# Shalak v. City Of Chicago

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · August 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11116670

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11116670

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding at summary judgment that plaintiff spoke as a public employee when her complaints “were aimed at resolving her health issues so that she could continue to teach, and ensuring that she had a safe and clean environment in which to work”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
OLEKSANDRA SHALAK, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
v. ) Case No. 24-cv-03941
)
CITY OF CHICAGO and CHICAGO )
TREASURER, MELISSA CONYEARS- ) Judge Joan H. Lefkow
ERVIN, )
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Oleksandra Shalak brings this action against the City of Chicago (the “City”) and Melissa
Conyears-Ervin for terminating her employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Illinois common law. (Dkt. 11 ¶ 1.)1
Shalak brings claims of sex discrimination (Counts I and III), national origin discrimination
(Counts II and IV), and race, ethnicity, and ancestry discrimination (Count V). She also alleges
that defendants unlawfully retaliated against her by terminating her employment. (Counts VI,
VII, VIII, and IX). Defendants move to dismiss Counts III, IV, V, VIII, and IX of Shalak’s
Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 25.) For the
reasons stated below, the court grants defendants’ motion in part and denies it in part.

1 Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(2) and 1367. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
BACKGROUND2
Shalak, a Ukrainian-born woman, began working for the City in February 2016. The City
promoted her “several times and consistently awarded her merit pay raises.” (Dkt. 11 ¶ 12.)
Shalak worked as an Executive Administrative Assistant from February 2016 to February 2017.

She then served as a Portfolio Manager on the Investments Team until October 2021 and became
Assistant City Treasurer until her termination in April 2023. While employed with the City,
Shalak’s “job performance met or exceeded … legitimate expectations.” (Id. ¶ 12.)
As Assistant City Treasurer, Shalak also worked as “Director of Strategic Alliances and
Partnerships” within the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) department. (Id. ¶ 13.) Shalak
reported to DEI Chief Robye Scott, but City Treasurer Conyears-Ervin maintained “managerial
authority and control over [Shalak’s] employment.” (Id. ¶¶ 9, 13.)
From November 2021 to July 2022, Shalak suffered from pregnancy complications
including severe morning sickness, deep vein thrombosis, hyperemesis gravidarum, and
gestational diabetes. She notified the City’s Disability Office and asked to work from home. The

City denied this request “and then continued to … refuse to allow her to work from home
through to February 2022, and only after requiring her to repeatedly … submit the same
supporting medical records and information.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The City also mandated several
meetings where Shalak’s “private health information was shared with others who had no
legitimate reason to know.” (Id.) In March 2022, Shalak submitted a formal written complaint
with the City’s Diversity and Equal Employment Opportunity Office, alleging pregnancy
discrimination, disability discrimination, and failure to accommodate her disability. In July 2022,
Shalak delivered her child and took leave from work pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave

2 The court only includes allegations that are relevant to defendants’ motion to dismiss. Shalak’s well-
pleaded allegations are accepted as true. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019).
Act, followed by a “disability leave of absence.” (Id. ¶ 21.) She returned to work in October
2022.
In February 2023, Shalak was called into a meeting with Conyears-Ervin and Scott to
discuss the Treasurer’s goals for the year. Conyears-Ervin requested that Shalak “solicit Broker-

Dealers for sponsorship money for a full day summit … put on by the Treasurer’s Office.” (Id. ¶
24.) The Treasurer’s Office “selects and works with a number of Broker-Dealers to facilitate
investment transactions.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Conyears-Ervin stated that Shalak should involve Craig
Slack, Chief Investment Officer of the Treasurer’s Office, when requesting funds.
Shalak replied to Conyears-Ervin that, “because the Treasurer’s Office selects Broker-
Dealers to invest and manage the City’s investment portfolio,” the requested solicitations would
present a conflict of interest. (Id. ¶ 25). Conyears-Ervin told Shalak that “Broker-Dealers are
comfortable [making] such contributions to a Treasurer’s Office event.” (Id.) Conyears-Ervin
also said that, as part of the solicitation efforts, Shalak “can use her existing relationships with
Broker-Dealers from her work as part of the investments team.” (Id.¶ 24.) At the time, however,

