# WILLIAMS v. THE GEO GROUP

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · August 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119146

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119146

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the misconduct “must be objectively, sufficiently intolerable and cruel, capable of causing harm, and the official must have a culpable state of mind”
- concluding that conditions of confinement during COVID-19 did not amount to unconstitutional punishment
- noting that a “convicted inmate awaiting sentencing” is a pretrial detainee
- affirming denial of access-to-courts claim where the pretrial detainee had “not offered any other explanation of how his inability to access the library affected his criminal proceedings”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL WILLIAMS, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-5860
:
THE GEO GROUP, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
BEETLESTONE, C.J. AUGUST 11 ,2025
Pro se Plaintiff Daniel Williams asserts constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in connection with his confinement while housed as a pretrial detainee at the Delaware
County’s George W. Hill Correctional Facility. Williams also seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Williams leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss his Complaint in part. Williams will have the option to either proceed with
the claims that pass statutory screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or file an amended
complaint.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Williams names the following fifteen Defendants in his Complaint: the GEO Group2,

1 The facts are taken from Williams’s Complaint. (See ECF No. 1.) Williams initially
filed his Complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
which transferred the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1404(a). (See ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3.)
The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system. Grammar, spelling,
and punctuation errors are cleaned up where necessary.

2 The GEO Group formerly operated the George W. Hill Correctional Facility. In April
of 2022, Delaware County assumed full operational control of GWHCF from the GEO Group.
See Delaware County Officially Assumes Control of George W. Hill Correctional Facility (April
6, 2022),
CO Thomas, Sergeant Richburg, Wellpath, Sergeant S. Brown, Delaware County Prison,3 Dana
Keith, Megan Gilbert (a Wellpath Psychiatrist), the Warden of the George W. Hill Correctional
Facility, Sergeant Jones, Lieutenant Moody, Chief Leach, CO Suvoor, CO Garr, and CO Bacon.4
(Compl. at 2-7, 10.) He asserts an assortment of constitutional claims based on his stay at the
George W. Hill Correctional Facility from October 2019, through September 2022. (Id. at 4, 8.)5

In his Complaint, Williams alleges that beginning in the Fall of 2019, Thomas would
order Williams to perform sexual acts on him. (Id. at 12-16.) Williams specifically states that
Thomas used “coercive procedures and tactics . . . to get sex . . . [a]nd it worked.” (Id. at 13.)
Williams also states that “[s]ometimes for sexual favors, Thomas would bring in platters (outside
food) and/or alcoholic beverages” or would turn “a blind eye” to prison violations. (Id. at 12,

https://www.delcopa.gov/publicrelations/releases/2022/delcoofficiallyassumescontrolofgeorgew
hillcf.html (last accessed August 11, 2025).

3 Williams refers to both the Delaware County Prison and the George W. Hill
Correctional Facility. The Court understands these to be references to the same county prison.

4 Williams asserts claims against all Defendants in both their individual and official
capacities. Claims against municipal officials named in their official capacity are
indistinguishable from claims against the municipality that employs them. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). “[A]n official-capacity
suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. Although
Williams does not separately name Delaware County as a Defendant, he names Wellpath and
GEO Group. Thus the Court construes all official capacity claims asserted against the
individually named Defendants as a municipal liability or Monell claim asserted against
Wellpath and the GEO Group. For the reasons stated below, Williams has not alleged a
plausible municipal liability claim against any Defendant.

5 Williams’s public criminal docket reflects that he was sentenced on September 1, 2022.
See Commonwealth v. Williams, CP-23-CR-0005530-2019 (C.P. Del.). Accordingly, the events
described in Williams’s Complaint took place when he was a pretrial detainee. See Fuentes v.
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a “convicted inmate awaiting sentencing”
is a pretrial detainee), abrogated in part on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389 (2015).
13.) When Williams was moved to a different cell, from October 2020 until December 2021, he
was “held captive” in this new cell as a result of being “capitulated” by Thomas’s efforts to
obtain “sexual favors.” (Id. at 14.) Williams states that one time in September 2021, Thomas
became “enraged” when Williams refused his sexual advances. (Id.) The next day, Thomas

