# Hines v. Department of Social Services Cayuga County

> District Court, N.D. New York · August 12, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119196

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 12, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SARA HINES,

Plaintiff, 5:24-cv-071
(ECC/ML)
v.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
CAYUGA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Sara Hines, Pro Se Plaintiff
James A. Long, Esq., for Defendants
Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff Sara Hines, proceeding pro se, initiated this action against
the named Defendants for violating her constitutional rights in connection with a criminal
prosecution stemming from an alleged overpayment of childcare benefits. Complaint (Compl.),
Dkt. No. 1. The Court subsequently reviewed the Complaint, and dismissed some claims for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and on the basis of absolute immunity. Dkt. Nos. 10, 11. Currently
pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 37. The motion is fully briefed. Dkt. Nos. 40, 41. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. FACTS1
On March 9, 2022, Plaintiff attended a conference with the Defendant Department of Social
Services (DSS) in Auburn, New York, “regarding the discontinuance of day care services.”
Compl. at 12. In addition to Plaintiff’s mother and daughter, Defendants DSS senior investigator
Amanda Hare, DSS caseworker Lindsey Nuccilly, and DSS Supervisor Jeanette Murray also

attended the conference. Id.
On June 13, 2022, Plaintiff received a notice from DSS stating that from August 21, 2019
through February 28, 2022, she received an overpayment of childcare benefits in the amount of
$26,983.14. Compl. at 12.
On June 14, 2022, Defendant Hare filed a felony complaint with the Cayuga County
District Attorney’s Office against the Plaintiff, and on July 27, 2022, Auburn Police Department
arrested Plaintiff on one count of Grand Larceny in the Third Degree, one count of Welfare Fraud
in the Third Degree, and six counts of Offering a False Instrument for Filing in the First Degree.
Compl. at 12. Plaintiff was arraigned in Auburn City Court on August 12, 2022. Id. at 13. During
the arraignment, Plaintiff “immediately notified” the court and district attorney’s office that

Plaintiff did not receive a fair hearing “in accordance with the Administrative Procedure and rules
governing the Fair Hearing Procedures.” Id. at 16.
Plaintiff was given a “partial Fair Hearing” conducted by the Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistance via telephone on November 4, 2022, which was adjourned to a later date
“due to the lack of and wrong evidence submitted . . . by [Defendants] Amanda Hare, Lindsey

1 These facts are drawn from the Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto. The Court assumes
the truth of, and draws reasonable inferences from, the well-pleaded factual allegations, see Lynch
v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2020), but does not accept as true any legal
conclusions, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Nuccilly, and Jeannette Murry.” Compl. at 13. During the hearing, the administrative judge
“became aware of the fact that . . . Hare, Nuccilly, and Murray had already filed charges against
the Plaintiff,” before a final fair hearing was conducted. Id.
On November 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking dismissal of her criminal case due

to violations of her constitutional rights to due process. Compl. at 16. On November 30, 2022,
Plaintiff was called before a Cayuga County grand jury and indicted on all charges. Id. at 13.
Defendant Hare gave sworn testimony during the grand jury presentment. Id. Between the time
of her arraignment and the grand jury convening, Plaintiff “had not been afforded . . . a Preliminary
Hearing[.]” Id. at 16. The court “allowed [Plaintiff’s criminal case] to linger . . . for approximately
100 days.” Id.
On December 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking dismissal of the case before the
Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance due to violations of “Departmental Procedures.”
Compl. at 14. DSS did not respond to the motion. Id. “[P]laintiff was found not guilty of any
overpayment by the Department of Social Services and Temporary Disability on July 28, 2023.”

Id. at 19.
In November 2023, Plaintiff “furnished the court and district attorney’s office” with the
Decision After Fair Hearing issued by the Office of Temporary Disability. The Decision reversed
the SSA’s determination that Plaintiff received an overpayment for childcare benefits, and directed
the SSA to withdraw the November 13, 2022 notice and take no further action. Compl. at 19.
Despite the findings of the Office of Temporary Disability, the court and Defendant Antonacci
“blatantly disregarded these facts as [Defendant] Antonacci proceeded in hopes of a guilty verdict
. . . [and Plaintiff was sentenced] to an Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal.” Id. at 19-
20.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“a complaint must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Although a complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations, it may not rest on mere labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of the cause of action, and the factual allegations ‘must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’” Lawtone-Bowles v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-4240, 2017
WL 4250513, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court must
accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See EEOC v. Port Auth., 768 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2014)
(citing ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, “the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Cayuga County District Attorney’s Office
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint as against Cayuga County District Attorney’s
Office. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law (Def.’s MOL) at 6-7. The Complaint has already been
dismissed as against this defendant pursuant to U.S. District Court Judge Mae A. D’Agostino’s
June 20, 2024 Memorandum-Decision and Order, because it is “not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Dkt. No. 11 at 5 (citing Michels v. Greenwood Lake Police Dep’t, 387 F. Supp.
2d 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Thus, for the reasons previously set forth by the Court, the Clerk of
the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the Cayuga County District Attorney’s Office as a
defendant in this matter as of June 20, 2024.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity
“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune
from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Only
those acting “without any colorable claim of authority” are denied absolute immunity. See
Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 504 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Schloss v. Bouse, 876

