# Choudhury v. Northwell Health, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117534

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117534

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying materially adverse standard to disparate treatment claim
- finding summary judgment inappropriate where decisionmaker who fired plaintiff made racially offensive comments shortly before plaintiff’s termination
- finding two month gap between complaint and termination sufficient to allege a causal connection for Title VII retaliation claim
- applying materially adverse standard to disparate treatment claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MIZANUR CHOUDHURY,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
– against – 23-cv-01406 (NCM) (SIL)

NORTHWELL HEALTH, INC.; DENNIS
BERGEN; THOMAS HYNES; SIG
STEFANSSON; VINCENT PAWLOWSKI;
& KARINA NORR,

Defendants.

NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Mizanur Choudhury brings claims against his former employer, defendant
Northwell Health, Inc. (“Northwell”), and individual defendants Dennis Bergen, Thomas
Hynes, Sig Stefansson, Vincent Pawlowski, and Karina Norr, alleging that defendants
subjected him to discrimination based on his race, national origin, and religion, that he
was subjected to a hostile work environment, and that defendants failed to accommodate
his religious beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-17, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq.
(“NYSHRL”). Compl. ¶¶ 115–35, 142–56. Plaintiff also brings a claim of retaliation in
violation of Title VII. Compl. ¶¶ 136–41. Finally, plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 157–63. Defendants move for summary
judgment on each of plaintiff’s claims.1 For the reasons discussed below, defendants’
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
In 2015, plaintiff Mizanur Choudhury interviewed for a position as a Senior
Networking Engineer on Northwell’s Network Engineering Team. Counter 56.1 ¶ 3.2

Plaintiff was interviewed by defendant Dennis Bergen, Senior Manager for Network
Engineering, and John Vanegas, a manager. Counter 56.1 ¶ 4. Plaintiff was not offered
this position. Counter 56.1 ¶ 11. Plaintiff then interviewed for a different position as a
Manager of Network Operations in December 2016. Counter 56.1 ¶ 13. Plaintiff
interviewed with Don LePore, who offered plaintiff the job. Counter 56.1 ¶ 14. LePore
testified that around the time plaintiff was hired, Bergen approached LePore and asked
“why did you hire this Muslim guy, I do not like him” with an “evil smirk.” Counter
56.1 ¶ 23. Defendants deny that this incident occurred. 56.1 Reply ¶ 4.
After plaintiff was hired, he reported to LePore, who reported to defendant Bergen.
Counter 56.1 ¶ 29. Plaintiff’s responsibilities included managing a team of engineers.
Counter 56.1 ¶ 25. Defendant Thomas Hynes held the same position as plaintiff, as a

Manager of Network Operations, and managed his own team of engineers.

1 Hereinafter, the Court refers to defendants’ memorandum of law in support of
their motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 41, as “Mot.”; plaintiff’s memorandum in
opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 42, as “Opp’n”; and
defendants’ memorandum of law in further support of their motion for summary
judgment, ECF No. 43, as “Reply.”

2 The facts contained herein are undisputed unless otherwise indicated, and are
taken from the parties’ statements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, specifically
defendants’ 56.1 statement (“56.1”), see ECF No. 41-1, plaintiff’s counter 56.1 statement
(“Counter 56.1”), see ECF No. 42-1, and defendants’ response to plaintiff’s counter 56.1
statement (“56.1 Reply”), see ECF No. 43.1.
Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 25, 29–30. One of the engineers assigned to plaintiff’s team was Matthew
Procaccino, an employee with documented performance issues. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 35–36.
Human Resources (“HR”) directed LePore and plaintiff to document Procaccino’s
performance. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 40–41. Procaccino was eventually terminated in 2018.
Counter 56.1 ¶ 42. Following Procaccino’s termination, plaintiff and LePore were each

given a verbal counseling by Bergen for failing to provide daily updates on Procaccino.
Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 43–46. Plaintiff claims that the counseling he received was unwarranted
because Bergen had directed plaintiff to stop giving daily reports prior to Procaccino’s
termination. Counter 56.1 ¶ 44. Both plaintiff and LePore complained to HR about their
verbal counselings. HR investigated the complaints and concluded that both counselings
were warranted. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 46, 51–54.
LePore was terminated by defendant Northwell on January 18, 2019, and his role
was not filled by another employee. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 57–58, 61–62. After LePore’s
termination, plaintiff began reporting directly to Bergen. Counter 56.1 ¶ 64. Bergen
thereafter divided responsibility for the operation of the network between plaintiff and
plaintiff’s counterpart Hynes, assigning each of their teams a particular geographic

region. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 65–66. Plaintiff claims that his region was underresourced in
comparison to Hynes’s team. Counter 56.1 ¶ 70.
Bergen conducted plaintiff’s performance evaluations from 2019 to 2021. Counter
56.1 ¶¶ 73, 81, 108. In that time, Bergen gave plaintiff critical reviews. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 74–
84, 108–10. Plaintiff disputed each evaluation. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 74–84, 108–10. On
September 24, 2020, Bergen administered a written warning to plaintiff for a problem
relating to the LightPath Circuit. Counter 56.1 ¶ 86. Review of the record shows that an
issue was flagged on an email chain with plaintiff, Hynes, and some of their engineers.
See generally Opp’n Ex. 16 (“LightPath Email”). One of plaintiff’s engineers responded to
the email, stating that he would handle the issue only as to plaintiff’s assigned region.
LightPath Email 2. Bergen testified that plaintiff was issued a warning because the
LightPath Circuit issue affected a data center that connected to all regions, and because
plaintiff’s team represented that they were handling it, plaintiff’s team had a

responsibility to fix the issue for all regions. Mot. Ex. 7 (“Bergen Dep. Tr.”) 93:7–22,
94:11–16, ECF No. 41-9. Plaintiff denies that his team should have addressed all regions
and contests the validity of the written warning he received. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 86–88, 92,
97.
A few months later, Bergen administered a final written warning to plaintiff.
Counter 56.1 ¶ 98. Bergen issued that warning due to a Verizon WAN circuit issue that
occurred on November 12, 2020. Counter 56.1 ¶ 101. Defendants contend that plaintiff
acknowledged an issue with the circuit during business hours, but failed to take steps to
limit its impact, which negatively affected E911 services and the call center used to
dispatch ambulances. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 101–02. Plaintiff denies responsibility for this
incident. Counter 56.1 ¶ 101. Eight days after plaintiff received the written warning, he

lodged a complaint against Bergen alleging that plaintiff was being unfairly targeted
because of his identity. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 157–58. The Advice and Counsel Center (“ACC”),
an extension of the HR Department, investigated this complaint. Counter 56.1 ¶ 159. The
ACC found that plaintiff’s complaint was not substantiated after interviewing plaintiff,
Bergen, and Bergen’s supervisor Sig Stefansson. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 159–61.
At some point, it was decided that a role similar to the one held by LePore in 2019
should be reinstated. Counter 56.1 ¶ 130. The parties dispute whether this role was posted
in the company job portal. Counter 56.1 ¶ 131. Hynes was promoted to this role in 2022
and became plaintiff’s direct supervisor. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 133, 164. Following Hynes’s
promotion, plaintiff and Hynes’s relationship deteriorated, including in April of 2022
when they had tense interactions. For example, Hynes emailed plaintiff to request a list
of candidates plaintiff had interviewed to fill vacancies on plaintiff’s team, to which
plaintiff responded “Hi, I am not sure what you are asking and what are you looking for?