issued a misconduct report to Williams for possession of contraband, which caused Williams to
be sent to the restricted housing unit (“RHU”). (Id.) The misconduct report was eventually
dismissed. (Id.) Williams further alleges that in late 2021, when he was “locked in cell 204,” he
told Thomas that he was going to “spill the beans (be a whistleblower, a rat, a snitch) and let
everyone know about the sexual relationship” if Thomas did not give Williams “more exclusive
stuff,” such as “cigarettes, suboxone, marijuana, K-2, phone, etc.” (Id. at 15-16.) In response, a
“livid” Thomas threatened Williams. (Id. at 16.) Williams states that he was scared to report the
incidents with Thomas while he was housed at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility. (Id.)
Once he was transferred out of the facility, he reported the incidents to SCI Camp Hill and SCI
Smithfield. (Id. at 16, 25.)

Williams also describes two assaults by prison officials in his Complaint. (Id. at 17-18.)
The first occurred in December of 2021 when Williams was escorted in handcuffs to the Special
Management Unit (“SMU”). (Id. at 17.) Williams states that he was “dragged by the shirt” into
a cell by Sergeant Richburg and then “savagely, viciously, and brutally beaten by Sergeants
Richburg and S. Brown.” (Id.) Richburg allegedly “smushed” Williams’s face to the floor and
put his knee into Williams’s back, while Brown “sadistically punch[ed] and kick[ed]” Williams
until he could “no longer move.” (Id.) As a result of the incident, Williams felt “excruciating
pain” in his back, knees, elbows, and neck. (Id.) He states that medical services and his
grievances were denied. (Id.) He further alleges that “Sergeant Jones was notified of the assault
the very next day,” but that [t]here was still no results.” (Id.) Williams alleges that he was
assaulted a second time by Richburg “under direction of Megan Gilbert” sometime between July
21, 2022 and July 24, 2022. (Id. at 18.) The assault allegedly took place in one of the
examination rooms “at Medical” and caused an exacerbation of his knee injury. (Id.)

Williams also asserts in his Complaint that he did not have adequate access to the
prison’s law library. He alleges that from March 2020 until sometime in 2021, prison law
librarian Dana Keith closed the law library “due to Covid restrictions.” (Id.) During this time,
inmates could not request legal services unless they were able to “catch the law librarian . . . who
[would] creep[] on the block for 5 minutes during a time when everyone [was] asleep.” (Id. at
19.) Williams states that due to the law library closure, he missed a “possibility” that he “could
have found some information that could have helped him beat his case,” either at trial or at the
postconviction stage. (Id. at 18.) Instead, Williams had no ability to research and no law books
available to him. (Id. at 19.) Once he was able to get into the law library sometime in late 2021
or 2022, he was only permitted one hour a week, which was “not sufficient time for any case, let

alone a murder case.” (Id. at 18.)
Williams also asserts that the GEO Group failed to protect him from inmate assaults. (Id.
at 19.) He states that he was “coerced by two different inmates to have sex” and that on January
21, 2022, he was stabbed and beaten “by a trilogy of inmates known for violence and extortion to
staff.” (Id.) Defendant Suvoor was allegedly “notified” about the January 21 assault. (Id.)
Williams also alleges that the GEO Group, Wellpath, and unnamed prison officials failed to
provide him “medically assisted treatment” for his “known opioid addiction.” (Id. at 19-20.)
When he came to the George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Wellpath and the GEO Group were
“aware that [he] needed help” because the urinalysis upon his entry confirmed opioid use. (Id. at
19.) However, the prison did not offer Williams Medication-Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) such
as Sublocade or Suboxone, despite the opioid epidemic at that time. (Id.) As a result, Williams
would be “barred for a lifetime of” of MAT programs. (Id. at 20.) In addition, there was
allegedly “no drug program on Unit 10,” where he was placed when he arrived and thus “no

help” given to him for his opioid addiction. (Id.)
Williams also asserts that prison officials “upon the orders of Megan Gilbert of
Wellpath” kept him in the SMU for three months “for no reason other than arbitrary punishment,
torment, and torture.” (Id. at 21.) He alleges that he received no misconduct to warrant his
placement there but that it was done pursuant to a “custom” of the prison to “send to the SMU”
certain “maximum custody inmates” when they “get sentenced. (Id.) Williams also asserts that
while he was in the SMU, he was denied mail service. (Id. at 21-22.) He states that the prison
switched to a “digital mail system” on a tablet in June of 2022 but that SMU units like himself
were not permitted to have a tablet. (Id. at 21.) After Williams complained to Defendants Bacon
and Leach about being denied mail service, he was told by Bacon that “‘SMU inmates [would]

