# Noe Villanueva v. Gruma Corporation

> District Court, C.D. California · July 29, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11112620

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** July 29, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No.: 2:25-cv-04624-AB-E Date: July 29, 2025

Title: Noe Villanueva v. Gruma Corp. et al.

Present: The Honorable ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR., United States District Judge
Evelyn Chun N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
None Appearing None Appearing

Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
REMAND

Before the Court is Plaintiff Noe Villanueva’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to
Remand Action to State Court (“Mot.,” Dkt. No. 15). Gruma Corporation and
Mission Foods Corporation’s (collectively as “Employer Defendants”) filled an
opposition (“Opp.,” Dkt. No. 17), and Plaintiff filed a reply (“Reply,” Dkt. No.
20). The Court found this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument
and vacated the hearing set for July 18, 2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal.
R. 7-15. Having considered the materials submitted by the parties, and for the
reasons indicated below, the Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action in the Superior Court of California, County of
Los Angeles on April 18, 2025 against Defendants Gruma Corporation, Mission
Foods Corporation, Rene Doe (an individual, hereinafter “Defendant Rene”), and
DOES 1 through 100. See Notice of Removal (“NOR” Dkt. No. 1), Ex. 1,
Summons and Complaint Packet (“Compl.”); Opp. 8:13-14. Plaintiff alleges sexual
orientation harassment in employment (Compl. ¶ 15), sex/gender harassment in
employment (Id. ¶ 68), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Id. ¶146-
47) against all Defendants. Also, Plaintiff alleges sexual orientation discrimination
in employment (Id. ¶ 33), sexual orientation retaliation in employment (Id. ¶ 48),
sex/gender discrimination in employment (Id. ¶ 89), sex/gender retaliation in
employment (Id. ¶¶ 109-11), whistleblower violations (Id. ¶¶ 132-35), and
wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of public policy (Id. ¶¶ 160-162)
against only Employer Defendants and DOES 1 through 100. Plaintiff asserts nine
causes of action for various violations of California Government Code, California
Labor Code, and California Civil Code.

On April 18, 2025, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on the
original jurisdiction of this Court under 28 United States Code (“U.S.C.”) sections
1332(a), and removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1446. NOR ¶ 5, 9. On
June 19, 2025, Plaintiff moved to remand the action. See Mot.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to federal court
when the federal district court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). “A suit may be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) only
if it could have been brought there originally.” Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc.,
813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987).

A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.
See Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). A
federal district court has diversity jurisdiction over a matter where the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and there is complete diversity
among opposing parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

The amount in controversy, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is the total
“amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown &
Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]his includes any result of the
litigation, excluding interests and costs, that ‘entails a payment’ by the defendant.”
Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016).
“Among other items, the amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory,
punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, and attorneys’
fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Fritsch v. Swift
Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). “[I]n
assessing the amount in controversy, a court must ‘assume that the allegations of
the complaint are true and assume that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff
on all claims made in the complaint.’ ” Campbell v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 471 Fed.
App'x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).

In determining the amount in controversy, courts first look to the allegations
in the complaint. Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir.
2015). But “where it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court
complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled[,]” courts apply a
preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires the defendant to provide
evidence showing that it is more likely than not that the $75,000 amount in
controversy is met. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir.
1996)). In considering whether the removing defendant has satisfied its burden, the
court “may consider facts in the removal petition” and “summary-judgment-type
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v.
R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995)). “[A] damages
assessment may require a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions ... [but]
those assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground
underlying them.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.

To meet this burden as to the amount in controversy, “a defendant’s notice
of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v.
Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)). Only “when the
plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation” must the
defendant submit evidence to establish the amount in controversy by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 89 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)); see
Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1195; Harris v. KM Industrial, Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 699 (9th
Cir. 2020) (“When a plaintiff mounts a factual attack, the burden is on the
defendant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in
controversy exceeds the $5 million jurisdictional threshold.”).

