# Williams v. Payne

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · August 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117464

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** August 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION

HENRY WILLIAMS PLAINTIFF
ADC #094006

v. No: 4:22-cv-00826-KGB-PSH

DEXTER PAYNE, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to Chief United States District
Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written objections to all or part of this
Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the
factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this
Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may
waive the right to appeal questions of fact.
DISPOSITION

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Henry Williams filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action while confined
in the Arkansas Division of Correction. Williams alleges that certain ADC officers and
employees failed to protect him from at attack that occurred on March 11, 2022, and
that he failed to receive appropriate medical care afterwards. Doc. No. 3. After
screening Williams’ complaint, the Court issued service on defendants Director Dexter
Payne, Deputy Warden Robert Pierce, Warden Gary Musselwhite, Officer Natalie Bass,

Officer Dennis Goins, Officer Laura Cook, Nurse Practitioner Lerizza Nunag, and
Nurse Assistant Joseph Wesson-Points with respect to certain claims. See Doc. Nos.
15 & 42. Numerous claims have since been dismissed,1 and the following claims
remain: (1) Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Pierce, Goins, and Bass

in their individual capacities (the “ADC Defendants”); and (2) Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims against Nurse Practitioner Lerizza Nunag and Nurse
Assistant Joseph Wesson-Points (the “Medical Defendants”). See Doc. Nos. 94 & 119.
Before the Court are motions for summary judgment and related pleadings filed

by the Medical Defendants, the ADC Defendants, and Williams (Doc. Nos. 145-147,
177-179, 180-182 & 201-212).2 For the reasons described below, Williams’ motion
should be DENIED, and the motions filed by the ADC Defendants and the Medical
Defendants should be GRANTED.

1 The following claims were dismissed for failure to state a viable claim:
Williams’ claims against Wellpath; his understaffing claims; his claims against the ADC
Defendants in their official capacities; his retaliation claims against Musselwhite, Pierce,
and Cook; and his corrective inaction claims against Payne and Musselwhite. See Doc.
No. 94 (adopting Doc. No. 67). Williams’ retaliation claim against Nunag and his failure
to protect claims against Musselwhite and Cook were dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. See Doc. No. 119 (adopting Doc. No. 112).
2 This case was stayed from January 16, 2025, through May 14, 2025, due to the
bankruptcy of the Medical Defendants’ employer, Wellpath LLC. See Doc. Nos. 187 &
196; In re Wellpath Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 24-90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tex).
II. Legal Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.3 Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002).

The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must
demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann v.
Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations must be

supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on
more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations omitted).
An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must be
supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . .

3 In Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009), the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals discussed the requirement that facts be viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party when considering a motion for summary judgment. The Court
stated, “[i]f ‘opposing parties tell two different stories,’ the court must review the record,
determine which facts are material and genuinely disputed, and then view those facts in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party—as long as those facts are not so ‘blatantly
contradicted by the record . . . that no reasonable jury could believe’ them.” Id. at 790
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
.”. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or
undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence

of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is
such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is
material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Othman v. City of Country

Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not genuine or that are
about facts that are not material will not preclude summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of
West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010).
III. Williams’ Relevant Complaint Allegations4

Williams alleges that he appeared before a classification committee that included
ADC Defendant Pierce on March 1, 2022. Doc. No. 3 at 4, ¶ 14. He claims he asked
the committee members to place him in protective housing because gang members in
general population were threatening to kill him. Id. He alleges they did not investigate
his allegations and returned him to housing unit 10-B in general population where the

death threats originated. Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 14-15. Williams further alleges that he was
attacked on the night of March 11, 2022, after he informed ADC Defendants Goins and
Bass that inmates were threatening to kill him. Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 16-23. He also complains

4 A full description of Williams’ complaint is included in the Court’s Proposed
Findings and Partial Recommendation entered on March 17, 2023 (Doc. No. 67). The
complaint allegations described in this recommendation pertain to Williams’ remaining
claims in this case. See footnote 1, supra.
that while he was being attacked, Goins and Bass were standing in the hallway talking.
Id. at 16, ¶ 23 (Exhibit B, Grievance CU-22-00248). Finally, Williams alleges that

