# L.G.M. v. LaRocco

> District Court, E.D. New York · July 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11112572

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11112572

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding, in context of involuntary commitment to psychiatric hospital following not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity acquittal, the government is required to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, insanity and dangerousness permitting confinement
- finding “mere speculation” based on past convictions inadequate to draw conclusions with the certainty required to meet the “clear and convincing” standard
- noting that the pre-trial release analysis that is appropriate for adjudicated criminals could hardly be faulty in the immigration detention context, which is essentially a civil action

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------x
L.G.M.,

Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
- against - 25-CV-2631 (PKC)

ANTHONY J. LAROCCO, in his official
capacity as Sheriff of the Nassau County
Correctional Center; WILLIAM P. JOYCE, in
his official capacity as Acting Field Office
Director, New York City Field Office, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement; KRISTI
NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,

Respondents.
-------------------------------------------------------x
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
On May 9, 2025, Petitioner L.G.M. (“Petitioner” or “L.G.M.”) filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he requested immediate release
from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody or, in the alternative, a bond
hearing. (Pet., Dkt. 1.) Named as Respondents are Anthony J. LaRocco (“LaRocco”),1 William
P. Joyce (“Joyce”), Kristi Noem (“Noem”), and Pamela Bondi (“Bondi”), all in their respective
official capacities (Joyce, Noem, and Bondi, together, “Government Respondents”). (Id.) On
June 25, 2025, the Court granted L.G.M. a bond hearing in front of this Court. (Bond Hr’g Mem.
& Order (“M&O”), Dkt. 30.) On July 9, 2025, the Court held the bond hearing, which L.G.M.
attended in person as facilitated by ICE, and during which the Court received testimony and

1 LaRocco has not yet made an appearance in this matter.
evidence from the parties. (7/9/2025 Min. Entry.) The Court deferred ruling on L.G.M.’s release
at the hearing. (Id.) The Court now grants L.G.M.’s release, subject to bond conditions to be
determined with input from L.G.M. and Government Respondents.
BACKGROUND
Given the extensive briefing by the parties and the summary included in the Court’s

previous decision, (Bond Hr’g M&O, Dkt. 30, at 2–4), the Court summarizes only the facts most
relevant to the issue of bond. The underlying facts are not disputed.
I. L.G.M.’s Arrival in the United States
L.G.M. was born in El Salvador and began to show developmental delays early in life.
(Hesser Decl., Dkt. 3-2, at 1.) His mother relocated for work, and so he was raised primarily by
his grandparents. (Id.) During his childhood in El Salvador, L.G.M. and his family faced threats
and significant violence from the notorious gang MS-13, which sought to recruit L.G.M. (Id. at
1–2.) Eventually, due to these threats, L.G.M.’s mother decided that he would come to the United
States; he entered the United States as an undocumented minor in 2016 at age 13 and reunited with
his mother in Long Island. (Id. at 2.) He applied for and was granted Special Immigrant Juvenile

Status and deferred action in conjunction with that status in October 2019, and he has had a pending
asylum application since September 2017. (Id. at 3.)
II. L.G.M.’s Criminal History
After arriving in the United States, L.G.M. was eventually recruited by the 18th Street
Gang, or Barrio 18 (the “Gang”), which is an MS-13 rival. (Id. at 2.) L.G.M.’s affiliation with
the Gang led to several arrests and convictions in New York State court, for disorderly conduct,
attempted assault in the second degree, and attempted robbery. (Id. at 2; Gov’t Bond Ex. 1,
Dkt. 38-1, at 17–18.) Based on these convictions, L.G.M. was sentenced to two one-year sentences
and one 15-day sentence, to run concurrently. (Hesser Decl., Dkt. 3-2, at 2.) He served his
sentence and was released on August 16, 2024. (Id. at 2–3.)
III. L.G.M.’s Removal History
Immediately upon his release from state custody, L.G.M. was transferred into ICE custody
and detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). (Id. at 3.) L.G.M.’s counsel in his removal

