# Pabon v. Shoemaker

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11115000

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CARLOS RAMON PABON, :
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-1178

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)
BRAD SHOEMAKER, et al., :
Respondents :
MEMORANDUM
Currently before the Court are an application for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§2241 filed by pro se Petitioner Carlos Ramon Pabon (“Pabon”), a pretrial
detainee incarcerated in the Lycoming County Prison (“LCF”) while awaiting
the disposition of several criminal charges. For the reasons stated below, the

Court will grant Pabon leave to proceed in forma pauperiss, dismiss his

Section 2241 habeas petition without prejudice, decline to issue a certificate
of appealability, and direct the Clerk of Court to close this cas:e.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 22, 2024, Pabon was charged by crimiral complaint with
home improvement fraud (73 P.S. §517.8(a)(2)), deceptve or fraudulent
business practices (18 Pa. C.S. §4107(a)(2)), and theft by decseption — false
| impression (18 Pa. C.S. §3922(a)(1)) in Lycoming Courty. See Docket,

Commonwealth v. Pabon, No. MJ-29102-CR-52-2025 (Magis. Dist. Ct.)
(‘MDJ Docket”); Docket, Commonwealth v. Pabon, No. CP-41-CR-27-2025
(Lycoming Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.) (“CCP Dkt.”); (Doc. 1 at 1). On February 27,
2025, Pabon waived his preliminary hearing, see MDJ Docket, and his
charges were bound over for trial to the Lycoming County Court of Common
Pleas. See CCP Docket. To date, Pabon’s criminal charges are unresolved.
See id."
Pabon commenced the instant case by filing his Section 2241 habeas
petition and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP
Application”), both of which were docketed on June 27, 2025. (Docs. 1, 2.)
Pabon did not submit a certified prisoner trust fund account statement with

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket sheets for Pabon’s
criminal case while initially before the Magisterial District Court and now with
the Court of Common Pleas as they are public state-court records, which are
available through the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania’s Web Portal
for Pennsylvania criminal matters (https://ujsportal.pacourts.us). See
Zedonis v. Lynch, 233 F. Supp. 3d 417, 422 (M.D. Pa. 2017)
(“Pennsylvania’s Unified Judicial System provides online access to the
docket sheets for criminal cases, and this Court may take judicial notice of
those public dockets.” (citations omitted)). The Court also notes that the
docket sheet for Pabon’s proceedings before the Magisterial District Court
appears to show that Pabon was charged with two (2) counts of each
offense, whereas the Court of Common Pleas’ docket sheet appears to show
that he was charged with only one (1) count of each offense. Compare MDJ
Docket, with CCP Docket. This difference on the docket sheets does not
affect the Court’s resolution of Pabon’s habeas petition in this case.

his IFP Application, see 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2) (requiring that when applying
to proceed in forma pauperis, an incarcerated litigant must submit “a certified

copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the
[litigant] for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the appropriate official of each
prison at which the [litigant] is or was confined”); as such, an Administrative
Order issued requiring the Warden of LCP to submit Pabon’s certified
account statement to the Clerk of Court. (Doc. 4.) Pabon’s certified account
statement was docketed on July 14, 2025. (Doc. 5.)
In his Section 2241 petition, Pabon identifies several grounds for
habeas relief such as, inter alia: (1) he was falsely arrested; (2) both the
Lycoming County District Attorney's Office and the Lycoming County Public
Defender’s Office have impermissible conflicts of interest that should
preclude them from participating in his case; (3) there is a “procedural default
that prevents [him] from relief in state court[;] motion for pre-trial relief, insofar

as ‘this originated as a civil case [and] should have continued as a civil case’;
(4) the District Attorney’s Office wrongfully doubled the charges despite the
second set of charges being “not substantiated”; (5) the Public Defender
Office’s conflict of interest results in pretrial detainees losing due process
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteen Amendments as well as their

. 8.

“ore-trial preliminary hearing rights,” “pre-trial habeas corpus federal rights,”
and “violation Brady [sic] doctrine materials’; (6) and he was wrongfully
denied bail. See (Doc. 1 at 6, 10, 11). In addition to these claims, Pabon also

references: (1) state-law torts of defamation, libel, slander, and false light
invasion of privacy, see (id. at 8, 9); (2) the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’
Model Civil Jury Instructions, see (id. at 8, 9); (3) the search and seizure of
certain telephone conversations in March and April 2023, see (id. at 7); (4)
the use of a confidential informant for a controlled purchase of
methamphetamine and its relation to a search warrant seemingly issued on
April 3, 2023, see (id.); (5) the denial of his right to counsel at a preliminary
hearing, see (id.); (6) a false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for

monetary damages, see (id. at 9, 10); (7) the appointment of a special master
for “settlement,” see (id. at 8); and (8) punitive damages, see (id. at 9). For
relief, Pabon seeks an evidentiary hearing before the Court, the dismissal of
his charges, and either a bail hearing before the trial court, his conditional
release from incarceration, or his discharge from incarceration. See (id. at
11).

