# James Robert Hendricks v. West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board

> Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia · August 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11115609

## Case

- **Court:** Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia
- **Decided:** August 6, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Administrative Agency-Other
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

JAMES ROBERT HENDRICKS,
Applicant Below, Petitioner

v.) No. 24-ICA-448 (W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. (In Re: James Robert Hendricks))

WEST VIRGINIA CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC RETIREMENT BOARD, FILED
Respondent Below, Respondent
August 6, 2025
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF WEST VIRGINIA

Petitioner James Robert Hendricks appeals the October 9, 2024, order of the West
Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (“Board”), which found that Mr.
Hendricks, a member of the Teachers Retirement System (“TRS”), was not eligible to
purchase military service credit. The Board filed a response.1 Mr. Hendricks filed a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds that there is error in the Board’s decision but no substantial
question of law. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d)
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for reversal in a memorandum decision. For these
reasons, the Board’s decision is reversed.

This appeal centers on whether the Board erred in its determination that Mr.
Hendricks is ineligible to receive military service credit towards his TRS retirement
annuity pursuant to statute. Because the Board’s determination was predicated upon its
application of relevant statutes, we briefly pause to place the relevant historical background
of military service credit for TRS members in context before delving into the facts of this
case.

In 2005, the West Virginia Legislature enacted West Virginia Code § 18-7A-17
(2005) (“2005 Statute”), which pursuant to subsection (b), stated:

For the purpose of this article, the Retirement Board shall grant prior service
credit to new entrants and other members of the retirement system for service
in any of the Armed Forces of the United States in any period of national
emergency within which a federal Selective Service Act was in effect. For
1
Mr. Hendricks is represented by Kimberly G. Dotson, Esq. The Board is
represented by J. Jeaneen Legato, Esq.
1
purposes of this section, “Armed Forces” includes Women’s Army Corps,
women’s appointed volunteers for emergency service, Army Nurse Corps,
SPARS, Women's Reserve and other similar units officially parts of the
military service of the United States. The military service is considered
equivalent to public school teaching, and the salary equivalent for each year
of that service is the actual salary of the member as a teacher for his or her
first year of teaching after discharge from military service. Prior service
credit for military service shall not exceed ten years for any one member, nor
shall it exceed twenty-five percent of total service at the time of retirement.
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this subsection, contributions,
benefits and service credit with respect to qualified military service shall be
provided in accordance with Section 414(u) of the Internal Revenue Code.
For purposes of this section, “qualified military service” has the same
meaning as in Section 414(u) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Retirement
Board is authorized to determine all questions and make all decisions relating
to this section and, pursuant to the authority granted to the Retirement Board
in section one, article ten-d, chapter five of this code, may promulgate rules
relating to contributions, benefits and service credit to comply with Section
414(u) of the Internal Revenue Code. No military service credit may be used
in more than one retirement system administered by the Consolidated Public
Retirement Board.

W. Va. Code § 18-7A-17(b) (2005).

In 2013, this portion of the statute was amended to limit the TRS members eligible
for military service credit to those who were “honorably discharged from active duty
service in any of the Armed Forces of the United States in any period of national emergency
within which a federal Selective Service Act was in effect.” W. Va. Code § 18-7A-17(b)
(2013) (“2013 Statute”). Notably, neither the 2005 nor 2013 statutes contained any other
qualifying language or otherwise imposed time limitations upon a TRS member’s
eligibility for military service credit.

In 2015, the Legislature passed West Virginia Code § 18-7A-17a (2015) (“2015
Statute”), a standalone statute, which amended and recodified the statutory scheme
governing TRS military service credit. The 2015 Statute provides:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, for the purpose of this
article, the retirement board shall grant prior service credit to members of the
retirement system who were honorably discharged from active duty service
in any of the Armed Forces of the United States in any period of national
emergency within which a federal Selective Service Act was in effect. For
purposes of this section, “Armed Forces” includes Women’s Army Corps,
women’s appointed volunteers for emergency service, Army Nurse Corps,

2
SPARS, Women’s Reserve and other similar units officially part of the
military service of the United States. The military service is considered
equivalent to public school teaching, and the salary equivalent for each year
of that service is the actual salary of the member as a teacher for his or her
first year of teaching after discharge from military service. Prior service
credit for military service shall not exceed ten years for any one member, nor
shall it exceed twenty-five percent of total service at the time of retirement.
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this subsection, contributions,
benefits and service credit with respect to qualified military service shall be
provided in accordance with Section 414(u) of the Internal Revenue Code.
For purposes of this section, “qualified military service” has the same
meaning as in Section 414(u) of the Internal Revenue Code. The retirement
board is authorized to determine all questions and make all decisions relating
to this section and, pursuant to the authority granted to the retirement board
in § [5-10D-1] of this code, may promulgate rules relating to contributions,
benefits and service credit to comply with Section 414(u) of the Internal
Revenue Code. No military service credit may be used in more than one
retirement system administered by the Consolidated Public Retirement
Board.

