# Clark v. Pratt

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11112583

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
JESSICA CLARK, ¢

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:25-cv-109

y Judge Walter H. Rice

JUDGE JEANNINE N. Mag. Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
PRATT, et a/, :
Defendants.

ORDER OVERRULING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF JESSICA CLARK’S
MOTION TO CORRECT THE RECORD AND NOTIFY THE COURT OF
CORRECTED FILINGS IN PROGRESS (DOC. #13), OVERRULING
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. #14), OVERRULING
AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EXPEDITED RULING ON
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC. #15), AND OVERRULING
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (DOC. #16); PLAINTIFF MUST FILE ANY
AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS OF ENTRY;
FAILURE TO DO SO WILL RESULT IN THE COURT ADOPTING THE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
(DOC. #2), OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE REPORT
(DOC. #4), AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (DOC. #3)
WITH PREJUDICE

Before the Court are the Motion to Correct the Record and Notify the Court
of Corrected Filings in Progress (“Motion to Correct,” Doc. #13), Amended Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (“Amended TRO
Motion,” Doc. #14), Motion for Expedited Ruling on Amended TRO Motion

(“Motion to Expedite,” Doc. #15), and Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. #16), all
filed by Plaintiff Jessica Clark. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to
Correct is SUSTAINED, the Amended TRO Motion is OVERRULED, the Motion to
Expedite is OVERRULED AS MOOT, and the Motion to Appoint Counsel is
OVERRULED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewal.
On June 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Correct, stating that the
document that she filed on May 1, 2025, and was docketed by the Clerk of Courts
Office as Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. #6), “is not her amended
complaint at all. Instead, Document 6 contains the body of her Amended Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order, but it is mistakenly preceded by a single cover

page identifying it as an amended complaint.” (Doc. #13, PAGEID 479). She prays
that the Court disregard her May 1, 2025, filing, and permit her to file both an
Amended TRO Motion and First Amended Complaint forthwith. (/¢. at PAGEID
480). On June 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Amended TRO Motion (Doc. #14), thus
enabling the Court to evaluate Plaintiff's filing and desired relief properly.
Accordingly, the Motion to Correct is SUSTAINED to the extent it seeks to render
Document 6 a nullity and to file the Amended TRO Motion.
However, the Court, in its June 2, 2025, Order, noted that the Magistrate
Judge, in his Report and Recommendations, had evaluated Plaintiff's initial
Complaint, and recommended that it be dismissed because Plaintiff “seeks relief
from parties that are either immune from suit (Judge Pratt) or incapable of being
sued in this Court (Common Pleas Court and Prosecutor's Office).” (Order, Doc.

#12, PAGEID 475, citing Report, Doc. #2, PAGEID 174-76). Plaintiff had also filed
Objections to the Report. (Doc. #4). The Court understood Document 6 to be
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, which superseded the Initial Complaint (Doc.
#3) and thus mooted the Report and Objections. (Doc. #12, PAGEID 475-76).
However, because Document 6 is not an operative filing, the Report and
Objections are once again properly before the Court, and if Plaintiff does not file a

proper First Amended Complaint, then the Court will rule on the Report and
Objections. Accordingly, the Motion to Correct is SUSTAINED in that Plaintiff may
file a First Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of entry of this Order.
Failure to do so will result in the Court ruling promptly on the Report and
Objections and dismissing the initial Complaint with prejudice.
As to the Amended TRO Motion, the Court noted previously that the
“likelihood of success on the merits is typically the most important factor of a
preliminary injunction analysis, and a preliminary injunction issued where there is
simply no likelihood of success on the merits must be reversed.” (Doc. #12,
PAGEID 474 (emphasis in original), quoting Higuchi Int’! Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc.,
103 F.4th 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The Court concluded that Plaintiff had no chance of succeeding on the merits as to
the initial Complaint, as Defendant Judge Jeanine Pratt is entitled to absolute
immunity, “because the complained-of actions were judicial acts undertaken by
Judge Pratt in her valid exercise of jurisdiction,” and “neither a common pleas
court nor a prosecutor's office is a ‘person’ for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

thus,” Defendants Miami County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas and Miami
County, Ohio, Prosecutor's Office “may not be sued in this Court.” (/a. at PAGEID
474-75, citing Doc. #2, PAGEID 174-76). Because the initial Complaint is again
operative, and Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants in this Court, are foreclosed

as matters of law, there is no likelihood—much less a substantial one—that
Plaintiff will ultimately succeed on the merits. The Amended TRO Motion (Doc.
#14) is OVERRULED for that reason alone."
While, as discussed above, Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint
within fourteen (14) days of this Order, and may file a renewed TRO Motion in
conjunction with that amended complaint, the Court is not satisfied that it should
exercise jurisdiction even if Plaintiff asserts facially colorable claims in a new
pleading. Under the doctrine of abstention articulated in Younger v. Harris, “a
federal court must decline to interfere with pending state civil or criminal
proceedings when important state interests are involved.” O’Nei/ v. Coughlan,
511 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added), citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Younger, 401 U.S. 37,
41 (1971): accord Doe v. Univ. of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017), citing
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (federal courts should refrain from exercising jurisdiction
over a federal civil case to avoid “interfering with the functions of state criminal

1 Having ruled on the Amended TRO Motion, the Motion to Expedite (Doc. #15) is OVERRULED AS
MOOT. Also, although Plaintiff may renew her prayer for injunctive relief after filing an Amended
Complaint, if she fails to remedy the Complaint’s fatal flaws that (a) Defendant Judge Pratt is
absolutely immune from suit, and (b) the remaining Defendants are not entities capable of being
sued, then any subsequent TRO Motion would be summarily overruled.

