# Aluizio v. Van Kanegan

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · August 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117448

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117448

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- clarifying the substantive due process analysis is a two-part inquiry

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JORDAN ALUIZIO, ) CASE NO.: 4:23-cv-02399
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
)
v. )
)
CORY VAN KANEGAN, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION
) AND ORDER
Defendant. )

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) filed by Defendant
Cory Van Kanegan (“Defendant” or “Van Kanegan”). Plaintiff Jordan Aulizio (“Plaintiff” or
“Aulizio”)1 responded in opposition (Doc. 26), and Defendant replied (Doc. 28). For the reasons
stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statement of Facts
On July 7, 2023, around 4:00 PM, emergency personnel were dispatched to a Dollar
General in Kinsman Township because Aulizio was reportedly “about to pass out” in the store.
(Doc. 24-1 at 231-32.)2
At his deposition, Aulizio admitted he drove himself to the Dollar General. (Doc. 21,
Aulizio Depo., at 133.) He did not recall passing out. (Id.) He gave his keys to a store

1 Although the case caption lists Plaintiff’s last name as “Aluizio,” the correct spelling appears to
be “Aulizio.” (See Docs. 26, 29.)

2 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document
and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.
employee after they expressed concern about him driving. (Id. at 133-34.) Aulizio recalled an
EMT asking him to leave the store because he was “scaring people.” (Id. at 134.)
Van Kanegan, who was serving as the volunteer Fire Chief of Kinsman Township,
received an EMS dispatch notification about a semiconscious male at the Dollar Store. (Doc. 24
at 215; Doc. 22, Van Kanegan Depo., at 189-90.) Van Kanegan was across the street at a yard

sale when he received the call. (Doc. 22 at 190.) He knew Johnston Township paramedics were
short staffed at the time, so he decided to assist. (Id. at 189-90.) When Van Kanegan arrived at
the scene, he saw Aulizio in the Dollar General parking lot. (Id. at 190.) Johnston Township
paramedic Sean Whitehouse (“Whitehouse”) was already on the scene. (189.) Van Kanegan
arrived at the same time as Kinsman Township Police Officer Ellwood-Bellas (“Ellwood-
Bellas”). (Id.) From that point, the incident was captured by Ellwood-Bellas’s body camera.
(Doc. 25, Body Camera.)3
The body camera video begins with Ellwood-Bellas asking Aulizio, “What’s wrong?”
(Doc. 25 at 12:37:44.) The beginning of Aulizio’s response is unintelligible, but he later states

his ride left him. (Id. at 12:37:46-49.) Aulizio tells Ellwood-Bellas he is going to leave his car
“until they bring my key.” (Id. at 12:38:00.) Ellwood-Bellas asks if Aulizio passed out, to
which Aulizio responds he was “in the ICU.” (Id. at 12:38:04.) Aulizio then says in the
direction of Van Kanegan and Whitehouse, who are off camera, “I didn’t overdose in jail.” (Id.
at 12:38:13.) Van Kanegan states, “That’s not what I was told,” and asks whether Aulizio was in
jail because he overdosed. (Id. at 12:38:14-21.) When Aulizio explains he already got sentenced
for a DUI, Van Kanegan responds, “We all know that. We see you all the fucking time. You

3 Although the incident occurred around 4:00 PM, the body camera timestamp begins at
12:37:44. (Doc. 25.) All references to the body camera herein will use the timestamp on the
video.
know that as well as I do . . . so you’re going to sit here and tell me you’re not now?” (Id. at
12:38:25-32.) Aulizio questions, “What, overdosing?” (Id. 12:38:33.) Van Kanegan continues
to push back on whether Aulizio has ever overdosed, and Aulizio’s response is not coherent. (Id.
at 12:38:34-12:38:41.) Van Kanegan eventually states, “I know that both of us standing here
have pushed Narcan on you before, so you can lie all you want.” (Id. at 12:38:42-45.) Ellwood-