Complete diversity exists only when “each defendant is a citizen of a
different State from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365, 373 (1978). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, individuals’ state
citizenship is “determined by [their] state of domicile”: the place where they
“reside[] with the intention to remain[.]” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d
853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
Any doubt about the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980
F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d
1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553
F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The removal statute is strictly construed, and
any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.”
(citation omitted)); Sandoval v. Republic Servs., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01224-
ODW(KSx), 2018 WL 1989528, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018). A removal's
propriety “may later be tested in the federal court, either on a motion by a party to
remand, or by the court on its own motion.” Libhart, 529 F.2d at 1065.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue that this case must be remanded because: (1) citizenship of
Defendant Rene defeats complete diversity and (2) Employer Defendants fail to
provide evidence establishing that the controversy in this case is over $75,000.
Mot. 2:12-21.

1. Citizenship of Defendants with Fictitious Names Is Irrelevant

It is not contested that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, and Employer
Defendants are both citizens of Nevada and Texas. Mot. 2:13-15; Opp. 9:27-10:9.
Plaintiff asserts that the citizenship of Defendant Rene described in the Complaint
defeats complete diversity because they are both citizens of California. Mot. 2:12-
19. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides that "the citizenship of defendants sued
under fictitious names shall be disregarded." See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1); see also
Soliman v. Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The citizenship
of fictitious defendants is disregarded for removal purposes and becomes relevant
only if and when the plaintiff seeks leave to substitute a named defendant.”)
(emphasis added); Goldsmith v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV 20-00750-AB
(JCX), 2020 WL 1650750, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020) (“the Court must
disregard the citizenship of the Doe Defendants for removal purposes”). In this
case, Defendant Rene has been sued under the moniker “Rene Doe.” See generally,
Compl. Because Defendant Rene has been sued under a fictitious name, the Court
must disregard indicia of his citizenship unless and until plaintiff seeks leave to
substitute a named defendant.

Plaintiff argues that when allegations give a “definite clue” about the
identity of a fictitious defendant, the Court should consider their citizenship. Reply
2:13-3:9. However, the appellate authority from which the “definite clue” standard
arose can be tracked back to 1982. See Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2024
WL 3029500, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2024) (quoting Sandoval, 2018 WL
1989528, at *3 (quoting Collins v. Garfield Beach CVS, LLC, 2017 WL 2734708,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (quoting Brown v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 897
F.Supp. 1398, 1401 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (quoting Tompkins v. Lowe's Home Center,
Inc., 847 F.Supp. 462, 464 (E.D.La.1994) (citing Green v. Mutual of Omaha, 550
F.Supp. 815, 818 (N.D.Cal.1982) (relying on Hartwell Corp. v. Boeing Co., 678
F.2d 842 (1982 9th Cir.) to hold that when “a definite clue as to the identity of
the fictitious defendant” is given, their citizenship should be considered))))).
The 1982 Hartwell case was decided before the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(Pub.L. 100-702, Title X, § 1016(a), Nov. 19, 1988, 102 Stat. 4669) which added:
“For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued
under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” The language concerning “defendants
sued under fictious names” was later moved to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). Pub.L.
112-63, Title I, § 103(a), Dec. 7, 2011, 125 Stat. 759. Thus, the “definite clue”
standard relies on an outdated appellate interpretation of U.S. Code. Despite a split
among district courts in interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1), and the significant
amount of identifying information provided for Defendant Rene, the clear language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) and that of the Soliman court requires this Court to
disregard the citizenship of Defendant Rene at this stage. See, e.g., Roe SL 48 v.
Doe 1, No. 2:25-00436 MWC (EX), 2025 WL 987198, *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2025) (“There is no reason to ignore the plain language, particularly when
‘[r]emoval statutes are strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal
requires resolution in favor of remand.’”) (quoting Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98
F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024)). Therefore, no matter how definite the clue, the
Court must disregard indicia of his citizenship unless and until plaintiff seeks leave
to substitute a named defendant. Accordingly, there is complete diversity in this
case.

