# Rosario v. Williams

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · August 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11118465

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11118465

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that conduct that was “at worst negligence, not recklessness” was insufficient for liability

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Matthew Rosario (R-71339), )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 23-cv-2726
v. )
) Hon. April M. Perry
Sydney Williams and Antonio Fleming, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Matthew Rosario, an Illinois prisoner, brings this Section 1983 action against two
officers at Stateville Correctional Center claiming that they failed to protect him from a fight with
another inmate. Defendants now seek summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’
motion is granted, and judgment is entered in Defendants’ favor.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Local Rule 56.1 of the Northern District of Illinois
Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures for filing and responding to motions for summary
judgment in this court. Here, Defendants filed a compliant Rule 56.1 statement of facts and
supporting exhibits, and as required by Local Rule 56.2 served Plaintiff with a notice to
unrepresented litigants opposing summary judgment. Doc. 57, 58.
Plaintiff has attempted to comply with Local Rule 56.1. He responded to Defendants’
submissions by filing a response to Defendants’ statement of facts, a statement of additional
material facts, several exhibits, a sworn declaration, and an argument as well as a list of what
Plaintiff believes to be the key disputed factual issues. Doc. 61, 62, 64, 66. Defendants responded
to Plaintiff’s submissions. Doc. 71, 72.
Plaintiff’s responses and factual assertions do not always fully comply with Local Rules
56.1(d) and (e), in that they in places do not consist of clearly numbered paragraphs and do not
cite to the record for alleged factual assertions. Where Plaintiff has not properly responded to one

of Defendants’ stated facts or has admitted it, the Court will accept that fact as true if it is supported
by evidence in the record. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). But although the
Court is entitled to demand strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1, see Coleman v. Goodwill
Indus. of Se. Wis., Inc., 423 F. App’x 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2011), it will also consider the facts
identified by Plaintiff, including in his declaration, to the extent that those facts are supported by
the record or Plaintiff has the personal knowledge to testify to them. See Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d
1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (courts may construe pro se submissions leniently). That said, the Court
will not look beyond the portions of the record that have been cited by the parties. See Johnson v.
Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[D]istrict courts . . . are not required

to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment
motion before them.”).
Plaintiff’s failure to comply strictly with Local Rule 56.1 is not a basis for automatically
granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th
Cir. 2021). The Court is mindful that Defendants have the “ultimate burden of persuasion” to show
that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600,
608 (7th Cir. 2006).
B. Material Facts

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With the foregoing standards in mind, the following facts are taken as true (unless noted
otherwise) for deciding Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff Matthew Rosario is an Illinois Department
of Corrections prisoner who during the relevant time was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional
Center (“Stateville”). Doc. 57 ¶ 1; Doc. 64 at 1. Defendant Sydney Williams (“Williams”) was a
Lieutenant at Stateville. Doc. 57 ¶ 2; Doc. 64 at 1. Defendant Antonio Fleming (“Fleming”) was a

correctional officer at Stateville. Doc. 57 ¶ 3; Doc. 64 at 1.
On June 5, 2021, Plaintiff had an altercation with another Stateville inmate named Hardin.
Doc. 57 ¶ 5; Doc. 64 at 1. Plaintiff and Hardin then both spent twenty-eight days in segregation,
after which Plaintiff was returned to his cell in Edward House. Doc. 62 at 1-2; Doc. 64 at 1-2.
Plaintiff testified that Warden Osborn, who was in charge of the Restrictive Housing Committee,
told Plaintiff that he would be transferred out of Stateville if he again fought with Hardin. Id.
Plaintiff believes that Hardin was housed in Bravo House. Doc. 57 ¶ 19.
A “Keep Separate Form” (“KSF”) was placed in Plaintiff’s file the first week in June 2021
for Plaintiff and Hardin. Id. ¶ 6; Doc. 57-2; Doc. 64 at 2. The effective date listed on the form is

June 7, 2021. Doc. 57-2. Plaintiff did not request the KSF, but he testified that he learned about its
existence a few days after his release from segregation during a conversation with a counselor.
Doc. 62 at 5. Plaintiff did not see Hardin again until July 12, 2021 – the date of the incident in this
case. Doc. 57 ¶ 8.
Prior to July 12, Plaintiff did not personally know Defendant Williams or Defendant
Fleming. Doc. 57 ¶¶ 9-10. His only interactions with the Defendants prior to that date was to say
things like, “hi” or “what’s up” as they passed each other. Id. Both Defendants testified that they
were unaware of the KSF for Plaintiff and Hardin on July 12. Doc. 57 ¶¶ 26-27, 31-32.