Bellas and Van Kanegan are heard asking Aulizio how he got there. (Id. at 12:38:48-50.)
Aulizio is adamant he did not drive to the Dollar General as he walks toward his own car in the
parking lot. (Id. at 12:38:51.)
Whitehouse then engages with Aulizio. (Id. at 12:39:00.) Whitehouse tells Aulizio he
has two ambulances coming from Cortland for him because Aulizio went into the Dollar General
and was passing out. (Id. at 12:39:05-14.) Whitehouse tells Aulizio, “Your pupils are pinpoint.”
(Id. at 12:39:14-15.) Aulizio states he just got out of the ICU, and Van Kanegan remarks,
“Getting out of the ICU has nothing to do with your pinpoint pupils.” (Id. at 12:39:18-24.)
Aulizio walks away from Whitehouse and Van Kanegan to retrieve something from his

car, and then attempts to walk away from the scene to wait for his ride elsewhere. (Id. at
12:39:28-40.) Ellwood-Bellas tells Aulizio to “wait over here” and that the paramedics “are
leaving.” (Id. at 12:39:44-49.) Aulizio walks back toward the Dollar General. (Id.) Ellwood-
Bellas asks him again how he got there. (Id. at 12:39:53.) Aulizio says a friend took him up
there, but his response trails off. (Id. at 12:39:57-12:40:03.) Ellwood-Bellas directs Aulizio to
sit on the curb. (Id. at 12:40:04.) Aulizio insists his friend lives nearby and says he will just
walk home. (Id. at 12:40:12-16.) Ellwood-Bellas responds, “You’re not walking anywhere . . .
you’re in no condition to walk right now, Jordan.” (Id. at 12:40:16-21). When Aulizio questions
him, Ellwood-Bellas explains, “because your pimples are like that big,” referring to Aulizio’s
pupils. (Id. at 12:40:21-26).
At this point, Ellwood-Bellas can be heard communicating over the radio. (Id. at
12:40:29-57.) Ellwood-Bellas confirms Aulizio has an outstanding warrant for a probation
violation on a DUI. (Id.) Aulizio is walking away from the scene. (Id. at 12:40:57.) Ellwood-

Bellas tells Whitehouse and Van Kanegan that Aulizio has a warrant and says, “let’s go.” (Id. at
12:40:59-41:01.)
Ellwood-Bellas and Van Kanegan pursue Aulizio on foot as Aulizio runs away. (Id. at
12:41:02-15.) Ellwood-Bellas brings Aulizio to the ground and Van Kanegan assists with
handcuffing. (Id. at 12:41:17-12:42:02.) Aulizio is resistant. (Id.) Van Kanegan can be heard
mentioning Narcan. (Id. at 12:42:01.) Once handcuffed, Aulizio is walked back to the Dollar
General parking lot. (Id. at 12:42:07-57.)
Back in the Dollar General parking lot, Aulizio insists he is just dehydrated and that those
on the scene do not know his situation. (Id. at 12:43:00-22.) Van Kanegan retorts everyone

knows his situation. (Id. at 12:43:22-27.) Whitehouse can be seen entering the frame and
mentions Narcan. (Id. at 12:43:34.) Aulizio asks, “Narcan me, for fucking what?” (Id. at
12:43:34-36.) Van Kanegan responds, “Because you’re fucking high.” (Id. at 12:43:37.)
Aulizio denies he is high and states he is not getting “Narcaned.” (Id. at 12:43:37-46.) Aulizio
argues they cannot just Narcan someone who is fine. (Id. at 12:43:53-57.) Van Kanegan
responds, “You’re not fine.” (Id. at 12:43:58.)
Ellwood-Bellas places Aulizio against the hood of the police vehicle. (Id. at 12:44.)
With Van Kanegan helping hold Aulizio against the vehicle, Whitehouse unsuccessfully attempts
to administer Narcan to Aulizio. (Id. at 12:44:01-10.) Aulizio exclaims he is resisting the
Narcan. (Id. at 12:44:09.) Whitehouse and Van Kanegan bring Aulizio to the ground. (Id. at
12:44:20.) Whitehouse retrieves the vial of Narcan from the hood of the police vehicle. (Id. at
12:44:34.) Aulizio continues resisting the administration of Narcan and kicks Ellwood-Bellas.
(Id. at 12:44:40-45.) Van Kanegan can be seen helping hold Aulizio on the ground. (Id. at
12:44:41-56.) Van Kanegan can be heard saying “push this fucking Narcan.” (Id. at 12:44:57.)

