twenty-four years ago for
purposes of attending a conference and that he has not visited Florida for business purposes
or otherwise since then. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.

In their Response, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants Cryptych and Roger have
engaged in business in Florida based on the following activities: (1) Ms. Roche’s December
2018 email communication with Plaintiffs for purposes of obtaining further information about
Plaintiffs’ third-party review services; (2) in May 2019, Cryptych signed a contract with
Plaintiff ADAS for third-party review services for the NuroChek device; and (3) in February
2020, Roger sent an email to Plaintiffs following a teleconference call. Resp. at 1–2. Notably,
Plaintiffs offer no declarations or sworn evidence to rebut the statements in Mr. Roger’s
Declaration.
The alleged activities identified by Plaintiffs are insufficient to establish that
Defendants Cryptych and Roger have carried on a business or business venture in Florida to

satisfy the requirements for substituted service. See RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Kingsmen Creatives, Ltd.,
579 F. App’x 779, 784 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have held that ‘telephonic and electronic
communications [made from elsewhere] into Florida’ do not constitute carrying on a business
venture in Florida, even when those phone calls were incident to some economic activity.”)
citing Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1167 (11th Cir.
2005))); see also Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 628 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that making phone calls from Canada to Florida did not qualify as carrying on a business
venture in Florida).
As for the allegation that Cryptych and Plaintiff ADAS entered into a contract in 2019,

Plaintiffs fail to explain how the contract constitutes evidence that Defendants Cryptych and
Roger have carried on a business or business venture in Florida for purposes of Section 48.181.
Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence or even attempt to rebut the sworn Declaration
of Mr. Roger demonstrating that neither Cryptych nor Roger have conducted any business
activities in Florida.

Simply put, Plaintiffs have failed to allege or meet their burden of demonstrating the
jurisdictional requirement that Defendants Cryptych and Roger have carried on a business or
business venture in Florida to justify substituted service pursuant to Section 48.181. As such,
Plaintiffs’ attempt to effectuate service of process upon Defendants Cryptych and Roger
through substituted service on the Secretary of State was not justified and is due to be quashed.
B. Personal Jurisdiction.
In light of the foregoing, this Court need not address Cryptych’s and Roger’s
alternative basis for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the undersigned briefly addresses Plaintiffs’ arguments in response to Cryptych’s
and Roger’s jurisdictional challenge.

Plaintiffs argue that Cryptych and Roger waived their ability to challenge personal
jurisdiction for two reasons: (1) the Notice of Removal, filed by Defendant RQM+, did not
preserve an objection to jurisdiction, and (2) Cryptych and Roger consented to removal of
this action to this Court. Id. As explained in this Court’s Order on Headsafe’s Motion to
Quash, both claims are unavailing. See ECF No. 72, at 21–22.
Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction can be waived if a defendant
fails to raise it as an issue in either a responsive pleading or a Rule 12 motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2), (h); see also Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort and Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357,
1365 (11th Cir. 2006); Lane v. XYZ Venture Partners, L.L.C., 322 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir.

2009) (“While it is true that the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction can be waived by filing
a motion which does not raise the defense, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), waiver is only
accomplished if the defense is not asserted in the first motion made under Rule 12 or
responsive pleading.”). “[P]ersonal jurisdiction may also be waived, even if a defendant has
nominally preserved the defense by reciting it in an answer, if that defendant substantially

participates in the litigation without actively pursuing its Rule 12(b)(2) defense.” Matthews v.
Brookstone Stores, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (citations omitted); see,
e.g., Rates Tech. Inc. v. Nortel Networks Corp., 399 F.3d 1302, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that
“a party may consent to personal jurisdiction by extensively participating in the litigation
without timely seeking dismissal”).
Here, Cryptych and Roger timely asserted their objection to personal jurisdiction by
raising it in the pre-answer Motion now before the Court. See Mot. at 11–17 (addressing lack
of personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute). Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument,
the Notice of Removal, which was not even filed by Cryptych and Roger, is neither a