Goins intentionally left his assigned housing unit, thereby enabling the attack, and that
Bass encouraged Goins to do so. Id. at 10, ¶ 37.
Williams also asserts Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against
Medical Defendants Nunag and Wesson-Points, claiming they were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs following the March 11 attack. Doc. No. 15.
Specifically, he alleges that Wesson-Points, who treated him following the attack:
. . . fail[ed] to properly access and medically treat Petitioner Williams for
his head truma injury. Petitioner Williams was only given peroxide, mesh
gauls to stop the head bleeding. The nurse assistance refuse to stitch
Petitioner Williams Head wound stated he didn’t know how to preform
the procedure. No medical doctor or nurse practioner was on duty the
night of the attack.

Doc. No. 3 at 6-7, ¶ 24.5 As to Nunag, Williams states:

On March 14, 2022, Petitioner Williams place a sick call request to be
seen by a doctor to properly examine stitch his head wound an to conduct
an X-ray, MRI to properly medical access Petitioner Williams head injury
due to Williams having sever head pain, headaches, blurred vision, sever
dizziness, periodic nose bleed’s and flesh still hanging from the head
wound, of Petitioner Williams.

. . . Petitioner was seen by Practioner Nunage in which Defendant Nunage
refuse to look at or examine Petitioner Williams head injury & refuse to
order an X-ray or MRI to access the skull fracture or soft tissue brain
damage Petitioner Williams substain during the attack. . . .

5 Documents are transcribed verbatim without any corrections for misspellings or
mistakes.
Doc. No. 3 at 6-7, ¶¶ 25-26. Williams claims that the Medical Defendants’ refusal to
treat his head injury led to more medical and mental health problems and caused him

pain, suffering, physical injury and emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶ 44-47.
IV. Facts6
The March 11, 2022 Attack7
Williams had an altercation with several inmates, including inmate Sharp, in 12A
barracks at the Cummins Unit in February of 2022. Doc. No. 177-2, Transcript of

Henry Williams’ Deposition Testimony (“Williams Deposition”), at 25:17-25 – 26:2-25.
After the altercation, Williams received a disciplinary and was sentenced to 30 days
punitive isolation. Id. at 25:20-21; 32:9-21. Williams testified that he went before the
classification committee on March 1, 2022, and told the members, including defendant
Pierce, that he felt unsafe in the area where the February altercation occurred. Id. at

29:10-17, 32:22-25. Specifically, he said:
Well, we talked about the incident and about restrictive housing, what had
happened, and I informed them, you know what I’m saying, in that area I
didn’t feel safe in that area. So they said we’re going to make a decision
and make a vote dealing with putting me in restrictive housing, and that
was it.

6 Unless otherwise noted, these material facts are taken from the parties’ statements
of undisputed facts, responses, and the other exhibits provided. Disputed facts are noted.
Opinions, argument, legal conclusions, and immaterial facts are omitted.
7 Facts concerning Williams’ subsequent requests for protective housing and
disciplinaries he may have received for refusing to return to general population after the
March 11 attack are omitted because they are not relevant to the Williams’ remaining
claims against ADC Defendants Pierce, Goins, and Bass for failing to protect him from
the March 11, 2022 attack. See Doc. No. 119 at 5 (stating that certain grievances do not
exhaust his claims because they “do not relate back to any claim that Mr. Williams has
that ADC officials failed to protect him from the March 2022 attack.”).
Id. at 29:12-17. The committee voted initially on March 1, 2022, and again on March
7, 2022, after a “review,” to release Williams to general population after his punitive
sentence ended.8 Doc. No. 177-10, Classification Committee Action, at 3-4. Williams
testified he believed they did so because they determined he faced no threat. Williams