Aulizio is still being held on the ground while Van Kanegan and Whitehouse are on
either side of him. (Id. at 12:44:50-12:45:20.) Van Kanegan asks if Aulizio blew his nose on
him and slaps Aulizio in response. (Id. at 12:45:22-26.) Whitehouse’s gloved hand can be seen
placing the vial of Narcan onto the ground next to Aulizio. (Id. at 12:45:33.) Ellwood-Bellas
confirms over the radio EMS administered Narcan. (Id. at 12:45:54-46:06.)
Another medical responder on the scene then asks Aulizio what he took. (Id. at
12:46:20.) Aulizio denies taking anything and reiterates he just got out of the ICU for being
dehydrated. (Id. at 12:46:20-32.) Van Kanegan can be heard stating “pinpoint pupils don’t come
from dehydration.” (Id. at 12:46:32-34.) Van Kanegan adds, “Your pupils are almost gone.”

(Id. at 12:46:38.) Aulizio insists he cannot be “Narcaned” while he is awake. (Id. at 12:47:17-
20.) Someone on the scene replies, “you weren’t awake in the store.” (Id. at 12:47:23.) Aulizio
continues to go back and forth with emergency personnel on the scene. (Id. at 12:47:23-12:50.)
Ellwood-Bellas communicates over the radio that Aulizio is high and asks if the jail will take
him because EMS is refusing to transport him. (Id. at 12:50:50-55.) Eventually Aulizio is
placed in an ambulance to be transported to the hospital. (Id. at 12:55:50.)
Aulizio testified that on the day of the incident, he had just gotten out of the hospital for
dehydration. (Doc. 21 at 122.) He was serving a 10-day jail sentence for OVI when he was sent
to the hospital. (Id.) He went home from the hospital with two days left on his sentence. (Id.)
Aulizio admitted that prior to the incident, he had been seeing a counselor for addiction help and
recovery for an addiction to prescription opiates. (Id. at 127.) Aulizio and Van Kanegan did
know each other prior to the incident because they went to school together from elementary
school to ninth grade. (Id. at 124; see also Doc. 22 at 188.)
Aulizio acknowledged during the incident people on the scene made various references to

his pinpoint pupils, which can be caused by opiate use. (Doc. 121 at 134, 137.) Aulizio agreed
the video does not show Van Kanegan administering the Narcan. (Id. at 140.) He denied
ingesting opiates that day. (Id. at 134.) Aulizio went to the hospital after receiving Narcan, but
there was “nothing” medically wrong with him. (Id. at 122-23.) As a result of the incident,
Aulizio pled guilty to resisting and obstruction and served almost two months in jail. (Id. at
122.) When asked in written discovery, Aulizio stated he had no economic loss because of the
incident and had no records of any resulting medical treatment. (Id. at 128-29; Doc. 21-1 at
156.)
Van Kanegan testified Whitehouse was the paramedic in charge during the incident.

(Doc. 22 at 191.) Van Kanegan conferred with Whitehouse, who believed it was appropriate to
administer Narcan to Aulizio. (Id.) Van Kanegan agreed. (Id. at 191-92.) He observed Aulizio
staggering, slurring, not completing sentences, confused how he got to the store, and had an
agitated demeanor. (Id. at 190-92, 194-96.) Van Kanegan and others also saw Aulizio’s
pinpoint pupils, which is a classic sign of narcotic use. (Id. at 190-92, 195-96.) Van Kanegan
admitted Aulizio was not showing signs of respiratory depression, but asserted there are multiple
occasions to administer Narcan even when a person is conscious. (Id. at 192-93.) Van Kanegan
and Whitehouse were leaving before Aulizio ran from the scene and was arrested. (Id. at 197-
98.)
Van Kanegan did not administer the Narcan. (Id. at 192.) He knew Aulizio did not want
the Narcan. (Id. at 192, 199.) Van Kanegan helped Whitehouse administer the Narcan by
restraining Aulizio. (Id. at 189, 192.) Van Kanegan asserted Narcan is not designed to harm the
patient, and he was not trying to harm Aulizio. (Id. at 200.)
B. Procedural History

On December 18, 2023, Aulizio commenced this action against Van Kanegan. (Doc. 1.)
Aulizio alleges one count for violation of constitutional rights, in which he references bodily
integrity and excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-15.) He
also alleges state law claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional harm.
(Id. at ¶¶ 16-21.)
On November 27, 2024, Van Kanegan moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 24.)
Defendant asserts qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims and statutory immunity on the state
law claims. (See id.) On December 27, 2024, Aulizio responded in opposition. (Doc. 26.) He

asserts Van Kanegan is not entitled to qualified immunity or state law immunity. (Id. at 259-67.)
The motion is fully briefed. (Doc. 28.)
The Court will address the parties’ arguments in turn.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the
part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no
genuine issues of material fact exist.” Williams v. Maurer, 9 F.4th 416, 430 (6th Cir. 2021)
(citations and quotations omitted). A “material” fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law[.]” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“[A] genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider, 954 F.3d 842, 849-50 (6th