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On July 12, 2021, Williams was assigned to Stateville’s commissary, filling in for another
lieutenant who was off that day. Doc. 57 ¶¶ 26, 30. That morning, Plaintiff’s gallery, Edward
House Gallery 5, was called for commissary. Doc. 57 ¶¶ 11-12; Doc. 62 at 2. It was broadcasted
over the radio that Edward House was going to commissary. Doc. 62 at 6-7. As Plaintiff was
leaving the Edward House building, Plaintiff testified that he saw Williams at the bottom of the

stairs. Doc. 57 ¶ 13; Doc. 62 at 6. Plaintiff testified that Williams told him, “I heard about the fight
with Hardin.” Id. Plaintiff testified that he responded, “yeah,” and kept walking to the commissary
building. Doc. 62 at 6.
At commissary, Plaintiff and his gallery were placed in bullpens in the building to wait for
their turn to be called. Doc. 57 ¶ 15; Doc. 62 at 7. After about twenty minutes, Plaintiff asked
Fleming if he could use the restroom, and Fleming opened the bullpen door to let Plaintiff out.
Doc. 57 ¶ 16; Doc. 62 at 7. At that time, Williams was sitting at a desk by the bullpen door talking
to Fleming and another officer. Doc. 57 ¶ 17. Plaintiff testified that he heard Williams say to the
other officers, “I hope he knows how to fight.” Id.; Doc. 62 at 7. Plaintiff testified that he heard

the other officers laugh. Doc. 62 at 7. Williams testified, however, that she never made this
statement, and that she did not hear any other officer make this statement. Doc. 57 ¶ 29. Fleming
also testified that he did not hear Williams or any other officer make this statement. Doc. 57 ¶ 34.
Plaintiff testified that he did not hear any of the officers’ conversation that preceded this
comment. Doc. 57 ¶ 18. He testified that, “I don’t know if she’s talking to me, or making a joke, or
whatever it is.” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff wondered whether Williams was talking to him given her earlier
statement by the stairs, but he did not say anything to Williams in response. Id.
Plaintiff then exited the bullpen and walked with his head down towards the bathroom.

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Doc. 62 at 3. He noticed a person’s feet and looked up and saw that it was Hardin. Id. Plaintiff
asked Hardin, “what’s going on?”, and then Hardin launched at Plaintiff. Doc. 57 ¶ 20. A fight
ensued. Id. Plaintiff does not believe that Bravo house was called to commissary at the same time
as Edward House because only one house attends commissary at a time. Doc. 57 ¶ 19; Doc. 62 at
7.

Williams gave two orders for the inmates to stop fighting, and when they did not comply,
she sprayed them with OC spray. Doc. 57 ¶ 30; Doc. 62 at 7. Plaintiff and Hardin were eventually
restrained and escorted to the Health Care Unit where they received medical attention. Id. The
corresponding medical report states that Plaintiff had “no visible injuries,” Doc. 57 ¶ 37, but
Plaintiff testified that he later developed a black eye, Doc. 62 at 3. Plaintiff testified that he shortly
thereafter told Warden Osborn that Hardin should not have been at commissary at the same time
as him, and that, according to Plaintiff, Warden Osborn agreed and released him early from
segregation. Doc. 62 at 3.
In September 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance about the July 12, 2021 incident which does

not note any statements made by Williams to Plaintiff prior to the fight with Hardin. Doc. 57 ¶
38; Doc. 57-9. The grievance did request that Plaintiff’s disciplinary report be expunged. Id. This
request was denied because Plaintiff had pleaded guilty to the charge in the disciplinary report.
Doc. 57 ¶ 39.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On summary judgment, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and grant the motion if the movant “show[s] that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gupta v. Melloh,

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19 F.4th 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2021); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is warranted “against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence

of any genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If that burden is met, the burden “shifts to the non-
moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute.” Carroll v. Lynch,
698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). A factual dispute is genuine when a reasonable jury could return
a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Although courts must draw all inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, “the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial.” Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1011–12 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587).