have their mail printed out and brought to them,’” however this allegedly never occurred for
Williams. (Id.) Williams states that from June 2022 through September 2022, he did not receive
mail, either physically or through the tablet. (Id.) During this time, he had “limited contact
[with] family members.” (Id.) He also claims he was denied a visit with his attorney on one
occasion in July of 2022. (Id.)
In his Complaint, Williams also briefly complains about other conditions of his
confinement when the GEO Group ran the facility, such as that he was only offered Islamic
services three times, was “locked in a cell 24 hours a day 5 days a week” for two years, endured
“black mold in the shower” on his unit, was not provided workout equipment, and was deprived
of showers and electricity for “months at a time.” (Id. at 20-21.) Williams states that he was
provided a radio during this time but was not provided batteries for it. (Id. at 20.)
Finally, Williams asserts that Gilbert “coerced” him to share “false information” with a
prison psychiatrist, which was allegedly “used at the murder trial” and resulted in Williams’s

“demise.” (Id. at 22.) Gilbert also allegedly placed Williams on suicide watch multiple times,
despite his claims of not being suicidal at that time. (Id.) Williams states that due to prison
conditions, he attempted suicide once in August 2022, and that no prison official “helped or
cared.” (Id.) Garr was allegedly on duty at the time. (Id.) Based on these allegations, Williams
asserts constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983 and seeks money damages. (Id. at 11.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Williams leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he
is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.6 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At the
screening stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in Williams’s favor, and “ask only whether that complaint, liberally
construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th

6 Because Williams is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments
in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v.
Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. As Williams is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally.
Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court understands Williams to assert various constitutional claims in connection
with his pretrial detention at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility.7 Williams asserts
constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, the statute enabling a plaintiff to raise claims for
violations of the federal constitution. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In a § 1983 action, the personal involvement of each defendant
in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege

how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998).
A. Claims against the Delaware County Prison
Williams names the Delaware County Prison as a Defendant. However, a jail or
correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983. See Miller v. Curran-Fromhold Corr.
Facility, No. 13-7680, 2014 WL 4055846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Mitchell v.

7 In his Complaint, Williams states that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated.
(Compl. at 4.) However, because Williams was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events in
question, the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, governs his
conditions-of-confinement claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2005).
Chester Cnty. Farms Prison, 426 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1976)); Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr.
Facility, No. 09-6014, 2010 WL 2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010). Accordingly, his
claims against the Delaware County Prison must be dismissed because it is not a legal entity
susceptible to suit. See Lenhart v. Pennsylvania, 528 F. App’x 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2013) (per

curiam) (affirming dismissal of claims against county prison because even though “[a] local
governmental agency may be a ‘person’ for purposes of § 1983 liability, [the county prison] is
not a person capable of being sued within the meaning of § 1983” (internal citations omitted)).
B. Claims against Thomas

Williams asserts constitutional claims against Thomas based on allegations that he was
coerced into engaging in sexual relations with Thomas over the course of several years and that
on one occasion, when Williams refused, Thomas retaliated against him by writing him a
misconduct report and sending him to the RHU. The Court understands Williams to assert
Fourteenth Amendment sexual abuse claims and First Amendment retaliation claims against
Thomas.
Sexual abuse and harassment can violate an inmate’s rights. Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d
468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018); E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019). A claim for sexual
abuse is analyzed in the same manner as an excessive force claim. Ricks, 891 F.3d at 473-74.
Because Williams was a pretrial detainee during the relevant event, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment governs his sexual abuse claims. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 397 (2015) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of
excessive force that amounts to punishment.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Sharkey,
928 F.3d at 307 (“E.D.’s allegations of Sharkey’s sexual assault, which could not have served a
legitimate governmental objective and thereby constituted impermissible punishment, set forth a
plausible violation of her right to personal bodily integrity protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). To allege a sexual abuse claim, a detainee must allege facts
plausibly establishing both objective and subjective components. Ricks, 891 F.3d at 475 (stating
that the misconduct “must be objectively, sufficiently intolerable and cruel, capable of causing

