# Pettit v. Walraven

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · July 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117905

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** July 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

JASON PETTIT PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:25-CV-04047-SOH-BAB

SHERIFF BOBBY WALRAVEN;
JAIL ADMINISTRATOR GINA BUTLER;
CAPTAIN CHERSE CHAPA; and
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JORDON LNU DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He proceeds pro se and in
forma pauperis. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in Little River County Detention Center
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will be dispositive of certain of Plaintiff’s claims, this document will be filed as a Report and
Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief United States District
Judge Susan O. Hickey. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No.
6) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity.

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I. BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Sheriff Bobby Walraven, Jail Administrator Gina Butler,
Captain Cherese Chapa, and Correction Officer Jordon LNU as Defendants. Plaintiff alleges all
of his claims against all of these Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. (ECF

No. 1).
In Plaintiff’s Claim One he asserts Defendants Walraven, Butler, and Chapa interfered with
his legal correspondence and access to the courts on May 19, 2025 claiming he needed to place
stamps on the mail. (ECF No. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff claims this interference negatively effects his
mental health. Id. For his official capacity claim he states:
The jail is required to give me access to the Courts and they stop time sensitive legal
correspondence. If Im not indigent they can charge my books they take out medical they
can take out legal mail fees.

Id. at 5 (errors in original).
In Claim Two Plaintiff claims, Defendants Walraven and Butler denied him medical care
on May 22, 2025. Specifically, Plaintiff claims he requested an eye exam, complained of
migraines, disclosed his suicidal thoughts, and requested a trip to Riverview Behavioral
Healthcare, but Defendants Walraven and Butler denied him all of these requests and treatments.
Id. at 6. For his official capacity claim Plaintiff states:
The jail is responsible for care of my body and mental state I believe they are denying my
right to medical attention.

Id. at 7.
In Claim Three, Plaintiff claims all Defendants, on May 10, 2025, violated his
constitutional rights by failing to behave in a professional and respectful manner and maintain
clean standards. Id. at 7-8. Specifically, Plaintiff states:
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I asked CO Jordon to spray the tables to disinfect them after breakfast on the 10th of May
and he told me “fuck you write me up bitch” Jordon (AJ) will not identify used profanity
with me when I asked him to spray the tables. The captain says they have no policy about
respecting the inmates. The Administrator has not corrected them after multiple
grievances on the subject and the chief executive of the jail I have heard from his mouth if
it keeps getting complained about then bond out. I am being mentally tortured here in this
jail and it is effecting my mental state.

Id. For his official capacity claim Plaintiff states: “It is the policy of the jail and the federal
detention facility standards to be professional at all times but they aren’t here.” Id. at 8-9.
For relief Plaintiff request both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 9.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
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Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). However, the complaint must still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.

1985).
Under § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his official
capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official
capacities. The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend on
whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. See
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “Claims against
individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they
work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the
only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Personal capacity

claims “are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the course of
their duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may be raised
as a defense” to these individual capacity claims. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and that the actor violated a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court finds Plaintiff has adequately alleged a denial of medical care claim under his

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Claim Two at this stage. Accordingly, Claim Two asserted against Defendants Walraven and
Butler should proceed. However, Plaintiff has failed to adequately state claims upon which
relief may be granted in his Claims One and Three. For the reasons explained below, both
Claims One and Three should be dismissed and Defendants Chapa and Jordon should be

dismissed from this matter.
A. Claim One – Access to Courts
First, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable access-to-courts claim against any
Defendant. In order to state an access-to-courts claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate he suffered
prejudice or actual injury because of the prison officials' conduct. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 351-2 (1996); see also Farver v. Vilches, 155 F.3d 978, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam);
Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 617 (8th Cir. 1997) (to prevail on access-to-courts claim,
inmate must show actual injury or prejudice even if denial of access to library is complete and
systematic); McMaster v. Pung, 984 F.2d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 1993). “To prove a violation of the
right of meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner must establish the state has not provided an

opportunity to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner's sentence or conditions of confinement in
a court of law, which resulted in actual injury, that is, the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably
meritorious underlying legal claim.’” Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged any injury or prejudice from
Defendants refusing to send out his mail to this Court without a stamp. Furthermore, Plaintiff has
filed six new cases in this Court since May 2025 and appears to be prosecuting each sufficiently
at this time.

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B. Claim Three – Professional Behavior and Jail Standards
Next, Plaintiff’s Claim Three fails to state a cognizable claim pursuant to Section 1983
both on the grounds of unprofessional conduct and failure to follow jail standards or procedures.
First, it is well established that “[v]erbal threats do not constitute a constitutional violation.”

Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). Similarly, taunts, name calling, and the
use of offensive language does not state a claim of constitutional dimension. McDowell v. Jones,
990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (inmate's claims of general harassment and of verbal harassment
were not actionable under Section 1983); O'Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987)
(verbal threats and abuse by jail official did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation).
Accordingly, Plaintiff claims related to Defendant Jordon using profanity and the other Defendants
not preventing Defendant Jordon from using profanity towards Plaintiff fail as a matter of law.
Secondly, any jail standards or policy and procedures of Union County Plaintiff attempts
to reference in his Complaint do not create constitutional rights. See Brown v. Boone Cty., Civil
No. 5:13-cv-03065-TLB, 2014 WL 4405433, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 5, 2015) (citing Kennedy v.

Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (the law is clear than “an internal jail policy or
procedure does not create a constitutional right, nor does a correctional officer’s failure to follow
such regulation rise to the level of a [Section] 1983 claim.”). Accordingly, Defendants failure to
follow “policy of the jail” and “the federal detention facility standards” fails to allege a cognizable
claim.
C. Official Capacity Claims
Lastly, Plaintiff has failed to allege any cognizable official capacity claims against any
Defendant. Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in

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his official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his
official capacities. The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend
on whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. See
Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “Claims against

individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they
work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the
only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id.
Here, that means Plaintiff needed to allege a policy, procedure, or custom of Union County
caused his alleged constitutional violations. While Plaintiff did reference generally Union County
policy and procedure in his Claim Three, it was to state that the Defendants were not following
policy and procedure. Plaintiff has wholly failed to allege any policy or procedure of Union
County caused his alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s alleged official
capacity claims against all Defendants should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is recommended that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Claim One and Three against all Defendants in their individual capacities
and all of Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against all Defendants be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
and
(2) Plaintiff’s Claim Two for denial of medical care asserted against Defendants Walraven
and Butler, in their individual capacities only, shall proceed for service by separate order.

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The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.
Status of Referral: The case shall remain referred at this time.

DATED this 11th day of July 2025.

Barry A. Bryant
/s/
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117905. Public record. Not legal advice.