proceedings noticed L.G.M.’s limited verbal communication skills and ordered a psychological
evaluation, which was completed on October 21, 2024, by psychologist Dr. Macarena Corral. (Id.)
L.G.M.’s individual hearing was scheduled to begin on November 19, 2024, but the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) assigned to L.G.M.’s removal proceedings adjourned the proceedings due to L.G.M.’s
demonstrated verbal communication issues. (Id.) A competency evaluation was completed on
November 26, 2024. (Id.) After a competency hearing in January 2025, the IJ agreed with Dr.
Corral’s assessment that L.G.M. was not competent to stand trial under normal procedures, but
that L.G.M. could do so with various safeguards. (Id.) In April 2025, after conducting an
individual hearing with agreed-upon safeguards, the IJ granted L.G.M. deferral of removal under
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). (Id.) This deferral was premised on the IJ’s finding

that L.G.M. faced significant risk of torture if returned to El Salvador “due to his criminal record,
tattoos, age, socioeconomic status, and status as a deportee from the United States.” (IJ Decision,
Dkt. 14-1, at ECF2 24–25.) On April 24, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security filed an
appeal of the deferral order with the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Hesser Decl., Dkt. 3-2, at 3.)
The appeal is pending, (see Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 66:2), and L.G.M. remains in ICE custody.

2 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing
system and not the document’s internal pagination.
IV. Procedural History before this Court
L.G.M.’s counsel filed this Petition on May 9, 2025. (Pet., Dkt. 1.) At that time, L.G.M.
was being held at the Nassau County Correctional Center (“Nassau”) in East Meadow, New York,
where he was transferred on May 8, 2025, from the Orange County Jail in Goshen, New York,
where he had been detained for the previous nine months. (Id. at 1, n.2.) At some point prior to

filing the Petition, L.G.M.’s counsel was notified that ICE intended to transfer L.G.M.
“tomorrow,” i.e., May 10, 2025, from Nassau to a facility in Louisiana. (Id. at n.2.) Despite the
filing of L.G.M.’s Petition in this district, ICE transferred L.G.M. to Louisiana on May 10, 2025.
(Dkt. 10, at 1.) After a hearing before this Court on May 13, 2025, (5/13/2025 Min. Entry),
Government Respondents transferred L.G.M. to a facility near Buffalo, New York, (Dkt. 15).
Following briefing by both parties, the Court granted L.G.M.’s request for relief in the form of a
bond hearing in front of this Court. (Bond Hr’g M&O, Dkt. 30.) The Court held that hearing (the
“Bond Hearing”) on July 9, 2025, during which it heard testimony from Dr. Corral via video and
L.G.M. in person, as well as received documentary evidence from both parties.3

3 In its Bond Hearing M&O, the Court invited L.G.M.’s counsel to submit a request for
hearing accommodations for L.G.M. in light of his mental deficits and the safeguards implemented
in prior hearings in front of the IJ. (Bond Hr’g M&O, Dkt. 30.) On July 1, 2025, L.G.M.’s counsel
submitted this request, (Dkt. 32), which the Court granted in part, (7/2/2025 Dkt. Order). Namely,
the Court granted counsel’s request that Government Respondents submit their written questions
for L.G.M. before the Bond Hearing, but denied the request that L.G.M. provide only written,
rather than oral, testimony. (Id.) During the Bond Hearing, the Court required L.G.M. to testify
but limited the scope of questioning to L.G.M.’s affiliation with the Gang. (Bond Hr’g Tr.,
Dkt. 42, at 13:25–14:7.)
LEGAL STANDARD4
The Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens to due process in removal proceedings. Black
v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 143 (2d. Cir. 2024) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).5
“The Constitution establishes due process rights for ‘all ‘persons’ within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.’” Id.

(quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)). Courts in this Circuit determine what due
process is due to noncitizens in removal proceedings and related custody based on an evaluation
of the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which include: (1) the
individual’s private interests; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s liberty;
and (3) the government’s interest. Id. at 147, 151 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Where a noncitizen’s detention has been unconstitutionally prolonged in violation of their
due process rights, the noncitizen is entitled to a bond hearing, during which the government bears
the burden of showing by “clear and convincing evidence” “the need for [the noncitizen’s]
continued detention.” Black, 103 F.4th at 155, 157–58. Because removal proceedings are civil
rather than criminal, any need for detention cannot be punitive in nature and must instead serve

“two regulatory goals: ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings and
[p]reventing danger to the community.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Therefore, the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that the