. . . What are you looking to accomplish? . . . My team is supporting more than half of the
enterprise with only six engineers. Let’s work on the issues please. Let’s focus.” Counter
56.1 ¶¶ 168–69.
When Hynes began supervising plaintiff, he learned that plaintiff required a
religious accommodation for prayer time. Counter 56.1 ¶ 219. Hynes requested plaintiff
to mark his calendar to indicate when he was not available. Counter 56.1 ¶ 221. The parties
dispute whether plaintiff eventually marked his calendar with his prayer times, and
whether after doing so plaintiff was required to attend meetings which conflicted with his
prayer time. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 221–22.
That same month, Bergen also requested that plaintiff indicate on his calendar
when he was available and to mark non-work meetings in his calendar as personal.

Counter 56.1 ¶ 170. Plaintiff responded stating “Hi man, you are harassing me now . . . I
have a lot to catch up but you are harassing me. . . If this is important for you then let’s
have it at 4 PM. If not, we can do it next week.” Counter 56.1 ¶ 171. Plaintiff lodged another
complaint of discrimination through a phone call with an HR representative on May 12,
2022, which he recorded. Counter 56.1 ¶ 172. In this call, plaintiff claimed that Bergen
had told him, either two years previously or maybe in 2019, that people from plaintiff’s
background were not always as smart as plaintiff or easy to work with. See Mot. Ex. 33
(“HR Confidential Complaint”) 15:41–17:48, ECF No. 41-35. In this call, plaintiff also
accused Bergen of making fun of one of plaintiff’s engineer’s names. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 173–
74. The ACC investigated this complaint, interviewing plaintiff and others, including the
individual whose name plaintiff claimed Bergen was mocking. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 173–76.
The ACC concluded that plaintiff’s claim was unsubstantiated. Counter 56.1 ¶ 177.
A week after his complaint to the HR Representative, plaintiff complained to

Hynes that Hynes had gone to one of plaintiff’s engineers directly for a task, stating: “You
need to STOP doing that. I am still their manager. . . Let’s stay within protocol and not
confusing team members about my leadership capability. Consider this a friendly advice.”
Counter 56.1 ¶ 178. Plaintiff again made a similar complaint to Hynes the following week
stating, “Man, you have too many opinions and too many advice. STOP treating me as a
new employee and I am not your slave.” Counter 56.1 ¶ 179.
Hynes issued plaintiff a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) on July 7, 2022.
Counter 56.1 ¶ 186. Plaintiff claimed that the PIP was vague and lacked specific details.
Counter 56.1 ¶ 188. Shortly after the PIP was issued, plaintiff and Hynes met to discuss it.
Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 188–89. During this meeting, which plaintiff recorded, Hynes highlighted
that plaintiff had failed to schedule a 1:30 PM meeting the previous day which Hynes had

requested, and plaintiff responded that he did not schedule the meeting because he was
out to lunch and he did not consider the request an emergency. See Mot. Ex. 36 (“PIP
Meeting”) 6:55–8:00, ECF No. 41-38; see also Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 188, 190. Plaintiff also
informed Hynes that if Hynes thought the meeting was “so important, [he] should have
put it together,” see PIP Meeting 18:04–09, and in reference to another meeting plaintiff
did not attend, that plaintiff did not “have to join every call [Hynes] ask[s] [plaintiff] to
join,” see PIP Meeting 20:20–25. During that call, Hynes also noted that he had asked
plaintiff to send out minutes from a recent meeting and plaintiff had failed to do so, to
which plaintiff responded that type of work was “not gonna happen by me because I don’t
have time to do that.” PIP Meeting 23:42–52.
The next month plaintiff and Hynes met to review plaintiff’s progress on the PIP,
and Hynes informed plaintiff he was not meeting the expectations outlined in the PIP.
Counter 56.1 ¶ 198. Plaintiff disputes that he was not meeting the expectations of the PIP.

Counter 56.1 ¶ 198; see also Opp’n 16. Later that week, Hynes contacted a member of
plaintiff’s team with an emergency task. Counter 56.1 ¶ 212. Plaintiff represented he would
handle the task on the next business day. Counter 56.1 ¶ 212. Hynes had a meeting with
plaintiff the next day to discuss the events of the previous day. Counter 56.1 ¶ 213. During
that meeting, Hynes instructed plaintiff that if the assigned engineer was unavailable,
plaintiff should have assigned it to another engineer or done it himself that day, as the
task would have taken a few minutes. Counter 56.1 ¶ 215. Plaintiff responded that Hynes
was micromanaging him, and that the requested task was not a priority. Counter 56.1 ¶
218.
In late August 2022, Hynes began drafting a termination notice in consultation
with HR. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 227–29. Plaintiff was presented with his termination notice on

September 26, 2022. Counter 56.1 ¶ 230.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 13
F.4th 247, 259 (2d Cir. 2021).3 Facts are in genuine dispute when “the jury could
reasonably find for” the non-moving party based on the evidence in the record. Borley v.
United States, 22 F.4th 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2021).
The movant “bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute
as to a material fact.” Jaffer v. Hirji, 887 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2018). Where the moving

party meets their burden, the non-moving party must provide sufficient evidence
establishing a genuine issue of material fact beyond “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence[.]” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 205 (2d Cir. 2012). The court need only
consider admissible evidence, and is not obligated to conduct an independent review of
the record to identify a factual dispute. Looney v. Macy’s Inc., 588 F. Supp. 3d 328, 340
(E.D.N.Y. 2021).
DISCUSSION
I. Title VII and NYSHRL Claims
Plaintiff claims that (1) he was terminated because of his protected characteristics
and for making complaints of discrimination; (2) he suffered a hostile work environment
based on his protected characteristics; and (3) defendants failed to accommodate his

religious beliefs in the workplace. Defendants move for summary judgment on each claim.
See generally Mot. The Court evaluates each of plaintiff’s claims in turn.
A. Discrimination
Historically, courts have treated discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and
Title VII as “analytically identical” and evaluated them pursuant to the same standard.
See Charles v. City of New York, No. 21-cv-05567, 2023 WL 2752123, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