Cir. 2020) (citations and quotations omitted).
“Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact.” Queen v. City of Bowling Green,
Ky., 956 F.3d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 2020) (quotation and citations omitted). On summary judgment,
the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. Kalamazoo Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 395 F.3d
338, 342 (6th Cir. 2005). A party asserting or disputing a fact must cite evidence in the record or
show the record establishes either the absence or the presence of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c), (e). Rule 56 further provides “[t]he court need consider only” the materials cited

in the parties’ briefs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see also Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d
1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record
to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.”) (citations omitted).
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quotations and citations omitted). The Court’s role is
not to make credibility determinations or “weigh” conflicting evidence. Payne v. Novartis
Pharms. Corp., 767 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2014). “The ultimate question is whether the
evidence presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury,
or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of
law.” Id.
B. Qualified Immunity
Van Kanegan argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because Aulizio cannot establish

a violation of any clearly established constitutional right. (Doc. 24 at 221.) In response, Aulizio
clarifies “he is only pursuing a violation of his substantive due process right to bodily integrity”
for the forced administration of Narcan.4 (Doc. 26 at 253; see also id. at 252, 264.)
“The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that ‘government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Skatemore, Inc. v. Whitmer, 40 F.4th 727, 738 (6th Cir.
2022) (quoting Williams, 9 F.4th at 430).
Once asserted by a defendant, a “[p]laintiff bears the burden of showing that defendants

are not entitled to qualified immunity.” Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 269 (6th Cir. 2018)
(citing Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also Palma v.
Johns, 27 F.4th 419, 427 (6th Cir. 2022). The plaintiff must demonstrate both the challenged
conduct violated a constitutional right and the right was clearly established. T.S. v. Doe, 742
F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2014). “If the plaintiff fails to establish either element, the defendant is
immune from suit.” Id.; see also Barber v. Miller, 809 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Once a
defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that (1) the
defendant’s acts violated a constitutional right and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at
the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”). “Between these two considerations, [the

4 Aulizio “is no longer pursuing an excessive force claim.” (Doc. 26 at 264.)
Court] may take them in either order. Hall v. Navarre, 118 F.4th 749, 759 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
To overcome Van Kanegan’s qualified immunity defense, Aulizio must establish, in
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Aulizio, (1) Van Kanegan violated Aulizio’s
substantive due process right to bodily integrity, and (2) governing caselaw clearly established

the violation. See Lawler ex rel. Lawler v. Hardeman County, 93 F.4th 919, 925 (6th Cir. 2024).
The Court’s analysis begins and ends with the constitutional violation prong.
1. Deprivation of a Liberty Interest
Aulizio asserts under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the introduction of Narcan into his
system without his consent” violated his substantive due process rights. (See Doc. 26 at 255.)
Both the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit have ruled forced medication for non-consenting
individuals violates the substantive due process right of bodily integrity, Aulizio urges. (Id. at
255-56.) The video of the incident shows Narcan was administered to Aulizio while Van
Kanegan restrained him, and he made it clear he did not consent to receiving the Narcan. (Id. at

257, 260; Doc. 25.) To Aulizio, this is conclusive evidence of a violation of his bodily integrity.
The right to bodily integrity is a fundamental substantive due process right. See Guertin
v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 918-19 (6th Cir. 2019). “[A] government actor violates individuals’ right
to bodily integrity by knowingly and intentionally introducing life-threatening substances into
individuals without their consent, especially when such substances have zero therapeutic
benefit.” Guertin, 912 F.3d at 921 (citations and quotations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has
recognized “‘the central tenet of the Supreme Court’s vast bodily integrity jurisprudence is
balancing an individual’s common law right to informed consent with tenable state
interests . . . .’” Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor, Mich., 137 F.4th 420, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Guertin, 912 F.3d at 919). “‘[I]ndividuals possess a constitutional right to be free from
forcible intrusions on their bodies against their will, absent a compelling state interest.’”
Guertin, 912 F.3d at 919 (quoting Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d
490, 506 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (forcible
injection of medication with serious side effects into a nonconsenting person’s body requires a

legitimate state interest); Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269,
278-81 (1990) (“This notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that
informed consent is generally required for medical treatment,” but state also has interest in life
and informed consent). This includes the ability to refuse medical treatment. See Capen v.
Saginaw Cnty., Mich., 103 F.4th 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278). But
the right to bodily integrity is not absolute. See Guertin, 912 F.3d at 919, 934; see also Harper,
494 U.S. at 225-27, 236 (involuntary medication of inmate does not violate due process where
inmate is dangerous to himself and others and the treatment is in inmate’s medical interest);
United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 544 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008).