Deposition at 30:11-24, 33:1-8. He was placed in Barracks 10B, not 12A, where his
altercation with Sharp took place.
Defendant and classification committee member Pierce does not specifically
address what Williams told the committee members during the March 1 classification

committee meeting in his declaration filed in support of his motion for summary
judgment. See Doc. No. 177-5, Declaration of Robert Pierce, at ¶¶ 22-23. He states
that he was unaware that Williams had requested to be placed in protective custody and
that Williams did not request that he be separated from any inmates in Barracks 10B

prior to the March 11 attack. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 22. Pierce further states that there was no
prior history of any conflict between Williams and any inmates in Barracks 10B on
March 11, 2022. Id. at ¶ 23. He states that the only person on Williams’ enemy alert
list at that time was inmate Sharp, who was not housed in Barracks 10B. Id. at ¶¶ 13,

21.

8 Documents relating to the meeting and review state: “Inmate will not be
assigned and is to be released, after Punitive, to population upon available bed space.”
Doc. No. 177-10 at 1-6.
On March 11, 2022, non-defendant Lieutenant Haney escorted Williams to
Barracks 10B, which is next to Barracks 12A where he had a prior altercation with

Sharp in February. Williams Deposition at 33:13-17, 35:9-11, 28:23-25. Williams
testified that he told Haney he felt unsafe there, and that he also told the guard at the
door9 what was going on, but the guard said nothing and just moved him into the
barracks. Id. at 24:15-19, 19:19-23. He testified there were people in the back of the

barracks that
. . . started sending little threats, what they’re going to do and we’re going
to kill you and all that, you know what I’m saying, and different, you know
what I’m saying, different threats like that, death threats and stuff like that.

Id. at 39:6-11. Williams did not know who any of these individuals were, but he
“guessed” they were affiliated with inmate Sharp, who was next door and could
communicate with these inmates through a big window between the barracks. Id. at
39:13-25, 42:20-25 - 41:1-5. See also id. at 51:24-25 – 25:1-3; 58:16-25. He also
testified that Sharp had seen him when he walked by Barracks 12A to get to Barracks
10B, and again when Sharp came out for chow. Id. at 59:2-9. Williams testified that
when Sharp came out for chow,
he pulled up to the window and, like I said, that officer there that was on
that door had to have him removed, you know, remove him from the door.
He was making signs like a gun, like shooting an individual, you know
what I’m saying. That was, like, inciting the other guys, whoever he was

9 Williams testified that he sought the security logs to learn the name of this
officer but did not receive them during discovery. See e.g., Williams Deposition at 35:18-
25 -- 36:1-7. The Court previously addressed Williams’ request for officer logs, ordering
that he be provided the names of the officers assigned to unit 10-B on that date. See Doc.
No. 172. Williams did not subsequently file another motion relating to these names.
connected with in the back of the barracks, you know what I’m saying.
You know, they were – oh, we got it, we’re going to kill him, we got it,
we’re going to get his ass out of here, you know what I’m saying, all them
different types of threats and stuff like that there.

Id. at 59:9-19.
Williams further testified: “Once Goins came on, he came on around about 6:00,
I informed him what was going on” and “that the environment was not safe.” Id. at
19:23-25 – 20:6-8, 40:5-10, 41:1-4. He said, “I told him that a lot of inmates in the
back were sending death threats to kill me and I needed to be removed from the barracks
immediately.” Id. at 43:9-14.
Williams testified that after he told Goins he felt unsafe, Goins began to talk with
Bass and they walked down the hall towards Barracks 11. Id. at 20:9-15, 64:18-24. He
also said he tried to talk to them and let them know that he felt unsafe and had been
threatened before they walked off. Id. at 44:15-18. Williams also claimed that inmates

were talking to Goins and Bass, and he believed they told Goins and Bass they planned
to attack Williams. Id. at 44:19-24, 46:6-10.10
Williams stated that the power went out at some point, and he fell asleep while
waiting on Goins to return to the security booth. Id. at 20:16-19. When he woke up,