harm, and the official must have a culpable state of mind”). “To determine whether challenged
conditions of confinement amount to punishment, this Court determines whether a condition of
confinement is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Sharkey, 928 F.3d at
307.
To state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the
constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action.
See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Coit v. Garman, 812 F. App’x
83, 86 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). A prisoner’s filing of a grievance or expressing an intent to

file a grievance constitutes constitutionally protected conduct. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417,
422-23 (3d Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). “To establish the
requisite causal connection a plaintiff usually must prove either (1) an unusually suggestive
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a
pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.” Ruttle v. Brady, No. 22-
3000, 2023 WL 5554648, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2023) (quoting Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Williams alleges that Thomas, a “man of authority,” used “coercive procedures and
tactics” to get Williams to engage in sexual relations with him, and that this went on for several
years. (Compl. at 12-16.) Williams has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly support both the
subjective and objective prongs of a sexual abuse claim against Thomas. Williams also alleges
that when he refused Thomas’s sexual advances and threatened to “snitch” on him, Thomas
became “enraged” or “livid,” threatened Williams, and wrote Williams up for misconduct, which

caused him to be sent to the RHU. Based on these allegations, Williams has stated a plausible
First Amendment retaliation claim against Thomas. Williams’s claims against Thomas pass
statutory screening and will be served.
C. Claims against Richburg and S. Brown

Williams asserts excessive force claims against Defendants Richburg and S. Brown based
on allegations that, in December 2021, he was “brutally beaten” by these Defendants, and that in
July of 2022, he was “assaulted” by Richburg. To state a due process violation based on
excessive force, a pretrial detainee must allege plausibly “that the force purposely or knowingly
used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. “Considerations
such as the following may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: the
relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the
plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the
severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and
whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 397. Whether unreasonable force has been
used against a detainee “requires ‘careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.’” Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Williams alleges that while he was handcuffed and being escorted to the SMU, Richburg
“smushed” Williams’s face to the floor and put his knee into Williams’s back while Brown
punched and kicked Williams until Williams could no longer move. (Compl. at 17.) Williams
alleges plausible excessive force claims against Richburg and Brown based on the December
2021 incident. This claim will be served. Williams has not, however, stated sufficient facts
regarding the incident that occurred in July of 2022. He merely alleges in conclusory fashion

that Richburg “assaulted” him in a medical examination room at the direction of Megan Gilbert,
an alleged prison psychiatrist. (Compl. at 5, 18.) He provides no other details about the
circumstances that led to his encounter with Richburg, what actions specifically Richburg took,
and how Gilbert was involved. The claim based on the July 2022 incident in the medical
examination room is therefore underdeveloped and will be dismissed without prejudice.
D. Claims against Jones, Suvoor, Moody, and Garr (Lack of Personal
Involvement)

As noted above, to state a plausible § 1983 claim, Williams must allege how each
individual defendant was specifically involved in the alleged constitutional harms. See Rode,
845 F.2d at 1207 (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs.”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability
is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”).
Williams has not alleged sufficient facts regarding the alleged involvement of Defendants Jones,
Suvoor, Moody, or Garr.
The only allegations in the Complaint relating to Jones, Suvoor, and Moody are that they
were notified about an incident after it occurred. With respect to Jones, Williams merely alleges
that Jones was “notified the very next day” after the alleged assault by Richburg and Brown in
December of 2021. (Compl. at 17.) No other facts are alleged about Jones’s involvement in the
alleged assault or in any other incident described in the Complaint. With respect to Suvoor,
Williams alleges only that Suvoor was “notified” after Williams was assaulted and stabbed by
three inmates on July 21, 2022. (Id. at 19.) No other facts are alleged about Suvoor’s
involvement in the alleged assault or in any other incident described in the Complaint. With
respect to Moody, Williams states that Moody was “made aware of the theft of property multiple

times,” and references an undisclosed “UCC financing statement/UCC contract trust account.”
(Id. at 23.) Williams alleges no other facts about an alleged theft of his property and no other
facts about Moody’s involvement in any of the other events described in the Complaint. Simply
being notified about an alleged constitutional violation after it happened is not sufficient to
establish a causal link between the constitutional harm and the Defendants’ actions to establish
personal involvement. See Williams v. Wetzel, No. 23-1235, 2025 WL 908406, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 26, 2025) (“[A]fter-the-fact notice is not sufficient to establish personal involvement.”); see
also Ricker v. Weston, 27 F. App’x 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that a decision not to
discipline does not establish personal involvement “given that all of the injuries occurred before
the decision” and “[t]here is simply no causal link between those injuries and what [the

