# Alexander v. Greene

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117472

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117472

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining, with reference to the Second Chance Act, “that the BOP may assign a prisoner to [prerelease custody] does not mean that it must”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEROY ALEXANDER, Civil No. 3:25-cv-1191
Petitioner . (Judge Mariani)
. □
WARDEN J. GREENE, .
Respondent
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Leroy Alexander (“Alexander”) initiated the above-captioned action by filing
a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) improperly denied him prerelease custody placement in a
halfway house or home confinement due to his parole violations. (Doc. 1). For the reasons
that follow, the Court will deny the habeas petition.
I. Background
Alexander initially entered BOP custody on March 24, 1994, to serve a life sentence
imposed by the Superior Court for the District of Columbia for kidnapping, armed robbery,
sodomy, and possession of a firearm during a crime. (Doc. 7-2, Declaration of BOP Case
Manager Mitchell Cassel (“Cassel Decl.”), at 2 ] 3; Doc. 7-3, Public Information Inmate
Data; Doc. 7-5, Warden Greene’s Recommendation for Denial of Residential Reentry
Center (“RRC”) Placement). He was released on parole on November 6, 2009. (Doc. 7-3).

Since his release on parole in 2009, Alexander has violated the conditions of his parole on
the following, numerous occasions. (/d.).
On July 11, 2012, Alexander was sentenced to a 14-month term of imprisonment for
his conviction of attempted distribution of a controlled substance. (/d.). He was released,
via good conduct time, on December 27, 2012. (Id).
On October 28, 2015, Alexander was arrested in Fairfax County, Virginia, for grand
larceny greater than $200.00, not from a person, and entering property to damage. (/d.).
Then, on December 29, 2015, Alexander was arrested in the District of Columbia for
forgery. (Id.). His parole was revoked. (/d.). He was released, via parole, on February 23,
2018. (Id.).
On March 30, 2019, Alexander was arrested in Charlottesville, Virginia, and charged
with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, reckless driving, driving while
intoxicated, refusal to submit to blood/breath test, and driving with an open container. (/d.).
His parole was revoked. (/d.). He was released, via parole, on May 30, 2020. (/d.).
Alexander's current parole violator term. commenced on August 26, 2024, after
receiving an alleged violation report for numerous positive urinalysis tests for cocaine,
numerous failures to report for urinalysis, and failure to report for supervision and to get
treatment. (/d.).
Alexander's current projected release date is December 13, 2025, via parole. (/d.).

Respondent argues that the habeas petition must be denied on the following
grounds: (1) Alexander has no legal entitlement under the Second Chance Act to a
prerelease custody placement; and (2) the BOP properly considered Alexander for
prerelease custody placement under the five factors stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), and the
BOP did not abuse its discretion in denying Alexander an RRC placement because he hag a
public safety factor of sex offender and he has an extensive history of parole violations.
(Doc. 7). The petition is ripe for disposition.
ll. Discussion
It is well-settled that the award of prerelease custody days under the Second Chance
Act is statutorily committed to the exclusive discretion of the BOP, and thus an inmate has

no right or entitlement to a certain amount of Second Chance Act prerelease custody. See
Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining, with
reference to the Second Chance Act, “that the BOP may assign a prisoner to [prerelease
custody] does not mean that it must”). Alexander’s placement is solely in the discretion of
the BOP and Alexander has no vested liberty interest in a placement in a residential facility
notwithstanding the provisions of the Second Chance Act. See Pisman v. Warden,
Allenwood FC! Low, 2023 WL 6618238, at *1 (3d Cir, 2023) (a prisoner's “pre-release
placement decisions are committed to the BOP’s sole discretion’); s2e also Tapia v. United
States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) (“[w]hen a court sentences a federal offender, the BOP
has plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over the place of the prisoner's

imprisonment and the treatment programs (if any) in which he may participate”). All that is
required is a good-faith, individualized review of an inmate’s potential transfer to prerelease
custody, which review must consider the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 251; Brown v. Warden Fairton FCI, 617 F. App’x 117, 119 (3d Cir.
2015) (nonprecedential). Alexander received this individualized determination. (See Doc.
7-2, Cassel Decl., at 2-3 Jj 4-6; Doc. 7-5).
The Second Chance Act provides:
(c) Prerelease custody. —