10 Williams testified that he sought video footage to show the identity of the
individuals who spoke to Goins before the attack. Williams Deposition, at 62:1-23. He
claimed video footage from that day would also show Sharp making threatening gestures
when he was released for chow. Id. at 62:24-25 – 63:1-7. The Court previously
addressed Williams’ request for this video footage, ordering that he be allowed to watch
it if it existed. See Doc. No. 172. Williams did not subsequently file another motion
relating to the video footage.
four individuals were attacking him with a lock, and he then passed out. Id. at 47:2-7.
He testified he did not know any of these individuals. Id. at 58:10-14. Williams

testified that he woke up in a pool of blood, went to the door, did not see Goins or
anyone in the security booth, and began to beat on the door. Id. at 47:8-15; 55:22-25 –
56:1-7. He said that Goins, Bass, and another officer came down the hall, and Bass
called a code. Id. at 47:16-18. Williams said he was then escorted to the infirmary. Id.

at 47:20. He guessed this happened around 6:45 p.m., but he could not be sure because
he was dizzy and in a “daze.” Id. at 47:21-24, 52:4-8.
According to his declaration, Goins arrived at the Cummins Unit to begin his
shift at 6:00 p.m. on March 11, 2022. Doc. No. 177-3, Declaration of Dennis Goins, at

¶ 4. He explained that he was assigned to work 9 and 10 Barracks that evening, and
that each barracks has two sides, an A side and a B side. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Goins therefore
had four areas to monitor: 9A, 9B, 10A, and 10B. Id. at ¶ 7. He explained that his job
was to count the inmates in each barracks when he first arrived and every 35-40 minutes
thereafter. Id. at ¶ 8. Goins recalled a power outage occurred sometime after 6:00 p.m.

on March 11, 2022, and that around 6:50 p.m., he noticed Williams beating on the door
in 10B Barracks. Id. at ¶¶ 9 & 11. He stated that he called for supervisor assistance,11
and Bass arrived with additional staff, and they restrained Williams and escorted him
to the infirmary. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. In his declaration, Goins stated that he was unaware

11 Williams disputes that Goins called “code 4,” and insists it was Bass who did.
Doc. No. 206 at 11-12. This is not a material fact in this case.
of any threats made to Williams or any other inmate. Id. at ¶ 15. In an incident report,
Goins stated:

On March 11, 2022 At Approx. 6:50 p.m. I Cpl. Dennis Goins was
working East 2 (zone 1) when I noticed Inmate Henry Williams #94006
(10B, Rack 4, IV, Hoe Squad) bleeding from the head. I then called a
code 4 (Incidents needed supervisor attention). Sgt. N. Bass along with
additional staff arrived, placed Inmate Williams in hand restraints and
escorted him to the infirmary for treatment.

Doc. No. 177-6, Incident Report, at 2.
Bass (now Lieutenant Bass-Magee) provided a declaration stating that she was
on duty as a sergeant on March 11, 2022. Doc. No. 177-4, Declaration of Natalie Bass-
Magee, at ¶¶ 6-7. She stated that she responded to a call from Goins at 6:50 p.m., and
was informed that Williams was bleeding from his head in Barracks 10B. Id. at ¶¶ 7-
8. Bass, along with other staff, restrained Williams and took him to the infirmary. Id.
at ¶ 9. In her declaration, Bass stated that she was unaware of any threats made to
Williams or any danger to his safety before he was attacked. Id. at ¶ 15. In an incident
report, Bass stated:
On March 11, 2022 at Approx. 6:50 p.m. I Sgt. Natalie Bass responded
to Cpl. Dennis Goins needing a Supervisor at East 2 (zone 1). Upon
arrival Cpl. Goins advised that Inmate Henry Williams #94006 (10B,
Rack 4, IV, Hoe Squad) bleeding from his head. Myself along with
additional staff arrived, placed inmate Williams in hand restraints and
escorted him to the infirmary where he was treated for his injuries. While
in the infirmary inmate Williams refused to give any information
concerning how he sustained his injuries. An investigation was started.
Staff went to 10B barrack, placed on all inmates on their assigned racks
and looked for any signs of them being in a physical altercation. Several
inmates assigned to 10B was questioned but no one had knowledge about
the incident or would write a witness statement. It could not be
determined who assaulted Inmate Williams due to camera footage not
being functional due to a partial power outage in the barrack caused by
inclement weather. His property was searched and packed with no
contraband being found. Inmate Williams was given a direct order to
submit to an onsite urinalysis in which he refused to provide a sample.
Major Disciplinary was written. Maintenance was notified of the power
outage as well as Deputy Warden Young.