W. Va. Code § 18-7A-17a(a) (2015).

Moreover, subsection (b) of the 2015 Statute provides that TRS members who were
employed prior to July 1, 2015, but do not qualify for credit under subsection (a), may
qualify for military service credit. In that respect, West Virginia Code § 18-7A-17a(b)
(2015) directly states:

(1) Any member may purchase up to sixty months of military service credit
for time served in active military duty prior to first becoming an employee
of a participating public employer if all of the following conditions are
met:

(A) The member has completed a complete fiscal year of contributory
service;

(B) The active military duty occurs prior to the date on which the member
first becomes an employee of a participating public employer; and

(C) The employee pays to the retirement system the actuarial reserve
purchase amount within forty-eight months after the date on which
employer and employee contributions are first received by the retirement
system for the member and while he or she continues to be in the employ
of a participating public employer and contributing to the retirement

3
system, or within forty-eight months of July 1, 2015, whichever is later:
Provided, That any employee who ceases employment with a
participating public employer before completing the required actuarial
reserve purchase amount in full shall not be eligible to purchase the
military service.

The 2015 Statute also placed limitations upon the timeframe in which TRS members
could seek military service credit under subsection (b), stating in West Virginia Code § 18-
7A-17a(b)(8):

To receive credit, a member must submit a request to purchase military
service credit to the board, on such form or in such other manner as shall be
required by the board, within the complete fiscal year period required by
subdivision (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this subsection, as applicable. The board
shall then calculate the actuarial reserve lump sum purchase amount, which
amount must be paid by the member within the 48-month period required by
said subdivisions, as applicable. A member purchasing military service credit
pursuant to this subsection must do so in a single, lump sum payment:
Provided, That the board may accept partial, installment or other similar
payments if the employee executes a contract with the board specifying the
amount of military service to be purchased and the payments required:
Provided, however, That any failure to pay the contract amount in accordance
with this section shall be treated as an overpayment or excess contribution
subject to [§18-7A-14c] of this [code] and no military service shall be
credited.

We recognize that since its enactment in 2015, West Virginia Code § 18-7A-17a
was amended by the Legislature in 2016 and 2025. However, other than making stylistic
changes, the operative language of subsections (a) and (b) were unaffected by those
amendments. With this backdrop in mind, we return to the matter at hand.

Mr. Hendricks enlisted in the Navy in 1974. He served in active duty for four years,
ten months, and eighteen days, which included service abroad during the Vietnam War. He
was honorably discharged from the Naval Reserve on September 26, 1980.

Mr. Hendricks has been employed as a science teacher at Morgantown High School
since July 2006 and is a Tier I TRS member.2 According to Mr. Hendricks, when he
accepted this employment, it was represented to him by the Human Resources Director for

2
Tier I refers to TRS members who were hired before July 1, 2015. Those hired for
the first time and became a TRS member on or after July 1, 2015, are Tier II. The Tiers
carry different benefits.
4
the Monongalia County Board of Education (“BOE”) that he would receive military service
credit towards his TRS retirement annuity.

In March 2024, Mr. Hendricks submitted a retirement estimate request to the Board
(“2024 Estimate”) and attached a copy of his DD-214.3 By letter dated March 18, 2024,
the Board advised Mr. Hendricks that he was not eligible for military service credit because
Tier I members were required to request military service credit prior to June 30, 2016. See
W. Va. § 18-7A-17a(b)(8).

