# Hair v. Autonation USA Corporation

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11116052

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

PATRICK HAIR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-359-CEM-LHP

AUTONATION USA
CORPORATION,

Defendant

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form), which has been construed as a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. No. 2. The matter has been
referred to the undersigned and is ripe for review. Upon consideration, the
undersigned will respectfully recommend that the motion (Doc. No. 2) be denied
without prejudice and Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) be dismissed with leave to
amend.
I. BACKGROUND.
On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff Patrick Hair, appearing pro se, instituted this

action against Defendant Autonation USA Corporation, by filing a Complaint for
Employment Discrimination and Retaliation. Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff asserts claims
of discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and the related Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), and
a claim for failure to accommodate his disability (diabetes) in violation of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id.1 In sum, Plaintiff’s claims stem
from his employment with Defendant during an unidentified time period, with

Plaintiff alleging the following facts in toto:
A. Discriminatory Employment Practices

7. Defendant engaged in discriminatory hiring and onboarding
practices, delaying Plaintiff’s employment start date despite
confirming his hire. Plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly
situated employees who did not share his protected characteristics.

8. Defendant’s HR department failed to communicate Plaintiff’s
onboarding status, and management publicly undermined Plaintiff’s
qualifications, making false and discriminatory statements.

B. Failure to Accommodate a Disability (ADA Violation)

9. Plaintiff, who has diabetes, requested a reasonable accommodation
due to a documented health condition. Despite providing medical

1 At the beginning of the complaint, Plaintiff also references the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), Doc. No. 1, at 1, but the FLSA is not further mentioned in the
complaint. Accordingly, this report does not further address the FLSA.
documentation, Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s medical
needs and instead subjected him to harassment and retaliation.

10. Defendant’s management made derogatory comments regarding
Plaintiff's medical condition and unfairly criticized his work
attendance despite prior medical approval.

C. Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation

11. Plaintiff faced disparate treatment and favoritism, with
management selectively assisting favored employees while
undermining Plaintiff’s ability to make sales and earn commissions.

12. Plaintiff was subjected to intimidation, threats, and verbal abuse
from both management and coworkers, including an incident where a
manager balled his fists and warned Plaintiff to “keep his mouth
closed.”

13. Defendant failed to protect Plaintiff from harassment despite
multiple complaints, allowing a toxic work environment to persist.

D. Retaliation for Reporting Misconduct

14. Plaintiff reported discriminatory practices, workplace safety
violations (OSHA), and predatory lending practices. In response,
Defendant retaliated by isolating Plaintiff, restricting his job
responsibilities, and suspending him under pre-textual reasons.

15. Following a customer complaint about an inflated interest rate
(26.43%), Defendant faced an investigation. Plaintiff, who was
involved in the transaction, was subsequently subjected to heightened
scrutiny and retaliation, including attempts to sabotage his sales
performance.

16. After requesting legal counsel during a performance hearing,
Plaintiff was suspended again, demonstrating retaliatory intent by the
employer.

E. Pattern of Favoritism and Unlawful Practices
17. Defendant engaged in predatory lending by inflating interest rates
for customers, disproportionately affecting minority buyers. Plaintiff
became aware of these practices and attempted to intervene on behalf
of customers.

18. Defendant’s management encouraged covert misconduct, such as
manipulating finance terms to dissuade customers from purchasing
vehicles. Plaintiff witnessed fraudulent lending practices that led to a
government agency investigation.

19. The employer protected employees who complied with unethical
practices while retaliating against those who challenged unlawful
behavior.

Id. at 2–3. The claims asserted under Title VII, the FCRA, and the ADA do not
incorporate any of these specific facts but instead are stated in general terms. Id.
at 3. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief,
reinstatement or front pay, and fees and costs. Id. at 4.
The complaint is unsigned. See id. at 4–6. Plaintiff submits with the
complaint a “Witness List,” a “Description of Evidence,” and a Determination and
Notice of Rights from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Id. at 7–12. With the complaint, Plaintiff has also filed a motion to
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. No. 2.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The Court must conduct a two-step inquiry when a plaintiff files a complaint
and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. First, the Court must evaluate the
plaintiff’s financial status and determine whether he or she is eligible to proceed in
forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, the Court must review the
complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and dismiss the complaint if the action is

frivolous or malicious, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or the complaint seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).2 A complaint is frivolous within the

meaning of § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the allegations must show plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 557 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citation omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
A pro se complaint should be construed leniently, but a court does not have

“license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order
to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

2 The statute governing proceedings in forma pauperis references actions instituted
by prisoners, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915, but has been interpreted to apply to all litigants
requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d
1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004).
Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Moreover, a pro se
litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 863 (1989).
III. ANALYSIS.

On review of Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2), it
appears that Plaintiff qualifies as a pauper pursuant to § 1915(a)(1). However, the
complaint is not signed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion,
and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s

name--or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. . . . The court must
strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being
called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.”). For the sake of completeness, the

undersigned also addresses the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims. Upon
consideration, Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) fails to state a claim, and thus it is
subject to dismissal under § 1915(e).

In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to provide sufficient factual support. To
establish a discrimination claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he
is “a qualified member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse
employment action in contrast with similarly situated employees outside the

protected class.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004),
abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th
Cir. 2019); see also Andrews v. City of Hartford, 700 F. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2017)

(“[A] complaint must allege sufficient facts to allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the employer engaged in discrimination.”).3 “Although a Title VII
complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic . . . prima facie case,

it must provide enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional . . .
discrimination.” Pouyeh v. Bascom Palmer Eye Inst., 613 F. App’x 802, 810 (11th Cir.
2015) (quoting Davis v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir.
2008)). But besides conclusory assertions, Plaintiff does not identify to what

protected class he belongs or allege how he was discriminated against based on
such protected characteristic. And other than a conclusory statement, he identifies
no similarly situated employees that were treated differently. See, e.g., Gilliam v.

