# Kitler v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

> District Court, N.D. New York · August 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11113998

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11113998

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that on a motion to dismiss, “the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference” (citation omitted)
- noting that the parties to an agreement cannot use the agreement to “take away the legal rights of . . . a nonparty” and that such an agreement “violates the fundamental principle of contract law prohibiting the parties to a contract from binding nonparties”
- stating that allegations that a defendant “turn[ed] a blind eye” are insufficient (citation omitted)
- noting that the current version of the civil liability provision “add[ed] a constructive knowledge alternative”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALAN KITLER, MICHAEL KITLER and
KRESTEN BALLANTYNE,

Plaintiffs,
1:24-cv-01071 (AMN/PJE)
v.

THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS (a corporation), RONALD BOYCE
(an individual), ROD STANDAGE (an individual),
ERIC SELIN (an individual), JOSHUA MADSEN
(an individual), ROBERT RUBILAR (an
individual), EUGENE JENKINS (an individual),
JOHN VOM LEHN (an individual), CLYDE
MAUGHAN (an individual), VAN SLYKE (an
individual), DOLORES METZGER (an individual),
and DOES 1-500, Inclusive,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

HINCKLEY, ALLEN & SNYDER LLP CHRISTOPHER V. FENLON, ESQ.
30 South Pearl Street, Suite 901
Albany, NY 12207
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

ANDREWS & THORNTON ANNE ANDREWS, ESQ.
4701 Von Karman Ave – Suite 300 KIMBERLY M. DEGONIA, ESQ.
Newport Beach, CA 92660 RYAN M. MCINTOSH, ESQ.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs SEAN T. HIGGINS, ESQ.

WATTS LAW FIRM, LLP DAMON C. SINGLETON, ESQ.
811 Barton Springs Rd. - Suite 725
Austin, TX 78704
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

BARCLAY DAMON LLP MICHAEL J. MURPHY, ESQ.
80 State Street
Albany, NY 12207
Attorneys for Defendant The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
LUIBRAND LAW FIRM, PLLC ELIZABETH M. HARMON, ESQ.
950 New Loudon Road – Suite 270 KEVIN A. LUIBRAND, ESQ.
Latham, NY 12110
Attorneys for Defendant Ronald Boyce

PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP DAVID L. COOK, ESQ.
100 South Clinton Ave. – Suite 2900
Rochester, NY 14604
Attorneys for Defendants Rod Standage,
Eric Selin, Joshua Madsen, Robert Rubilar,
Eugene Jenkins, John Vom Lehn, Clyde Maughan,
Van Slyke, and Dolores Metzger
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Alan Kitler, Michael Kitler (the “Kitler Plaintiffs”), and Kresten Ballantyne
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (“TVPRA”) and assert various state law causes of action
against The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the “Church”), Ronald Boyce, Rod
Standage, Eric Selin, Joshua Madsen, Robert Rubilar, Eugene Jenkins, John Vom Lehn, Clyde
Maughan, Van Slyke, and Dolores Metzger (collectively “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 1
(“Complaint”). Presently before the Court are three separate motions to dismiss filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. Nos. 45, 49, 59 (the “Motions”). Plaintiffs
responded to each of the Motions. Dkt. Nos. 51, 52, 64. In turn, Defendants filed replies. Dkt.
Nos. 54, 60, 65.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are granted in part and denied in part.
II. BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the Complaint, its attachments,
or materials it incorporates by reference. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152
(2d Cir. 2002) (noting that on a motion to dismiss, “the complaint is deemed to include any written
instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by
reference” (citation omitted)). The allegations are assumed to be true for purposes of ruling on the
Motion, see Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union-N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 9 F.4th 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam), or are otherwise matters of public record,

Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 816 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020).
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
This case arises out of Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were sexually abused by Defendant
Boyce for years while they were minors and members of the Church in Schenectady, New York.
Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 3-12.
i. Abuse in the Church Generally
Generally, Plaintiffs allege that the Church “maintains a pattern and practice of concealing
abuse from the authorities.” Id. at ¶ 56. According to Plaintiffs, the Church has a history of
inadequately responding to reports of sexual abuse against its members, and its conduct “ratifies

abusive conduct, perpetuat[es] a culture of concealment[,] and encourag[es] a lack of cooperation
. . . with law enforcement.” Id.; see also id. at ¶ 67. In particular, the Complaint alleges that the
Church maintains a national “Helpline” for the nominal purpose of reporting incidents of sexual
assault in the Church, but that, in reality, the Helpline is used by the Church to identify potential
liabilities and to discourage callers from reporting sexual abuse to law enforcement. Id. at ¶¶ 61-
64. The Church is also alleged to have relocated individuals accused of sexual abuse to different
wards, or local congregations, of the Church rather than hold such individuals accountable. See
id. at ¶¶ 26, 67, 161. Plaintiffs allege that this case represents another example of the Church’s
mishandling of reports of sexual abuse. Prior to meeting any of the Plaintiffs, Defendant Boyce is
alleged, upon information and belief, to have been “disciplined in Utah for sexually assaulting
track athletes.” Id. at ¶ 27. The Church, however, “decided to move Defendant Boyce from Utah
to Schenectady, New York,” where the alleged events pertinent to this case took place, “rather
than pursue legal or disciplinary action against him.” Id. at ¶ 161.
ii. Kitler Plaintiffs

The Kitler Plaintiffs allege that they were sexually abused by Defendant Boyce from 1994
to 2001. Id. at ¶ 4. At some point in 1994, the Church assigned Defendant Boyce to be the Kitler
Plaintiffs’ “Home Teacher” and “Seminary Teacher.” Id. at ¶¶ 5, 69. At the time, Alan and
Michael Kitler were 12 and 13 years old respectively, and their mother was “undergoing a
divorce.” Id. at ¶ 69. In light of the family’s situation, the Church assigned Defendant Boyce to
“act[] as a mentor, spiritual guide, and father figure to the boys.” Id.
The Complaint alleges that Defendant Boyce used this assignment to groom and sexually
abuse the Kitler Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Alan Kitler was allegedly sexually abused “on a near-daily
basis.” Id. at ¶¶ 69-70. Plaintiff Michael Kitler alleges he was abused “weekly[.]” Id. at ¶ 87.

Defendant Boyce allegedly subjected Plaintiff Alan Kitler to “hundreds of sexual abuse incidences
[sic] of rape, sodomy, fondling, kissing, groping, and oral copulation” from 1994 to 2001. Id. at ¶
75. During the same period, Defendant Boyce allegedly forcibly groped, masturbated in front of,
and attempted to coerce Plaintiff Michael Kitler into having penetrative sex, often while
performing massages. Id. at ¶¶ 87-93. The alleged abuse occurred in Defendant Boyce’s home,
in the Kitler family’s home, on Church-sponsored trips, and on other overnight trips. Id. at ¶¶ 71,
88. Defendant Boyce allegedly used coercion, force, and manipulation to convince the Kitler
Plaintiffs to stay alone at his house. Id. at ¶¶ 76, 94. He also “made constant threats,” such as
telling the Kitler Plaintiffs that they were being watched and that he had many connections to
lawyers and judges through the Church. Id. The Complaint asserts that the Kitler Plaintiffs were
drugged using “crushed up white pills” so that Defendant Boyce could more easily “overpower
them” during the alleged abuse. Id. at ¶ 138. The Complaint also alleges that Defendant Boyce
gave the Kitler Plaintiffs clothing, video games, jewelry, trips, and tickets to sporting events, all
in exchange for sex acts. Id. at ¶ 139. Defendant Boyce threatened to confiscate every item he

had given to the Kitler Plaintiffs if they did not remain silent about the sexual abuse. Id. at ¶¶ 77,
95. The Complaint alleges that these gifts were purchased using funds provided by the Church.
Id. at ¶¶ 97-98, 140.
The Church allegedly received several reports regarding the abuse of Alan and Michael
Kitler. First, in 1994, the Kitler Plaintiffs’ mother “vocalized her concerns regarding [Defendant]
Boyce’s inappropriate behavior around her sons” to Defendant Maughan, a Bishop with the
Church. Id. at ¶ 99. Elsewhere in the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, around the same time, the
Kitler Plaintiffs’ mother similarly “made a report of extreme sexual abuse” to Defendants Van
Slyke and Metzger, teachers with the Church. Id. at ¶ 155. The Complaint alleges, upon

information and belief, that Defendant Maughan ignored this complaint because of his close
relationship with Defendant Boyce, id. at ¶¶ 99-101, and further alleges that Defendants Van Slyke
and Metzger suggested that the Kitler Plaintiffs’ mother seek psychiatric care for making the
report, id. at ¶ 155.
Later, in 1997, Plaintiff Alan Kitler met with Defendant Selin, another Bishop with the
Church, and “recounted [the abuse] in graphic detail[.]” Id. at ¶ 80. Defendant Selin allegedly
repudiated the claims of abuse “without a reasonable investigation[,]” called Plaintiff Alan Kitler
a liar, and told him not to share the allegations with anyone else. Id. Defendant Selin took no
action to prevent further abuse, and instead, informed Defendant Boyce that Plaintiff Alan Kitler
had made a report. Id. at ¶¶ 80-81. In response, Defendant Boyce allegedly “attacked” Plaintiff
Alan Kitler, id. at ¶ 82, and the abuse of both Kitler Plaintiffs became “rougher and more violent[,]”
id. at ¶ 103.
Finally, in 2001, Plaintiff Alan Kitler reported the abuse to Defendant Standage, yet
another Bishop with the Church. Id. at ¶¶ 103, 157. Two years later, in 2003, the Church initiated

disciplinary proceedings against Defendant Boyce, which were overseen by Defendant Vom Lehn.
Id. at ¶¶ 43, 159. As a result, the Church excommunicated Defendant Boyce. Id. However, even
after his excommunication, Defendant Boyce was allegedly permitted to attend Church services,
interact with other members of the Church community, and participate in Church-sponsored
activities at the behest of Defendant Vom Lehn. Id. at ¶¶ 30, 107. The Complaint also alleges,
upon information and belief, that the Church gave “no announcements or warnings” to the Church
community regarding the basis for Defendant Boyce’s excommunication. Id. at ¶ 107.
iii. Plaintiff Ballantyne
Plaintiff Kresten Ballantyne alleges that he was sexually abused by Defendant Boyce from