Shalak’s job involved “very little contact or interaction with Broker-Dealers.” (Id. ¶ 27.)
After her meeting with Conyears-Erwin, Shalak met Slack in his office and informed him
that “she was not comfortable soliciting funds from Broker-Dealers as requested, and that she
would not do it.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Slack responded that he was also uncomfortable with the request and
suggested that Shalak contact Human Resources. Shalak decided not to contact HR because she
knew of other Treasurer’s Office employees whom Conyears-Erwin retaliated against after they
complained about similar unethical or illegal work directives. Shalak refused to perform any
solicitation efforts requested by Conyears-Ervin.
On April 24, 2023, Amanda Brown, the Treasurer’s Office Director of HR, notified
Shalak that her position would be transferred to a new employee on April 28 and “that [Shalak]
could apply for a lesser, non-comparable job in a different department that paid significantly
less.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Two days later, Brown provided Shalak with a letter of resignation, but Shalak

refused to sign it or resign. On April 28, Brown emailed Shalak a termination letter, effective that
day, with no reasons stated. Conyears-Ervin “made and/or approved” the decisions to transfer
Shalak, present her the resignation letter, and terminate her. (Id. ¶ 36.)
Defendants “have treated similarly situated male employees, non-pregnant employees,
and/or employees who had not engaged in legally protected activity more favorably than
[Shalak].” (Id. ¶ 37.) Indeed, defendants replaced Shalak with “one or more” such individuals.
(Id. ¶ 38.) Shalak filed this action on May 14, 2024 (dkt. 1) and amended her complaint on July
21, 2024. (Dkt. 11.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the

sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The complaint
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The court draws all reasonable inferences in
Shalak’s favor. See Taha v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, Local 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir.
2020).
DISCUSSION
I. Sex Discrimination – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III)
Shalak alleges that defendants unlawfully terminated her employment “because of her
gender” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. 11 ¶ ¶

48‒49.) Defendants move to dismiss Shalak’s sex discrimination claim against both Conyears-
Ervin and the City.
A. Conyears-Ervin
At the outset, defendants contend that Shalak’s failure to specify whether Conyears-Ervin
is named in her individual or official capacity requires dismissal of any claim for her personal
liability. Courts ordinarily construe a Section 1983 complaint “that fails to specify the capacity in
which the defendants are being sued … to be against them in their official capacity.” Stevens v.
Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 706 (7th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless, this fact “is not conclusive.” Id. at 707.
The court maintains “discretion to interpret a claim as against an official in his or her individual
capacity if the actions of the parties … demonstrate that they assume this to be the case.” Nanda

v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 219 F. Supp. 2d 911, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Stevens, 131 F.3d at
707 (“A court must … consider the manner in which the parties have treated the suit.”)
(quotation omitted).
That is the case here. If Shalak sued Conyears-Ervin solely in her official capacity,
naming both her and the City as defendants would be “redundant.” See Sacks v. Niles Tp. High
Schools, Dist. 219, No. 12 C 4554, 2013 WL 3989297, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2013) (dismissing
claim against a district agent in his official capacity because it was “identical” to the claim
brought against the district); see also Stevens, 131 F.3d at 707 (construing claim against
defendant in his individual capacity because defendant raised qualified immunity defense, which
“is applicable only in individual capacity suits”). Moreover, in all relevant filings, the parties
extensively briefed the merits of Conyears-Ervin’s individual liability. The court, in its
discretion, interprets Count III as against Conyears-Ervin in her individual capacity.3
Defendants next contend that Conyears-Ervin should be dismissed from Count III

because she was not personally involved in the alleged discrimination and lacked the requisite
intent. “Individual liability pursuant to § 1983 requires personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 893 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir.
2018) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff “must allege ‘a causal connection between (1) the sued
officials and (2) the alleged misconduct.’” Washington v. Bd. of Educ., No. 21 C 396, 2021 WL
5881682, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2021) (quoting Colbert v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th
Cir. 2017)). Personal involvement “requires specific intent to discriminate.” Id. (quoting Taylor
v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 494 (7th Cir. 2021)).
Shalak alleges that Conyears-Ervin, in her managerial role, “made and/or approved” the
decisions to transfer Shalak’s position to another employee, offer her a resignation letter, and

terminate her after she refused to sign. (Dkt. 11 ¶¶ 9, 36.) Conyears-Ervin also replaced Shalak
with one or more males and treated them more favorably. Moreover, Conyears-Ervin
“intentionally terminated [Shalak’s] employment because of her gender” and “knew … or acted
with reckless disregard” of the fact that her actions were unlawful. (Id. ¶¶ 49‒51.)
These allegations are sufficient to infer Conyears-Ervin’s personal involvement in the
alleged sex discrimination. See Washington, 2021 WL 5881682, at *6 (concluding that the
plaintiff sufficiently alleged defendant’s personal involvement where they “approved and agreed