U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 2:16-cv-255-FtM-29CM, 2018 WL 3707834, at *5–6
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2018) (dismissing disparate treatment discrimination claims for
failure to adequately plead potential comparator). Moreover, Plaintiff’s general

claims of harassment are otherwise “no more than labels or conclusions,” which are
insufficient to state a claim under Title VII. See Chapman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 442 F.
App’x 480, 484 (11th Cir. 2011).

3 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit are cited as persuasive authority.
See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
As to his retaliation claims, Plaintiff must allege that “(1) [he] participated in
an activity protected by Title VII; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) there is a causal connection between the participation in the protected
activity and the adverse action.” Arafat v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 549 F. App’x 872,
874 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th

Cir. 2001)). But here too, Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation and the facts in support
are conclusory. See, e.g., Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., 251 F. App’x 626, 628
(11th Cir. 2007) (finding allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, “including filing a
union grievance, filing an informal complaint of harassment by a co-worker, and

writing letters to the editor of local newspapers, do not constitute the type of
protected activity contemplated by Title VII because [plaintiff] failed to allege that
the complaints included in these documents had any relationship to [a protected

characteristic] or otherwise indicate that [defendant] was engaged in unlawful
employment practices”); cf. Pinder v. John Marshall Law Sch., LLC, 11 F. Supp. 3d
1208, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (“[I]t is not enough for a plaintiff to show that he opposed

garden-variety unfairness or harsh treatment in the workplace; he is only protected
from retaliation if the practice he opposed or complained about is specifically
prohibited by Title VII.”).
Finally, with regard to the ADA, to state a claim, “a plaintiff must allege

sufficient facts to plausibly suggest ‘(1) that he suffers from a disability, (2) that he
is a qualified individual, and (3) that a “covered entity” discriminated against him
on account of his disability.’” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246

(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 1997)). The
ADA defines “disability” to include any “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).

The ADA also defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from diabetes and Defendant failed to

provide accommodations based thereon. Doc. No. 1. But Plaintiff does not allege
how his diabetes “substantially limits one or more major life activities,” nor does
Plaintiff identify the accommodation requested. See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Bd. of

Pinellas Cty., Fla., No. 8:22-cv-2279-JLB-CPT, 2023 WL 2810731, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
6, 2023) (“Mr. Williams’s omission of how the School Board failed to reasonably
accommodate him, or what accommodations—if any—he was owed, is fatal to the

prima facie case.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff also does not
include sufficient facts alleging that he was a “qualified individual” for purposes of
the ADA. Indeed, “[t]he complaint includes no fact allegations about the type of
position [Plaintiff] held, what that position required, or whether his disability

prevented him from performing those requirements.” See Marable v. Jack’s Fam.
Restaurants, No. 2:23-CV-00876-NAD, 2024 WL 42622, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 3, 2024)
(finding failure to state an ADA claim for same reason).

For these reasons, the undersigned will respectfully recommend that the
complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See, e.g., Pouyeh, 613 F.
App’x at 810 (“The district judge properly dismissed Pouyeh’s discrimination

claims, since Pouyeh did not provide sufficient factual matter to suggest
discrimination.”).
Ordinarily, a pro se party should be given one opportunity to file an amended
complaint. See Sifford v. Ford, 701 F. App’x 794, 796 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Generally, a

district court must sua sponte provide a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to
amend his complaint, even where the plaintiff did not request leave to amend.”
(citing Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v.

Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002))). Because it is at
least possible that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint stating a claim, the
undersigned will recommend that the Court allow Plaintiff to file an amended

complaint, within a time established by the Court.
Should Plaintiff be permitted leave to amend, Plaintiff is cautioned that he
must sign the complaint. In an amended complaint, he must also include factual
allegations stating a plausible claim for relief, which requires him to “plead[] factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Therefore, in an amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly allege the legal
basis of the cause of action, whether a constitutional provision, treaty, statute, or
common law. Plaintiff must name as Defendants only those persons who are

responsible for the alleged violations. Plaintiff must allege in the body of the
complaint, under a section entitled “Statement of Facts,” how each named
Defendant participated in the activity that allegedly violated his rights. Plaintiff
must also allege some causal connection between each Defendant named and the

injury he allegedly sustained. Finally, Plaintiff must allege specifically harm or
injury by the actions and/or omissions of the Defendant(s).
Because Plaintiff is currently proceeding without a lawyer, the undersigned

directs his attention to the Court’s website, http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov. On
the Court’s homepage, Plaintiff can find basic information and resources for parties
who are proceeding without a lawyer in a civil case by clicking on the “For

Litigants” tab and then clicking on “Litigants without Lawyers.”
IV. RECOMMENDATION.
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the
Court:
1. DENY without prejudice the motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
No. 2);
2. DISMISS the complaint without prejudice (Doc. No. 1);
3. PERMIT Plaintiff to file a signed amended complaint, within a time
established by the Court, along with a renewed motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, by filing an Application to Proceed in District Court Without
Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form).*
NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from the date the Report and Recommendation is
served to serve and file written objections to the Report and Recommendation’s
factual findings and legal conclusions. Failure to serve written objections waives
that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding or legal
conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation. 11th
Cir. R. 3-1.
Recommended in Orlando, Florida on July 7, 2025.

LESLIE NOFFMAN PRICE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

4 The Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs
(Long Form) is available on the Court’s website, https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov, by
selecting “For Litigants,” and “Litigants Without Lawyers,” and then selecting “Forms.”

44

Copies furnished to:

Presiding District Judge
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party
Courtroom Deputy

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11116052. Public record. Not legal advice.