4 Although the Court suggested that it was going to consider L.G.M.’s bond under the
standard set forth in Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2001), (see Bond Hr’g M&O, Dkt. 30,
at 10), that would be incorrect, as the parties recognize, because Mapp governs bond pending a
separate habeas petition, and here the Court has already granted L.G.M.’s Petition by ordering a
bond hearing. The Court therefore agrees with the parties that an analysis under Mapp is no longer
required at this stage. (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 48:2–50:7.)
5 Throughout this matter, Government Respondents have repeatedly objected to Black, as
to which they have sought en banc review. (See, e.g., Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 57:19–22.)
petitioner “poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community” such that continued detention is
necessary. Black, 103 F.4th at 155 (quoting Black v. Decker, No. 20-CV-3055 (LGS),
2020 WL 4260994, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020)).
DISCUSSION
I. The Mathews Factors and Consideration of Mitigating Measures
The parties agree that the underlying facts of L.G.M.’s detention, including its duration,

warrant a bond hearing under Black, (see Gov’t Ltr., Dkt. 12, at 2 (acknowledging “that the facts
and law set forth in Black would likely lead this Court to order that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing before an IJ”)), and that Government Respondents carry the burden of showing, by clear
and convincing evidence, that L.G.M.’s detention must continue because he is either a danger to
the community or a flight risk, (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 57:4–5). See Black, 103 F.4th at 155–
56 (noting that “Mathews factors again serve as . . . guide” for bond hearing procedures).6 As the
Court advised the parties at the Bond Hearing, the Court is taking into consideration measures that
can mitigate any risk of danger or flight that L.G.M. poses in determining whether he poses a risk
of danger or flight. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (finding, in context of

involuntary commitment to psychiatric hospital following not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity
acquittal, the government is required to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, insanity and
dangerousness permitting confinement); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987)
(finding, in context of pretrial detention, that the government is required “[i]n a full-blown
adversary hearing . . . to convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that

6 The Black court thoroughly analyzed the unique challenges faced by individuals detained
in immigration matters pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Black, 103 F.4th at 156. These include
difficulty in securing counsel, as noncitizens in removal proceedings are not entitled to counsel
and can be “transfer[ed] to any ICE detention center, even one not located in the district of the
alleged offense” and “far from any community support,” id.—as has occurred in this matter.
no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person”, i.e.,
“that [the] arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community”).
Other courts in this Circuit have applied the same standard. See, e.g., Cantor v. Freden, 761 F.
Supp. 3d 630, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[F]ailing to consider whether alternatives to detention may

ameliorate any danger posed by [petitioner’s] release creates a significant risk that he will be
erroneously deprived of his liberty interest.”); J.C.G. v. Genalo, No. 24-CV-8755 (JLR),
2025 WL 88831, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2025) (requiring the IJ to hold a bond hearing where
the IJ must “consider the availability of alternative conditions of release” when “determining
whether to grant bond”); Bonilla v. Decker, No. 22-CV-4501 (ER), 2024 WL 182315, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2024) (upholding the IJ’s assessment that “no bond or alternatives to detention
could ameliorate the danger of recidivist drunk driving or gang activity”).
Citing Black, Government Respondents argue that mitigating measures should be
considered only if and once the Court has determined that L.G.M. poses no danger to the
community, rather than as part of the dangerousness evaluation itself.7 (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42,

at 5:5–24; Gov’t Opp. to Bond Hr’g, Dkt. 27, at 6 (“Significantly, ‘a bond amount would be at
issue only once the IJ has determined the noncitizen does not pose a danger to the community.’”
(quoting Black, 103 F.4th at 158)).) Black later states that “a showing of dangerousness by clear
and convincing evidence would foreclose any possibility of bond.” 103 F.4th at 159.
The Court disagrees with Government Respondents’ reading of Black. The discussion
Government Respondents cite to in Black is focused on the process for setting the amount of bond

7 As previously noted, Government Respondents disagree with Black and are seeking en
banc review of that decision. However, if Black is reversed, it is unclear what support Government
Respondents will have for their argument that mitigating measures may only be considered if and
after no dangerousness is found.
and not the availability of bond. That is, setting a bond amount does not come into play unless
and until the Court finds that the petitioner does not present a risk of danger to the community.
That holding does not say anything about what the Court may consider in determining whether the
petitioner poses such a risk. Similarly, Black’s subsequent language that a “showing of