3 Shalak has represented that she intends to amend the Amended Complaint to “make clear” that Conyears-
Ervin is sued in both her individual and official capacities with respect to Counts III and IV. (Dkt. 31 at 1‒2.) Any
claim against Conyears-Ervin in her official capacity would be redundant to Shalak’s claim against the City,
however, and likely faces dismissal. Sacks, 2013 WL 3989297, at *3.
to terminate [him] …. on the basis of [his] sex” and, “[h]ad a female coach sent the identical
texts[,] … she would not have been removed”); McQueen v. City of Chi., 803 F.Supp.2d 892, 901
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss Section 1983 claims for lack of personal
involvement where defendants allegedly “were … involved in the decision-making process” for

discipline). The court therefore denies defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III as to Conyears-
Ervin.
B. Municipal Liability
Defendants next argue that Shalak fails to state a sex discrimination claim under Section
1983 against the City. “A local governing body may be liable for monetary damages under §
1983 if the unconstitutional act complained of is caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and
promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially
authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.”
Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).

To state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege “a general pattern of
repeated behavior,” rather than just a “mere isolated event.” David v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 694
(7th Cir. 2006). “Boilerplate allegations of a municipal policy, entirely lacking in any factual
support that a [municipal] policy does exist, are insufficient.” McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60
F.3d 381, 382–83 (7th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, “federal courts may not apply a ‘heightened
pleading standard’ … in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability.” White v. City of Chicago,
829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993)). Rather, a Monell claim “must simply set forth
sufficient allegations to place the court and defendants on notice of the gravamen of the
complaint.” Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2001).
Defendants contend that Shalak’s Amended Complaint is “completely devoid” of factual
allegations suggesting a policy or practice of sex discrimination. (Dkt. 26 at 6.) To the contrary,

Shalak has “detail[ed] both the nature of the alleged unconstitutional policy and the
circumstances of its application to [her].” Stokes v. Ewing, No. 16 C 10621, 2017 WL 2224882,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2017). She alleges that Conyears-Ervin acted “in accordance with the
policy and practice of Chicago’s Treasurer’s Office” when she made or approved the decision to
transfer Shalak’s position, offer her a resignation letter, and terminate her employment after
Shalak refused to sign the letter. (Dkt. 11 ¶ 36.) Shalak further alleges that defendants terminated
her employment “because of her gender,” replaced her with a male or non-pregnant person, and
treated such persons more favorably. (Id. ¶¶ 37‒38, 49.)
Shalak alleges a multi-step practice of forcing out employees, along with facts suggesting
that defendants carried out this practice based on her sex. The Amended Complaint is therefore

not so “boilerplate or short on unique facts” that defendants “can be said to lack notice” of the
alleged unconstitutional conduct. Stokes, 2017 WL 2224882, at *3; see also Zinn v. Village of
Sauk Village, 16 CV 3542, 2017 WL 783001, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2017) (denying motion to
dismiss Monell claim alleging that plaintiff was harmed “pursuant to [defendant’s] widespread
practice of illegally and unconstitutionally seizing private property”).
Defendants relatedly argue that Shalak fails to identify other instances of sex
discrimination by the City.4 They contend that courts “regularly dismiss Monell claims where the

4 Shalak counters, in part, that “the Chicago Tribune has published several articles” detailing similar
misconduct. (Dkt. 31 at 4.) Although Shalak failed to reference the articles in her complaint, they are appropriately
considered here. See Early v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] plaintiff is free, in
defending against a motion to dismiss, to allege without evidentiary support any facts he pleases that are consistent
plaintiff has failed to allege instances other than that from which [the plaintiff] suffered.” (Dkt.
26 at 5) (quoting Petropoulos v. City of Chicago, 448 F. Supp. 3d 835, 841 (N.D. Ill. 2020)
(citation omitted)). In White, 829 F.3d at 844, however, the court emphasized that a plaintiff is
“not required to identify every other or even one other individual” who had been harmed

“through the complained-of process.” Courts following White have therefore “‘scotched motions
to dismiss’ premised on arguments that the complaint does not contain allegations beyond those
relating to the plaintiff.” Brainer v. Dart, No. 16 CV 6013, 2018 WL 1519154, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 28, 2018) (quoting Stokes, 2017 WL 2224882, at *4) (collecting cases).5 Shalak’s
allegations suffice for this purpose.
At this stage, Shalak “need only allege a pattern or practice, not put forth the full panoply
of evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude such a pattern exists.” Zinn, 2017
WL 783001, at *7 (quoting Barwicks v. Dart, No. 14-CV-8791, 2016 WL 3418570, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. June 22, 2016)) (emphasis in original). Because Shalak pleads a constitutional violation “in
accordance with [the City’s] policy and practice,” (dkt. 11 ¶ 36), she has stated a Monell claim.