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ll. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), a district court “may authorize the

commencement . . . of any [civil] suit, . . . without prepayment of fees or

security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a

statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees or give security therefor.” /d. This statute
“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful
access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Specifically,
Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court
costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone
else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from
pursuing meaningful litigation. [Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §1915(a) allows a
litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in
forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among
other things, that [they are] unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.
Douris, 293 F. App’x at 131-32.
A litigant can show that they are unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit
“pased on a showing of indigence.” Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1084 n.5. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has not defined what it means to be indigent;
nevertheless, “[a] plaintiff need not ‘be absolutely destitute to enjoy the
benefit of the statute.” Mauro v. N.J. Supreme Ct., Case No. 56,900, 238 F.
App’x 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (quoting Adkins v. E./. DuPont
-5-

de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). Some district courts have

explained that all a litigant needs to show is that because of their poverty,
they cannot afford to pay for the costs of litigation and provide themselves

with the necessities of life. See, e.g., Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F. Supp.
879, 880 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (“An affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner
cannot, because of [their] poverty, provide [themselves] and any dependents
with the necessities of life is sufficient.”); Jones v. State, 893 F. Supp. 643,
646 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“An affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis is sufficient
if it states that one cannot, because of poverty, afford to pay for the costs of

litigation and still provide for him- or herself and any dependents.”).
B. Section 2241 Habeas Petitions
Section 2241 provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. §2241(a). After receipt
of a Section 2241 habeas petition, a district court must conduct an initial
review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petition is not entitled to relief in
the district court.” R. 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254; see also R. 1, 28 U.S.C. foll.
§2254 (“The district court may apply any and all of these rules to a habeas

corpus petition not covered by [Section 2254].”); In re Gorbey, 833 F. App’x

-6-

371, 372 (3d Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (“As the District Court noted in its

October 13, 2020 order, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases are

applicable to §2241 petitions by Rule 1(b).” (citing Bowers v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, Warden, 760 F.3d 1177, 1183 n.8 (11th Cir. 2014))). If so, the Court

must dismiss the petition. See R. 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254.
In addition, when a judgment against a petitioner in a state criminal
proceeding has not yet been entered and the petitioner files an application
for a writ of habeas corpus while in pretrial detention, jurisdiction for federal
habeas review arises under Section 2241, not [Section 2254], because
Section 2254 requires that the petitioner be “in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State Court.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (emphasis added). Under
Section 2241, the writ of habeas corpus may extend to a prisoner in pretrial
detention if they are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3). While federal courts
have jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a judgment is
entered in a state criminal proceeding pursuant to Section 2241, see, e.g.,
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 443 (3d Cir. 1975), in the pretrial setting,
“federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances’ to
adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior
to a judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct.

Pie!

of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973); see also Moore, 515 F.2d at 443

(“[JJurisdiction without exhaustion should be exercised at the pre-trial state

unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”). Disfavor of pretrial
intervention in state criminal proceedings is based on the notion of comity,
“a principle of deference and ‘proper respect’ for state government functions
in our federal system.” Evans v. Ct. of Com. Pl. Del. Cnty., Pa., 959 F.2d
1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971));
see also Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App’x 3, 4 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
(explaining that Section 2241 jurisdiction “must be exercised sparingly in
order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance ‘pre-trial habeas interference
by federal courts in the normal functioning of state criminal processes”
(quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46)). Thus, where no extraordinary
circumstances are present and a petitioner seeks to litigate the merits of a
constitutional defense to a criminal charge, “the district court should exercise
its ‘pre-trial’ habeas jurisdiction only if [the] petitioner makes a special
showing of the need for such adjudication and has exhausted state
remedies” by presenting their claim to the highest state court. See id. (citation
omitted).

Ill. DISCUSSION
A. The IFP Application
After reviewing the IFP Application and Pabon’s account statement, it

appears that he lacks the financial means to prepay the filing fee in this

matter. Therefore, the Court will grant the IFP Application and allow Pabon

to proceed in forma pauperis in this habeas action.
B. Review of the Petition
The Court has thoroughly reviewed Pabon’s Section 2241 petition, and
it plainly appears from it that he is not entitled to habeas relief. Several of
Pabon’s claims are not cognizable in habeas, his cognizable claims are
wholly unexhausted, and his criminal case and habeas claims do not present
extraordinary circumstances to warrant excusing exhaustion. As such, the
Court will dismiss his Section 2241 petition without prejudice.
1. Pabon’s Section 1983 Claims, State-Law Tort Claims,
Requests for Monetary Relief, and Request for
Appointment of a Special Master for “Settlement”
As stated above, along with his challenges to his criminal charges and
proceedings in Lycoming County, Pabon asserts Section 1983 false-arrest
claims, asserts various state-law tort claims, requests various forms of
monetary damages, and seeks an order appointing a special master to