2007 to 2015. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 118. Prior to living in Schenectady, New York, Plaintiff Ballantyne
lived in Washington and attended the ward where Defendant Jenkins was a Bishop. Id. at ¶ 109.
While in Washington, Plaintiff Ballantyne’s mother moved her family away from Plaintiff
Ballantyne’s father and began divorce proceedings. Id. at ¶ 108. In light of the family’s situation,
Defendant Jenkins and the Church provided financial assistance to the Ballantyne family and
facilitated a move to Schenectady. Id. at ¶¶ 109, 114.
The Ballantynes planned to live with Defendant Boyce in Schenectady. Id. at ¶ 163. Prior
to the move, Defendant Jenkins allegedly had multiple conversations with Defendant Boyce about
the Ballantyne family’s plans to move in with him. Id. at ¶ 109. Plaintiffs allege, upon information
and belief, that at the time of these conversations, and prior to the Ballantynes’ move to
Schenectady, Defendant Jenkins was told by members of Church leadership in Schenectady,
including Defendant Standage, that Defendant Boyce was excommunicated from the Church due
to allegations of sexual abuse. Id. Despite this alleged knowledge, the Complaint further alleges
that Defendant Jenkins took no steps to warn Plaintiff Ballantyne or his mother of Defendant

Boyce’s history of abuse. Id. at ¶ 110. Defendant Standage, who allegedly had firsthand
knowledge of the accusations against Defendant Boyce, also had more than ten conversations with
Plaintiff Ballantyne’s mother about the family’s move to Schenectady. Id. at ¶ 114. Despite
knowing of Defendant Boyce’s alleged history of sexual abuse, Defendant Standage provided no
warning. Id.
The Ballantyne family moved across the country to Schenectady, but on the way there,
Plaintiff Ballantyne’s mother was severely injured in a car accident. Id. at ¶ 115. Upon their
arrival, Defendant Rubilar, a Bishop, informed the Church that the Ballantynes required additional
support due to the accident. Id. Defendant Rubilar also “performed religious ceremonies,

sacraments, and performed other duties” for the Ballantyne family at Defendant Boyce’s home
when they arrived but made no mention of Defendant Boyce’s alleged history of abuse. Id. at ¶¶
127-28. Instead, the Complaint alleges that the Church “assigned” Defendant Boyce to be Plaintiff
Ballantyne’s “mentor, caretaker, and father figure[.]” Id. at ¶¶ 9, 232.
The Complaint suggests that Plaintiff Ballantyne did not immediately move in with
Defendant Boyce, but that upon arrival, Defendant Boyce nevertheless had unfettered access to
the family’s children. Id. at ¶ 117. Eventually, Plaintiff Ballantyne did in fact move in with
Defendant Boyce and Plaintiff Ballantyne’s grandmother.1 Id. Members of the Church, including
Defendant Standage, often visited yet never warned of Defendant Boyce’s alleged history of sexual
abuse. Id. The Complaint also suggests that, eventually, the Ballantynes moved to a separate
residence, yet Defendant Boyce continued to visit frequently, and the Church remained aware of
his visits. Id.

After moving to Schenectady, Plaintiff Ballantyne alleges that he was subjected to sexual
abuse “an average of 15-20 times each month for six years of his childhood[.]” Id. at ¶ 118. The
abuse continued into Plaintiff Ballantyne’s adulthood and stopped in 2015 when Plaintiff
Ballantyne “left to study abroad in China.” Id. at ¶ 153. The alleged abuse consisted of
molestation, penetration, and oral copulation, and it often occurred in Defendant Boyce’s
basement, bedroom, and in other rooms of the house. Id. at ¶¶ 118-19. As alleged in relation to
the Kitler Plaintiffs, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Boyce used coercion, force,
manipulation, threats, and discussion of legal connections to convince Plaintiff Ballantyne to stay
at Defendant Boyce’s home alone and to remain silent about the abuse. Id. at ¶ 122.

The Complaint also alleges that Defendant Boyce used funds given to him by the Church
and sourced from his connections in the Church to pay for gifts and necessities for Plaintiff
Ballantyne. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 148-49, 164. Specifically, Plaintiff Ballantyne alleges that Defendant
Boyce provided him with a vehicle, a cell phone, credit cards, clothing, video games, jewelry,
trips, tickets to sporting events, job opportunities, a pet dog, rent for an apartment in New York
City, tuition assistance, and textbooks, all in exchange for sex acts. Id. at ¶¶ 148-53. The Church

1 The Church asserts that Defendant Boyce was a family member of Plaintiff Ballantyne, a fact
which is absent from the Complaint. See Dkt. No. 49-1 at 6-7. At this stage, the Court may not
consider facts outside the allegations in the pleadings. See Fonte v. Bd. of Managers of Cont’l
Towers Condo., 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Factual allegations contained in legal briefs or
memorandum are ... treated as matters outside the pleading[.]”).
allegedly insisted on communicating directly with Defendant Boyce regarding the Ballantyne
family’s financial needs. Id. at ¶ 164. Defendant Boyce also allegedly “monitored and
orchestrated” Plaintiff Ballantyne’s relationship with the Church community and restricted his
ability to speak with his mother. Id. at ¶¶ 120-25. The Complaint alleges that the Church
benefitted from its relationship with Defendant Boyce by avoiding reputational harm, avoiding the

loss of tithes from Church members, and by using Defendant Boyce for free labor and financial
bookkeeping related to the Ballantyne family’s needs. Id. at ¶¶ 203(c)-(d), 204.
In 2015, Plaintiff Ballantyne reported the abuse to law enforcement. Id. at ¶ 129.
Prosecutors interviewed Plaintiff Ballantyne but declined to prosecute because they said that
Plaintiff Ballantyne refused to testify. Id. Plaintiff Ballantyne alleges that this is false, and that
he was willing to testify. Id. The Complaint alleges, upon information and belief, that the Church
“obstructed” the investigation to prevent criminal charges. Id. at ¶ 130. Later, in 2016, the
Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Ballantyne’s mother informed Defendant Madsen, a Bishop with
the Church, of the abuse of her son. Id. at ¶ 131. In response, Defendant Madsen expressed that

rather than looking after Plaintiff Ballantyne, Church leadership had been “looking after the
girls[,]” to ensure that Defendant Boyce did not sexually abuse her daughters. Id.
B. The Litigation
Prior to the applicable deadline, Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the Church to
extend their opportunity to file suit until September 4, 2024. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 211; see also Dkt. No.
51-2; 59-3 (“Tolling Agreement”).2 The Tolling Agreement lists the Church’s “ecclesiastical

2 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Court may consider the Tolling Agreement. See Dkt. No. 51 at
11 (referring to the agreement as a document “incorporated into the motion”); see also GMH
Capital Partners v. Fitts, 24-cv-00290 (ER), 2025 WL 950674, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025)
(“The Court may consider the tolling agreements . . . because [the] claims depend upon the tolling
of the statute of limitations, thus making the tolling agreements ‘integral’”).
officers” as parties to the agreement, but only the attorneys for the Church and for Plaintiffs were
signatories, and the Tolling Agreement does not otherwise mention any of the other Defendants
by name. Id.
Plaintiffs filed suit on September 3, 2024 and asserted the following claims: (1) violations
of the TVPRA against the Church, Defendant Boyce, and Does 1-500, (2) sexual abuse of a minor

against the Church, Defendant Boyce, and Does 1-500, (3) negligence against all Defendants,3 (4)
negligent infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants, and (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress against the Church, Defendant Boyce, and Defendant Selin.4 See Dkt. No. 1 at
68, 82, 87, 96, 99, 103. On October 30, 2024, Defendant Boyce moved to dismiss all the claims
against him, arguing that they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. No. 45. On
November 11, 2024, the Church moved to dismiss the TVPRA claims against it, arguing that the
Kitler Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims were barred by a lack of a private right of action and the statute
of limitations. Dkt. No. 49. The Church also argued that Plaintiffs’ allegations against them
generally failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim. Id. Finally, Defendants Rod Standage, Eric

Selin, Joshua Madsen, Robert Rubilar, Eugene Jenkins, John Vom Lehn, Clyde Maughan, Van
Slyke, and Dolores Metzger (“Individual Defendants”) moved to dismiss all the claims against
them as time barred. Dkt. No. 59.