Incident Report at 4.
Williams’ Medical Treatment
Williams was admitted to the infirmary at the Cummins Unit on March 11 after
the attack and seen by Medical Defendant Joseph Wesson-Points. Doc. No. 147-1 at 1
(medical record contains one note by Wesson-Points, stating “Pt walked in for
altercation with other prisoner”). The next morning at 5:08 a.m., non-defendant Asia
Wilson performed a wellness check in the infirmary. Doc. No. 147-3 at 1. She noted:
inmate was involved in an altercation on the night of 03/1/22. patient
states, “I was hit with a lock.”
Inmate is A&Ox3. resp even and unlabored. patient is supine in bed.
verbally responds and answers questions. clear speech.
patient attempted to sit up in bed but immediately laid back down in bed,
patient states, “I am very dizzy.”
vital signs were taken. patient is unable to stand to feet at this time. gait
and balance is undermined at this time. patient is noted holding his head
and c/o headache. patient rates headache pain as a 10. patient denies
having nausea/vomiting.
laceration to back of head. bleeding is controlled.
hand grips are equal bilaterally. patient is able to wiggle and move fingers
to both hands. sensation and feeling equal bilaterally. patient is able to
lift arms and lift legs. flex and extend, point toes on right foot. patient
states he has a previously injury and has pins and rods in left foot and
states he is unable to point and flex left foot.
patient has only had sips of water during this shift. refused breakfast chow
tray.
Id. At 8:05 a.m., non-defendant Tarsha Goodman noted:
LOC fully conscious. PERRLA. Symmetrical facial grimace. AAOx2.
Dizziness with ambulation to door for vital signs. Small laceration to
posterior skull. Cleaned with dermal would cleanser and hydrogen
peroxide. Steri strips applied.

Id. at 2. At 12:25 p.m., Goodman noted that Williams complained of a headache with
a pain level of 10 and dizziness with standing. Id. She further noted “AAOx3 LOC
fully conscious. PERRLA. Symmetrical facial grimace. Equal hand grips.” Id.
Goodman informed Williams that he was scheduled to receive acetaminophen (APAP)
every 12 hours to begin soon. Id. At 7:48 p.m., non-defendant Shirley Lubin noted that
Williams voiced no complaints of pain or discomfort. Id. at 3. She also noted that he
had received 1000 mg of acetaminophen (Tylenol) at 6:00 p.m. and had tolerated it
well, and also noted his vitals. Id.
On March 13, 2022, Williams reported decreased pain and said he was “ready to

go.” Doc. No. 147-4 at 1. Lubin noted “no neck rigidity. Grips good bilat. Amb. w/o
diff. show steady gain.” Id. She administered Tylenol, and Williams was discharged
from the infirmary. Id.
On March 18, 2022, Williams was seen by non-defendant Michelle Musselwhite

at sick call. Doc. No. 147-5 at 1. She noted his complaint that he was “still suffering
from dizziness headaches unbalance when I walk and blurred vision from being hit in
the back of the head with a lock. the screws and rod in my left ankle is still giving me
pain and swelling. I have nothing for pain that’s working during the day.” Id. Williams
reported nausea but not vomiting. Id. Musselwhite prescribed acetaminophen and
referred him to the provider. Id.