2. Conscience-Shocking Conduct
“Upon a showing of a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, a
plaintiff must show how the government’s discretionary conduct that deprived that interest was
constitutionally repugnant.” Guertin, 912 F.3d at 922 (citing Am. Express Travel Related Servs.
Co. v. Kentucky, 641 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2011)). Violations of bodily integrity are
constitutionally repugnant when they shock the conscience. Guertin, 912 F.3d at 922 (citing
Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 176, 725 (6th Cir. 1996)). Aulizio must show (a) a
deprivation of a liberty interest and (b) conscience-shocking conduct. Id. (quotations and
citations omitted); see also Siefert v. Hamilton Cnty., 951 F.3d 753, 765-66 (6th Cir. 2020)
(clarifying the substantive due process analysis is a two-part inquiry).
Aulizio has shown a deprivation of his right to bodily integrity, which is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Guertin, 912 F.3d at 918-19. But he has failed to meet his burden
to show Van Kanegan’s conduct “shocks the conscience.” Id. at 922.

“Conscience-shocking” behavior is more than mere negligence. Siefert, 915 F.3d at 766.
It must be conduct “so ‘brutal’ and ‘offensive’ that [it does] not comport with traditional ideas of
fair play and decency” or civilized conduct. Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573, 589-90 (6th Cir.
2014) (quoting Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998)); see also Guertin, 912 F.3d at
923. To prevent “transforming run-of-the-mill tort claims into constitutional” violations, only
the most egregious official conduct qualifies as conscience-shocking. See Guertin, 912 F.3d at
923; Novak v. Federspiel, 140 F.4th 815, 822-23 (6th Cir. 2025). “[U]njustifiable and
intentionally injurious conduct” is usually conscience-shocking. Mitchell, 137 F.4th at 430.
When conduct falls somewhere between negligence and intentionally injurious, courts

“evaluate the conduct in context to determine if the official was deliberately indifferent to a
known risk of harm . . . .” Id. Considerations include “‘the time for deliberation, the nature of
the relationship between the government and the plaintiff, and whether a legitimate government
purpose motivated the official’s act.’” Id. at 431 (quoting Guertin, 912 F.3d at 924). The Court
must find the governmental actor chose to act despite a subjective awareness of substantial risk
of serious injury, and that he did not act in furtherance of a governmental purpose that justified
taking that risk. Guertin, 912 F.3d at 924 (citations and quotations omitted).
Aulizio did not address these considerations. (See Doc. 26.) Aulizio maintains Van
Kanegan has failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest. (Doc. 26 at 266.) But it is
Aulizio’s burden to show Van Kanegan’s conduct shocks the conscience. Guertin, 912 F.3d at
922-23; Barber, 809 F.3d at 844.
Aulizio asserts the body camera footage shows “Aulizio was ambulatory, alert, oriented
to name, date, and place, and showed no signs of respiratory depression.” (Doc. 26 at 258.) To
Aulizio, these facts show there was no compelling state interest in administering the Narcan

against his wishes. (See Doc. 26 at 257-58, 264-66.) To the extent Aulizio relies on the
proposed expert report to prove there was no compelling state interest to administer Narcan, the
Court cannot consider the report. (See Doc. 26 at 258; Doc. 26-1.) Van Kanegan argues
Aulizio’s expert report violates Federal Rule of Evidence 704 by offering legal conclusions.
(Doc. 28 at 282-83.)
Setting aside the Rule 704 challenge, the Court finds the report fails to meet the
disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). The report does not
provide the witness’s qualifications; a list of all other cases in which the witness testified as an
expert; or a statement of compensation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(iv)-(vi). Rule 37(c)(1)