III. DISCUSSION
Upon § 1915A screening, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on a claim of failure to protect
from the second fight with Hardin. Doc. 6. This claim arises under the Eighth Amendment, which
requires that prison officials “protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). But “a prison official does not violate the Eighth
Amendment every time an inmate gets attacked by another inmate.” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563,
569 (7th Cir. 2008). “Prisons, after all, are dangerous places often full of people who have
demonstrated aggression.” Id. at 569. Rather, to establish a claim that officials violated his Eighth

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Amendment rights by failing to protect him, Plaintiff must produce evidence showing that he faced
a substantial risk of harm and that officials acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. Brown
v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2005). A risk is “substantial” when it is “almost certain to
materialize if nothing is done.” Id. at 911. “[T]he risk must be somehow specific to a [inmate], and
not a mere general risk of violence.” Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 842-43 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned

up). A prison official demonstrates deliberate indifference to such a risk when he or she “knows
of and disregards” the risk; the official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. General requests for help, expressions of fear, and even prior attacks are
insufficient to alert guards to the need for action. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40
(7th Cir. 2008).
Defendants’ motion focuses on deliberate indifference. They contend that they did not
possess knowledge of a serious risk to Plaintiff, and therefore that they could not have been
deliberately indifferent. The Court agrees.

First, the mere existence of a KSF – absent Defendants’ knowledge thereof – does not
support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Placing two inmates together who
have a KSF can create a substantial risk of harm. See Miller v. Fisher, 219 F. App'x 529, 532 (7th
Cir. 2007) (describing a keep-separate order as “itself a statement of the risk” of potential
violence). But if the placing officer is unaware of the KSF, then he or she is not “subjectively
aware” of the risk it represents, and therefore not constitutionally liable. See id.; Miller v.
Mascillino, No. 15-cv-11746, 2023 WL 6276526, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2023) (knowledge or
lack thereof of KSF was the deciding issue at summary judgment); see also generally Goka v.

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Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1988) (“When prison officials are unaware of the risk involved
and violate a policy which may have prevented injury to an inmate, courts have generally found
no constitutional violation.”).
In this case, Plaintiff has not come forward with evidence to create a disputed issue of fact
as to Defendants’ knowledge of the KSF. Defendants’ testimony that they were not aware of the

KSF is undisputed. Plaintiff testified that he did not tell either of the Defendants about the KSF.
Doc. 57-1 at 28. And Plaintiff did not introduce any evidence showing that Defendants were
informed of the KSF through other means. Indeed, Plaintiff’s main argument is that Defendants
should have checked whether a KSF existed before allowing both Plaintiff and Hardin in the
commissary building. Doc. 62, pg. 8-9, 10-11. This suggests, at most, negligence, which is not
enough to support an Eighth Amendment claim. In other words, Plaintiff’s assertion that Williams
failed to learn that a KSF existed and thus allegedly did not separate Plaintiff from Hardin is
inconsistent with the type of intentional conduct that is necessary to establish a constitutional
violation. See Giles v. Tobeck, 895 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that conduct that was

“at worst negligence, not recklessness” was insufficient for liability); see also Conner v. Hoem,
768 F. App’x. 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019) (constitution does not require state actors to enforce their
own policies and regulations). The existence of a KSF of which Defendants were unaware is
simply not a basis for their liability.
This leaves only Defendant Williams’ statements to Plaintiff that she had heard about the
first Hardin fight and her statement to the other officers before Plaintiff went to the bathroom that
she “hopes he can fight” to support a showing of deliberate indifference. Williams denies making
both of these statements, Fleming denies hearing the latter, and Plaintiff made no mention of either