On March 25, 2022, Mr. Williams was seen by Medical Defendant APRN
Lerizza Nunag at sick call.12 Doc. No. 147-7 at 1. He complained of continued
dizziness; he denied headaches, vomiting and blurred vision. Id. Nunag noted that
Williams was alert and oriented x 3 with purposed movements and no evidence of

incoordination. Id. Under notes, she listed “concussion.” Id. Nunag ordered an X-ray
of his foot and lab tests, as well as acetaminophen 325mg for 7 days. Id.
On April 28, 2022, Williams requested medication for his foot pain. Doc. No.
147-9. Collene Rogers reviewed his foot X-ray which revealed osteopenic bones. Id.;

Doc. No. 147-10 (X-ray results). Rogers prescribed acetaminophen for 30 days and
exercises. Doc. No. 147-9.
Nunag treated Williams or prescribed medications for his headaches and/or
blurred vision again on May 20, June 21, July 5, and August 28, 2022. See Doc. Nos.

12 This is the first record of Williams being seen by Medical Defendant Nunag.
He previously submitted a grievance dated March 14, 2022, stating he had seen Nunag
that day. There is no March 14, 2022 visit with Nunag reflected in the records submitted
with the Medical Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. This unnumbered
grievance is the only basis for the Court’s prior finding that Williams may have
exhausted administrative remedies with respect to Nunag and Wesson-Points. See Doc.
No. 112 (citing Doc. No. 103 at 24). There was no evidence he completed any other
grievances before filing this lawsuit. See id. Accordingly, his only Eighth Amendment
claims against Nunag and Wesson-Points stem from their initial treatment of his head
injury following the March 11 attack; any claim relating to ongoing treatment for his
head injury or pre-existing foot condition was not exhausted. See id. at 12-13 (describing
grievance CU-22-00681 submitted on August 8, 2022, and concluding that it did not
serve to exhaust any of his claims).
147-11, 147-13 – 147-15 & 147-18 – 147-19. She also ordered an optometry consult
and lab tests on June 21, 2022, and Williams was prescribed eyeglasses on August 11,

2022. Doc. Nos. 147-13 & 147-17.
Dr. Mahlon Maris Affidavit
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the Medical Defendants
submitted the affidavit of Dr. Mahlon Maris, a family practice physician. Doc. No.

147-2 at ¶ 2. Dr. Maris reviewed Williams’ medical records from March 2022 through
September 2022 to determine if the care and treatment Williams received was
appropriate, particularly with respect to his complaints of headaches, dizziness, and foot
pain following an altercation on March 11, 2022. Id. at ¶ 3. According to Dr. Maris,

the care and treatment Williams received for these complaints was appropriate,
adequate, and timely. Id. at ¶¶ 5-10.
Williams objects to the admissibility of Dr. Maris’ affidavit and claims it is false,
but provides no legal basis for his objection. See Doc. No. 201 at 3; Doc. No. 202 at 3-
6 & 9; Doc. No. 203 at 2-3, 31-39.

V. Discussion
A. The ADC Defendants
The ADC Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to Williams’ failure to protect claims. Qualified immunity protects government

officials from liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [in their
positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Qualified immunity is a question of law and is appropriately resolved on summary

judgment. McClendon v. Story County Sheriff’s Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir.
2005); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To determine whether a
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions: (1)
do the facts alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right;

and (2) if so, was that right clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged
misconduct. Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts may
exercise “their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances of the

particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). In this case,
the Court finds that Williams fails to establish a constitutional violation, as explained
below.
An inmate has a constitutional right to be free from attacks by others. See
Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1994). To succeed on a failure to protect

claim, Williams must show that there was a substantial risk of serious harm to him and
that defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk. See Irving v. Dormire, 519
F.3d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 2008). Specifically,
This claim has an objective component, whether there was a substantial
risk of serious harm to the inmate, and a subjective component, whether
the prison official was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Curry v. Crist,
226 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2000). To be liable, “the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128
L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). . . .

Vandevender v. Sass, 970 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2020). The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has recognized that prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity when an
inmate is attacked by surprise. See Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1047-49 (8th
Cir. 2010); Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2002); Curry v. Crist, 226
F.3d at 979; Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d at 1151; Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1007
(8th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990). Additionally,
an inmate’s complaints regarding a “general fear for his safety” do not establish that a
defendant “acted with deliberate indifference by not placing him in protective custody.”

Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d at 895; see also Jones v. Wallace, 641 Fed. Appx. 665
(unpublished) (a general fear of another inmate is not sufficient to put guards on notice
of a specific threat or danger).
Williams’ failure to protect claim against ADC Defendant Pierce fails based on
his own testimony. He testified that he told the committee on March 1 that he did not

feel safe in the area – he did not communicate any specific fear or threat he had received
that he would be attacked in general population. And again, an inmate’s general fear
for his safety is insufficient to establish a failure to protect claim. See Robinson v.
Cavanaugh, supra. Accordingly, Pierce should be awarded summary judgment.

With respect to Williams’ failure to protect claims against Goins and Bass, there
is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the March 11 attack: whether Williams
told Goins and Bass that he had been threatened by other inmates shortly after Goins
came on duty at 6 p.m. As stated above,13 if opposing parties tell two different stories,

as is the case here, the Court is required to view genuinely disputed material facts in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as long as those facts are not so blatantly
contradicted by the record that no reasonable jury could believe them.
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, he still

cannot establish a failure to protect claim against Goins or Bass. According to
Williams’ deposition, he told Goins he had been threatened by some inmates in the back
of the barracks. He did not provide more specific information, e.g., he did not know
who had threatened him and did not specifically describe who made those threats. He

simply indicated that he had received threats since being placed in the barracks earlier
that day. Further, while Williams testified that he tried to speak to Bass after he told
Goins he felt threatened, it is not clear that he actually expressed his fears to Bass.
Rather, he speculates that Goins and Bass talked about his concerns and also speculates
that other inmates told Goins and Bass they planned to attack him. Setting aside his

speculation, and even taking Williams’ assertions as true, he failed to provide
information to Goins and Bass that should have put them on notice of a specific and
serious threat to him. His general concern about unnamed or unidentified inmates being
influenced by Sharp to attack him, without more, was simply insufficient to establish

13 See footnote 3, supra.
a substantial risk of serious harm. The ADC Defendants are therefore entitled to
qualified immunity on his failure to protect claims. See Robinson, supra; Blair v.

Bowersox, 929 F.3d 981, 988 (8th Cir. 2019) (“Even if [inmate plaintiff] had voiced his
concerns to [defendant] about there being a hit out on him, there is no evidence [inmate
plaintiff] knew who ordered it or who [his] enemies in general population may have
been.”); Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1996) (prison officials did not act

with deliberate indifference where inmate asked to be placed in protective custody due
to his fear that friends of his enemies who remained in general population would attack
him where inmate could not provide names for his potential attackers and his “vague
and unsubstantiated” statements did not constitute “sold evidence . . . of an identifiable

serious risk to [his] safety.”).
For these reasons, Williams’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 180)
should therefore be DENIED,14 and the ADC Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 177) should be GRANTED.

14 The Court also notes that as plaintiff, Williams bears the burden of proof.
However, his motion simply restates the allegations of his complaint and offers no
dispositive evidence to prove his claims against the Defendants. Rather, he refers to his
own complaint, grievances, and deposition testimony; photographs of his head injury, the
lock used to attack him, and his prison barracks; prison policies; the March 1, 2022
classification committee report; and the March 11, 2022 incident reports by Goins and
Bass. Doc. No. 180 at 1-4; Doc. No. 182. While his deposition testimony that he
informed Goins and Bass of a risk creates a material issue of fact, it is not dispositive for
the reasons already explained.
B. The Medical Defendants
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment

obligates prison officials to provide adequate medical care to inmates in their custody.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976). To succeed with an inadequate medical
care claim, an inmate must show that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to
the inmate’s serious medical needs. Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir.