3 Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,
and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.
31, 2023). Under that standard, to establish a claim of employment discrimination under
Title VII, a plaintiff must “prove discrimination either by direct evidence of intent to
discriminate or, more commonly, by indirectly showing circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination.” Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2024), cert.
denied sub nom., Golub Corp. v. Bart, 145 S. Ct. 173 (2024). Where “only circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory intent is available, courts use the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework to assess whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence of
discrimination to survive summary judgment.” Id.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case by showing: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was qualified
for his position; (3) that he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) that the
adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015).
“Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the [defendant]
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Stephan v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 450 F. App’x 77, 79 (2d

Cir. 2011). If the employer satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must then show that the
stated reason is either pretextual, or that an impermissible consideration was nonetheless
a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Bart, 96 F.4th at 570.
As noted above, courts construed both Title VII and NYSHRL claims pursuant to
this framework. However, in 2019, the NYSHRL was amended to provide that its
provisions “shall be construed liberally . . . regardless of whether federal civil rights laws,
including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article,
have been so construed.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 (2023). Following this amendment, courts
have scrutinized discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL under a more
lenient standard akin to the standard for claims brought pursuant to the New York City
Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). See Reyes v. City Prac. Grp. of N.Y., LLC, No. 22-cv-
09482, 2025 WL 388524, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2025) (“Following the New York
legislature’s 2019 amendment to the NYSHRL . . . courts [] now scrutinize discrimination

claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL under a lenient pleading standard similar to the
standard for NYCHRL discrimination claims.”); see also Wright v. White Plains Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 237 A.D.3d 1143, 1145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025) (“As a result of the amendment,
the NYSHRL now aligns with the standards of the New York City Human Rights Law[.]”).
Under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that he was
treated “less well, at least in part for a discriminatory reason.” Khwaja v. Jobs to Move
Am., No. 19-cv-07070, 2021 WL 3911290, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2021).
The parties do not dispute that plaintiff has satisfied the first three requirements
for a prima facie case of discrimination. The parties agree that plaintiff belongs to a
protected class, as a brown, Muslim man of Bangladeshi descent. See Mot. 22. The parties
also agree that plaintiff was terminated, which constitutes an adverse employment action.

Mot. 22; Opp’n 21. The parties dispute, however, the final requirement of a prima facie
case—whether plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to show that he was terminated
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Mot. 22; Opp’n 21–22.
i. Termination
Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that his termination
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, and thus
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination in connection with his
termination under either the Title VII or NYSHRL standards.
A plaintiff satisfies the final requirement of a prima facie case of employment
discrimination under Title VII when he can offer evidence to show that the plaintiff’s
protected characteristic was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor contributing to the
employer’s decision to take the action. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801
F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff’s burden to make out a prima facie case of

discrimination under the NYSHRL is even lower and may be satisfied if he can show that
unlawful discrimination played any role in the adverse employment action. See Wright v.
White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 237 A.D.3d 1143, 1145 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025) (noting that
under the NYCHRL, and by extension the NYSHRL, unlawful discrimination “must play
no role in an employment decision”). Plaintiff argues that he has made these showings.
Opp’n 21. The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff contends that discriminatory conduct began in 2015 when Bergan
“refused to hire” plaintiff to the Senior Networking Engineer position, and that after
plaintiff was hired for another position in 2016, Bergen approached LePore to ask LePore,
“Why did you hire this Muslim guy, I do not like him” and that during that confrontation
Bergen had “an evil smirk.” Opp’n 21; Mot. Ex. 12 (“LePore Dep. Tr.”) 19:10–21, ECF No.

41-14. Plaintiff also points to his own testimony that in either 2019 or 2020 Bergen told
him that people from plaintiff’s background were not always as smart as plaintiff or easy
to work with. Opp’n 21. As an example of discriminatory conduct which raises an
inference of discrimination regarding his termination, plaintiff also contends that Bergen
would approve Hynes’s requests for resources or extra engineers within a few days but
would take much longer to approve plaintiff’s requests, even though plaintiff’s team had
fewer engineers and was responsible for overseeing a larger region. Opp’n 21–22. These
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmovant, are insufficient to
create an inference that plaintiff was terminated, at least in part, because of his protected
characteristics.
The gap in time between the last offensive comment made by Bergen and plaintiff’s
termination undermines plaintiff’s argument that his termination occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See Amaya v.

Ballyshear LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 204, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[Plaintiff] was terminated
more than four months after any of the alleged discrimination. As a matter of law, this is
simply too large a gap to demonstrate a causal connection.”). Cf. Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co.,
LLC, 134 F.4th 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2025) (finding summary judgment inappropriate where
decisionmaker who fired plaintiff made racially offensive comments shortly before
plaintiff’s termination). Here, the first offensive comment directed at plaintiff and
attributed to Bergen occurred sometime in late 2016, around the time that plaintiff was
hired by Northwell, and over five years before plaintiff’s termination. See LePore Dep. Tr.
19:10–21; Counter 56.1 ¶ 24. The other offensive comment plaintiff attributes to Bergen
was made—at least—two years before plaintiff’s termination. See HR Confidential
Complaint 15:33–17:48. This is too large a gap to support a causal connection between

Bergen’s alleged discriminatory animus and plaintiff’s termination.
Plaintiff’s attempt to create a causal connection between Bergen’s offensive
comments and plaintiff’s termination is further undermined by the fact that Bergen, the
only individual that allegedly made offensive remarks, is not the individual who made the
decision to terminate plaintiff. Plaintiff was placed on a PIP in July 2022 by his direct
supervisor, Hynes. Counter 56.1 ¶ 186. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Bergen was
involved in the decision to place plaintiff on the PIP, in monitoring his progress on the
PIP, or in the decision to terminate plaintiff in September 2022. Hynes testified that the
decision to put plaintiff on the PIP, and the development of the PIP’s objectives, occurred
between himself and HR. Mot. Ex. 11 (“Hynes Dep. Tr.”) 131:13–20, ECF No. 41-13.
Additionally, email communications between Hynes and others regarding plaintiff’s
progress on the PIP did not include Bergen. See generally Mot. Ex. 41 (“Re: Supporting
Docs Email Thread”), ECF No. 41-43 (includes emails between Hynes, Katelyn Kelly,