mandates the exclusion of this report. See Baker v. Blackhawk Mining, LLC, 141 F.4th 760, 771-
73 (6th Cir. 2025); R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908-14 (N.D.
Ohio 2008).
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Aulizio, the record before the Court
demonstrates Van Kanegan and other first responders on the scene reasonably believed giving
Narcan to Aulizio was necessary. Prior to the July 7 incident, Aulizio sought help for an
addiction to prescription opiates. (Doc. 21 at 127.) On the day of the incident, Aulizio drove
himself to the Dollar General. (Id. at 133.) He gave his keys to a store employee after they
expressed concern about him driving. (Id. at 133-34.) An EMT asked Aulizio to leave the store
because he was “scaring people.” (Id. at 134.) He was released from the hospital while he was
serving a jail sentence for OVI. (Id. at 122.)
The body camera footage depicts the following events. Emergency personnel are
responding to reports that Aulizio was about to pass out in the Dollar General. (Doc. 25 at
12:38:04, 12:39:05-14, 12:47:23; Doc. 22 at 189-90.) He was confused as to how he got there,

he had trouble completing responses to questions posed to him, and he was agitated. (Doc. 25 at
12:37:46-49, 12:38:00-51, 12:39:53-12:40:03.) And there are several references to Aulizio’s
pinpoint pupils from Van Kanegan, Whitehouse, and Ellwood-Bellas. (Id. at 12:39:14-24,
12:40:21-26, 12:46:20-38.) Pinpoint pupils are a sign of opioid use. (Doc. 21 at 134, 137; Doc.
22 at 190-92, 195-96.) Throughout the incident, Van Kanegan accuses Aulizio of overdosing or
being high. (Doc. 25 at 12:38:13-45, 12:39:18-24, 12:43:22-27, 12:43:37-58, 12:46:32-38.)
Whitehouse and Van Kanegan were preparing to leave the scene before Ellwood-Bellas learned
about Aulizio’s warrant. (Doc. 22 at 197-98.) Whitehouse administered the Narcan, with Van
Kanegan’s assistance, after Aulizio was arrested. (Id. at 189, 192, 199; Doc. 21 at 140; Doc. 25

at 12:44:20-12:45:33.) He was taken to the hospital but there was nothing medically wrong with
him after he received the Narcan. (Doc. 21 at 122-23.)
Van Kanegan testified Whitehouse was the paramedic in charge, and he agreed with
Whitehouse’s determination that Narcan was appropriate. (Doc. 22 at 191-92.) Although
Aulizio was not showing signs of respiratory depression, Van Kanegan believed Narcan was
necessary. (Id. at 192-93.) Van Kanegan observed Aulizio not completing sentences, he was
confused how he got to Dollar General, had an agitated demeanor, and had pinpoint pupils. (Id.
at 190-92, 194-96.) As discussed above, Van Kanegan’s testimony is supported by the body
camera footage. To the extent Van Kanegan relies on the Whitehouse’s Prehospital Care Report
to corroborate emergency personnel’s assessment of Aulizio, the Court cannot consider it. (See
Doc. 24 at 224-25; Doc. 28 at 283.) The excerpt of the prehospital report in Van Kanegan’s brief
purportedly comes from Exhibit B. (See Doc. 24 at 224-25; Doc. 24-2.) But the only version of
Exhibit B before the Court is redacted, without any justification. (Id.) Nonetheless, as described
above, the video shows Van Kanegan and others on the scene thought Aulizio was experiencing

and opioid overdose, and they reasonably believed administering Narcan was necessary.
Van Kanegan argues Aulizio’s arrest meant Aulizio no longer had the freedom to act on
his own behalf or consent to medical treatment. (Doc. 24 at 223-25; Doc. 28 at 278-82.) Van
Kanegan cites to DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-20-
(1989), and Sixth Circuit caselaw for the proposition that emergency personnel are obligated to
provide adequate medical care to pretrial detainees. (Doc. 24 at 223-25; Doc. 28 at 281-82.) To
Van Kanegan, once Aulizio was arrested, his consent to medical treatment was unnecessary
because first responders were solely responsible for his care. (Id.)
While the Fourteenth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty to provide adequate