Mr. Hendricks filed his administrative appeal on April 19, 2024, and a hearing was
held before the Board’s hearing officer on August 6, 2024. Mr. Hendricks testified on his
own behalf, and the Board relied upon the testimony of the Board’s Deputy Director and
CEO, Terasa Miller. At the hearing, the Board introduced three exhibits. The first was a
newsletter called TRS Pension Press, which was created by the Board and mailed to its
TRS members along with each member’s annual statement of contributions. Although it is
undated, from the context of the newsletter it was issued in late 2015 or early 2016.
According to the Board, the import of this newsletter is that it informed Tier I members:

A time sensitive legislative amendment made through Senate Bill 529 passed
during the 2015 Legislative Session now allows TRS Tier 1 members not
eligible to be granted prior military service credit during the “Draft” period
to purchase up to sixty months (5 years) of military service credit for time
served in active duty if they meet the following conditions: (1) The member
actively contributes to TRS for a complete fiscal year after July 1, 2015; (2)
The active duty military service occurred prior to first becoming an employee
of a TRS employer; and (3) TRS Tier 1 member pays to TRS the actuarial
reserve purchase amount in full by July 1, 2019, while actively employed.

The newsletter referenced the 2015 Statute and stated: “TRS Tier 1 members who work a
complete fiscal year in 2015-2016 must notify TRS in writing no later than June 30, 2016
of their request to receive a cost calculation to purchase military service credit[.]”

3
Mr. Hendricks submitted an earlier retirement estimate request in 2019 (“2019
Estimate”). As part of this inquiry, the Board requested a copy of his DD-214, which Mr.
Hendricks provided. After receiving the Estimate, Mr. Hendricks determined that he did
not have sufficient annuity funds to retire. The 2019 Estimate provided zero credit for his
military service; however, Mr. Hendricks maintains he received no accompanying
correspondence from the Board stating that he was ineligible for military service credit.
Regardless, the 2019 Estimate has no bearing on Mr. Hendricks’ 2024 Estimate or the
proceedings which led to this appeal.

5
Next, the Board introduced two brochures, which were created by the Board and
distributed to TRS members. The first was from November 2014 (“2014 Brochure”) and
the second from February 2016 (“2016 Brochure”); relevantly, each contained information
regarding military service credit. The 2014 Brochure stated, in pertinent part: “[m]embers
shall be given military service credit for service in any of the Armed Forces of the United
States during any period of national emergency within which the Federal Selective Service
Act (Draft) was in effect.” Conversely, the 2016 Brochure stated that “[m]ilitary service
will be credited in accordance with [West Virginia Code] § 18-7A-17a.” The 2016
Brochure then distinguished military service credit between those Tier I members who
served during the Draft from those whose service was performed after the Draft, stating in
relevant part:

Military Service during the Draft – Tier I members shall be given military
service credit for service in any of the Armed Forces of the United States
during any period of national emergency within which the Federal Selective
Service Act (Draft) was in effect[.]

Military Service after the Draft – Tier I members may be eligible to
purchase up to sixty months of active duty military service for military
service performed prior to employment with a TRS employer. To determine
eligibility to purchase military service, the member must submit a Request to
Purchase Military Service Credit form to the [Board] during the first
complete fiscal year of contributory retirement service completed after July
1, 2015.

Through Ms. Miller’s testimony, the Board maintained that Mr. Hendricks
voluntarily enlisted in the Armed Forces and, thus, the Board’s three exhibits established
that Mr. Hendricks was ineligible to receive military service credit because he did not
timely submit a request to purchase credit with the Board.

On September 23, 2024, the hearing officer filed their recommendation with the
Board, which recommended that the Board find Mr. Hendricks ineligible for military
service credit. In support of this recommendation, the hearing officer reasoned that when
Mr. Hendricks was hired in 2006, the 2005 Statute only permitted those TRS members who
had been drafted to receive military service credit. Because Mr. Hendricks chose to enlist
in the military, he was not automatically eligible for credit and any representation to the
contrary by the BOE was incorrect. The hearing officer further reasoned that when the
2015 Statute was adopted, it permitted Tier I TRS members to receive credit for their
undrafted military service if they applied for military service credit within one fiscal year
of July 1, 2015, and that this information was provided to Mr. Hendricks and other TRS
members in the TRS Pension Press and 2016 Brochure. However, because Mr. Hendricks
did not timely apply for credit, he was ineligible.

6
On October 9, 2024, the Board entered its order adopting the hearing officer’s
recommendation verbatim. This appeal followed.4

In this appeal, we apply the following standard of review:

The court may affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case
for further proceedings. It shall reverse, vacate, or modify the order or
decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, decision, or order are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedures;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.