Norr, and Samantha Beltre). Email communications regarding the decision to terminate
plaintiff were also made between Hynes and others, and did not include Bergen. See Mot.
Ex. 42 (“Re: Confidential Email Thread”), ECF No. 41-44. There is no evidence that
Hynes, or those individuals with whom he consulted regarding plaintiff’s termination,
made any offensive remarks concerning plaintiff’s religion, race, or national origin or
harbored discriminatory animus. See Counter 56.1 ¶ 63 (admitting that Hynes made no
offensive remarks concerning plaintiff’s religion, race, or national origin to plaintiff
during plaintiff’s employment at Northwell).
The other instances which plaintiff cites as a basis for his contention that he was
treated unfairly due to his protected characteristics are too attenuated from his
termination, and did not occur under circumstances that raise an inference of

discrimination. For example, plaintiff objects to a verbal warning he received in 2018. See
Opp’n 10. In 2018, plaintiff and LePore, who was plaintiff’s supervisor at the time, were
instructed by HR to keep tabs on a difficult employee, Procaccino, and give Bergen daily
updates. LePore Dep. Tr. 39:5–17. Plaintiff testified that at some point, he was told by
Bergen that plaintiff no longer needed to give daily updates on Procaccino, which Bergen
denies. Opp’n Ex. 1 (“Pl. Dep. Tr. Day One”) 95:6–15, ECF No. 42-3. Shortly after
Procaccino was eventually fired, both plaintiff and his supervisor were given disciplinary
notices for failing to give daily updates. LePore Dep. Tr. 44:2–5. Plaintiff testified that
“Bergen didn’t hesitate or even HR didn’t hesitate” to discipline plaintiff because of who
plaintiff was “as a Muslim brown man,” and because they were not happy about letting
Procaccino, a white employee, go. Pl. Dep. Tr. Day One 114:5–115:12. Plaintiff’s claim of
discrimination surrounding this incident is purely speculative, and there is no evidence
to suggest that it was motivated by any of plaintiff’s protected characteristics. While

plaintiff testified that he thought “[i]f [he] was [a] Caucasian manager, you know, [he]
would not get [discipline],” plaintiff also testified that his own supervisor, a white
manager, was disciplined in connection with the same incident. Pl. Dep. Tr. Day One
117:21–22, 119:22–120:6; LePore Dep. Tr. 90:10–13.
As plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that draws a connection between Bergen’s
offensive conduct and plaintiff’s eventual termination, plaintiff has not established
circumstances which give rise to an inference that discriminatory animus was the basis
for his termination, or that discriminatory animus played any part in his termination.
Thus, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of race, national origin, or religious
discrimination in connection with his termination under either Title VII or the more
lenient NYSHRL. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these claims

is GRANTED.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Prior to 2019, “[h]ostile work environment claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL
[were] governed by the same standard.” Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir.
2015). Under this standard, to establish a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff
needed to make a showing that the complained of conduct (1) was objectively severe or
pervasive enough that it created an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive; (2) created an environment that the plaintiff subjectively perceived as
hostile or abusive; and (3) created that environment because of the plaintiff’s protected
characteristics. Figueroa v. Johnson, 648 F. App’x 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2016).
However, as of October 11, 2019, hostile work environment claims brought
pursuant to the NYSHRL are considered under a more lenient standard. Under this more
lenient standard, to establish a NYSHRL hostile work environment claim a plaintiff must

show that he was subjected to “inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of [his] membership in one or more . . . protected categories.” N.Y. Exec. Law §§
296(1)(h), 300. Courts have interpreted this requirement to be analogous to the
requirements of the NYCHRL, which requires a plaintiff only show that he was treated
“less well than other employees” because of his protected characteristics, and need not
show that the conduct of which plaintiff complains was “severe” or “pervasive.” Wheeler
v. Praxair Surface Techs., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 3d 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). The NYSHRL
amendments do not have a retroactive effect. Id. Therefore, the Title VII standard applies
to conduct which occurred prior to October 11, 2019. See Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.,
No. 17-cv-03479, 2019 WL 4081898, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019) (The NYSHRL
“amendments only apply to claims that accrue on or after the effective date of October 11,

2019.”).
Plaintiff’s briefing does not acknowledge the change in the standard for hostile
work environment claims that accrued after October 2019. See Opp’n 27 (citing pre-
amendment caselaw holding that the standard under the NYSHRL and Title VII are the
same). In opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff points to the
following facts in support of his claim for a hostile work environment under both the
NYSHRL and Title VII: “unfair discipline and negative performance reviews had been
ongoing and repeated between 2019 and 2022 . . . Further the interference and
harassment with respect to Plaintiff’s known religious practice and accommodation . . . ,
repeatedly scheduling meetings for unavailable times, and chastising Plaintiff for the
harassment he was being subjected to[.]” Opp’n 28.
To analyze plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims, the Court will consider the
totality of the conduct in the record, from 2016 to 2022, to consider whether plaintiff has

presented facts by which a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff was subjected to a
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The Court will next consider the
evidence in the record from 2019 to 2022 to determine whether plaintiff has established
a plausible inference of a hostile work environment claim under the NYSHRL.
i. Title VII
To determine whether there is a genuine factual dispute concerning the
harassment of which plaintiff complains and whether it was severe or pervasive enough
to satisfy the first prong of a Title VII hostile work environment claim, the Court will
consider whether “the workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that . . . alter[ed] the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create[ed] an abusive working environment.” Harris v. NYC Hum. Res. Admin., No. 20-

cv-02011, 2021 WL 3855239, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2021). To make this determination,
courts must consider “all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.” Id. In order for the conduct to be deemed pervasive, the “incidents must
be more than episodic” and instead must “be sufficiently continuous and concerted.”
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, a single incident
can create a hostile environment where it is so severe that it results in a “transformation”
of the plaintiff’s workplace based on the plaintiff’s protected characteristics. Id.
Additionally, to establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show some connection between the hostile or abusive conduct and a protected
characteristic. See Parekh v. Swissport Cargo Servs., Inc., No. 08-cv-01994, 2009 WL
290465, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2009) (“[T]he incidents comprising a hostile work

environment claim . . . must occur under circumstances in which the incidents can
reasonably be interpreted as having taken place on the basis of that trait[.]”).
Here, the only conduct plaintiff relies upon to substantiate this claim, and which is
connected to his protected characteristics, is “interference and harassment” with respect
to plaintiff’s Friday prayers, and “repeatedly scheduling meetings for unavailable times.”
Opp’n 28. Though not relied upon in support of his hostile work environment claim,
plaintiff also offered evidence that defendant Bergen made a comment in late 2016 about
LePore hiring a “Muslim guy,” that he did “not like him,” in reference to plaintiff, and
Bergen’s comment made in either 2019 or 2020 that people from plaintiff’s background
were not always as smart as plaintiff or easy to work with. HR Confidential Complaint
15:33–17:48. These comments are the kind of “stray remarks” which, while offensive, are

not severe or pervasive enough to establish liability for a hostile work environment claim
pursuant to Title VII. Additionally, plaintiff’s testimony that he had to miss “4, 5 of [his]
prayer sessions you know because [Hynes] wanted [plaintiff] to join some calls,” Opp’n
Ex. 2 (“Pl. Dep. Tr. Day Two”) 44:2–5, ECF No. 42-4, does not rise to the level of a hostile
work environment. Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that he was harassed with respect
to his Friday prayers or that any interference with his prayers was pervasive. See
Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]solated incidents of offensive
conduct (unless extremely serious) will not support a claim of discriminatory
harassment.”); Zheng-Smith v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 486 F. Supp. 3d 611, 624
(E.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d, No. 20-3544-CV, 2021 WL 4097316 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2021) (finding
five instances, only one of which constituted direct mocking, was insufficient for a
reasonable jury to find a hostile work environment existed).
The other conduct of which plaintiff complains, and which he contends establishes