defendants] did or did not do”).
Finally, with respect to Garr, Williams alleges only that Garr was on duty when Williams
attempted suicide. (Compl. at 22.) Williams asserts no facts about whether Garr was even aware
of the suicide or his involvement in the alleged failure to provide aid after it occurred.
Moreover, there are no facts about Garr’s involvement in any other incident described in the
Complaint. Williams has failed to establish the necessary personal involvement of Jones,
Suvoor, Moody, and Garr to state a plausible claim. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims asserted
against these Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice.
E. Claims against Dana Keith
The Court understands Williams to assert an access-to-courts claim against prison law
librarian Dana Keith based on allegations that Keith shut the law library down and limited
Williams’s ability to make requests for legal documents. The inability of pretrial detainees to
access legal resources such as the law library is analyzed as an access-to-courts claim under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments. Prater v. City of Philadelphia, 542 F. App’x 135, 137 (3d
Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of access to the courts.”). To state a
claim for denial of access to courts, a plaintiff must show that he “suffered ‘an actual injury’
because of his alleged inability to access the prison library.” Prater, 542 F. App’x at 137
(quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)). A detainee states an actual injury by
alleging “that a ‘nonfrivolous’ and ‘arguable’ claim was lost because of the denial of access to
the courts.” Tinsley v. Giorla, 369 F. App’x 378, 381 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also
Sanders v. Rose, 576 F. App’x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“[T]o sufficiently plead an
access-to-courts claim . . . a non-prisoner must plead that ‘official acts . . . may allegedly have

caused the loss . . . of a meritorious case.’” (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416
(2002)).
Williams fails to state a plausible access-to-courts claim because he does not allege an
actual injury. He states only that had he been provided law library access, “there is a possibility
that [he] could have found some information that could have helped him beat his case.” (Compl.
at 18.) Such vague and generalized allegations are too speculative and do not support a plausible
inference that Williams lost a nonfrivolous or arguable claim. See Prater, 542 F. App’x at 137
(affirming denial of access-to-courts claim where the pretrial detainee had “not offered any other
explanation of how his inability to access the library affected his criminal proceedings”); Diaz v.
Holder, 532 F. App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of access-to-courts
claims where plaintiff failed to tie alleged deficiencies in library to harm in underlying action).
In any event, Williams was represented by an attorney during the conviction and sentencing
phases of his criminal proceeding. See Williams, CP-23-CR-0005530-2019. Williams cannot

state a plausible claim for denial of access to courts if he was represented by counsel during his
criminal case. Prater, 542 F. App’x at 137 n.4; see also Diaz, 532 F. App’x at 63; Roman v.
Union Cty. Jail, No. 16-1049, 2017 WL 498715, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2017) (denying access-to-
courts claim for pretrial detainee to the extent the plaintiff was represented by counsel in his
criminal proceedings); Hurdle v. Dantos, No. 20-5595, 2020 WL 6747293, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
17, 2020) (denying claim for access to legal research in part because the pretrial detainee was
represented by counsel). Accordingly, Williams’s access-to-court claims asserted against Keith
will be dismissed with prejudice.
F. Claims based on Denial of Access to Mail
Williams also asserts a First Amendment claim against Leach and Bacon based on

allegations that he was denied access to his personal mail for three months in 2022 when the
prison switched to a digital mail system and Williams was not provided a tablet. Prisoners have
protected First Amendment interests in both sending and receiving mail. See Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see also Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[P]risoners, by virtue of their incarceration, do not forfeit their First Amendment right to use of
the mails.” (internal quotations omitted)). However, this right to receive and send mail “can be
restricted for legitimate penological interests.” Nixon v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 501
F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Courts have found that mere isolated incidents
of interference without evidence of an improper motive are insufficient to establish a First
Amendment violation. See, e.g., id; Gibson v. Erickson, 830 F. App’x 372, 373 (3d Cir. 2020)
(per curiam).
Williams fails to allege a plausible First Amendment claim. He alleges generally that he
was “denied mail service” from June 2022 to September 2022 but he does not allege any specific