See Zinn, 2017 WL 783001, at *7. The court therefore denies defendants’ motion to dismiss
Count III against the City.6

with the complaint, in order to show that there is a state of facts within the scope of the complaint that if proved …
would entitle him to judgment.”). Even so, the articles do not assist her. While they describe lawsuits involving
female whistleblowers terminated from the Treasurer’s Office, they contain no allegations of sex discrimination.

5 The court finds defendants’ discussion of Hankle-Sample v. City of Chicago, No. 20-CV-1997, 2021 WL
4461557 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2021) similarly unpersuasive, as it fails to address the pleading standard set forth in
White. In requiring plaintiff to allege a “series of constitutional violations,” id. at *12, the Hankle-Sample court
referenced Calderone v. City of Chicago, 979 F.3d 1156, 1164‒65 (7th Cir. 2020). Calderone, unlike here, involved
a plaintiff’s contention that facially constitutional policies violated her Second Amendment rights. Id. The court
specifically noted that, “where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the
single incident will be necessary ….” Id. (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985)
(plurality opinion)).

6 Shalak also alleges that Conyears-Ervin maintained final policymaking authority. The City asserts that the
Commissioner of Human Resources or City Council are final policymakers for personnel matters under local law,
not Conyears-Ervin. (Dkt. 26 at 7–8.) Shalak does not respond and has therefore waived the argument. Alioto v.
II. First Amendment Retaliation Claim – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VIII)
Shalak alleges that defendants retaliated against her by terminating her for engaging in
speech protected by the First Amendment. She identifies two categories of protected speech: (1)
her filing of a formal complaint following the City’s denial of her request to work from home

due to pregnancy complications, and (2) her statements to Conyears-Ervin and Slack that she
was uncomfortable soliciting funds from broker-dealers, coupled with her refusal to assist in the
efforts.
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that she (1) “engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment,” (2) “suffered a deprivation
that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future,” and (3) that “the First
Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendant’s decision to take the
retaliatory action.” 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up)
(citation omitted). “A public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected only if it: (1) was
made as a private citizen; and (2) addressed a matter of public concern.” Forgue v. City of

Chicago, 873 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2017). If the plaintiff “fails to establish either of these
elements,” they have no First Amendment cause of action. Id. “The determination of whether
speech is constitutionally protected is a question of law.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d
476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016).
Defendants contend that Shalak’s speech is not protected by the First Amendment
because she spoke “pursuant to her job duties, not as a private citizen.” (Dkt. 26 at 12.) “[W]hen
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not

Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he rule that a person waives an argument by failing to make
it … also appl[ies] … where a litigant effectively abandons the litigation by not responding to alleged deficiencies in
a motion to dismiss.”).
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.” Forgue, 873 F.3d at 967 (quoting Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
Shalak alleges that she asked to “work from home due to her disability” and filed a

complaint after the City denied her request. (Dkt. 11 ¶¶ 18‒19.) Such speech solely reflects “an
employee’s attempt to improve her work environment” and therefore is not protected under the
First Amendment. Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 482; see also Massaro v. New York City Dep’t of Educ.,
481 F. App’x 653, 656 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding at summary judgment that plaintiff spoke as a
public employee when her complaints “were aimed at resolving her health issues so that she
could continue to teach, and ensuring that she had a safe and clean environment in which to
work”).
Shalak’s hesitancy to solicit broker-dealers is similarly tied to her employment.
Conyears-Ervin, “at all times relevant to this action[,] … had managerial authority and control
over [Shalak’s] employment.” (Dkt. 11 ¶ 9.) Conyears-Ervin convened the meeting to “discuss

the Treasurer’s goals for 2023.” (Id. ¶ 23.) She sought sponsorships “for a … summit … put on
by the Treasurer’s Office” and asked Shalak, Assistant City Treasurer and “Director of Strategic
Alliances and Partnerships,” to help. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 24.) Shalak, appearing to concede the point, does
not respond to defendants’ argument, nor does she dispute that her responsibilities included
securing such sponsorships.7
Similarly unhelpful are Shalak’s allegations that her job duties “involved very little
contact” with broker-dealers and “did not include soliciting [them] for funds.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Though