a hostile work environment, is “unfair discipline and negative performance reviews.”
Opp’n 28. While plaintiff contends that he was subjected to discipline and negative
reviews because of his protected characteristics, this conduct is neutral on its face. And
while “actions that are racially neutral on their face can be considered in assessing the
totality of the circumstances for a hostile work environment claim, there must be some
circumstantial or other basis for inferring that such incidents were in fact discriminatory.”
Hughes v. Xerox Corp., 37 F. Supp. 3d 629, 647 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).
No matter how genuinely upsetting or unfair they may be, actions that are
unconnected to a plaintiff’s protected characteristics cannot support a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII. See Vito v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 403 F. App’x 593,
595 (2d Cir. 2010) (“It is axiomatic that in order to establish a hostile work environment

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct occurred because of [his] membership in a
protected class.”); Johnson v. City Univ. of N.Y., 48 F. Supp. 3d 572, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“Bullying and harassment have no place in the workplace, but unless they are motivated
by the victim’s membership in a protected class, they do not provide the basis for an action
under Title VII.”).
For example, in Hughes, the plaintiff made several allegations of wrongdoing in
support of her hostile work environment claim. 37 F. Supp. 3d 629 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). One
of those allegations concerned racist comments posted on a “sympathy” card posted in an
employee kitchen area regarding a loss of incentive pay for the company’s CEO, who was
African American. Id. at 635. The other allegations concerned racially-neutral conduct by
plaintiff’s supervisor. Id. That alleged conduct included: undermining plaintiff in front of
direct reports, excluding plaintiff from meetings, taking away plaintiff’s work duties, and
making negative comments about plaintiff’s career advancement. Id. at 646–47. The

court found that this conduct could not support a Title VII hostile work environment
claim because plaintiff failed to connect the racially-neutral conduct to the race-based
sympathy card incident. Id. Similarly here, plaintiff has failed to connect the discipline
and negative reviews he received to his protected characteristics or conduct which was
not neutral on its face.
Construing all of the evidence in the plaintiff’s favor as the nonmovant by assuming
that Bergen made the discriminatory comments to which LePore and plaintiff testified,
and that Hynes scheduled at least five meetings during plaintiff’s Friday prayer time,
these incidents do not rise to the level of severity required to support a hostile work
environment claim. Additionally, these incidents do not constitute continuous conduct
that would allow a reasonable jury to find that plaintiff’s work environment was

“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that . . . alter[ed] the
conditions of [his] employment and create[ed] an abusive working environment.” See
Harris, 2021 WL 3855239, at *9. As plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact which, if resolved in his favor, would allow a reasonable jury to find that he
was subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED.
ii. NYSHRL
Next, the Court considers whether the conduct that occurred after October 11, 2019
is sufficient to raise a plausible inference of a hostile work environment under the
amended NYSHRL. As discussed above, a plaintiff bringing a hostile work environment
claim under the NYSHRL no longer needs to show that the harassment complained of was

“severe or pervasive,” but must only show that the plaintiff was “treated less well” because
of his protected characteristics. Smith v. Nat’l Grid USA, No. 2:21-cv-06899, 2025 WL
1248676, at *10–11 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2025). To be entitled to summary judgment on a
hostile work environment claim, a defendant must show that the conduct “amounted to
nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider petty
slights and trivial inconveniences.” Suri v. Grey Glob. Grp., Inc., 164 A.D.3d 108, 114 (1st
Dep’t 2018) (applying the NYCHRL).
The conduct of which plaintiff complains, and which is considered under the
NYSHRL’s amended standard, include plaintiff’s 2019, 2020, and 2021 performance
reviews all submitted by Bergen, a September 2020 written warning from Bergen, a
December 2020 final written warning by Bergen, and Hynes’s placement of plaintiff on a

PIP. See Opp’n 28 (referencing plaintiff’s “unfair discipline and negative performance
reviews” between “2019 and 2022 when Plaintiff was ultimately terminated”). Plaintiff
claims that Bergen made a comment in either 2019 or 2020 that people from plaintiff’s
background were not always as smart as plaintiff or easy to work with. HR Confidential
Complaint 15:33–17:48. Plaintiff also claimed that his team was frequently understaffed
and underresourced because Bergen would stall approving plaintiff’s requests, while
approving Hynes’s requests within a few days. Plaintiff’s Additional Statements of Fact ¶
20, ECF No. 43-1. Lastly, plaintiff claimed that Hynes and others scheduled meetings
during his Friday afternoon prayers and would not move the meetings after plaintiff
stated that the meeting time conflicted with his religious observance. Pl. Dep. Tr. Day Two
44:2–5. Plaintiff testified that he was forced to miss “4, 5 of [his] prayer sessions . . .
because [Hynes] wanted [plaintiff] to join some calls.” Pl. Dep. Tr. Day Two 44:2–5.
This conduct, considered under the totality of the circumstances, is sufficient to

create a question of fact as to whether plaintiff was treated less well because of his
protected characteristics. Negative performance reviews and discipline, by themselves,
are insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. Nevertheless, as plaintiff
has presented evidence of offensive comments referencing plaintiff’s protected
characteristics, plaintiff has created a question as to whether Bergen’s evaluations of
plaintiff and the decisions to discipline plaintiff were motivated by discriminatory
animus. See Suri v. Grey Glob. Grp., Inc., 83 N.Y.S.3d 9, 13 n.10 (1st Dep’t 2018) (applying
the NYCHRL and finding that harsh criticism and professional exclusion could support a
hostile work environment claim when presented in connection with a sexual overture);
see also Ruiz v. Credit Agricole Corp. & Inv. Bank, No. 22-cv-10777, 2025 WL 1642406,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2025) (finding that potentially race-related related allegations

were sufficient to suggest that defendant’s criticism of plaintiff was “at least in part
racially motivated” in “the more relaxed NYCHRL context”).
Thus, the evidence offered by plaintiff is sufficient to raise a question of whether
plaintiff was impermissibly treated “less well” than other employees because of his race,
religion, or national origin. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim under the NYSHRL is DENIED.
C. Failure to accommodate
Plaintiff next brings claims of religious discrimination pursuant to Title VII and
the NYSHRL for failing to accommodate plaintiff’s religious practices by scheduling
meetings during plaintiff’s Friday prayers. Defendants argue that the Court should grant
summary judgment because plaintiff was granted his request for a reasonable religious