3 In particular, the Kitler Plaintiffs allege negligence claims against the Church, Defendant
Maughan, Van Slyke, Metzger, and Selin. Plaintiff Ballantyne alleges negligence against all
Defendants. See Dkt. No. 1 at 87.
4 In particular, the Kitler Plaintiffs allege intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Defendant Selin. See Dkt. No. 1 at 103. All Plaintiffs allege the claim against Defendants Boyce
and the Church. Id. at 99.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007).
In considering legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. See ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund,

Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). This presumption, however, does not extend to legal
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a court’s review of a
motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleadings, the court may
consider documents that are “integral” to the pleadings even if they are neither physically attached
to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleadings. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391,
398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers, 282 F.3d at 152-53).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the
claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (alteration in original) (quotation
omitted). Under this standard, a pleading’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are
“plausible on [their] face,” id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, “when
the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed,” id. at 570.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Undisputed Dismissals and Unopposed Claims
For the sake of clarity, the Court takes note of several claims which Plaintiffs have
conceded must be dismissed, as well as several claims that the Church has not moved to dismiss.
First, Plaintiffs “acknowledge that a private right of action under the TVPRA did not exist

at the time of [the Kitler Plaintiffs’] abuse and do not contest the Church’s motion” to dismiss the
Kitler Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims. Dkt. No. 52 at 10. Plaintiffs’ admission that the Kitler Plaintiffs
may not bring a TVPRA claim also bars the Kitler Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims against the other
Defendants. Thus, the Court dismisses the Kitler’s TVPRA claims in their entirety. Second,
Plaintiffs have stipulated to the dismissal without prejudice of their claims of negligence, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant
Boyce. Dkt. No. 51 at 6. Such dismissal is granted. Third, “Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal
of Defendant Van Slyke.” Dkt. No. 64 at 4 n.1. Therefore, all claims against Defendant Van Slyke
are dismissed. Finally, the Church solely moved to dismiss the TVPRA claims against it. Dkt.
No. 49-1 at 5. Thus, the remaining claims against the Church are not at issue.

In sum, the Court proceeds to evaluate whether the following claims should be dismissed:
(1) Plaintiffs’ sexual abuse of a minor claims against Defendant Boyce and the other state law
claims against the remaining Individual Defendants, (2) Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claim
against Defendant Boyce, and (3) Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claim against the Church.
B. State Law Claims and the Tolling Agreement
Defendant Boyce and the Individual Defendants move to dismiss the remaining state law
claims against them as time barred. See Dkt. No. 45-3; Dkt. No. 59-2 at 17. Plaintiffs argue that
Defendant Boyce and the Individual Defendants are bound by the Tolling Agreement, and thus,
the claims are timely. See Dkt. No. 51 at 9-12; Dkt. No. 64 at 8-12. Plaintiffs also argue that
Defendants have not carried their “higher burden” to warrant dismissal based on untimeliness at
the motion to dismiss stage. Dkt. No. 51 at 19; Dkt. No. 64 at 14. In turn, Defendant Boyce and
the Individual Defendants assert that they are not bound by the Tolling Agreement because they
did not sign the agreement, and that the burden is on Plaintiff to show that tolling applies. See
Dkt. No. 54 at 5-7; Dkt. No. 65 at 5.

“The determination of when a statute of limitations began to run is generally a factual one”
that is often inappropriate at the pleading stage. See D.B. v. Sullivan, 1:22-cv-282 (MAD/CFH),
2023 WL 2456070, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2023) (citation omitted). “However, ‘where the dates
in a complaint show that an action is barred by a statute of limitations, a defendant may raise the
affirmative defense in a pre-answer motion to dismiss.’” Id. (quoting Ghartey v. St. John's Queens
Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989)). Where claims “are prima facie time-barred, the burden
is on the plaintiff to ‘plausibly alleg[e] that they fall within an exception to the applicable statute
of limitations.’” Roeder v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 523 F. Supp. 3d 601, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).

i. Prima Facie Untimeliness
Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Defendant Boyce and the Individual Defendants are
prima facie untimely. Roeder, 523 F. Supp. 3d at 611. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not dispute that, based
purely on the dates of the alleged conduct, their state law claims have expired.5 See Dkt. No. 45-
3 at 10-13; Dkt. No. 59-2 at 17. Instead, Plaintiffs mistakenly aver that Defendant Boyce and the
Individual Defendants “must prove that on [their] face, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support tolling

5 Nor does the Child Victims Act (“CVA”) save Plaintiffs’ sexual abuse of a minor claims against
Defendant Boyce in the absence of the Tolling Agreement. As Plaintiffs acknowledge in their
Complaint, the CVA extended the deadline for filing certain claims until August 14, 2021. See
Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 15. Without the Tolling Agreement, Plaintiffs did not meet this deadline.
of the statute.” Dkt. No. 51 at 8; Dkt. No. 64 at 12-14. This is a reversal of the applicable burden.
Instead, Defendants’ burden is to show that the claims are prima facie untimely based on the dates
of the conduct alleged. See Ghartey, 869 F.2d at 162. They have done so.
ii. Plaintiffs’ Burden to Allege Facts Supporting Tolling
Thus, Plaintiffs have “the burden of pleading facts sufficient to establish that the statutes

of limitations should be tolled” against Defendant Boyce and the Individual Defendants. Essex
Capital Corp. v. Garipalli, No. 17 Civ. 6347 (JFK), 2018 WL 6618388, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,
2018). Plaintiffs point to the Tolling Agreement and the allegations pertaining to it.
The Tolling Agreement, which extends the deadline for filing claims arising out of the
alleged childhood abuse experienced by Plaintiffs, was made “by and between” the Church, “its
affiliated entities . . . and any ecclesiastical officers . . . and Alan Kitler, Mike Kitler, and Kresten
Ballantyne[.]” Dkt. No. 51-2 at 2. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Boyce and the Individual
Defendants are “ecclesiastical officers” under the Tolling Agreement,6 and therefore are bound.
Plaintiffs also contend that, to the extent that the Tolling Agreement is ambiguous as to whether

Defendant Boyce and the Individual Defendants are ecclesiastical officers, this Court must
construe the term’s meaning in favor of Plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage because they have
not had the opportunity to present evidence as to its meaning. Dkt. No. 51 at 11 (citing Int’l
Audiotext Network, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) and then citing Serdarevic v.
Centex Homes, LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 322, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) and Banks v. Corr. Servs. Corp.,
475 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)); Dkt. No. 64 at 11 (same).

6 The Complaint alleges that Defendant Boyce was “ordained a member of the Aaronic Priesthood
. . . and [is a] Deacon, a Teacher, a holder of the Melchizedek Priesthood . . . and was ordained an
Elder[.]” Dkt. No. 51 at 10 (citations omitted). The Individual Defendants “are or have been
Bishops, Stake Presidents, or Relief Society President within the Church.” Dkt. No. 64 at 10.
But Plaintiffs miss a more fundamental issue. The Tolling Agreement does not mention
Defendant Boyce nor the Individual Defendants by name, and none are signatories. See Dkt. No.
51-2 at 5. Instead, the Tolling Agreement is signed solely by attorneys for the Church, and that
signature is offered only on behalf of the Church. Id. “It goes without saying that a contract cannot
bind a nonparty.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002). As a matter of law, a

contract’s language purporting to cover a nonparty is insufficient, on its own, to establish that the
nonparty is indeed bound. See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that the
parties to an agreement cannot use the agreement to “take away the legal rights of . . . a nonparty”
and that such an agreement “violates the fundamental principle of contract law prohibiting the
parties to a contract from binding nonparties”). In light of these principles, where a defendant is
“not a direct signatory on the Tolling Agreement . . . . the Tolling Agreement does not apply to
claims against [that defendant].” Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. ANM Funding LLC, No.
15-cv-03405, 2016 WL 11263666, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 1, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted by 15-CV-3405 (KAM)(RER), 2016 WL 8672950 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2016). Thus,

without more, the Tolling Agreement itself does not overcome the facial untimeliness of the state
law claims against Defendant Boyce and the Individual Defendants.
Plaintiffs also argue that even though Defendant Boyce and the Individual Defendants are
not signatories, they may be properly bound by other principles of contract law such as agency,
authorization, or some other legal theory capable of binding non-signatories to a contract. See
Dkt. No. 64 at 12-14. But Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged facts in support of such theories.
The Complaint merely states, in conclusory terms, that the parties “entered” into the Tolling
Agreement. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 15, 211. Moreover, as discussed, the Tolling Agreement itself
contradicts these allegations. See Dkt. No. 51-2. Tellingly, the Complaint does not allege that
Defendant Boyce nor any of the Individual Defendants were privy to the conversations leading up
to the Tolling Agreement, that they consented to it, or even that they knew it existed. In the absence
of any allegations suggesting that these parties consented to the Tolling Agreement, that they
shared counsel at the time the agreement was reached, or that the Church was otherwise authorized
to sign on their behalf, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the state law claims against non-

signatories should be tolled by virtue of the Tolling Agreement.7
As such, the remaining state law claims must be dismissed against Defendant Boyce and
the Individual Defendants without prejudice.8 Because no claims remain against the Individual
Defendants, they are dismissed from the case entirely.