2. The Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000

Plaintiff seeks damages for severe and permanent emotional and/or mental
distress medical expenses, lost earnings, prejudgment interest, punitive damages,
and attorneys’ fees. Compl. ¶¶ 20-26, 37-43, 55-61, 74-80, 96-102, 116-122, 136-
143, 151-157, 168-174, Prayer for Relief. These allegations serve as the basis for
Defendant’s calculation of the amount in controversy. NOR ¶¶ 15, 17, 21, 23, 25,
29, 36.
Plaintiff claims Employer Defendants calculations of the amount in
controversy do not satisfy the standard of preponderance of evidence for failure to
address the potential of yet-to-be-alleged mitigated losses or other damages.
However, binding precedent counsels against considering affirmative defenses
such as mitigation in determining the amount in controversy. See Greene v.
Harley-Davidson, 965 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The district court erred in
considering the merits of ... affirmative defense to determine the amount in
controversy.”); Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir.
2019) (“[T]he amount in controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff
could reasonably recover.”); Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel.
Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[J]ust because a defendant might
have a valid defense that will reduce recovery to below the jurisdictional amount
does not mean the defendant will ultimately prevail on that defense.”). “[I]f a
district court had to evaluate every possible defense that could reduce recovery
below the jurisdictional amount the district court would essentially have to decide
the merits of the case before it could determine if it had subject matter
jurisdiction.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1108. Accordingly, the Court
rejects Plaintiff’s contention that Employer Defendants calculations are invalid
because they fail to account for potential mitigation. See id.; Jackson v. Compass
Grp. USA, Inc., 2019 WL 3493991, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2019) (“[M]itigation
of damages is an affirmative defense, and a potential defense does not reduce the
amount in controversy for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiff also claims Employer Defendants calculations of the amount in
controversy are “arbitrary,” “subjective,” and “self-serving” which means the sums
do not satisfy the standard of preponderance of evidence. Reply 4:24-5:4. Plaintiff
does not point to any authority, the Notice of Removal, or anywhere in the
Opposition in articulating these claims. For the following reasons, in making
calculations, Employer Defendants provide a chain of reasoning that includes
assumptions with reasonable ground underlying them. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.

A. Lost Earnings

Plaintiff seeks to recover an unspecified amount of “loss of earnings and
future earning capacity.” Compl. ¶¶ 25, 42, 60, 79, 101, 121, 142, 156, 173.
Employer Defendants contend that Plaintiff could potentially seek $81,972.48 in
lost wages, exclusive of lost benefits and any future wages, based on Plaintiff’s
undisputed weekly salary at the time employment ended ($853.88 per week ) (See
Declaration of Horacio Gaitan in Support of Defendant’s Notice of Removal, ¶
6(b) and the length of time from Plaintiff's termination through a trial date
estimated to be one year after removal (approximately ninety-six weeks). See NOR
¶ 17, 19, 20; Ulloa v. California Newspaper Partners, 2021 WL 6618815, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2021) (“district courts consistently have included as part of the
amount in controversy future wages up to the expected date of trial in this action”)
(collecting cases); Reese v. Daikin Comfort Techs. Distribution, Inc., 729 F. Supp.
3d 980, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“courts in employment cases have found that a year
from the date of removal is a conservative estimate for front pay”) (collecting
cases). Thus, Defendant’s assessment of lost earnings is not “arbitrary,” but instead
looks to the allegations of the complaint, has assumptions supported by caselaw,
and has calculations that follow a “chain of reasoning.”

In sum, considering only the lost earnings through trial, the Court finds that
the Employer Defendants have established by a preponderance of evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Because the Court finds that the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000 with the lost wages alone, it need not determine
the amount at stake with respect to civil penalties, emotional distress, attorneys’
fees, or punitive damages.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11112620. Public record. Not legal advice.