accommodation. Mot. 29–30. The Court disagrees.
To succeed on a religious discrimination claim premised on failure to
accommodate, “a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) [he]
held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) [he]
informed [his] employer of this belief; and (3) [he] was disciplined for failure to comply
with the conflicting employment requirement.” Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist.,
129 F.4th 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2025). After a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
employer “is required to show that it offered [him] a reasonable accommodation or that
doing so would cause undue hardship.” Marte v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 22-cv-03491,
2022 WL 7059182, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2022) (citing Baker v. The Home Depot, 445
F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Defendants argue that Hynes agreed to accommodate plaintiff’s request for time
to pray during the workday and asked that plaintiff mark his calendar so that the team
could avoid scheduling meetings during those times, and that plaintiff refused and
criticized this request as harassment. Mot. 29–30. Plaintiff responds by arguing that
Hynes knew when plaintiff had Friday prayers, and yet continued to schedule meetings
during this time, and that plaintiff was not asked to adjust his calendar with prayer times
until after Hynes began supervising plaintiff. Opp’n 24.
It is undisputed that plaintiff has satisfied the first two prongs of a prima facie case
for failure to accommodate. Defendant has not argued that plaintiff’s Muslim faith is
insincere, or that plaintiff’s religious practice of attending Friday afternoon prayers did
not conflict with plaintiff’s work schedule. See generally Mot. The parties also do not
dispute that Hynes was aware of plaintiff’s need to attend Friday afternoon prayers.

Counter 56.1 ¶ 219. The parties do dispute, however, whether plaintiff was disciplined for
failing to comply with the conflicting work requirement. Plaintiff argues that he was, and
cites his termination notice which alleged that plaintiff had failed to attend meetings or
document prayer services on his work calendar. Opp’n 24. Defendants rebut this point by
arguing that the record contains instances of plaintiff missing meetings for reasons
unrelated to religious observance. Mot. 16–17. Construing all factual inferences in
plaintiff’s favor as the nonmovant, it is reasonable to assume that some of those missed
meetings referred to in plaintiff’s termination notice were those meetings which
conflicted with plaintiff’s observance of Friday afternoon prayer. Accordingly, the Court
finds that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of failure to accommodate.
Having found that plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the Court

considers whether defendants offered plaintiff a reasonable accommodation. To avoid
liability for a failure to accommodate claim, “the employer need not offer the
accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any reasonable accommodation is
provided, the statutory inquiry ends.” Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir.
2002). “A reasonable accommodation is one that eliminates the conflict between the
employment requirement and the employee’s religious practice.” Conde v. Mid Hudson
Reg’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 22-cv-03085, 2024 WL 168282, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024).
Nevertheless, the “reasonableness of an employer’s accommodation is a fact-specific
question that often must be resolved by a factfinder.” Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.,
787 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying the reasonable accommodation standard under
the ADA and NYSHRL).
The parties do not dispute that Hynes directed plaintiff to designate on his
calendar when he would be unavailable because he was participating in prayers. Counter

56.1 ¶ 221.4 Defendants argue that Hynes’s direction for plaintiff to mark his calendar so
that the team could avoid scheduling meetings during plaintiff’s prayers constituted a
reasonable accommodation of plaintiff’s religious practice, and thus summary judgment
on this claim is warranted. See Mot. 29. Plaintiff does not directly address whether a
request to notify his employer when he would be unavailable during the workday due to
his religious belief constitutes an unreasonable accommodation. Plaintiff does argue that
he should not have had to mark his calendar because “Hynes knew” when plaintiff had
his prayers scheduled every Friday. Opp’n 24. Plaintiff also testified that he “did not feel
like putting it on the calendar because [he] never needed it” before he started being
managed by Hynes in 2022. Pl. Dep. Tr. Day One 204:6–8.
Nevertheless, plaintiff testified that he eventually acquiesced and placed his prayer

times on his calendar. Pl. Dep. Tr. Day One 84:2–7. Plaintiff also testified that he was

4 In response to defendants’ statement of undisputed fact which states “Hynes asked
[plaintiff] to update his calendar to indicate his prayer times,” plaintiff responded with a
denial, stating that “Hynes knew the Jumma prayer time on Friday based not just on
[plaintiff’s] participation but members of Hynes’ team.” See Counter 56.1 ¶ 221. The Court
considers this response an admission that Hynes asked plaintiff to update his calendar to
indicate his prayer times. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a party . . . fails to properly address
another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the
fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”); Falls Lake Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Kalnitech
Constr. Corp., No. 22-cv-01473, 2025 WL 913781, at *3 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2025)
(“Failure to expressly deny a statement of material fact or provide contrary record
evidence constitutes an admission.”).
required to miss “4, 5 of [his] prayer sessions . . .because [Hynes] wanted [plaintiff] to
join some calls.” Pl. Dep. Tr. Day Two 44:2–5. Construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff as the non-movant, plaintiff was required to miss prayer sessions to
attend meetings. Thus, plaintiff has created a question of fact as to whether defendants’
offered accommodation eliminated the conflict between plaintiff’s religious observance

and his job requirements and was therefore “reasonable” within the meaning of Title VII
and the NYSHRL.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII and
NYSHRL religious discrimination claims for failure to accommodate is DENIED.
D. Retaliation
Plaintiff brings a retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII. Compl. ¶¶ 136–141.
Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim, arguing that
plaintiff has failed to present evidence of a retaliatory motive for his termination.
Mot. 27–29. The Court finds that while plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
retaliation, he has not met his burden of establishing a genuine question of fact as to
whether defendants’ proffered reasons for his termination were pretextual. Thus,

defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim.
To demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, “a plaintiff must
establish: (1) that he participated in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that his
participation was known to his employer, (3) that his employer thereafter subjected him
to a materially adverse employment action, and (4) that there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Charles v. City of
New York, No. 21-cv-05567, 2023 WL 2752123, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023). To
establish the third element of a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff must
show that the retaliatory action was “materially adverse” and caused a harm that would
dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 68 (2006).5 Examples of a materially adverse
action include termination, demotion, change in title, or significantly diminished
responsibilities. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 312 n.10 (2d Cir. 2015)

(applying materially adverse standard to disparate treatment claim). Discipline, criticism,
or counseling generally do not constitute materially adverse employment actions for
purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim. Rodriguez v. Town of Ramapo, 412 F. Supp. 3d
412, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[C]ourts in this circuit have found that reprimands, threats of
disciplinary action, and excessive scrutiny do not constitute adverse employment actions
in the absence of other negative results[.]”).
The fourth element of a prima facie case, causal connection, can be established
when the plaintiff shows that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the
adverse employment action, among other ways. Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., LLC, 134 F.4th
39, 50 (2d Cir. 2025). The Second Circuit has found a four-month period between the
protected activity and the materially adverse employment action sufficient to establish a