1997). This requires a two-part showing that (1) the inmate suffered from an objectively
serious medical need, and (2) the prison official knew of the need yet deliberately
disregarded it. Id.; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has held that a “prisoner must

show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement
with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Estate
of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, the Court finds
that the undisputed material facts do not establish that either Wesson-Points or Nunag

was deliberately indifferent to Williams’ serious medical needs.
Wesson-Points encountered Williams shortly after the March 11 attack. While
the records do not specify what treatment Wesson-Points provided to Williams that
night, Doc. No. 147-1, Williams asserts in his complaint that Wesson-Points treated the

cut on his head with hydrogen peroxide and gauze. See Doc. No. 3 at 6, ¶ 24. He
complains that Wesson-Points did not stitch the cut, but when Williams was seen a few
hours later and examined by Nurse Asia Wilson, she did not provide stitches either. In
fact, she noted that that he had a laceration and the bleeding was controlled. See Doc.

No. 147-3 at 1. Later that morning, another provider noted that Williams had a “small
laceration” which she cleaned with dermal wound cleanser and hydrogen peroxide, and
applied steri strips. Id. at 2. There is no indication Williams needed stitches, and he
has come forward with no evidence to prove that any short delay in receiving steri strips

worsened his injury or caused him any particular harm.
Williams has also come forward with no evidence to prove that Nunag failed to
adequately treat his head injury after the March 11 attack. He complains that he
submitted a sick call on March 14, 2022, and that Nunag refused to order an X-ray or

MRI. See Doc. No. 3 at 7, ¶¶ 25-26. His medical records show that he was seen by
another provider on March 18, 2022, who noted his complaints, prescribed
acetaminophen, and referred him to the provider. Doc. No. 147-5. He was then seen
by Nunag on March 25, 2022. Doc. No. 147-7. She also noted his complaints,
documented that he may have a concussion, ordered lab tests, and continued his

prescription for acetaminophen. Id. Williams has come forward with no evidence to
show that his complaints warranted the treatment he requested – an MRI or an X-ray –
or that he has suffered any injury as a result of Nunag’s failure to order any additional
tests. He also fails to show facts to suggest that Nunag’s treatment decisions were made

with deliberate indifference to his medical conditions.
Finally, the Court addresses Williams’ claims regarding Nunag’s ongoing
treatment of a pre-existing foot injury.15 Williams’ medical records show that Nunag

did not ignore Williams’ complaint about foot pain. She treated Williams on March 2,
2022, and ordered an X-ray of his foot. Doc. No. 147-7. Another provider reviewed
the X-ray’s results with Williams. Doc. Nos. 147-9 & 147-10. Williams has come
forward with no evidence to show that further treatment was warranted but not

provided. Nunag is therefore entitled to summary judgment with respect to Williams’
claim that she was deliberately indifferent to his complaints of an ongoing foot injury
in March of 2022.

The evidence provided in this case shows that Williams’ claims regarding
Wesson-Points and Nunag amount to a mere disagreement regarding treatment, which
does not equate a constitutional violation. See Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg, 56
F.3d at 37. Furthermore, Dr. Maris reviewed Williams’ medical records and concluded

that Wesson-Points and Nunag appropriately treated Williams after the March 11
attack. Williams has provided no evidence to refute Dr. Maris’ opinion. See Conseco
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 F.3d 902, 909 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Flentje v. First

15 Williams arguably makes no such claim in his complaint. See Doc. No. 3 at 7,
¶¶ 25-26. Rather, he claims that Nunag did not adequately treat his head injury in
retaliation for prior complaints he made about his foot. Id. at ¶ 26. That claim was
dismissed based on Williams’ failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Doc.
Nos. 119 & 112. The only claim that Williams arguably exhausted was reflected in an
unnumbered grievance dated March 14, 2022, in which he complained that Nunag
refused to treat his head injuries or look at his foot. Doc. No. 112 at 9 (quoting Doc. No.
103 at 24).
Nat'l Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d 531 (2000) (“When the movant makes

a prima facie showing of entitlement to a summary judgment, the respondent must
discard the shielding cloak of formal allegations and meet proof with proof by showing
a genuine issue as to a material fact.”). Accordingly, there are no material facts in
dispute, and the Medical Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 145)
should be GRANTED.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that Williams’
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 180) be DENIED; the ADC Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 177) be GRANTED; and the Medical
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 145) be GRANTED. Williams’
remaining claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this 8 day of August, 2025.
be
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117464. Public record. Not legal advice.