7Martin v. Garrett, No. 1:17-CV-350-MOC-WCM, 2020 WL 2858237 at *6 (W.D.N.C. June 2,
2020), is not to the contrary. There, the court denied a motion to dismiss because, unlike here, it
found that the plaintiff had marshalled facts supporting her argument that a defendant was bound
by a tolling agreement despite being a non-signatory. Id. at *6-7. Moreover, the Court has
identified several out-of-Circuit cases dismissing claims against non-signatories to tolling
agreements based on timeliness. See, e.g., Hanna v. K-Kel, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00639-JCM-BNW,
2022 WL 181252, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 20, 2022) (“Plaintiff did not plead any facts suggesting that
the tolling agreement applied to the [unnamed] individual defendants”); Doe v. Kentucky State
Univ., No: 3:18-cv-00061-GFVT, 2019 WL 6702541, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2019) (plaintiff
made “no suggestion in law or fact” that a signatory to a tolling agreement could bind a non-
signatory defendant); SOS Co., Inc. v. E-Collar Tech., Inc., No. CV 16-09667-AB (AFMx), 2017
WL 5714716, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017) (plaintiffs “failed to sufficiently allege” the basis for
their theory that a non-signatory to a tolling agreement was bound); Wolper v. Hotel Europe, 552
F. Supp. 2d 687, 691-92 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (finding a tolling agreement did not apply at the motion
to dismiss stage where plaintiff “present[ed] no adequate basis on which [the signatory], could . .
. have bound [the defendant]”).
8 Though the Court does not base its decision on such argument, Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to
the Individual Defendant’s Motion seemingly confirms that Plaintiffs, in fact, have no basis for
their assertion that the Individual Defendants authorized the Church to enter into the Tolling
Agreement on their behalf. Plaintiffs argue that discovery could uncover that the Individual
Defendants “were aware of the tolling agreement and agreed to it[,]” or that the Church’s standard
operating procedures might require that Bishops “sign agreements giving the Church’s counsel
authority to sign documents on their behalf[.]” Dkt. No. 64 at 13-14. But such argument amounts
to no more than a request for a fishing expedition, with no concrete basis in the facts alleged or in
the Tolling Agreement itself, as required where the claims are untimely on the face of the
Complaint.
C. Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA Claim Against Defendant Boyce
In contrast, the Court finds that Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claim against Defendant
Boyce is timely even without the Tolling Agreement.9 A claim under the TVPRA is subject to a
10-year statute of limitations which begins running after the later of: 1) the accrual of the cause of
action, or 2) when the victim reached the age of 18. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595(c)(1)-(2). For purposes

of the TVPRA, a cause of action accrues “on the last date the wrongful conduct occurs” because
the statute “involves a continuing tort, and . . . [] a single act occurring within the limitations period
will preserve a claim based on all acts that were part of a single pattern.” Levin v. Sarah Lawrence
Coll., 747 F. Supp. 3d 645, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Schneider v. OSG, LLC, 22-CV-7686
(AMD) (VMS), 2024 WL 1308690, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff Ballantyne alleges that Defendant Boyce abused him from 2007 to 2015.
See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 10. Plaintiff Ballantyne turned 18 in either 2012 or 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 118, 211
(alleging inconsistent dates). Because the last date of alleged abuse and trafficking in 2015 is later

than Plaintiff Ballantyne’s 18th birthday, the 10-year statute of limitations began running on
Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claim at some point in 2015. Plaintiff Ballantyne brought the
TVPRA claim in September 2024, less than 10 years after the claim accrued. Therefore, as alleged,
Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claim is not time barred.
Defendant argues that “by [Plaintiffs’] own admission,” Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA
claim is time barred. Dkt. No. 54 at 11. Indeed, the Complaint does directly allege that the claim
“would be time barred . . . after July 7, 2022” without the Tolling Agreement. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 211.

9 Defendant Boyce does not oppose Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claim against him on the merits.
Therefore, for purposes of this decision, the Court assumes without holding that Plaintiff
Ballantyne plausibly alleges a TVPRA claim against Defendant Boyce so long as it is timely.
But on a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider the facts in the Complaint in “the light most
favorable to [Plaintiffs].” DeMasi v. Benefico, 567 F. Supp. 2d 449, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(citations omitted). Given that the Complaint also plausibly alleges that the conduct at the center
of the alleged trafficking continued until 2015, at this stage, the Court must deny the motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claim based on the statute of limitations. Moreover, the

Complaint’s assertion that Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA claims were time barred as of July 7,
2022 is a legal conclusion, not an assertion of fact. Thus, the Court need not accept the assertion
as true. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
D. Plaintiff Ballantyne’s TVPRA Claims Against the Church
Finally, the Court turns to whether Plaintiff Ballantyne has pled a plausible claim under
the TVPRA against the Church. See Dkt. No. 49-1 at 11-14.
Part of the TVPRA, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (“§ 1591(a)”), imposes criminal liability upon
whoever knowingly: “recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises,
maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or benefits, financially or by receiving

anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act [previously
described],” with knowledge, or a reckless disregard for the fact, “that the person has not attained
the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act[.]” The TVPRA also
assigns civil liability, using language which closely (but not exactly) tracks the criminal statute:
“[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)] may bring
a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts
or conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter)[.]”

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (“§ 1595(a)”). Pursuant to the language of the statute, the TVPRA creates
two forms of civil claims: beneficiary liability and perpetrator liability. See Doe (G.N.C.) v.
Uniquest Hosp., LLC, 23-cv-7980 (PKC), 2024 WL 4149251, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2024).
Plaintiff Ballantyne brings both claims against the Church.
i. Beneficiary Liability
To state a claim for beneficiary liability, Plaintiffs must assert the following: “(1) a venture
has engaged in [a violation of § 1591(a)], (2) the defendant knew or should have known that the

venture had violated [§ 1591(a)], (3) the defendant participated in that venture, and (4) the
defendant knowingly benefited from its participation.” Levin, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 679 (quoting
G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 565 (7th Cir. 2023)); see also S.J. v. Choice Hotels
Int’l, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing A.C. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 2:19-
cv-4965, 2020 WL 3256261, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2020)). The Church argues that it is not
subject to beneficiary liability because the Complaint fails to allege the final three elements: that
it “knew or should have known” of the alleged trafficking, that it “participated” in a venture, and
that it “knowingly benefited” from the alleged participation. See Dkt. No. 49-1 at 11-14; Dkt. No.
60 at 10-14. The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiff Ballantyne has plausibly stated a claim

for beneficiary liability against the Church.
1. Knew or Should Have Known
First, the Court finds that Plaintiff Ballantyne has plausibly alleged the second element of
the beneficiary claim. In relevant part, the statute assigns liability to an entity that “knew or should
have known [a venture] has engaged in [a violation of § 1591(a)].” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (emphasis
added); see also Levin, 747 F. Supp. at 679. The Church’s arguments to the contrary confuse the
appropriate standard. Regardless of the applicable standard, however, the allegations are sufficient
to survive dismissal.
The Church argues that the Complaint fails to allege that it “actually knew that [Defendant]
Boyce was ‘trafficking’ [Plaintiff] Ballantyne.” Dkt. No. 60 at 11 (emphasis added). In doing so,
the Church relies on Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Id. at 10.
There, the court found that a defendant was not subject to civil beneficiary liability under the
TVPRA, in part, because the complaint did not assert that the defendant had knowledge of the sex
trafficking itself. Id. at 524. In reaching its decision, the court in Noble relied on U.S. v. Afyare,

a criminal case. 632 F. App’x 272, 282-86 (6th Cir. 2016).
But courts since Noble have criticized the knowledge standard applied there as failing to
account for the differences in criminal and civil liability under the TVPRA. See, e.g., Choice
Hotels Int’l, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d at 153; Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th at 558 n.14; Doe #1 v. Red
Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 724 (11th Cir. 2021); E.S. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 3d 420,
427 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (collecting cases). Specifically, the related criminal statute, § 1591, defines
“participation in a venture[,]” a separate element of the offense, to mean “knowingly assisting,
supporting or facilitating.” § 1591(e)(4) (emphasis added). In contrast, “participation in a venture”
is not defined in the civil portion of the statute, § 1595(a).10 Moreover, the civil portion of the

statute, but not the criminal portion, explicitly assigns liability where the defendant “knew or
should have known” of the trafficking. Id. Considering these distinctions, courts have concluded
that Congress intended “to broaden the behavior that can form the basis of civil liability.” Choice
Hotels Int’l, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d at 153 (quoting M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425
F. Supp. 3d 959, 964 (S.D. Ohio 2019)); Doe #1 v. MG Freesites, LTD, 676 F. Supp. 3d 1136,
1155 (N.D. Ala. 2022) (“[W]hile sections 1591 and 1595 both include provisions for beneficiary

10 Courts assessing civil TVPRA claims often discuss the knowledge requirement under the
“participation” element of the claim, as the Church has done in its brief, because of the language
in the related criminal statute. Considering the distinction between civil and criminal liability
discussed herein, and to avoid further conflation of the elements in the civil beneficiary context,
the Court addresses the “participation” and “knew or should have known” elements separately.
liability, the criminal statute requires that the defendant have actual knowledge of sex trafficking
at issue while the civil statute allows a plaintiff to plead that the defendant merely had constructive
knowledge.”). Indeed, were civil plaintiffs required to allege that beneficiary defendants actually
knew of the alleged trafficking, as Noble purports, such a requirement would render meaningless
Section 1595(a)’s unique “knew or should have known” language. See, e.g., A.B. v. Hilton

Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 935 (D. Ore. 2020) (agreeing with the “[s]everal
other courts [which] have rejected” the Noble approach); see also A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 455
F. Supp. 3d 171, 188 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“The court in Noble did not address the ‘knew or should
have known’ language[.]”); J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 20-cv-00155-WHO, 2020 WL
6318707, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020) (“[Plaintiff] need not allege that defendants had actual
knowledge of her sex trafficking[.]”); see also Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp.
3d 156, 167 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that the current version of the civil liability provision
“add[ed] a constructive knowledge alternative”).
The Court agrees with these cases and finds that, to assert civil beneficiary liability under

the TVPRA, Plaintiffs need not allege that the Church “knew” that Defendant Boyce was
trafficking Plaintiff Ballantyne. Instead, allegations plausibly suggesting that the Church “should
have known,” or had constructive knowledge of, the alleged trafficking are enough.
“Constructive knowledge is an intensely fact-based assessment, and obviously presents a
meaningfully lower hurdle than a requirement to show actual knowledge.” Edmondson v. Raniere,
751 F. Supp. 3d 136, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (assessing TVPRA beneficiary claims against NXIVM).
Plaintiff Ballantyne meets this burden. First, the Complaint alleges, upon information and belief,
that Defendant Boyce “was previously disciplined in Utah for sexually assaulting track athletes”
and that the Church “decided to move [Defendant Boyce] from Utah to Schenectady, New York,
rather than pursue legal or disciplinary action against him.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 27, 161. The
Complaint also alleges that the Church was aware of Defendant Boyce’s alleged sexual abuse of
the Kitler Plaintiffs in strikingly similar circumstances, and that the Church found those allegations
meritorious enough to warrant excommunication. Id. at ¶¶ 104-05. Moreover, the Complaint
alleges that members of the Church leadership observed worrisome behavior during visits between

Defendant Boyce and Plaintiff Ballantyne, including that Plaintiff Ballantyne was “forced” to sleep
on a couch on a separate floor from his sisters to facilitate nightly abuse and that Plaintiff
Ballantyne was shown “extreme favoritism.” Id. at ¶ 166. These visits would have presented red
flags “for any reasonable person[,]” according to the Complaint. Id. Moreover, the Church’s own
funds were allegedly used to purchase lavish gifts for Plaintiff Ballantyne, including a car, jewelry,
and rent for an apartment in New York. Id. at ¶¶ 148-49. The Complaint also alleges that after
being told of the abuse, Church leadership admitted that they had considered the possibility that
Defendant Boyce was abusing Plaintiff Ballantyne’s sisters, indicating an active awareness of the
danger posed by Defendant Boyce to the Ballantyne family. Id. at ¶ 131. Drawing all reasonable

inferences from these allegations, the Complaint plausibly alleges, at the very least, that the Church
should have known that Defendant Boyce was trafficking Plaintiff Ballantyne by providing gifts
in exchange for sexual acts.
However, even under the heightened standard applied in Noble, the Court would deny
dismissal. Certain states of mind such as knowledge “may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b); see also Doe v. Hotels, No: 6:23-cv-1012-JSS-LHP, 2024 WL 2955728, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
June 12, 2024) (finding complaint adequately pled actual knowledge where court could draw a
reasonable inference from circumstantial allegations). The Noble court dismissed the relevant
claim because, there, the complaint “d[id] not allege that [defendant] was present for any of the
alleged assaults, was told about them before or after they occurred . . . nor d[id] it allege anything
similar, which might show knowledge[.]” 335 F. Supp. 3d at 524 (citation omitted). Based on
these shortcomings, the court found that there were insufficient facts from which it could
reasonably infer knowledge. Id. at 525. Here, however, the Complaint directly alleges upon
information and belief that the Church “had actual . . . knowledge of [Defendant Boyce’s] sexual

abuse and sex trafficking of [Plaintiff Ballantyne][.]” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 167. The Complaint is also
filled with factual allegations which strongly support this general allegation and permit the Court
to draw the reasonable inference of the Church’s knowledge, such as those discussed above. To
reiterate: the Church is alleged to have excommunicated Defendant Boyce for sexually abusing
the Kitler Plaintiffs a few years prior to “assign[ing]” Defendant Boyce to be Plaintiff Ballantyne’s
“mentor, caretaker, and father figure[.]” Id. at ¶ 232. The Church is also alleged to have admitted
that it was actively concerned about Defendant Boyce’s relationship with other members of the
Ballantyne family. Id. at ¶ 131. As such, even if actual knowledge were required, the Court finds
that the allegations, at this stage, not only plausibly suggest constructive knowledge, but also

support a reasonable inference that the Church possessed actual knowledge.
2. Participation
Next, the Complaint plausibly asserts that the Church’s conduct satisfies the third element
of the claim. The statute provides, in relevant part, that “whoever . . . participat[es] in a venture”
engaged in sex trafficking may be held liable. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (emphasis added).11 “[T]he

11 “Venture” is defined extremely broadly in the context of the TVPRA to mean “any group of two
or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.” Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d at
524 (quoting § 1591(e)(5)). Though that definition comes from the criminal portion of the statute,
courts have recognized that “it [is] safe to assume that Congress did not intend ‘venture’ in [the
civil statute] to be any more demanding[.]” Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th at 554. Defendant
Boyce’s assigned position as an alleged liaison between the Church and the Ballantyne family, and
the Church’s longstanding relationship with Defendant Boyce, fulfill this requirement.
Second Circuit has not conclusively determined the meaning of ‘participation’” in relation to civil
liability under the TVPRA. Jones v. Combs, 24-CV-1457 (JPO), 2025 WL 896829, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025). Other courts have found that “participation in a venture” in the civil
liability context requires no more than “assisting, supporting, or facilitating” a venture that engages
in sex trafficking. Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th at 559 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4)). But courts

in this Circuit have also generally required more than allegations of “passive facilitation.” Doe 1
v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 671 F. Supp. 3d 387, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (assuming
participation requires more than “passive facilitation”); Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 524 (stating that
allegations that a defendant “turn[ed] a blind eye” are insufficient (citation omitted)).
For example, in Jones, plaintiffs alleged that an individual, Sean Combs, was a direct
perpetrator under the TVPRA, and that his company Combs Global Enterprises was liable through
the TVPRA’s provisions assigning beneficiary liability. Jones, 2025 WL 896829, at *10. The
court dismissed the beneficiary claim because plaintiff “only discusse[d] Combs Global in laundry
lists alongside [other defendants]” and had not “identif[ied] any distinct actions taken by Combs

Global to either facilitate or cover up Combs’s conduct.” Id. However, in dismissing plaintiff’s
claim, the Court found it relevant that the plaintiff had failed to “identify any funds contributed by
[the alleged beneficiary] that [the perpetrator] used to commit the alleged misconduct[.]” Id. Thus,
drawing on Jones, the provision of funds which are ultimately used to commit sex trafficking may
support a finding of participation under the TVPRA.
Additionally, in Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, an alleged beneficiary, a bank, argued
that the complaint alleged no more than passive facilitation because the bank “merely provided
their usual banking services to [Jeffrey Epstein] and his affiliated entities.” 671 F. Supp. 3d at
405. But the court found that, instead, the complaint adequately alleged active “engagement” with
the sex trafficking venture by alleging that the bank “assisted with ‘structuring’ cash withdrawals
so that those withdrawals would not appear suspicious” and “delayed filing suspicious activity
reports concerning Epstein’s activities.” Id. In doing so, the court noted that “even if it is true that
‘active participation’ in a sex-trafficking venture requires some special tailoring of one’s services
to that venture,” the complaint alleged such participation. Therefore, Deutsche Bank

Aktiengesellschaft stands for the proposition that a defendant’s efforts to conceal a perpetrator’s
engagement in sex trafficking, or the provision of other forms of “tailor[ed]” services to a venture,
may constitute an active and specific form of “participation” under the TVPRA.
In light of these authorities, the Court finds that the Church is adequately alleged to have
“participated” in the venture engaged in sex trafficking. Here, the Church allegedly failed to warn
the Ballantyne family of Defendant Boyce’s history, Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 114, assigned Defendant
Boyce to be Plaintiff Ballantyne’s caretaker, id. at ¶ 199, “insisted upon communicating directly
with excommunicated [Defendant Boyce] regarding the family’s needs,” id. at ¶ 164, and provided
funds for a car and other gifts which Defendant Boyce allegedly exchanged for the performance

of sex acts by Plaintiff Ballantyne, id. at ¶ 149. These acts were taken in spite of Defendant
Boyce’s excommunication, conduct which the Complaint alleges “contradicted” the Church’s
usual treatment of excommunicated members. Id. at ¶ 164. Finally, the Complaint alleges, upon
information and belief, that the Church engaged in the cover-up of Defendant Boyce’s sex
trafficking of Plaintiff Ballantyne, specifically by intervening in a police investigation. Id. at ¶
130.12 Through all of these acts, the Church allegedly empowered Defendant Boyce as a seemingly