5 In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the standard for an adverse employment action differs between Title
VII’s anti-discrimination provision and the Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. In
Muldrow, the Court held that a plaintiff bringing claims pursuant to Title VII’s anti-
discrimination provision need only show “some harm . . . to prevail in a Title VII suit” and
“need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.” Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
The Court noted that, in contrast, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision continues to be
governed by the “materially adverse” standard, which requires that a plaintiff show the
allegedly retaliatory action caused the plaintiff “significant” harm. Id. at 348; see also
Khazin v. City of New York, No. 24-1236-cv, 2025 WL 1091241, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 8,
2025) (describing Muldrow as “reiterating that the materially adverse standard applies
to Title VII retaliation claims”).
causal connection. Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252
F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001).
The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Knox, 134 F.4th at 49. If the
employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then show that the employer’s proffered

reason is pretextual. Id. Plaintiff’s burden to establish pretext for a Title VII retaliation
claim is more onerous than the burden to establish pretext for a Title VII disparate
treatment claim. While a Title VII disparate treatment claim can survive summary
judgment if the plaintiff shows that the employer’s proffered reasons “were not the only
reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the motivating factors,” see Bart,
96 F.4th at 570, to survive summary judgment on a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must
show that “the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment
action,” see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013); see also
Golden v. Syracuse Reg’l Airport Auth., No. 23-1311, 2024 WL 4116427, at *2 (2d Cir.
Sept. 9, 2024) (“But-for causation does not require proof that retaliation was the only
cause of the employer’s action; it requires simply that the adverse action would not have

occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.”).
To establish pretext in a retaliation action, a plaintiff may “demonstrate[e]
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its action.” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp.
LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013). Conclusory allegations of pretext are insufficient
to show that a defendants’ reasons are pretextual and avoid summary judgment. Zheng-
Smith v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 486 F. Supp. 3d 611, 623 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d, No.
20-3544-cv, 2021 WL 4097316 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2021).
i. Prima facie case of retaliation
Here, the parties do not dispute the first four prongs of a prima facie case of Title
VII retaliation. The parties agree that plaintiff made complaints of discrimination. See
Counter 56.1 ¶ 172. The parties also agree that, as part of the investigation into these
complaints, plaintiff’s supervisor Hynes was interviewed. Counter 56.1 ¶ 176. Plaintiff has

therefore met the first two prongs of a prima facie case, as “knowledge of a complaint by
the person who directed an adverse employment action is sufficient” to meet the second
prong. Knox, 134 F.4th at 50. The parties also do not dispute that plaintiff was terminated,
which satisfies the third prong of a prima facie case. Id.6 The parties do disagree, however,
as to the fourth prong of plaintiff’s prima facie case—whether there was a causal
connection between plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.
The record before the Court establishes that plaintiff lodged a complaint of
discrimination and retaliation to HR on May 12, 2022. Counter 56.1 ¶ 172. Plaintiff was
then placed on a PIP on July 7, 2022, less than two months after he lodged the May 12,
2022 complaint. Counter 56.1 ¶ 186. Plaintiff was then terminated on September 26, 2022

6 Plaintiff’s briefing does not specify which adverse employment actions he believes
were retaliatory. He argues that because of his complaints of discrimination, “Bergen
began to retaliate and issue unwarranted disciplinary notices and annual negative
performance reviews beginning in 2019 resulting in being placed on a [PIP] and
ultimately terminated.” Opp’n 25–26. While plaintiff’s placement on the PIP and
subsequent termination undoubtedly qualify as materially adverse employment actions
for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, the discipline and negative performance
reviews do not. See Rasko v. N.Y.C. Admin. for Childs. Servs., 734 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir.
2018) (finding that discipline, criticism, or counseling does not constitute an adverse
employment action if not accompanied by any change in working conditions); Franco v.
City of New York, No. 19-cv-05905, 2025 WL 964014, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025)
(finding that an employer’s criticism and yelling, by itself, would not constitute actionable
conduct under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision). Thus, the Court concludes that
plaintiff has offered evidence that he suffered a materially adverse employment action
when he was terminated and thus considers whether plaintiff has offered evidence of a
causal connection between his protected activity and his termination.
for failure to improve his performance on the PIP. See Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 227, 230. This
temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title
VII. See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding two
month gap between complaint and termination sufficient to allege a causal connection for
Title VII retaliation claim); see also Neal v. Specialty Cable Corp., No. 21-cv-00497, 2022

WL 4584082, at *9 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2022) (finding plaintiff established causal
connection by showing close temporal proximity between complaint and first instance of
discipline when discipline was part of stated basis for plaintiff’s termination); Palumbo v.
Carefusion 2200, Inc., No. 12-cv-06282, 2014 WL 3921233, at *17 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,
2014) (finding plaintiff established prima facie case of NYSHRL retaliation with close
temporal proximity between complaint and placement on a PIP one month later). As
plaintiff was placed on the PIP less than two months after his last complaint of
discrimination, this is sufficient to establish a causal connection for purposes of his
retaliation claim. Plaintiff has therefore offered evidence sufficient to state a prima facie
case of retaliation in violation of Title VII.
ii. Defendants’ proffered bases for plaintiff’s termination

Having established a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden next shifts to the
employer to articulate a nonretaliatory reason for plaintiff’s termination. Knox, 134 F.4th
at 50. To satisfy this burden, defendants point to plaintiff’s insubordination, disregard for
his manager’s authority, unprofessionalism, and poor work performance. Mot. 24–25.
These bases for termination are well-documented in the record before the Court. For
example, on May 19, 2022, plaintiff sent an email to his manager Hynes which stated: “I
am not sure why you are calling my team members and asking them about stuff” that you
should be “asking me as their manager,” and “You need to STOP doing that . . . [c]onsider
this a friendly advice.” Mot. Ex. 44 at 12, ECF No. 41-46. In another email on May 26,
2022, plaintiff stated in an email to his manager: “Man, you have too many opinions and
too many advice. STOP treating me as a new employee and I am not your slave.” Mot. Ex.
44 at 11. In another email, after his manager noted that a weekly update was due on
Tuesday mornings after plaintiff submitted his update on Tuesday after 5:00 PM, plaintiff

responded “Do you realize Monday was close and I send it to you Tuesday evening?” Mot.
Ex. 50 at 2, ECF No. 41-52. Additionally, during plaintiff’s PIP meeting, in response to
Hynes’s concern that plaintiff had not scheduled a 1:30 PM meeting the previous day as
requested, plaintiff stated that if Hynes thought the meeting was “so important, [he]
should have put it together.” PIP Meeting 18:04–09. Plaintiff also objected to Hynes’s
previous request that plaintiff send out meeting minutes, stating that this type of work
was “not gonna happen by me because I don’t have time to do that.” PIP Meeting 23:42–
52. Accordingly, defendants have established a nonretaliatory reason for plaintiff’s firing.
As defendants have established a nonretaliatory basis for his termination, the
burden shifts to plaintiff to offer evidence that the defendants’ proffered reasons are
pretextual, i.e., that a retaliatory motive was the but-for cause of plaintiff’s termination.