F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1989)). The immunity covers “virtually all acts, regardless of motivation,
associated with [the prosecutor’s] function as an advocate.” Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653,
661 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994)). “The Supreme Court
has explained that a prosecutor’s functions preliminary to the initiation of proceedings include
‘whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether to file an information, whether and when to
prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call,
and what other evidence to present.’” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33).
Alternatively, absolute immunity does not cover “a prosecutor’s acts of investigation or
administration,” see Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994), which are “protected only by

qualified, rather than absolute, immunity,” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997); see also
Bernard, 356 F.3d at 502 (“[O]nly qualified immunity applies to law enforcement officials,
including prosecutors, when they perform investigative functions.” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at
430)). Courts apply a “functional approach” to claims of absolute immunity, focusing on “the
nature of the function performed.” Bernard, 356 F.3d at 503 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). The “official who asserts absolute immunity from § 1983 shoulders the
burden of establishing the existence of immunity for the function in question.” Hill, 45 F.3d at
661.
Liberally construed, the alleged actionable conduct of the Defendant-prosecutors
Antonacci, Pado, and Azzarelli is confined to the scope of their duties in prosecuting a criminal
case against Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff complains that these Defendants allowed her case to
“linger . . . for approximately 100 days,” despite their knowledge that she did not receive a fair

hearing at the administrative level with respect to the conduct giving rise to the criminal charges.
Plaintiff also complains that Defendant Antonacci “blatantly disregarded” the administrative
judge’s decision after the fair hearing reversing DSS’s determination, and continued to prosecute
the case “in hopes of a guilty verdict[.]” Even assuming the truth of these allegations, the Second
Circuit has made clear that “if the charging decision or other act is within the prosecutor’s
jurisdiction as a judicial officer, then absolute immunity attaches to their actions ‘regardless of any
allegations’ that their ‘actions were undertaken with an improper state of mind or improper
motive.’” Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 865 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Shmueli v. City of New York,
424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005). This includes allegations of baseless prosecutions lacking
probable cause. See Bernard, 356 F.3d at 497-98 (county prosecutors entitled to absolute

immunity for their politically motived prosecution of plaintiffs without probable cause, which
included knowingly presenting false evidence to, and withholding exculpatory evidence from, the
grand jury); Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 233 (absolute immunity applied to protect local prosecutors who
prosecuted plaintiff “despite knowing that the charges against her were false and that [she] was
innocent” of those charges); Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1148 (2d Cir. 1995)
(granting absolute immunity to prosecutors who improperly sought to increase plaintiff’s bail;
made false representations to prompt a plea agreement which they later breached; manufactured a
bail jumping charge; lied to the Bureau of Prisons; and unnecessarily transferred plaintiff from
county to state jail).
The Second Circuit has made clear that “jurisdiction” to prosecute “depend[s] on the
authority conferred by the New York statutes” to prosecute the underlying crime. Shmueli, 424

F.3d at 238. In this case, there is no meaningful argument that the Defendant-prosecutors lacked
jurisdiction over the offense – i.e. authorization by statute to prosecute the underlying crimes.
Thus, even accepting the allegation that the Defendant-prosecutors trampled Plaintiff’s rights in
the course of prosecuting the underlying crimes, because the events described by Plaintiff
“consist[ ] only of the prosecution” of Plaintiff “in a court of competent jurisdiction on charges
that were within the [prosecutors’] authority to bring,” the prosecutors “are entitled to absolute
immunity against” Plaintiff’s “claims for damages[.]” Id. at 239. Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the Complaint is therefore granted as to Defendants Antonacci, Pado, Azzarelli.
C. Administrative Procedure Act
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim for violation
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Def.’s MOL at 3-6. The first cause of action listed in the