W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(g) (2021). “An appeal of a decision as to the conclusions of law
and application of law to the facts, is reviewed de novo.” Stemple v. W. Va. Consol. Pub.
Ret. Bd., 251 W. Va. 121, 909 S.E.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 2024) (citing Cahill v. Mercer
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 208 W. Va. 177, 539 S.E.2d 437 (2000)).

On appeal, Mr. Hendricks contends that the Board erred in its determination that his
non-draft status precluded his eligibility for military service credit. Here, Mr. Hendricks
contends when he was hired in 2006, the Board was required to grant him credit for his
prior active duty military service pursuant to the plain language of the 2005 Statute.
Notwithstanding this statute, Mr. Hendricks further argues that the Board erred by not
finding that he was entitled to credit under the mandatory language of the 2015 Statute,
and erroneously limited his eligibility for credit upon the provisions of West Virginia Code
§ 18-7A-17a(b).5 In support of his argument, Mr. Hendricks cites mirroring language from

4
The hearing officer’s recommendation also set forth a basis for rejecting Mr.
Hendricks’ detrimental reliance claim, which was also adopted by the Board. However,
because we resolve this appeal on other grounds, we will not address Mr. Hendricks’
challenge to that determination in this decision.
5
Mr. Hendricks’ appeal also contains assignments of error asserting that he holds a
vested property right in his military service credit, and that he had insufficient notice of the
deadline to purchase military service credit pursuant to West Virginia Code § 18-7A-
7
both the 2005 and 2015 Statutes that states that the Board “shall grant prior service credit
to new entrants and other members of the retirement system for service in any of the Armed
Forces of the United States in any period of national emergency within which a federal
Selective Service Act was in effect.” Compare W. Va. Code § 18-7A-17(b), with W. Va.
Code § 18-7A-17a(b) (emphasis added). Mr. Hendricks maintains that nothing within this
statutory language limits military service credit to only those members who were drafted.
On appeal, the Board abandons its earlier position that the statutes only apply to TRS
members who had been drafted.6 Instead, the Board now argues that this language means
that “only those TRS members who served when the Federal Selective Service Act
([D]raft) was in effect were eligible[.]” For this reason, the Board claims that it properly
determined that Mr. Hendricks could only apply for service credit under West Virginia
Code § 18-7A-17a(b), which he failed to do in a timely manner. Upon review, we find no
merit in the Board’s position.

Ultimately, this appeal turns on the Board’s interpretation of the phrase “in any
period of national emergency within which a federal Selective Service Act was in effect.”
When considering the meaning of statutory provisions, it is axiomatic that “[t]he primary
rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 8, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953). Likewise,
“[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous[,] and the legislative intent is plain, the statute
should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case[,] it is the duty of the courts not to
construe but to apply the statute.” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548,
Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959); see also Syl. Pt. 2,
State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory provision which is
clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted
by the courts but will be given full force and effect.”).

Applying these principles, we conclude that a proper reading of this statutory
language cannot support the Board’s interpretation. To begin, we observe that the subject
language only requires that a TRS member’s military service occur during any national
emergency “within which a federal Selective Service Act was in effect.” (emphasis
added).7

17a(b). However, because we have disposed of this appeal on other grounds, we do not
need to address those issues herein.
6
The Board’s brief concedes this issue by stating that “[n]either [the 2005 Statute
nor the 2015 Statute] requires [Mr. Hendricks] to have been drafted . . . .”
7
We acknowledge that unlike the 2015 Statute, the 2005 Statute does not require a
TRS member to have an honorable discharge from active military service to be eligible for
credit. However, it is undisputed that Mr. Hendricks was honorably discharged from active
military service.
8
Because the term “within” is not defined under the statutes, this Court must look to
the commonly understood meaning. See State v. Soustek, 233 W. Va. 422, 426, 758 S.E.2d
775, 779 (2014) (quoting State ex rel. Cohen v. Manchin, 175 W. Va. 525, 336 S.E.2d 171
(1984)) (“In determining what undefined words and terms in a statute mean, undefined
words and terms are given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.”). According to
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, the term “within” means “in or into the scope or sphere
of” or “in or into the range of.”8 Merriam Webster Online, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/within (last visited July 24, 2025).