However, plaintiff’s opposition does not respond to defendants’ articulated nonretaliatory
reasons for his termination, and states simply that because “there is an undeniable
temporal proximity” between plaintiff’s complaints about Bergen and “the adverse
employment action,” summary judgment must be denied. See Opp’n 26–27. However,
“[t]o survive summary judgment at this stage, [plaintiff] cannot rely solely on temporal
proximity.” See Knox, 134 F.4th at 50. Moreover, while plaintiff disputes the bases for
discipline issued by Bergen, see Opp’n 23, the last disciplinary action taken by Bergen
occurred in December 2020, approximately one year and six months before plaintiff was
placed on the PIP in July 2022, and approximately one year and nine months before
plaintiff was terminated on September 26, 2022, see Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 98, 186, 230.
Additionally, Hynes became plaintiff’s supervisor in early 2022 and made the
decision to terminate plaintiff in consultation with HR. Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 164, 227–29. That
decision, as noted by defendants, was supported by plaintiff’s insubordination and

unprofessional conduct, among other things. Plaintiff does not dispute that these
incidents occurred, and offers no evidence by which a trier of fact could find that these
bases are a pretext for retaliation—in fact, plaintiff does not address any of his conduct
regrading Hynes, his direct supervisor and the individual who made the decision to
terminate plaintiff in consultation with HR. See Opp’n 25–27. Accordingly, plaintiff has
failed to raise a question as to whether retaliatory motive was a but-for cause of his
termination.
As plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to raise a reasonable inference that
defendants’ proffered reason for his termination was a pretext for retaliation, defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to this claim is GRANTED.
E. Aiding and Abetting under the NYSHRL

Plaintiff also brings claims pursuant to Section 296 of the NYSHRL against all
defendants. This section of the NYSHRL makes it unlawful to “aid, abet, incite, compel or
coerce the doing” of any unlawful acts of discrimination, including the creation of a hostile
work environment. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6). Defendants move for summary judgment on
plaintiff’s claims against each individually named defendant. As plaintiff has offered
evidence sufficient to support his failure to accommodate claim based on Hynes’s
conduct, and a NYSHRL hostile environment claim based on Bergen’s conduct,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to those defendants is denied. See Maher
v. All. Mortg. Banking Corp., 650 F. Supp. 2d 249, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]n individual
may be liable under § 296(6) for aiding and abetting an unlawful discriminatory practice
of his employer even where his conduct serves as the sole predicate for the employer’s
liability.”). Defendants also move for summary judgment as to the individual defendants
Sig Stefansson, Vincent Pawlowski, and Karina Norr, arguing that plaintiff has failed to

show that these individuals supervised plaintiff, were involved in his performance
assessments, or made the decision to terminate him. Plaintiff concedes to discontinuance
of his claims against Pawlowski and Norr but argues that his claims against Stefansson
should continue, as Stefansson “fail[ed] to hold Bergen accountable . . . and continu[ed]
to approve the discipline that was being issued to [plaintiff.]” Opp’n 29–30. The Court
finds that this conduct is insufficient to show that Stefansson aided or abetted violations
of the NYSHRL, and thus summary judgment as to defendant Stefansson is granted.
To be liable under Section 296 for aiding and abetting a violation of the NYSHRL,
the defendant “need not have had an employer-employee or supervisory relationship with
the plaintiff.” McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, 68 (S.D.N.Y.
2020). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must show that that the defendant at issue actually

participated in unlawful conduct. Id. To establish aiding and abetting liability, the
plaintiff must establish that the individual defendant “was aware of the discrimination,
and participated or condoned it.” Almodovar v. City of New York, 208 N.Y.S.3d 850 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2024), amended on reargument, 215 N.Y.S.3d 920 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024).
Additionally, “[t]he aider and abettor must also share the intent or purpose of the
principal actor.” Nezaj v. PS450 Bar & Rest., 719 F. Supp. 3d 318, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2024).
The Court finds that plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence of defendant
Stefansson’s involvement in allegedly discriminatory actions or evidence that he shared
the intent of Hynes or Bergen to give rise to liability pursuant to Section 296 of the
NYSHRL. In support of his argument that Stefansson should be held liable, plaintiff refers
the Court to the statement of facts contained in his opposition. See Opp’n 29–30.
However, the only specific mention of defendant Stefansson in plaintiff’s statement of
facts is that “on January 25, 2022, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Stefansson that

Bergen was belittling and being condescending toward one of the senior network
engineers on [plaintiff’s] team.” Opp’n 16. This complaint was documented in the record
and shows that Stefansson reached out to the senior network engineer at issue, who
refuted plaintiff’s characterization of his interaction with Bergen. See Mot. Ex. 25 at 2–3,
ECF No. 41-27.
While the record contains several complaints submitted to Stefansson by plaintiff,
the record also reflects that those complaints were investigated by Northwell’s HR
Department, which concluded that plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination and retaliation
were unsubstantiated. See, e.g., Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 159–60. While a “failure to conduct a
proper and thorough investigation or take remedial measures upon a plaintiff’s complaint
of discrimination is sufficient to impose liability,” the plaintiff must offer evidence that

the defendant’s response was improper. Ananiadis v. Mediterranean Gyros Prods., Inc.,
54 N.Y.S.3d 155. 159 (2d Dep’t 2017). While plaintiff disagrees with the findings of the HR
investigations, he has failed to offer evidence that the investigations were improper or
that Stefansson improperly relied on their findings.
Thus, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the NYSHRL § 296 claims
against defendant Stefansson is GRANTED.
II. Section 1983 Claim
Defendants move for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff’s claims. Mot. 7.
Nevertheless, defendants present no argument as to why plaintiff’s eighth cause of action,
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection violations, should be dismissed
on summary judgment. Plaintiff similarly advances no arguments in support of his

Section 1983 claim in his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Section 1983 “provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting
under color of state law, deprives another of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir.
1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). There is no evidence in the record before the Court to
suggest that any defendant in this action is a state actor. Plaintiff is therefore ordered to
show cause, on or before August 25, 2025 why his Section 1983 claim should not be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants Sig Stefansson, Vincent

Pawlowski, and Karina Norr are dismissed from this action. Plaintiff is also ordered to
show cause, on or before August 25, 2025, why his Section 1983 claim should not be
dismissed. In accordance with the Court’s Individual Practice Rule IV.A, the parties shall
file a proposed joint pretrial order by September 8, 2025.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: August 8, 2025
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117534. Public record. Not legal advice.