-§-

facilitate a “settlement.” (Doc. 1 at 8, 9, 10.) Pabon may not assert those

claims and seek those forms of relief in this Section 2241 habeas action.
In situations where a habeas petitioner, such as Pabon, “is seeking
damages, [they are] attacking something other than the fact or length of their
confinement, and [they are] seeking something other than immediate or

more speedy release-the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In [such
cases], habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy.”
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); see also Barela v.
Martin, 830 F. App’x 252, 255-56 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (concluding
that Section 2241 habeas petitioner improperly sought “expungement of his
disciplinary convictions, return of his personal property, reinstatement to his
prior position in the dog program, different housing, prison employment,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages” because “[t]hese remedies

are available in a civil rights suit but not in a habeas action” (citation
omitted)). Instead, the petitioner must file a civil complaint to seek such
damages. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002)
(indicating that when a prisoner challenges a condition of confinement such
that finding in the prisoner’s favor would not alter their sentence or undo their
conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate). Accordingly, the Court will
dismiss Pabon’s Section 2241 habeas petition to the extent that he asserts

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claims under Section 1983 and state tort law, requests monetary relief, and

seeks an order appointing a special master for settlement, without prejudice
to him pursuing his claims in a civil complaint.”
2. Claims Seemingly Unrelated to the Charges in Pabon’s
Underlying Criminal Case
In his petition, Pabon includes factual averments and legal claims that

appear to bear no relation to the charges he faces in his underlying criminal

case, i.e., criminal charges involving alleged theft, deception, and fraud,
which were filed in 2025. More specifically, Pabon references, inter alia, the
seizure of telephone conversations on March 23, 2023, March 24, 2023, and
April 3, 2023; “a Body [sic] wire to conduct a controlled drug buy in suspects
[sic] residence”; and “a fictitious controleled [sic] drug buy that the suspect
sold Fifty [sic] dollars worth of meth to Confidential [sic] informant.” (Doc. 1
at 7.) Further casting doubt on these types of factual allegations’ relationship
to Pabon’s criminal charges is that almost identical allegations, using a very
similar form and typeface, were recently submitted in Section 2241 habeas
petition filed by a different individual being held in pretrial detention in the
Lycoming County Jail, which was also assigned to the undersigned.
Compare (id.), with Werkheiser v. Shoemaker, et al., No. 25-cv-1068 (M.D.

2 The Court expresses no opinion on the viability of any claims if Pabon
decides to file a civil complaint.
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Pa.), ECF No. 1 at 2. Overall, while it ultimately does not alter the Court's
conclusion that Pabon’s cognizable habeas claims in this case are

unexhausted, and he has not shown extraordinary circumstances to excuse
his failure to exhaust, Pabon should be mindful in any future filings to limit

his allegations to those relating to his case.
3. Exhaustion
Section 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement like
Section 2254, see 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that[] . . . the applicant
has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State... .”);
nevertheless, “an exhaustion requirement has developed through decisional
law, applying principles of federalism.” Moore, 515 F.2d at 442. Moreover,
“although there is a distinction in the statutory language of [Sections] 2254
and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is
concerned.” /d. Accordingly, a Section 2241 habeas petitioner must have
exhausted their state-court remedies regarding their claims before the
federal court can consider their merits. /o.; see Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d
627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have consistently applied an exhaustion
requirement to claims brought under §2241.”).

145

To properly exhaust state remedies, a Section 2241 habeas petitioner
must invoke “one complete round of the state’s established appellate review
process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The petitioner
bears the burden of showing that all claims alleged have been “fairly
presented” to the state courts, and ‘it is not enough that the petitioner
presents to the state court the facts upon which a federal claim is based.”
Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
Here, Pabon has not shown that he exhausted his available state
remedies in his petition. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d
Cir. 1997) (“The habeas petitioner carries the burden of proving exhaustion
of all available state remedies.” (citation omitted)). In this regard, Pabon does
not aver that he first raised any of his claims for habeas relief in his underlying
criminal proceedings and identify how the Court of Common Pleas
addressed those claims. The publicly available docket entries for Pabon’s
criminal case also do not show that he has filed any pretrial motions to date,
although the Court recognizes that his charges have only been pending in
the Court of Common Pleas for a few months. See CCP Dkt. Thus, it appears
that Pabon may still raise his constitutional claims pertaining to, inter alia, his
arrest, any search and seizures, and the amount of his bail, in the Court of
Common Pleas and then challenge any adverse rulings therein in the