facts about what mail he specifically did not receive and when. (Compl. at 21.) In addition,
Williams does not allege the personal involvement of any individual defendant in interfering
with his access to his mail. See Taylor v. Oney, 196 F. App’x. 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting
that the plaintiff must show the personal involvement of individual defendants to establish a First
Amendment claim based on the interference of mail). Although Williams states that he
complained to Bacon and Leach about not having access to a tablet, Bacon advised him that his
mail would be printed and brought to him.8 There are no allegations in the Complaint
connecting Bacon or Leach to any alleged interference with Williams receiving his mail. The
First Amendment claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
G. Due Process Claims against Megan Gilbert and the Warden

The Court understands Williams to assert a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
against Gilbert, a Wellpath psychiatrist, and the Warden of the prison based on allegations that
they ordered Williams to be kept in the SMU for two months from July 2022 until September
2022, “for no reason other than arbitrary punishment and torture.” (Compl. at 22.) Williams
alleges that he did not receive any discipline or warning prior to the placement but rather that his
transfer was pursuant to a prison “custom” to send “maximum custody inmates” to the SMU
when they get sentenced. (Id.) Williams was sentenced in September of 2022. Based on the

8 It is also unclear whether Williams intends to assert claims against Bacon at all since a
“mediation statement” he included with his Complaint states that Bacon is “not really a
defendant but named in the Complaint.” (ECF No. 1-1.)
limited facts alleged, the Court understands Williams to allege that he was placed in segregated
housing for administrative and not disciplinary reasons. The standards Courts utilize to consider
due process claims by pretrial detainees differ depending on the type of restrictive housing
alleged.

Pretrial detainees are protected from “punishment” by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Generally, prison officials’
“restrictions on pretrial detainees will constitute punishment prohibited by the Due Process
Clause when: (1) ‘there is a showing of express intent to punish on the part of [those] [ ]
officials’; (2) ‘the restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive
government purpose,’ i.e., ‘if it is arbitrary or purposeless’; or (3) ‘the restriction is excessive in
light of that purpose.’” Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Stevenson v.
Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 67-68 (3d Cir. 2007) (alterations in original)). “Punishment” in this
context refers to “punishment of a pretrial detainee for his alleged criminal conduct, committed
prior to his detention, for which he has not yet been committed.” Id. (emphasis in original). It

does not refer to punishment of a pretrial detainee “for his in-facility conduct.” Id. at 505. In
other words, “prisons may sanction a pretrial detainee for misconduct that he commits while
awaiting trial, as long as it is not a punishment for the ‘underlying crime of which he stands
accused.’” Kanu v. Lindsey, 739 F. App’x 111, 116 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Rapier v. Harris,
172 F.3d 999, 1003-06 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Generally, prisoners confined for disciplinary reasons are afforded greater process those
confined for administrative reasons, such as Williams. See Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70. This is
because “maintaining internal security and order in jails and prisons are ‘legitimate governmental
objectives’” that may justify placement of a detainee in administrative segregation, and “courts
must give prison officials considerable discretion to manage internal security in their
institutions.” Steele, 855 F.3d at 505. In other words, if officials can articulate a legitimate
managerial concern for placement of the detainee in restricted housing, a substantive due process
claim is foreclosed. Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 69 (“Although the substantive and procedural due

process evaluations are distinct, a showing by the prison officials that a restrictive housing
assignment is predicated on a legitimate managerial concern and is therefore not arbitrary or
purposeless, will typically foreclose the substantive due process inquiry”). When a detainee’s
placement is for administrative purposes, “the minimal procedures outlined in Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 539 (1983) are all that is required.” Lewis v. Williams, No. 05-013, 2011 WL 2441377,
at *17 (D. Del. June 13, 2011) (citing Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70). Hewitt requires that, within a
reasonable time, a detainee be explained the reason for the administrative placement as well as
be given an opportunity to respond. Steele, 855 F.3d at 507; Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70 (citations
omitted). “[T]he opportunity to respond can be satisfied by written grievances.” Kanu, 739 F.
App’x at 117.