12 While alleged upon information and belief, the allegations of obstruction are (at least somewhat)
supported by allegations that the investigation was ended for allegedly false reasons, as well as by
allegations that Defendant Boyce had connections to the law enforcement community and that
Church leadership previously told Alan Kitler not to report his abuse to anyone, including the
police. Id. at ¶¶ 122, 129, 283.
indispensable figure in Plaintiff Ballantyne’s life, provided the means and funds through which
Defendant Boyce engaged in sex trafficking, and hindered an investigation into the alleged
trafficking. See Jones, 2025 WL 896829, at *10; Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 671 F. Supp.
3d at 405. Taking these allegations together, reading them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff
Ballantyne, and drawing all reasonable inferences, the Court finds that the Complaint does more

than allege a passive acquiescence to Defendant Boyce’s conduct; it plausibly alleges that the
Church took active steps in the alleged venture which differed from the Church’s ordinary conduct
and treatment of other members of the Church. Under any recognized definition of “participation,”
Plaintiff Ballantyne has met his burden at this stage.
3. Knowing Benefit
Finally, Plaintiff Ballantyne has plausibly alleged the fourth element. In relevant part, the
statute provides that “whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to benefit, financially
or by receiving anything of value from participation . . .” may be held liable. See § 1595(a)
(emphasis added). At base, the parties dispute two aspects of the “knowingly benefits” element:

1) whether it requires a causal relationship between the purported benefit and the defendant’s
participation, and 2) what form “anything of value” may take.
As to the first issue, the Church characterizes the Complaint as alleging “only that the
Church concealed [Defendant] Boyce’s abuse because some Church members might stop giving
tithes[,]” and asserts that such a benefit is insufficiently causally related to the alleged participation
in the sex trafficking venture. Dkt. No. 49-1 at 13-14. The Church argues that assigning it liability
would, in effect, create a system in which “any organization that covered up sexual abuse to protect
its reputation would be guilty of sex trafficking.” Id. at 14. In response, Plaintiff Ballantyne argues
that a direct causal relationship between participation and benefit is not required. Dkt. No. 52 at
17.
The Court disagrees with the Church’s interpretation of the “knowingly benefits” language
of the TVPRA. In essence, the Church argues that “knowingly benefits” requires allegations of a
quid pro quo. See Dkt. No. 49-1 at 14 (asserting that the Complaint must allege that “the Church
participated in a sex-trafficking venture for the purpose of gaining a new benefit” (emphasis in

original)). This reading has at least some support in cases before the Southern District of New
York. See, e.g., Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (“The controlling question, however, is whether H.
Weinstein provided any of those benefits to TWC because of TWC’s facilitation of H. Weinstein’s
sexual misconduct.” (emphasis in original)); Canosa v. Ziff, 18 Civ. 4115 (PAE), 2019 WL
498865, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019).
But, again, most district courts, and several Circuits, have criticized this approach and
applied a broader interpretation. Indeed, a heightened “benefit” requirement requiring a causal
connection “has been rejected by virtually every other court.” Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F. 4th at
565 n.20 (listing cases); see also Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 2017) (applying

broad definition of benefit); Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th at 723-24 (applying the same). These
courts point to the plain language of Section 1595(a), which imposes liability on “whoever
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The
statute “says nothing about why the sex-trafficker provides any benefit to the participant-
defendant[,]” nor does it “even require that the sex trafficker itself or himself provide any benefit.”
Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th at 565. Instead, the statute “uses the passive voice[,]” which, read
plainly, requires no more than allegations that a defendant “was aware that it was benefitting in
some way from its participation in the venture.” Id. at 564. Thus, in contrast to the interpretation
advocated for by the Church, these courts find that “the benefit need not take the form of ‘profits’
that are ‘the specific result’ of a sex-trafficking venture.” Id. at 564.
Tellingly, other decisions in the Southern District of New York have seemingly cast doubt
on the need for a causal connection. In Canosa, despite finding that the allegations were sufficient
even under the heightened standard, the court seemed to question whether a causal relationship
between the alleged participation and benefit was required. 2019 WL 498865, at *24 (noting that

the causal connection requirement came from “an unreported decision from the Western District
of Arkansas”). Moreover, in Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, the district court noted it was “not
convinced that the benefit element should be read” to mandate a causal relationship between
participation and the receipt of a benefit. 671 F. Supp. 3d at 408.
In light of these authorities, the Court finds that Plaintiff Ballantyne need not allege an
implicit quid pro quo or causal relationship to satisfy the “knowingly benefits” requirement.
As to the second issue, the form of the benefit, Plaintiff Ballantyne argues that the
Complaint alleges several forms of benefit to the Church, including the avoidance of reputational
harm and losses in tithes and voluntary contributions, Defendant Boyce’s financial and fundraising

connections in the area, free labor by Defendant Boyce, and protection from substantial civil and
criminal liability. Dkt. No. 52 at 17. The Church, in turn, argues that the retention of tithes and
the Church’s reputation is insufficient, because such allegations do not amount to a “new benefit.”
Dkt. No. 49-1 at 14.
But the Court need not reach the Church’s argument. By assigning Defendant Boyce to
the caretaking of Plaintiff Ballantyne’s family, and by using Defendant Boyce to assist in
“financial bookkeeping or similar services,” the Church is alleged to have gained the benefit of
assistance in executing functions of the Church. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 203(c)-(d). Though seemingly an
unwise and uneven exchange given the Church’s resources and the risk which came with the
Church’s relationship with Defendant Boyce, Defendant Boyce’s assistance satisfies the “anything
of value” language of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); see Doe v. Warren & Baram Mgmt. LLC,
20-CV-9522 (ER) (VF), 2024 WL 2941222, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2024) (“Courts have
consistently held that ‘anything of value’ encompasses more than simply monetary exchanges.”
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, there can be no question that the Church

“knowingly” received this benefit under the standard espoused above; the Complaint alleges that
the Church affirmatively assigned Defendant Boyce to provide these services. Therefore, Plaintiff
Ballantyne has plausibly alleged that the Church “knowingly benefitted.”
ii. Perpetrator Liability
Having found that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a beneficiary claim, the Court also finds
that Plaintiff Ballantyne plausibly asserts a claim for direct perpetrator liability against the Church.
As discussed above, the TVPRA establishes civil liability against not only whoever “should have
known” they were benefitting from a violation of the criminal statute, but also the “perpetrator” of
the crime directly. § 1595(a). To state a claim for perpetrator liability under the TVPRA, Plaintiff

Ballantyne must allege that the Church itself satisfied the requirements of the criminal statute by
knowingly “recruit[ing], entic[ing], harbor[ing], transport[ing], provid[ing], obtain[ing],
advertis[ing], maintain[ing], patroniz[ing], or solicit[ing] by any means a person . . . knowing, or,
. . . in reckless disregard of the fact, . . . that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and
will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.” St. Louis v. Perlitz, No. 3:13-CV-1132 (RNC),
2016 WL 1408076, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2016) (quoting § 1591(a)(1)). The “knowing or
reckless disregard” language requires more than the “knew or should have known” element
relevant to a beneficiary liability claim. Doe (G.N.C.), 2024 WL 4149251, at *3 (finding that a
plaintiff had pled a beneficiary claim but not a perpetrator claim).
Thus, in the context of claims involving minors, perpetrator liability has two requirements:
1) that the defendant knowingly took one of the actions listed in the statute, and 2) that the
defendant did so while knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that the person subject to their
action had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in commercial sex acts.
The Court addresses each requirement in turn.

First, the Court finds that the Church is alleged to have recruited, enticed, and provided
Plaintiff Ballantyne.13 “The statute does not define terms like ‘entice’ or ‘recruit,’ so courts have
given those terms their ordinary meaning, holding that they cover conduct ranging from ‘attracting
[a] victim by offering something that arouses hope or desire’ to ‘somehow secur[ing] the services
of [a] victim[].’” Jones, 2025 WL 896829, at *6 (brackets in original) (quoting Ardolf v. Weber,
332 F.R.D. 467, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Ballantyne’s family
reached out to the Church for assistance during a tumultuous period. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 108-09, 114.
The Church allegedly had several conversations with the Ballantyne family and Defendant Boyce
to “facilitate” the family’s transition to Schenectady. Id. at ¶¶ 109-114. The Church also provided

financial assistance to the family upon their move and channeled that assistance through Defendant
Boyce. Id. at ¶ 171. More than that, the Church “assigned” Defendant Boyce to be Plaintiff
Ballantyne’s “mentor, caretaker, and father figure” and insisted on interacting with Plaintiff
Ballantyne through Defendant Boyce. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 164, 232. Drawing all reasonable
inferences, the Complaint alleges that the Church acted to intimately connect Plaintiff Ballantyne
to Defendant Boyce upon his move to Schenectady and acted to ensure that the connection
remained intact by channeling Plaintiff Ballantyne’s access to resources through Defendant Boyce.