Pennsylvania state appellate courts. Moreover, he has not demonstrated
that his criminal case presents the type of “extraordinary circumstances”

necessary to excuse his failure to exhaust. Accordingly, because Pabon has

not exhausted his state-court remedies or shown extraordinary
circumstances to excuse his failure to exhaust, the Court will dismiss his
Section 2241 petition without prejudice to him refiling it after exhaustion. See
Callwood, 230 F.3d at 634 (vacating district court’s order dismissing Section
2241 habeas petition on the merits and remanding with instructions to the
district court to “dismiss for failure to exhaust [state] remedies without
prejudice to Callwood’s refiling his challenge under §2241 after exhaustion’);
see also Lambert, 134 F.3d at 513 (“The exhaustion requirement does not
foreclose federal relief, but merely postpones it.”).
The Court also notes that some district courts in the Third Circuit
decline to consider Section 2241 habeas petitions filed by petitioners with
unresolved state criminal charges under Younger abstention:
Where, as is the case here, state-court remedies are
unexhausted, “principles of federalism and comity require district
courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Moore, 515 F.2d at 447-48. Younger
abstention will apply when: “(1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings
afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”
Lazardis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
-14-

Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408
(3d Cir. 2005)). If the three Younger requirements are satisfied,
abstention is required unless the petitioner demonstrates that the
state proceedings are motivated by bad faith, the state law being
challenged is patently unconstitutional, or there is no adequate
alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be
raised. Id. at 670 n.4 (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106
(3d Cir. 1989)). These exceptions are to be construed “very
narrowly” and invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances.” /d.;
Moore, 515 F.2d at 448[; s]ee a/so Brian R. Means,
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, §10.3 Westlaw (database
updated June 2021).
Arrington v. Commonwealth, No. 21-cv-1282, 2022 WL 317147, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. Jan. 13, 2022) (citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 576(4), (5)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 314675 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2022).
If the Court analyzed whether to abstain from resolving this case under
Younger, abstaining would be appropriate. Initially, there is an ongoing
judicial proceeding insofar as there is a criminal prosecution in the Lycoming
County Court of Common Pleas. Granting habeas relief here would interfere
with those criminal proceedings. Additionally, the Commonwealth's criminal

case against Pabon implicates important state interests because the
Commonwealth has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws. Finally,
as already explained, there is no indication that Pabon will not have the
opportunity to raise claims challenging, inter alia, his arrest, any arrest and
search warrants, possible conflicts of interest with the District Attorney’s and
Public Defenders Offices, and any evidence obtained by the
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Commonwealth. See, e.g., Pa. R. Crim. P. 578 (requiring that all requests
for pretrial relief, such as those seeking the “suppression of evidence” or “to

quash or dismiss an information,” to be “included in one omnibus motion’).
Therefore, Pabon’s claims relating to his state-court criminal proceedings
also meet the requirements for Younger abstention.
C. Certificate of Appealability
Because Pabon is a state pretrial detainee, the Court presumes that
he requires a certificate of appealability (“COA”) should he decide to appeal
from this decision. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that unless a
circuit justice or judge issues a COA, a petitioner may not appeal from “the
final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained
of arises out of process issued by a State court”); Reese v. Pennsylvania,
No. 19-cv-775, 2019 WL 5746276, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019) (concluding
that COA requirement applies to Section 2241 petitions filed by state pretrial
detainees); see also Harris v. Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 20-cv-962, 2021
WL 880477, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2021) (declining to issue COA as part of
dismissal of state pretrial detainee’s Section 2241 petition). A COA may
issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). When deciding whether to issue

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a COA after a dismissal on procedural grounds, the Court applies the
following standard:
[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional
claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least,
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling... . Where a plain procedural
bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to
dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either
that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the
petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. In such a
circumstance, no appeal would be warranted.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
In this case, jurists of reason would not find the disposition of this case
debatable, i.e., that Pabon has raised claims and requests for relief that are
not cognizable in habeas and has failed to exhaust his state-court remedies
as to any cognizable claims prior to filing his Section 2241 petition here and
that he failed to present extraordinary circumstances to warrant this Court
considering the petition. See, e.g., Burley v. Superintendent Forest SCI, No.
22-2719, 2023 WL 2560361, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 3, 2023) (denying COA
because “reasonable jurists would not debate the conclusion that there was
no reason for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction over Appellant’s
current [Section 2241] habeas petition because he failed to establish that (1)
he exhausted his state-court remedies or (2) his case presents ‘extraordinary

circumstances.” (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 443)). Accordingly, the Court
will not issue a COA in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court will grant the IFP Application, dismiss
Pabon’s Section 2241 petition without prejudice, decline to issue a COA, and
direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An appropriate Order follows.

United States District Judge
DATE: bP 7 □
25-1178-01

= 4@<

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11115000. Public record. Not legal advice.