7 Shalak focuses her briefing solely on whether her speech addressed a matter of public concern. See
Palmer v. Penfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 918 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Garcetti made it clear that courts
should not conflate the public-concern requirement with the private-citizen requirement.”).
Shalak may have had valid concerns about the request, an employee’s “good reason[] to refuse
an order[] does not necessarily mean the employee has a cause of action under the First
Amendment when he contravenes that order.” Davis v. City of Chicago, 889 F.3d 842, 845‒46
(7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original and quotation omitted). “Because [her] refusal was pursuant

to [her] job duties,” Shalak spoke as a public employee, not as a private citizen. Id. at 845.
Shalak accordingly fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. Because the court
so concludes, Shalak’s Monell claim also fails. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 455 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[B]ecause his complaint fails to state a claim for any constitutional violation, the City …
cannot be held liable; a Monell claim requires a municipal policy or practice that results in a
constitutional deprivation.”). Count VIII is dismissed without prejudice.
III. Retaliatory Discharge (Count IX)
Defendants argue that Shalak’s common law retaliatory discharge claim against the City
should be dismissed because it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations under the Illinois
Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/8-101. Shalak responds that “Illinois common law actions for

retaliatory discharge are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.” (Dkt. 31 at 9.) This theory is
incorrect as a matter of law.
Under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101(a), “actions against
local entities … have a one year statute of limitations (except in the case of injury or death).”
Klee v. McHenry Cnty. Coll., No. 15-CV-04813, 2017 WL 3168973, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 26,
2017). “[T]he tort of retaliatory discharge is subject to the one-year statute of limitations under
the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.” Dayton v. Oakton Com. Coll., 907 F.3d 460, 470 (7th Cir. 2018)
(citing Halleck v. County of Cook, 637 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)).
Shalak relies on Zelman v. Hinsdale Township High School District 86, No. 10 C 00154,
2010 WL 4684039 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010), in support of her theory that the statute is governed
by a five-year statute of limitations. Zelman, however, involved a retaliatory discharge claim
brought under the Illinois Whistleblower Act, not Illinois common law. Id. at *1. Accordingly,

Zelman “does not control whether [Shalak’s] claim (which is not brought under the IWA) is time-
barred. Illinois law plainly subjects a general retaliatory discharge claim against a governmental
entity to a one year statute of limitations.” Klee, 2017 WL 3168973, at *4.8
Shalak’s reliance on Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 896 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. 2008) and its
progeny is also unavailing. Smith interpreted § 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act, “an entirely
different section of the statute not related to the statute of limitations,” and held that § 2-109
“provides public entities no immunity for retaliatory discharge based on the exercise of workers’
compensation rights.” Finch v. Vill. of Sauk Vill., No. 24 CV 4608, 2025 WL 1310461, at *4
(N.D. Ill. May 5, 2025) (quoting Smith, 896 N.E.2d at 239); see also Elue v. City of Chicago, No.
16 CV 09564, 2017 WL 2653082, at *9 n.10 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2017) (explaining that Smith “did

not address whether the statute of limitations under § 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act applied to
retaliatory discharge claims”). The court therefore concludes that Shalak’s common law
retaliatory discharge claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations under the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act.
“A statute of limitations defense, while not normally part of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), is appropriate where the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything
necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as when a complaint plainly reveals that an

8 The out-of-district cases cited by Shalak also fail to persuade for this reason. Ward v. City of Bloomington,
No. 13-1271, 2013 WL 12241836, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2013) (relying on Zelman and analyzing an Illinois
Whistleblower Act claim); Bogart v. Marron, No. 16-CV-1088, 2016 WL 11689575, at *12 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2016)
(collecting Illinois appellate court decisions interpreting the Illinois Whistleblower Act).
action is untimely[.]” Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quotation omitted). Here, Shalak alleges that the City terminated her employment on April 28,
2023, but she did not file the instant case until May 14, 2024—more than a year later. Her claim
is therefore time-barred and the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IX with
prejudice.
IV. National Origin and Race Discrimination (Counts IV and V)
Defendants also move to dismiss Count IV, national origin discrimination under Section
1983, and Count V, race, ethnicity, and ancestry discrimination under Section 1981. Shalak, in
her response, concedes that she will voluntarily dismiss Counts IV and V. Defendants
accordingly request dismissal with prejudice. Because the court makes no determination on the
merits, however, it declines this invitation. See Lennon v. City of Carmel, 865 F.3d 503, 509 (7th
Cir. 2017) (“[A] dismissal with prejudice ... operates as a disposition on the merits”).
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts IV and V is granted without prejudice.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss (dkt. 25) is granted in part and
denied in part. The court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III. The court grants
defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts IV, V, and VIII without prejudice. Count IX is dismissed
with prejudice. A scheduling conference is set for August 20, 2025 at 9:30 a.m. in courtroom
2201.

Date: August 7, 2025 z Mfuftort—
“S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11116670. Public record. Not legal advice.