responsive pleading nor a motion made under Rule 12, and thus does not operate as a waiver
of the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(h). See, e.g., Lane, 322 F. App’x
at *2 (rejecting argument that the defendants had waived their defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction by moving to stay the proceedings before moving to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction).
Nor does Cryptych’s and Roger’s consent to removal operate as a waiver of their
ability to challenge personal jurisdiction. As noted in the Notice of Removal, and as discussed
above, Cryptych and Roger have not been properly served and therefore, as with Defendant
Headsafe, their consent was not required for removal. See Johnson v. Wellborn, 418 F. App’x

809, 815 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The requirement that there be unanimity of consent in removal
cases with multiple defendants does not require consent of defendants who have not been
properly served.” (citing Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1208 (11th Cir.
2008))). Nor have Cryptych and Roger implicitly waived their defense of personal jurisdiction
by substantially participating in litigation before filing their Rule 12(b)(2) Motion. See generally
Docket. In fact, as Plaintiffs point out in their Motion for Substitute Service, Defendants

Cryptych and Roger “explicit[ly] refus[ed] to participate in the meeting concerning the Joint
Scheduling Report” (see ECF No. 35 ¶ 20) precisely because neither Cryptych nor Roger have
been served with process in this action. See id. at 18 (Exhibit E – Roger’s January 18, 2024
email). And, the Court notes that in their Motion to Quash, these Defendants expressly
indicate that their appearance is limited to the purpose of challenging service of process and
personal jurisdiction.
This Court is satisfied that Cryptych and Roger timely asserted and have not waived
their defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in this matter.
C. Plaintiffs’ Motion For Substitute Service.

As noted above, on January 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Substitute Service
on Defendants Cryptych and Roger [ECF No. 35]—three days before Cryptych and Roger
filed their Motion to Quash Service.4 In the Motion, Plaintiffs seek to effectuate substituted
service on Defendant Roger, individually and on behalf of Cryptych, via email on grounds
Defendant Roger appears to be evading service. See generally ECF No. 35. Plaintiffs contend
that Roger and Cryptych have actual notice of the instant action against them and that

4 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants Cryptych and Roger have failed to oppose their Motion
for Substitute Service. See ECF No. 47 at 2. But Cryptych and Roger specifically state in their
Motion to Quash that their Motion responds to Plaintiffs’ request for substituted service
against them. See ECF 37 at 3.
Plaintiffs have complied with the requirements for substituted service under Florida law. See
id.
As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of pleading facts that support
the applicability of the substituted service statutes for service of Defendants Cryptych and
Roger. Moreover, although Cryptych and Roger now have notice of these proceedings,5 it is

well settled that a defendant’s “actual notice is not sufficient to cure defectively executed
service.” Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). For the reasons set forth
above, Plaintiffs have not substantially complied with the requirements of Florida’s
substituted service statutes and, therefore, their Motion is due to be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants Cryptych and Greg Roger’s Motion
to Quash Improper Service and Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction [ECF No. 37] is GRANTED IN PART as follows:
1. Plaintiffs’ attempt to effectuate substituted service of process on Cryptych and
Roger is QUASHED.
2. Defendants Cryptych and Greg Roger are hereby DISMISSED from this
action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).6 In
the event Plaintiffs seek to attempt to serve Cryptych and Roger and correct

5 And, as discussed above, Cryptych and Roger reserved their right to object to service of
process and personal jurisdiction.

6 “If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion
or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
the deficiencies identified herein, they must seek leave to do so within twenty
(20) days of the date of this Order.
3. The alternative request for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is
DENIED AS MOOT and without prejudice.
It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Substitute Service on
Defendants Cryptych and Greg Roger [ECF No. 35] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 12th
day of August, 2025.

MELISSA 01 os
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Rafael Aguila, Pro se
6800 SW 40th Street, Suite 444
Miami, FL 33155
Email: support@510k-review.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119239. Public record. Not legal advice.