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in his contemporaneously-filed grievance. That said, at summary judgment, the Court must credit
Plaintiff’s testimony about Williams’ statements.
But even when drawing all reasonable, non-speculative, inferences in Plaintiff’s favor from
those statements, there is not evidence to demonstrate that Defendants had knowledge of a serious
risk that “was almost certain to materialize if nothing is done.” Brown, 398 F.3d at 911. Williams’

statement on the staircase was that she knew Plaintiff and Hardin had fought, but the Seventh
Circuit has made clear that mere knowledge of a past fight is not enough to impute knowledge of
a present threat. See Klebanowski, 540 F.3d at 639-40 (defendants’ knowledge that the plaintiff
“had been involved in an altercation with three other inmates, and that he wanted a transfer because
he feared for his life,” did not give the defendants actual knowledge of a “specific threat” to the
plaintiff's safety because “[h]e did not tell them that he had actually been threatened with future
violence”). A prisoner’s reported fear must be specific enough, or there must be other
corroborating evidence, demonstrating that the fear is plausible and there exists a real, imminent
threat of harm. Zirko v. Rabideau, No. 21-1389, 2022 WL 16955470, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 16, 2022)

(citing Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480-86 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, Plaintiff merely
responded “yeah” and walked away when Williams mentioned the first fight. Plaintiff has not
produced any evidence that he informed either Defendant that he feared Hardin or informed them
that Hardin continued to pose any ongoing threat of future harm to him.1
Plaintiff speculates that Williams and Fleming allowed Hardin to be in the hallway outside
the commissary bullpen and were aware of a risk he posed to Plaintiff based on Williams’
statement to the other officers that “I hope he knows how to fight.” But the record is devoid of

1 To the contrary, Plaintiff testified that he had never said more than “hi” or “what’s up” to either Defendant prior
to July 12, 2021. Doc. 57-1 at 19.
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evidence establishing how or why Hardin was outside the commissary bullpen or evidence that
Defendants even knew Hardin was there. Plaintiff’s speculation on this point is not enough to
defeat summary judgment. See generally Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401,
407 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[I]nferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice” to
survive summary judgment); Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, IL. Sch. Dist. 163, 315

F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It is well established that in order to withstand summary judgment,
the non-movant must allege specific facts creating a genuine issue for trial and may not rely on
vague, conclusory allegations”); Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc., 3 F.4th 927, 934 (7th
Cir. 2021) (“speculation may not be used to manufacture a genuine issue of fact.”). Moreover, it
is not reasonable to conclude that either Defendant would have somehow foreseen that Plaintiff
would ask to use the bathroom at the time Hardin was in the hallway leading to the bathroom.
While it is certainly unprofessional for a correctional supervisor to say that she hopes
anyone can fight, the context and meaning of Williams’ statement are unclear. Plaintiff concedes
that he does not know what Williams meant or whether the officers were even talking to him. Doc.

57-1 at 20, 22. Plaintiff and Williams hardly knew each other; they had no negative history, and
Plaintiff does not suggest that Williams harbored any animosity towards him. Even if the Court
assumes that Willimas was speaking about Plaintiff, no evidence in the record demonstrates that
Williams was doing anything more than speaking in jest given her earlier statement that she was
aware Plaintiff had been in a fight. Without evidence that Williams or Fleming knew Hardin’s
whereabouts and had actual knowledge of a specific and imminent threat to Plaintiff posed by
Hardin, a reasonable jury could not return a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. See Zirko, 2022 WL
16955470, at *1 (affirming summary judgment for correctional officer where plaintiff had told

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him that cellmate had “threatened to beat him within an inch of his life” but did not provide context
for that threat).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff provides evidence only that Williams knew of past harm, and provides
no evidence that Defendants had actual knowledge of a specific threat of impending harm,
summary judgment is warranted in favor of Defendants. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
final judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Clerk is also directed to terminate Plaintiff’s
“opposing motion for summary judgment,” Doc. 64, as a pending motion; the Court already
clarified that this pleading was intended to be part of Plaintiff's response to Defendants’ motion
rather than a cross motion. Doc. 69. The Clerk shall also terminate and dismiss “John Doe”
correctional officer. If Plaintiff wants to appeal, he must file a Notice of Appeal with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). If he appeals, he will be
liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal’s outcome. See Evans v.
of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998).

Date: August 11, 2025

United States District J udge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11118465. Public record. Not legal advice.