medical care to pretrial detainees, the Court is not persuaded a pretrial detainee is deprived of his
ability to consent to medication simply because he is arrested, as Van Kanegan suggests. See
Jackson v. Schultz, 429 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). But
Aulizio’s arrest, the first responders’ duty to provide him adequate medical care as a pretrial
detainee, and that first responders reasonably believed Narcan was necessary to reverse a
suspected opioid overdose are relevant to the Court’s shocks-the-conscience considerations. See
Mitchell, 103 F.4th at 431; Guertin, 912 F.3d at 924. Aulizio did not address these
considerations. (See Doc. 26.) He also did not establish Van Kanegan acted with deliberate
indifference in providing medical care or disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. (See
Doc. 28 at 284.)
The record evidence shows Van Kanegan had a compelling state interest to assist in the
administration of Narcan, even without Aulizio’s consent. Once Aulizio was arrested, first
responders owed him a duty of adequate medical care. Van Kanegan and others on the scene

observed Aulizio to be experiencing an opioid overdose. (Doc. 22 at 190-92, 194-96; Doc. 25 at
12:38:13-45, 12:39:14-24, 12:40:21-26, 12:43:22-58, 12:46:20-38.) Whitehouse and Van
Kanegan determined administering Narcan was in his medical interest. (Doc. 22 at 190-92.)
Van Kanegan helped restrain Aulizio while Whitehouse administered the Narcan. (Doc. 21 at
140; Doc. 22 at 189, 192, 199; Doc. 25 at 12:44:20-12:45:33.) Even if Narcan was not medically
necessary, there was no known risk of harm, and Van Kanegan did not intend to harm to Aulizio.
(Doc. 22 at 200.) And Aulizio acknowledges the Narcan did him no harm. (Doc. 21 at 122-23,
128-29; Doc. 21-1 at 156.)
Van Kanegan and others did not knowingly and intentionally introduce a life-threatening

substance into Aulizio that had zero therapeutic benefit. See Guertin, 912 F.3d at 921. They did
the opposite—they introduced a potentially lifesaving substance that had zero harmful side
effects. Aulizio has not met his burden to show Van Kanegan chose to act despite a subjective
awareness of substantial risk of serious injury. He also failed to show Van Kanegan’s conduct
lacked a legitimate governmental purpose. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Aulizio, no jury could find that restraining Aulizio so another paramedic could give him a
potentially lifesaving medication, with no harmful side effects, is conscience-shocking conduct.
Because Aulizio has not met his burden to establish a constitutional violation, the Court
need not consider whether the right was clearly established. The Court finds Van Kanegan is
entitled to qualified immunity on Aulizio’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
C. State Law Immunity

As to Aulizio’s state law claims, Van Kanegan asserts he is entitled to statutory immunity
under Ohio Rev. Code. §§ 2744.03(A)(6) and 4765.49(A). (Doc. 24 at 227-28; Doc. 28 at 285-
86.) Section 3715.504(A) explicitly authorizes administering overdose reversal drugs to an
individual “apparently experiencing an opioid-related overdose,” Van Kanegan urges. (Id.)
Under § 2744.03(A)(6), an employee is immune from liability unless (a) the employee
acted outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities; (b) the employee acted
with malicious purpose, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly; or (c) the Revised Code expressly
imposes liability on the employee. Under § 4765.49(A), a first responder is not liable for
damages in a civil action from his administration of emergency medical services, unless the

services are administered in a manner constituting willful or wanton misconduct.
Aulizio argues Van Kanegan does not have immunity from his state law claims pursuant
to § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). (Doc. 26 at 266-67.) But it is not clear which, if any, of his state law
claims he is still pursing. (See id. at 252, (“Issues Presented”); id. at 253 (“At the outset, Aulizio
states that he is only pursuing a violation of his substantive due process right to bodily integrity
claim in this lawsuit.”).)
To Aulizio, because Van Kanegan violated his substantive due process rights, Van
Kanegan breached a known duty as an EMT. (Id. at 266-67.) By breaching a known duty, Van
Kanegan therefore acted willfully and in bad faith, Aulizio urges. (Id. at 266-67.) Without
citations to the record, Aulizio further asserts the record supports Van Kanegan acted willfully
and in bad faith. Ud. at 267.) But as discussed above, Aulizio has not shown Van Kanegan
violated his substantive due process rights. And he has not shown Van Kanegan acted willfully
or in bad faith by helping Whitehouse administer Narcan, which they believed was medically
necessary. Thus, Van Kanegan is entitled to statutory immunity on Aulizio’s state law claims.
I. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Corey Van Kanegan’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 24) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: August 8, 2025 Law ie ——
BRIDGET MEEHA NNAN
UNITED STATE STRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11117448. Public record. Not legal advice.