Based on the minimal facts alleged, Williams’s due process claims are undeveloped as
pled. Williams has not alleged sufficient facts to give rise to an inference that his placement in
segregation amounted to improper punishment or that it was accomplished without appropriate
attendant notice and process. Williams does not allege whether he was explained the reason for
his administrative placement in the SMU or whether he simply assumed it was timed with his
criminal sentencing. Williams also does not allege whether he was provided an opportunity to
respond to his placement in the SMU or whether he filed any grievances about that placement.
Williams’s due process claims will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.9
H. Denial of Medical Treatment Claims against Wellpath and the GEO Group
Williams also asserts claims against Wellpath and the GEO Group based on allegations
that he was denied Medication-Assisted Treatment (“MAT”) for opioid addiction when he first

arrived at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility. To state a claim based on the failure to
provide medical treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts
indicating that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). A prison official is not deliberately indifferent
“unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at
837. Deliberate indifference has been found “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s
need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical
treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or
recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). “A
medical need is serious, . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring

treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

9 To the extent that Williams attempts to assert other claims against Gilbert based on
allegations that she ordered him on suicide watch even though he was not suicidal, or that she
“coerced” him to provide “false information” to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas
(see Compl. at 22), such claims are also dismissed without prejudice. Williams does not provide
sufficient factual details to state a plausible constitutional claim.
In addition, to the extent that Williams attempts to assert a claim based on allegations that
Gilbert violated his rights under HIPAA by sharing personal medical information with staff (see
id.), such a claim will also be dismissed. There is no federal private right of action under
HIPAA. See Byrne v. Berks Cnty. Jail, No. 24-1193, 2024 WL 2794446, at *1 (3d Cir. May 31,
2024) (citing Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 660 (4th Cir. 2021); Payne, 998 F.3d at 660
(noting that “[e]very circuit court to consider whether HIPAA created a private right to sue has
found that it does not” and citing cases from the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits)); Johnson v. WPIC, 782 F. App’x 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing
Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006)).
doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347
(3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
To plead a basis for municipal liability against a city under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that the city’s policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Similarly, to plead a § 1983 claim
against a prison medical provider like Wellpath, a plaintiff must allege the provider had “a
relevant . . . policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation [he]
allege[s].” Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)); Sims
v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 F. App’x 16, 20 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (stating that “a
private health company providing services to inmates ‘cannot be held responsible for the acts of
its employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability’”); see also Lomax v.
City of Philadelphia, No. 13-1078, 2017 WL 1177095, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (“Because
[defendant] is a private company contracted by a prison to provide health care for inmates, . . . it

can only be held liable for constitutional violations if it has a custom or policy exhibiting
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.” (citations and quotations
omitted)).10
“To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that
custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). It is not

10 “‘Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’”
Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other hand, can be proven
by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by
law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.’” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v.
Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)).
enough, however, to allege the existence of a policy or a custom. “A plaintiff must also allege
that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Estate of Roman v. City of
Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir.
1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom

and the particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id. (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850).
Williams does not allege a Wellpath or GEO Group policy or custom that was the cause
of his being denied Medication-Assisted Treatment for his opioid addiction. Instead, he states
that Wellpath and the GEO Group knew about his opioid addiction but “did nothing to help.”
(Compl. at 20.) This is not sufficient to state a plausible Monell claim.11 In addition, Williams
does not allege that any individually named Defendant was involved in the denial of Medication-
Assisted Treatment or that any Defendant was otherwise deliberately indifferent to his opioid
addiction. Accordingly, Williams’s Fourteenth Amendment claims based on the denial of
medical treatment will be dismissed without prejudice.12

11 While the claim against Wellpath will be dismissed without prejudice, the Court notes
that any liability against Wellpath in this Court is uncertain in light Wellpath’s discharge from
liability by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, for claims that arose prior to November 11, 2024. See In Re Wellpath Holdings, Inc.,
No. 24-90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tx.) (Bankr. Doc. Nos. 2596, 2679, 2680) ); see also 11 U.S.C. §
524(a)(2) (“A discharge in a [Chapter 11 bankruptcy] case . . . operates as an injunction against
the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect,
recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of
such debt is waived.”).
Moreover, claims against Wellpath employees such as Megan Gilbert, may also be
affected by Wellpath’s bankruptcy. In particular, absent any information that Williams has opted
out of the Third-Party Releases or otherwise taken action in the Bankruptcy Court, the claims
against Megan Gilbert or any other Wellpath employee may be barred by the injunction
contained in the confirmed Chapter 11 Plan. See Ch. 11 Plan, Art. IX, In re Wellpath, No. 24-
90533, ECF No. 2596 at 128-136; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a); 1123(b)(6); 1141(a), (d).