13 The Court finds that the Complaint does not plausibly allege that the Church committed any
other act listed in the statute.
Thus, giving the words recruit, entice, and provide their plain meaning, the Complaint plausibly
alleges that the Church knowingly undertook these acts.
Second, the Court finds that the Complaint plausibly alleges that the Church knew of or
recklessly disregarded the fact that Plaintiff Ballantyne would be caused to engage in commercial
sex acts. It goes without saying that the acts taken by the Church, alone, are insufficient to establish

liability. Indeed, the Church asserts that “[a] church providing financial support to a needy family
is hardly the hallmark of a trafficking purpose.” Dkt. No. 60 at 9. But the Church misses the point.
When these seemingly innocuous acts are paired with the Church’s knowledge, or reckless
disregard of the fact that a minor “will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act” because of
those acts, liability attaches. That the Church’s alleged acts took the form of what might otherwise
be commendable behavior does not protect the Church from liability. This Court has already found
the Complaint plausibly alleges that the Church knew of the alleged sex trafficking, and therefore,
the “recklessly disregarded” standard is necessarily met. As discussed above in relation to
beneficiary liability, the Complaint contains several allegations which, taken together, permit the

Court to draw the reasonable inference of knowledge at the time the Church recruited, enticed, and
provided Plaintiff Ballantyne. Thus, at this stage, the allegations are sufficient to assert a claim
for direct perpetrator liability.
The Church makes several arguments in support of dismissing the perpetrator liability
claim, but the Courts finds each unavailing.
First, the Church argues that “[t]he Complaint provides no basis for a plausible inference
that the Church provided financial assistance to [Plaintiff Ballantyne] for the purpose of recruiting
him into a sex scheme.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). But that is not what the statute requires.
Instead, “Plaintiffs must allege that [the Church] had an awareness or understanding” that a minor
would be caused to engage in commercial sex acts. Doe v. Jackson, 23-cv-04910 (ALC), 2025
WL 753949, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2025) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, it is
enough that the Church is plausibly alleged to have known, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that
Plaintiff Ballantyne would be caused to engage in commercial sex acts because of their actions.
Second, the Church also argues that it did not know that “[Defendant] Boyce would use

threats or force to coerce Ballantyne to perform sex acts.” Dkt. No. 60 at 9. But, again, the Church
misreads the statute. The relevant portion of the TVPRA assigns liability in two distinct scenarios.
First, the statute assigns liability to perpetrators with knowledge, or in reckless disregard of the
fact, that “means of force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion . . . will be used to cause the [victim]
to engage in a commercial act[.]” § 1591(a). Second, and separately, the statute also assigns
liability to perpetrators with knowledge, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that “the person has
not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act[.]” Id. Thus,
where the alleged victim is a minor, the TVPRA does not require that a perpetrator have knowledge
that specific means, such as force and threats, will be used to coerce the victim into performing

sexual acts. See A.B. v. Interstate Mgmt. Co., LLC, 746 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1005 n.2 (D. Or. 2024).
Instead, where the victim is a minor, the perpetrator need only have knowledge that the victim will
be caused, by any means, to engage in commercial sex acts. Therefore, the Church’s argument
that it did not know that Defendant Boyce would use threats or force specifically to cause the
performance of commercial sex acts is unavailing.
However, even ignoring that Plaintiff Ballantyne was a minor through the duration of most
of the allegations, at this stage, the Court finds that the Complaint plausibly alleges that the Church
knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion were being
used to cause Plaintiff Ballantyne to engage in commercial sex acts. The Complaint alleges that,
prior to the abuse of Plaintiff Ballantyne, members of the Church were told in “graphic detail”
about the Kitler Plaintiffs’ abuse, including that Defendant Boyce “violently sodomized, groped,
fondled, kissed, orally copulated, and masturbated” the Kitler Plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 80. Thus,
the Church was not only aware of the fact that Defendant Boyce had a history of sexual abuse but
was also allegedly aware that Defendant Boyce used violence to facilitate that abuse. While these

reports pertained to the Kitler Plaintiffs and not Plaintiff Ballantyne, at this stage, the Court finds
that the allegations, read as a whole, are enough to plausibly suggest that the Church recklessly
disregarded the fact of the specific means by which Plaintiff Ballantyne was caused to engage in
sex acts. Therefore, to the extent that the Complaint alleges a perpetrator claim in relation to
trafficking which occurred after Plaintiff Ballantyne turned 18, the Court finds such a claim is
adequately alleged.
Third, the Church marshals case law to argue that entities are rarely held liable as
perpetrators, rather than beneficiaries, under the TVPRA. Dkt. No. 60 at 10. In Doe (G.N.C.) v.
Uniquest Hosp., LLC, the court refused to assign perpetrator liability to a hotel which had hosted

trafficking activity. 2024 WL 4149251, at *2. The court noted that while plaintiff alleged certain
“red flags” which might have indicated to the hotel that trafficking was occurring and provided a
basis for beneficiary liability, such “red flags” were insufficient to establish the knowledge needed
to succeed on a perpetrator liability claim because they were “consistent with both sex trafficking
and the typical behavior of ordinary guests staying at a low-end hotel” and “prostitution[.]” Id. at
*3. But here, Plaintiff Ballantyne does not rely on mere indicators of potential trafficking which
could be misinterpreted. Of course, observing a close relationship between a member of the
Church and a young boy does not, alone, provide definitive cause for concern. But observing a
close relationship between a young boy and a member of the Church who has been
excommunicated for sexually abusing boys in a strikingly similar situation should, in fact, provide
serious cause for concern. The Complaint also alleges that the Church actually expressed their
concern that Defendant Boyce might abuse Plaintiff Ballantyne’s sisters. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 131.
These are not muddled signals. Instead, the collective warning signs are alleged to have pointed
to one, seemingly inexorable conclusion: that Defendant Boyce was trafficking Plaintiff

Ballantyne.
Second, contrary to the Church’s position, the court’s decision in J.M. v. Choice Hotels
Int’l, Inc. supports a finding that the Church is alleged to have acted as a perpetrator. No. 2:22-
cv-00672-KJM-JDP, 2023 WL 3456619 (E.D. Ca. May 15, 2023). There, the court noted that
hotel staff observed visible signs of injury on the victim, took cash payments from the victim,
rented the victim rooms away from other guests, told guests to “hurry up” when they entered and
left the room, and cleaned up “unusual numbers of condoms” and drug paraphernalia. In light of
these allegations, the Court found the hotel was alleged to have the requisite knowledge for
imposing perpetrator liability. Id. at *3. The Court finds no great distance between the weight of

the signals of knowledge alleged in Choice Hotels and the signals alleged in this case. If anything,
the excommunication of Defendant Boyce more deeply implicates the Church’s knowledge. A
hotel might be generally aware of a risk that it will be used for trafficking. But to know that a
particular guest is engaged in trafficking, a hotel must amass several observations to make the leap
from generalized suspicion to individualized knowledge. Put differently, a hotel might know the
shape of the puzzle, but it still must put specific pieces together to have a complete and specific
picture of the alleged trafficking. In Choice Hotels, the court found that the hotel had plenty of
pieces of the puzzle with which to work, and that the hotel’s alleged conduct confirmed their
understanding of the finished picture. 2023 WL 3456619, at *3. Here, the Complaint alleges that
a virtually complete puzzle was available to the Church from the start. Not only does the
Complaint plausibly suggest that the Church was generally aware of the prior abuse of young boys
in the Church, but it was also allegedly aware of the specific risk posed by Defendant Boyce.
Additionally, as with the allegations in Choice Hotels, the Church’s alleged actions seemingly
confirmed their understanding of the finished picture. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 131 (alleging that the

Church confirmed that it was concerned about Defendant Boyce).
Therefore, Plaintiff Ballantyne has plausibly alleged the elements of a perpetrator liability
claim, and the Court denies the Church’s motion to dismiss on these grounds.
E. Requests to Amend Pleadings
At various points in their responses to Defendants’ Motions, Plaintiffs request leave to
amend the Complaint in the event of dismissal. See Dkt. No. 51 at 16-20; Dkt. No. 52 at 27-29.
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides that plaintiffs should be given
leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Therefore, “[i]t is the usual
practice upon granting a motion to dismiss to allow leave to replead. Although leave to replead is

within the discretion of the district court, refusal to grant it without any justifying reason is an
abuse of discretion.” Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991)
(internal citations omitted). Leave to replead may be denied based on “undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., futility of amendment, etc.”
Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F. 3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Futility is a determination, as a matter of law, that proposed amendments would
fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citing Cortec Indus., Inc., 949 F.2d at 50). In making a futility determination, the court must
“consider ‘the proposed amendment[s] . . . along with the remainder of the complaint,’ accept as
true all non-conclusory factual allegations therein, and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s
favor to determine whether the allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
(internal citation omitted). Ultimately, “[t]he party opposing amendment bears the burden of

demonstrating good reason for denial.” Pinyuk v. CBE Group, Inc., 17 CV 5753 (RRM) (CLP),
2019 WL 1900985, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2019). Under the Local Rules of this Court, a party
requesting an opportunity to amend a pleading “must attach an unsigned copy of the proposed
amended pleading to its motion papers.” N.D.N.Y. L.R. 15.1(a).
i. Proposed Equitable Tolling Allegations
First, Plaintiffs request leave to amend the pleadings to “provide additional allegations
about the cover-up perpetrated by the Church that specifically prevented [the Kitler Plaintiffs]
from discovering the facts necessary to bring forth a claim under TVPRA.” Dkt. No. 51 at 17.
Plaintiff seeks this amendment to bolster its equitable tolling allegations. As previously noted,