Complaint is “Violation of Administrative Procedure” against Defendants Hare, Nuccilly, and
Murray. Compl. at 12. Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants’ conduct violated “the
Administrative Rules and Regulation governing both [DSS] and the plaintiff,” and “put the
plaintiffs [sic] life, liberty and property in jeopardy without due process of law.” Id. at 14.
To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed to state a claim for a violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Court agrees that dismissal is warranted. Pursuant to the APA,
“[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review
thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. “Agency” is defined as “each authority of the Government of the United
States[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1). Here, Plaintiff is not suing the federal government, but the DSS,
a local agency, and its employees. In the absence of any allegation that these Defendants can be
seen as taking on federal agency status, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for violations
of the APA against them. See Boyd v. Albany Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 1:14-cv-1386
(LEK/RFT), 2015 WL 3447608, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims

brought pursuant to the APA because the defendant department of social services was not a federal
agency); Dan v. New York, No. 1:24-cv-1233 (MAD/PJE), 2025 WL 2046169, at *4 n. 7
(N.D.N.Y. July 22, 2025) (“[T]he Administrative Procedure Act is only applicable to federal
agencies.”); Anderson v. State Univ. of New York, No. 24-cv-2083, 2024 WL 3656551, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2024) (“Because Plaintiff does not sue the federal government, and because his
claims do not implicate a final federal agency action, the allegations in the complaint cannot be
reviewed under the APA.”).
Plaintiff’s first cause of action could, however, be liberally construed to allege a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim against Defendants Hare, Nuccilly, and Murray. Accordingly, the
Court will incorporate these allegations into the following analysis concerning Plaintiff’s due

process claims.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims due to
prosecutorial immunity and failure to allege the deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Def.’s
MOL at 7. As previously discussed, the Court agrees that the Defendant-prosecutors are entitled
to absolute immunity from Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims as alleged.
Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that Defendants Hare, Nuccilly, and Murry
violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by filing the felony complaint
against Plaintiff before a final fair hearing had been conducted at the administrative level. Compl.
at 13. To successfully state a procedural due process claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
establish both the existence of a protected liberty or property interest, and that he or she was
deprived of that interest without being afforded sufficient process. Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106,
118 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).
Public assistance benefits “have long been afforded constitutional protection as a species of

property protected by the federal Due Process Clause.” Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir.
2005) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970)); see also M.K.B. v. Eggleston,
445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Persons who are qualified to receive welfare benefits
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to such benefits.”).
The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful time and a meaningful manner. Davis, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 485 (citing, among others,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)). Notice of benefit determinations
must provide claimants with enough information to understand the reasons for the agency’s action,
so that they may defend the impending termination. Id. (citing, among others, Kapps v. Wing,
404 F.3d 105, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005)). Under New York law, access to a fair hearing pursuant to

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 22 and 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358, and the availability of further review in the
state courts in an Article 78 proceeding have been found to be constitutionally adequate post-
deprivation procedures to challenge adverse determinations in connection with government
entitlement programs. See Banks v. HRA, 11-cv-2380, 2013 WL 142374, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
2013); Vapne v. Eggleston, 04-cv-0565, 2004 WL 2754673, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004).
However, as the Second Circuit recently reiterated, “the Due Process Clause requires more than
going through the motions—the process must be provided ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’” Walker v. Bellnier, ___ F.4th ___, No. 21-650, 2025 WL 2088314, at *18
(2d Cir. July 25, 2025) (quoting Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2017)) (in turn
quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).
Although it is undisputed here that Plaintiff eventually received a final fair hearing
resulting in the reversal of DSS’s determination of overpayment, Plaintiff alleges that the hearing

did not occur until after she had been arrested and indicted based on the named Defendants’
representations stemming from the initial determination of overpayment. Thus, to the extent
Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed to allege that the process she received was not
“meaningful,” and in consideration of Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff’s allegations of due process
violations as against Defendants Hare, Nuccilly, and Murray are sufficient to overcome
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
E. Conspiracy
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim is “vague, conclusory, and
does not contain specific allegations[,]” and is therefore subject to dismissal. Compl. at 10. In
order to survive a motion to dismiss on a § 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiff must allege “(1) an
agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act

in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal
causing damages.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999). “‘[C]omplaints
containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a
conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are properly dismissed; diffuse and
expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by specific instances of misconduct.’”
Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dwares v. City of
New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Here, even construing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Complaint fails to plausibly
allege a conspiracy. Plaintiff alleges that due to their professional experience, Defendants Hare,
Nuccilly, and Murry “knew or should have known” that filing the felony complaint before a final
fair hearing took place was a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Compl. at 17. Plaintiff further alleges
that Defendants Antonacci, Pado, and Azzarelli “knew or should have known that proceeding to
prosecute” Plaintiff without a final fair hearing determination was a violation of Plaintiff’s rights.