(1) In general. —The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent
practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a
portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under
conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to
and prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such
conditions may include a community correctional facility.
(2) Home confinement authority. —The authority under this subsection may
be used to place a prisoner in home confinement for the shorter of 10 percent
of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months. The Bureau of
Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, place prisoners with lower risk levels
and lower needs on home confinement for the maximum amount of time
permitted under this paragraph.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). The Act requires the BOP “to make an individual determination that

ensures that the placement is ‘of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of
successful reintegration into the community.” Wilson v. Strada, 474 F. App’x 46, 46-47 (3d
Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6)(C)). In doing so, the BOP
must consider the following five factors: “(1) the resources of the facility contemplated; (2)

the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the history and characteristics of the
prisoner; (4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence—(A) concerning the

purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or (B)
recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and (5) any pertinent
policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title
28.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); see also Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012)
(the Court’s “review is limited to whether the BOP abused its discretion.”).
In a nutshell, when considering an individual's eligibility for prerelease placement in

an RRC, the BOP is required to ensure that decisions are made: (A) consistent with the five
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); (B) on an individualized basis; and (C) so that the duration of
the placement period gives the inmate the greatest likelihood of successful community
reintegration. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(6).
The record in this case clearly establishes that Alexander's Unit Team gave him
individualized consideration consistent with the five factors of section 3621(b). (Doc. 7-2,
Cassel Decl., at 2-3 J] 4-6; Doc. 7-5). The Unit Team noted that Alexander had numerous
violations and arrests while on parole. (/d.). They noted further that Alexander has a public
safety factor of sex offender. (Doc. 7-4, Male Custody Classification Form). Case Manager
Cassel explains that “[iJnmates assigned a public safety factor of sex offender and those
whose behavior history suggests a substantial or continuing threat to the community, such
as repeated violations, shall not ordinarily participate in community corrections programs.”

(Doc. 7-2, Cassel Decl., at 2-3 5). The Unit Team ultimately found that due to Alexander's
repeated violations and arrests while on parole, and his public safety factor of sex
offender—indicating that he remains a threat to the safety of the community—he was not
appropriate for RRC placement. (Doc. 7-2, Cassel Decl., at 3 ] 6; Doc. 7-5). The Warden
reviewed the Unit Team's recommendation and the relevant factors in Alexander's case and
denied RRC placement. (Doc. 7-5).
After reviewing Alexander's petition and the applicable statutes, the Court finds that
the BOP has the discretion to determine if, and when, to transfer Alexander to an RRC.
Consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the BOP individually considered Alexander under the
factors relevant to RRC placement and denied him placement in an RRC. (Doc. 7-5).
Alexander's purported disagreement with the BOP’s decision does not establish a
constitutional violation, as nothing in the Second Chance Act or § 3621(b) entitles an inmate
to any guaranteed placament □□ □□ RRC. See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 244-51 (holding, in
exercising its discretion to make halfway house placement decisions, the Bureau must
consider the factors set forth in § 3621(b); “[hJowever, that the [Bureau] may assign a
prisoner to a halfway house does not mean that it must.”); see also Beckley v. Miner, 125 F.
App’x 385, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (holding, “[i]t is well settled, and the parties
agree, that the Bureau as nearly exclusive jurisdiction to classify and transfer jorisoners.”).

Alexander's habeas petition must, therefore, be denied.’
Ill. Conclusion
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court will deny the petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). A separate Order shall issue.

a ( cf 4
oe LWUU MA
Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge
Dated: August & 2025

1 Although he provides no analysis, Alexander cites to Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024). (Doc. 1, at 5). In Loper Bright. the Supreme Court overruled the Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 487 US. 837 (1984; doctrine, which required courts to □□□□□
to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. /d. at 412. Under Loper
Bright, courts are to give due regard to an agency’s expertise in a particular field, but are no longer bound
by the agency’s interpretation of the statute. /d. at 403. Courts must interpret a statute without deferring to
an agency's policy preference that is not expressed in the language of the statute. /d. at 403-04. At most,
Alexander has expressed a personal disagreement with the BOP’s decision regarding his RRC denial. His
reliance upon Loper Bright is meritless.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117472. Public record. Not legal advice.