prosecutions and to preserve equity and comity.”). “[A]bstention may occur
when three criteria are met: (1) state proceedings are currently pending; (2) the
proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings will
provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his
constitutional claims.” Doe, 860 F.3d at 369, citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432-35.
Based on the record before the Court, this case appears to satisfy all the
criteria for Younger abstention. There is an ongoing criminal prosecution against
Plaintiff (see, e.g., Order Denying Mtn. to Dismiss Charges, Doc. #14-4, PAGEID
561-62), which necessarily implicates important state interests, and it is a long-
established principle that federal and state courts “have concurrent jurisdiction
over § 1983 civil actions[.]” Long v. Dist. of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 937 n.4 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), citing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 25-27 (1820). Thus,
contrary to Plaintiff's argument (Doc. #14, PAGEID 520, citing Fieger v. Thomas, 74
F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996); Ke/m v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 1995)),
Plaintiff is not being deprived of the opportunity to raise her claims at a//in state

court. Rather, she is, at most, being deprived of the opportunity to raise her
constitutional claims when she wants to. However, principles of comity
underlying Younger abstention militate against a federal court dictating to a state
trial court the order in which it must address criminal versus civil claims. See
Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F.3d 1203, 1207 (6th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases; citation
omitted) (Abstention is appropriate when a federal plaintiff asks the district court

to “regulate ‘the day-to-day conduct of state hearings,’ assess the constitutionality
of procedures used in those hearings, or opine on the merits[.]”).
The cases cited by Plaintiff (Doc. #14, PAGEID 520-21, citing Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)) in support of her argument that
Younger abstention does not apply, are unavailing. In Dombrowski, “an
injunction against enforcement of certain state criminal statutes properly issued
because the prosecutor made repeated threats against the federal plaintiffs to
enforce the statutes without any expectation of securing a valid conviction.”
Fieger, 74 F.3d at 750, citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 48, in turn citing Dombrowski,
380 U.S. 479. Here, the trial court considered and overruled Plaintiff's multiple
motions to dismiss the indictment against her for facial insufficiency (Decision,
Doc. #14-5, PAGEID 568-69), and overruled Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
indictment based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. (Decision, Doc. #14-4,
PAGEID 561-62). The state court thus concluded that prosecution of Plaintiff was
neither subjectively malicious nor objectively unlikely to result in conviction; this
Court sees no reason to disturb those decisions.
Moreover, the Gerstein Court held that Younger did not apply because the
injunction sought “was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at
the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not
be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.” 420 U.S. at 108 n.9. Here, the
injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff—that this Court enjoin “law enforcement

officers, police departments, and any agents acting on [Defendants’] behalf...
from enforcing the capias warrants issued against Plaintiff[,]” (Doc. #14, PAGEID
523, 9 1)—is directed squarely at the ongoing prosecution of Plaintiff. Finally,
Mitchum stood only for the proposition that the Anti-Injunction Act does not
absolutely bar a district court from exercising jurisdiction over a 42 U.S.C. 8 1983
claim “where irreparable injury is both great and immediate, where the state law

is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions, or where
there are ... unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief.” 407 U.S.

at 230, 243 (citation modified), quoting Younger, 401 U.S at 46, 53, 54; citing 28
U.S.C. § 2283. The decision did not “question or qualify in any way the principles
of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to
enjoin a state court proceeding.” /d. at 243, citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37. None of
the circumstances cited in Mitchum and Younger is present here, and thus, the
Court has no reason to depart from “the fundamental policy against federal
interference with state criminal prosecutions.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
In sum, even if, in her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff could resolve the

issues of judicial immunity and suing the proper Defendants, she would also have

to overcome the Court's strong presumption against exercising jurisdiction over
her claims. Failure to do so may result in the entire case being dismissed
pursuant to Younger.
Finally, as to the Motion to Appoint, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff, no matter

how indigent, does not have the right to counsel in this Court. See, e.g., Lavado v.

Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 1993), quoting Wahl v. Mciver, 773 F.2d 1169,
1174 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a
constitutional right. It is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional
circumstances.”). Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
has held that “[a]ppointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is not
appropriate when a pro se litigant's claims are frivolous, or when the chances of

success are extremely slim.” Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted). As discussed above, it is impossible for Plaintiff to succeed on
the merits with the claims as pleaded. Accordingly, the ECF Motions and Motion

to Appoint are OVERRULED without prejudice to refiling if Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint survives the required screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and

any motions to dismiss by Defendants.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion to Correct (Doc. #13) is
SUSTAINED, Amended TRO Motion (Doc. #14) is OVERRULED, Motion to Expedite
(Doc. #15) is OVERRULED AS MOOT, and Motion to Appoint (Doc. #16) is
OVERRULED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renewal if Plaintiff sets forth colorable and
actionable claims in an amended pleading. Plaintiff must file any First Amended
Complaint within fourteen (14) days of entry. Failure to do so will result in the
Court adopting the Report and Recommendations (Doc. #2), overruling the
Objections thereto (Doc. #4), and dismissing Plaintiff's initial Complaint (Doc. #3)
with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 te
LSJ att A _ieiea
WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE
July 30, 2025 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11112583. Public record. Not legal advice.