Plaintiffs have conceded that the Kitler Plaintiffs may not assert a cause of action under the
TVPRA, regardless of equitable tolling, and therefore, their request to amend for this purpose is
denied as futile. See Dkt. No. 52 at 6, 10
ii. Proposed Gender Motivated Violence Act Allegations
Second, Plaintiffs seek to amend the pleadings to add a claim under New York City’s
Gender Motivated Violence Act (“GMVA”) against Defendant Boyce. Dkt. No. 51 at 18. That
statute provides a cause of action to anyone “claiming to be injured by a party who commits,
directs, enables, participates in, or conspires in the commission of a crime of violence motivated
by gender[.]” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-1104. Plaintiffs assert that the amendment would add
allegations regarding an incident in New York City in which Defendant Boyce allegedly attempted
to coerce Plaintiff Michael Kitler “into having anal sex with him[,]” while he was under the age of
18. Id.
Defendant Boyce opposes leave to amend based solely on Plaintiffs’ failure to file a
proposed amended pleading with their motion papers. Dkt. No. 54 at 11-13. The Court

acknowledges that Plaintiffs failed to follow the procedure laid out in the Local Rules for moving
to amend. Nevertheless, this Court has “broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a
party’s failure to comply with local court rules[.]” Kurtz v. Snyder, 9:22-CV-0487, 2025 WL
951481, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (citation omitted).
Here, though Plaintiffs have not provided a proposed version of the pleadings, Plaintiffs
have provided sufficient detail regarding the basis for the proposed additional claim under the
GMVA. Moreover, the described additional claim appears to potentially overcome the sole
arguments for dismissal identified in Defendant Boyce’s motion: timeliness and a lack of
retroactivity.14 Finally, Plaintiffs have not yet amended their pleadings, and the parties have not

yet proceeded to discovery. Thus, leave to amend is warranted.

14 A recent amendment to the GMVA re-opened the statute of limitations for claims under the
statute until March 1, 2025. See Dixon v. Reid, 744 F. Supp. 3d 323, 327 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)
(citing N.Y.C. Admin. § 10-1104); Roldan v. Lewis, 20-CV-03580 (HG) (MMH), 2025 WL
676090, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2025). Moreover, unlike the TVPRA, a private right of action
under the GMVA has existed since 2000, capturing at least part of the period of Michael Kitler’s
abuse. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 4 (alleging abuse between 1994 and 2001). Thus, the claim would
avoid the fate of the Kitler Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims so long as the alleged incident in New York
City occurred after the enactment of the private right of action under the GMVA in 2000. See
Louis v. Niederhoffer, No. 23-CV-6470-LTS, 2023 WL 8777015, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2023)
(dismissing claims under GMVA based on conduct pre-dating 2000).
iii. Obstructing Enforcement Allegations
Third, Plaintiffs seek to add allegations supporting a new claim pursuant to the TVPRA
against the Church which assigns liability for “obstruct[ing] the enforcement” of the statute. See
Dkt. No. 52 at 28-29. Such a claim would build on the current Complaint’s allegations, made upon
information and belief, that the Church allegedly obstructed a 2015 police investigation into

Defendant Boyce’s abuse of Plaintiff Ballantyne by adding new “specific allegations that, under
information and belief, the Church wrongfully applied the clergy-penitent privilege to prevent key
witnesses . . . from being interviewed by law enforcement[.]” Id. at 29. Plaintiffs assert the
Church’s conduct in 2015 constitutes obstruction in relation to both Plaintiff Ballantyne and the
Kitler Plaintiffs’ abuse, even though it was Plaintiff Ballantyne alone that contacted the police. Id.
at 28. Plaintiffs argue that such a claim would avoid the timeliness and retroactivity issues which
have proven fatal to the Kitler Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims because the alleged obstruction in 2015
occurred after the private right of action under the TVPRA was created and falls within the
applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 28. The Church argues that the proposed amendments fail

to state a claim for obstruction under the TVPRA, and therefore, leave should be denied as futile.
Dkt. No. 60 at 5-7.
In order to state a claim for obstruction under the TVPRA, Plaintiffs must allege that a
defendant “(1) kn[e]w of an effort to enforce the TVP[R]A and (2) intentionally obstruct[ed] or
attempt[ed] to obstruct that enforcement effort.” Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 671 F. Supp.
3d at 409. Additionally, to bring any claim under the TVPRA, including for obstruction, a plaintiff
must be a “victim” of a violation of the TVPRA. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)). While the
statute does not define “victim,” at least one court in this Circuit has found that a victim of
obstruction under the TVPRA is anyone “who suffered harm because the government’s
enforcement efforts were hindered.” Id.
The Church first argues that the Kitler Plaintiffs are not “victims” under the statute. The
Kitler Plaintiffs allege that they were abused between 1994 and 2001. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 4. Thus, an
investigation into Defendant Boyce’s conduct in 2015, even unhindered by the Church’s alleged

obstruction, would have been unable to prevent their abuse. Though the Court has no doubt that
an investigation into Defendant Boyce’s alleged abuse of another minor would have provided a
measure of emotional relief to the Kitler Plaintiffs, and perhaps would have resulted in a similar
after-the-fact investigation into their own allegations of abuse, the Court cannot find that the Kitler
Plaintiffs were “victims” of the Church’s sole alleged obstruction in 2015. The proposed
amendments, as described in Plaintiffs’ submissions, include no reference to any harm, separate
from the harm caused by the initial abuse, suffered by the Kitler Plaintiffs because of the alleged
obstruction. Moreover, allowing the Kitler Plaintiffs to bring a claim for obstruction based on an
investigation into the abuse of another minor more than a decade after their last allegations of

abuse would open the floodgates to otherwise time barred trafficking claims. However, the Court
finds that Plaintiff Ballantyne does have standing to bring a claim for obstruction under the
TVPRA.15 At this stage, Plaintiff Ballantyne qualifies as a “victim” of the alleged 2015
obstruction. The police report pertained to his abuse, and he alleges that his abuse continued in
the same year. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 10. Therefore, drawing all reasonable inferences from the
Complaint and the proposed allegations, it is plausible that Plaintiff Ballantyne suffered harm

15 The Church appears to construe Plaintiffs’ opposition to their motion to dismiss to only seek to
add a claim by the Kitler Plaintiffs involving obstruction. However, Plaintiffs clearly state that
such a claim is available for “all Plaintiffs.” Dkt. No. 52 at 28.
“because the government’s enforcement efforts were hindered.” Deutsche Bank
Aktiengesellschaft, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 409.
Next, the Church argues that the report to the police in 2015 does not qualify as an effort
to enforce the TVPRA because the proposed allegations “do[] not assert the . . . police department
investigated alleged violations of the TVP[R]A in 2015 or attempted an enforcement action against

the Church of any kind.” Dkt. No. 60 at 7. The Court is unconvinced. First, the Complaint clearly
alleges that law enforcement pursued a “case” related to Plaintiff Ballantyne’s report and
interviewed Plaintiff Ballantyne. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 129. Thus, to the extent that the Church
argues that an investigation never existed at all, the argument is contradicted by the allegations.
Second, to the extent that the Church argues that such an investigation was not designed to enforce
the TVPRA specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Church obstructed the investigation out of fear
that they would be “publicly and criminally implicated in the sex abuse and trafficking of
numerous minor male members of the [Church].” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 130. Again, drawing all
reasonable inferences from the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have at least alleged that

Plaintiff Ballantyne’s report to the police implicated the Church’s alleged role in “trafficking,” the
purview of the TVPRA. That is sufficient. Third, to the extent that the Church argues that the
claim fails because the Church was not the direct subject of the alleged investigation, the argument
is contradicted by the Church’s own proffered case. In Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, the
court found that two banks’ alleged failure to report suspicious activity for the purpose of
frustrating an investigation into Jeffrey Epstein (not the banks) was sufficient to support a claim
for obstruction under the TVPRA. 671 F. Supp. at 409. Therefore, the Church need not be the
subject of the enforcement effort or investigation to be liable for obstruction.
Having found the Church’s arguments against leave to amend unavailing, the Court grants
Plaintiff Ballantyne leave to add a claim of obstruction under the TVPRA based on the 2015 police
report.16
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant Boyce’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 45, is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART; and the Court further
ORDERS that all claims against Defendant Boyce except Plaintiff Ballantyne’s claim
pursuant to the TVPRA be DISMISSED without prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Church’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 49, is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs Alan Kitler and Michael Kitler’s claims against the Church
pursuant to the TVPRA are DISMISSED without prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that all other claims against the Church, including the state law claims and
Plaintiff Ballantyne’s claims pursuant to the TVPRA, may proceed; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 59, is GRANTED

and that the Individual Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice from this case; and the
Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

16 Notably, the parties do not address whether the proposed allegations of the Church’s wrongful
use of privilege to limit access to key witnesses constitutes obstruction under the statute. The
Court does not reach the issue. See Pinyuk, 2019 WL 1900985, at *2 (the Church “bears the burden
of demonstrating good reason for denial”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 4, 2025 Ounce] Va Rae
Albany, New York Anne M. Nardacci
U.S. District Judge

42

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11113998. Public record. Not legal advice.