Based upon this definition, we conclude that the Board’s interpretation fails to give
the term “within” its common meaning. Instead, the Board’s reading of the statute rewrites
it to read “in any period of national emergency while a federal Selective Service Act was
in effect.” See Merriam Webster Online, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/while (last visited July 24, 2025) (stating that “while” means
“during the time that” or “as long as.”). As this Court has previously recognized, “It is not
for this Court [to] arbitrarily . . . read into a statute that which it does not say. Just as courts
are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we
are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely omitted.” Price v.
Raleigh Gen. Hosp., LLC, 251 W. Va. 508, ___, 914 S.E.2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 2025)
(quoting Syl. Pt. 11, Brooke B. v. Ray C., II, 230 W. Va. 355, 738 S.E.2d 21 (2013)).
Instead, courts are charged with giving effect to the intent of the Legislature.

Here, we conclude that the Board’s interpretation fails to give effect to the intent of
the Legislature. We further conclude that in order to embody the Legislature’s intent, the
phrase “in any period of national emergency within which a federal Selective Service Act
was in effect,” must be interpreted to mean that the Board is required to provide military
service credit to any TRS member whose military service occurred in a period of national
emergency, and there must have been a Selective Service Act in effect during that national
emergency, but the military service need not have taken place during that Selective Service
Act (Draft). However, our inquiry does not stop here.

Rather, taking this reading, another critical issue becomes the definition of “national
emergency.” This term is also not statutorily defined and, thus, must be given its ordinary
and accepted meaning. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “national emergency”
means “[a] state of national crisis or a situation demanding immediate and extraordinary
national action.” National Emergency, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary defines “national emergency” as “a state of emergency resulting from
a danger or threat of danger to a nation from foreign or domestic sources and usually
declared to be in existence by governmental authority.” Merriam Webster Online,

8
The term “within” is used as a preposition in the statute, and we consider the
definition as a preposition.

9
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/national%20emergency (last visited July
24, 2025). See Brown v. Bernstein, 49 F. Supp. 728, 731–32 (M.D. Pa. 1943) (“It is to be
noted with emphasis that the matter of a national emergency is, and always has been, left
to the judgment of the President . . . .[C]ongress throughout the years [has] made little or
no distinction between a [s]tate of [n]ational [e]mergency and a [s]tate of [w]ar.”).

Given this guidance, we conclude that the definition of “national emergency” is
objectively understood to mean a national emergency declared by the President. We find
this requirement is met under the facts of this case. Although ignored by the Board’s
decision, we note that as a matter of public record, President Truman issued Proclamation
2914 on December 19, 1950, which declared the existence of a national emergency. See 15
Fed. Reg. 9029-01 (1950); see Syl. Pt. 3, Brown v. Bottom Creek Coal & Coke Co., 94 W.
Va. 287, 118 S.E. 284 (1923) (“The courts of this state take judicial notice of the laws of
the United States, and the proclamations of the President of the United States made in
pursuance thereof, and of public notoriety or general public interest.”). Although the
immediate impetus for this Proclamation was the Korean War, the emergency stayed in
effect until September 14, 1978, when it was terminated pursuant to the National
Emergencies Act. See 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976). Moreover, as established both by Ms.
Miller’s testimony below and public record, and as recognized by the parties in their
briefing, a federal Selective Service Act (Draft) was in effect until July 1, 1973, clearly
within the above national emergency. Therefore, given these unassailable facts, we
conclude that under both West Virginia Code § 18-7A-17(b) and West Virginia Code § 18-
7A-17a(a), Mr. Hendricks is entitled to military service credit for his service from
September 27, 1974, to September 14, 1978, when the national emergency ended.9 As such,
we reverse the Board’s October 9, 2024, order.

Accordingly, we reverse.
Reversed.

ISSUED: August 6, 2025

9
In this case, the dispositive facts are either undisputed or matters of public record
whose validity is not subject to dispute. As a result, a proper application of the law to the
facts only permits the conclusion that Mr. Hendricks is entitled to receive military service
credit towards his TRS retirement annuity for the period of active duty service stated above.
Thus, we decline to remand this case to the Board because it would be a futile act, and
“[t]he law does not require the doing of a futile act.” State v. James Edward S., 184 W. Va.
408, 413, 400 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mechling,
219 W. Va. 366, 633 S.E.2d 311 (2006).
10
CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11115609. Public record. Not legal advice.