Id. These allegations do not suffice to support a plausible claim that the Defendants acted in
concert or had an agreement to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Webb v. Goord, 340
F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2003) (to maintain a conspiracy action, the plaintiff “must provide some
factual basis supporting a meeting of the minds . . .”). Furthermore, Defendants Antonacci, Pago,
and Azarelli are immune from suit by virtue of their prosecutorial immunity. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claims is granted.
F. Department of Social Services Cayuga County/Official Capacity Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against DSS because she has not
identified a county custom or policy that caused her injury. Def.’s MOL at 6-12. “Under New
York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality have no separate legal
identity apart from the municipality and therefore cannot be sued.” Mulvihill v. N.Y., 956 F. Supp.

2d 425, 428 (W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (cleaned up) (quoting Omnipoint Comm’ns, Inc. v. Town
of LaGrange, 658 F.Supp.2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). Here, the Court construes Plaintiff’s
claim to be asserted against the appropriate entity, Cayuga County. See Jones v. Westchester Cnty.
Dep’t of Corr. Med. Dep’t, 557 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The Department of
Corrections Medical Department is a County agency, so the proper party [d]efendant is
Westchester County.”).
A municipality such as Cayuga County “can be held liable under Section 1983 if the
deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy,
or usage of the municipality.” Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). “Absent such a custom,
policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of
its employee.” Id. Here, liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, there is no allegation of a
policy or custom sufficient to withstand Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Rather, the Complaint

contains allegations concerning the individual Defendants’ conduct relative to Plaintiff’s specific
circumstances.
Moreover, “[c]laims against a government employee in his [or her] official capacity [are]
treated as a claim against the municipality[.]” Guarneri v. Schoharie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., No.
1:21-cv-0991 (TJM/ML), 2021 WL 6050305, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2021) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, due to Plaintiff’s failure to allege a Monell claim, any purported claims against DSS,
Cayuga County, and/or employees of DSS in their official capacities must be dismissed. See
Schweitzer v. Crofton, 935 F. Supp. 2d 527, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[The p]laintiffs’ claim against
the Suffolk County Department of Social Services must be dismissed because it is not a suable
entity.”), aff’d, 560 F. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2014); Trombley v. O’Neill, 929 F. Supp. 2d 81, 101

(N.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[The p]laintiff has failed to allege the existence of any policy, custom, or failure
to train, as a basis for his § 1983 claims. Accordingly, because [the p]laintiff has failed to state a
basis for the liability of Essex County on any of his claims, all claims against [the d]efendants in
their official capacities must be dismissed.”).
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) a court should freely give leave to amend
“when justice so requires.” See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir.
2007). Under Rule 15(a), absent certain circumstances not at play here, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court's leave. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)–(2). A court may, in its discretion, deny leave to amend “for good reason, including
futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” MSP Recovery Claims,
Series LLC v. Hereford Ins. Co., 66 F.4th 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2023).
Here, Plaintiff’s APA claims should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to
amend, because any proposed amendment under the relevant circumstances would be futile. The

Complaint should also be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend against Defendants
Pado, Antonacci, and Azzarelli based on their prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims against Defendants Hare, Nuccilly, and Murray in their individual
capacities survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss and will proceed to litigation. As to the
remainder of Plaintiff’s claims, out of deference to Plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is
possible that Plaintiff may be able to assert cognizable claims with better pleading, the Court grants
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.2
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 37, is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s APA violation claims is
GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims (due
process, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution) against Defendants Brittany Antonacci, Richard

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims against
Defendants Antonacci, Pado, and Azzarelli. Compl. at 18. As discussed, these claims are subject
to dismissal by virtue of these Defendants’ prosecutorial immunity. The Complaint does not
specifically articulate a claim for malicious prosecution against Defendant Hare, and the Court
does not recognize such a claim to be asserted at this juncture. If Plaintiff intends to allege a Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Hare, such claim should be
specifically articulated in any amended complaint filed.
Pado, and Susan Azzarelli is GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE due to these Defendants’ prosecutorial immunity, and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's conspiracy claims pursuant to
42 US.C. § 1983 against Defendants Hare, Nuccilly, and Murray is GRANTED, and those claims
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C
§ 1983 claims against Defendant Cayuga County Department of Social Services, and those claims
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the named Defendant DSS, but WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as to Cayuga County, and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs official-
capacity claims against Defendants Hare, Nucilly, and Murray, and those claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and it is further
ORDERED that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED, specifically in
that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against
Defendants Hare, Nuccilly, and Murray in their individual capacities survives Defendants’ motion
to dismiss, and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffis granted leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with
the above decision within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, and it is further
ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of
the date of this Order, this case will proceed on the basis of the original Complaint as modified by
this Memorandum-Decision and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 12, 2025 LA
U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119196. Public record. Not legal advice.