12 Williams also alleges that Wellpath and the GEO Group failed to protect him from
inmate assaults and inmate sexual advances. However, Williams has not alleged that the inmate
violence to which he was subjected was caused by a Wellpath or GEO Group policy or custom.
I. Conditions of Confinement Claims
Finally, Williams makes passing references in his Complaint to an assortment of
conditions to which he was exposed while housed at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility.
Specifically, he alleges that he endured black mold in the showers, was not provided workout

equipment, was deprived of showers and electricity for “months at a time,” was not provided
batteries, had limited access to Islamic services, was subjected to “beaming light all night” while
in “solitary confinement” at the SMU, and was “locked in a cell 24 hours a day 5, days a week”
for two years.13 (Compl. at 20-22.) To establish a basis for a Fourteenth Amendment violation,
a pretrial detainee must allege that his conditions of confinement amount to punishment. Bell,
441 U.S. at 538; Camps v. Giorla, 843 F. App’x 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). In that
regard, a “particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of express intent to
punish on the part of detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally
related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in

Thus, to the extent Williams intended to assert a failure to protect claim against Wellpath or the
GEO Group, he has failed to do so.

13 The Court notes that some of the conditions of which Williams complains occurred
when prisons undertook various measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Courts have held
that due to the nature of this pandemic and its resulting security implications for prisons and
jails, denial of exercise opportunities and other such prison activities during those periods of
lockdowns did not constitute punishment so as to support plausible claims. See, e.g., Hope v.
Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2022) (concluding that conditions of
confinement during COVID-19 did not amount to unconstitutional punishment)); Carredo v.
Hudson Cnty. Corr., No. 22-2122, 2022 WL 2358405, at *4 (D.N.J. June 27, 2022) (holding that
failure of prison officials to adhere to rules and regulations regarding recreation and exercise
during the COVID-19 pandemic failed to state a claim for relief that the conditions of
confinement constituted punishment); Chapolini v. City of Philadelphia, No. 22-284, 2022 WL
815444, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2022) (dismissing on screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) plaintiff’s claim that as a result of the prison’s COVID-19 response measures,
he was confined to his cell for 23 hours and 40 minutes per day and lost access to law library, in-
person visitation and out of cell exercise because plaintiff failed to allege how long he was
subjected to the challenged conditions) (citing Hope).
light of that purpose.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Stevenson,
495 F.3d at 68), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher, 115 F.4th 197; see also
Steele, 855 F.3d at 504. Only conditions of confinement that “cause inmates to endure such
genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time” violate the Fourteenth

Amendment. Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
Williams’s claims about the various conditions of his confinement at the George W. Hill
Correctional Facility fail as pled because Williams has not tied any named Defendant’s specific
conduct to the alleged constitutional violations. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. The claims also
fail because they are vague and factually undeveloped. Williams does not allege any specific
facts about the conditions to which he was exposed, including specific timeframes, the duration
of the exposure, and how he was harmed. His passing references to these conditions, without
more, fail to raise a plausible inference that the conditions were intended as punishment.
Accordingly, any claims Williams asserts based on the conditions of his confinement will be
dismissed without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Williams leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss his Complaint in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice.
Williams’s access-to-courts claim asserted against Dana Keith, his claims against the Delaware
County Prison, and any claims based on violations of HIPAA will be dismissed with prejudice.
Williams’s sexual abuse and retaliation claims asserted against Thomas and his excessive force
claims asserted against Richburg and Brown based on the December 2021 incident pass statutory
screening. The balance of Williams’s claims are dismissed without prejudice. Williams may file
an amended complaint in the event he can allege facts to cure the defects the Court has noted
regarding the claims that were dismissed without prejudice. In the alternative, Williams may
proceed with the claims that pass statutory screening, in which case the Court will direct service
of the Complaint only on Defendants Thomas, Richburg, and Brown, so that Williams may
proceed on his remaining claims. An appropriate Order follows, which offers additional

guidance on options for proceeding.
BY THE COURT:

S/ WENDY BEETLESTONE

WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11119146. Public record. Not legal advice.