dangerousness” precludes a bond says nothing about what the Court may consider in determining
whether dangerousness has been shown as a threshold matter. Indeed, it appears that in Black, the
government argued—and the Black panel “agree[d]”—that IJs enjoy “broad discretion . . . in
determining a noncitizen’s eligibility for release on bond,” and that “[a]n IJ . . . may consider
financial circumstances and alternatives to detention” in making that determination. Id. (emphasis
added). “[T]he private interest affected by the official action is the most significant liberty interest
there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Id. at 151 (quoting Velasco Lopez v.
Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). The government’s “legitimate interests” include
“protecting the community” and “ensuring the noncitizen’s appearance at proceedings.” Id. at 153.
“[A]ny detention incidental to such interests must ‘bear a reasonable relation to’ those interests,”

id. at 158 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690) (cleaned up), and depriving a detained individual
of their liberty interest would be “erroneous[]” if there were any available alternatives to that
deprivation that would ensure the community is protected and the noncitizen appears at subsequent
proceedings, id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335)). Thus, the Court does not find that Black
precludes the Court’s consideration of mitigating measures in determining whether Government
Respondents have shown by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a risk of danger
to the community.8

8 As suggested by Black, the Court is guided by the pre-trial release standards that apply in
criminal matters. See Black, 103 F.4th at 158 (finding “no reason . . . to deviate from [the]
approach” used in, inter alia, Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751, which required a finding of dangerousness
Accordingly, the Court considers the availability of ameliorative measures in determining
whether Government Respondents have demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Petitioner poses a risk of flight or danger to the community if he is released from detention pending
the resolution of his removal proceedings.

II. Dangerousness
After careful consideration of the facts in the record, the Court finds that bond can be
granted to L.G.M. with conditions that would sufficiently ameliorate any danger he presents to the
community.
A. L.G.M.’s Record
The Court conducts an independent review of the evidence that is part of L.G.M.’s record.
See Ozturk v. Trump, No. 25-CV-0374 (WKS), --- F. Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 1420540, at *9 (D. Vt.
May 16, 2025) (explaining that an Article III court “is obligated to conduct an independent and
rigorous review of the evidence that is a part of the record”); Mahdawi, 2025 WL 1243135,
at *3, *12 (considering past allegations, lack of criminal record, and letters from community
members in evaluating whether petitioner “presents [a] danger to his community or to others”).

Government Respondents rely on L.G.M.’s criminal history and disciplinary record while in ICE
detention to show dangerousness. (Gov’t Opp. to Bond Hr’g, Dkt. 27, at 9–10.) For the reasons
explained below, the Court, however, does not find that Petitioner’s past convictions or conduct
while in custody establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that L.G.M. poses a risk of harm to
the community if released from detention with restrictive conditions.

that “no conditions of release can dispel” for pre-conviction detention of a criminal defendant, and
Foucha, 504 U.S. 71, which applied the same standard in the context of involuntary commitment
to a psychiatric hospital); 18 U.S.C. § 3142; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (noting that the
pre-trial release analysis that is appropriate for adjudicated criminals could hardly be faulty in the
immigration detention context, which is essentially a civil action).
1. L.G.M.’s Prior Convictions and Gang Affiliation
The Court summarizes L.G.M.’s criminal record based on the evidence produced by the
parties and presented at the Bond Hearing. After arriving in the United States at the age of 13,
L.G.M. began affiliating himself with the Gang, perhaps motivated by a desire to make friends, to
get protection, or something else. (Hesser Decl., Dkt. 3-2, at 2 (describing L.G.M.’s recruitment

into the Gang); Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 51:22–52:12 (describing the bullying L.G.M. was
subjected to once in the United States and how this led to him seek friendship and protection from
individuals who were part of the Gang).) By the time of L.G.M.’s first arrest at the age of 18,
L.G.M. was a member of the Gang. (Id. at 52:13–15.) Between December 2021 and March 2023,
L.G.M. was arrested three times as a result of his involvement with the Gang. (Pujol Decl.,
Dkt. 14-1, ¶¶ 13, 15, 16; see also Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 52:19–21.) These arrests led to
convictions for: (1) disorderly conduct on May 9, 2022; (2) robbery in the second degree (although
adjudicated as a juvenile) on January 20, 2023; and (3) attempted assault with intent to cause
physical injury with a weapon, attempted robbery in the third degree, and disorderly conduct on
September 29, 2023. (Pujol Decl., Dkt. 14-1, ¶¶ 14, 15, 17; Gov’t Bond Ex. 1, Dkt. 38-1, at

ECF 17.) Although one of the incidents underlying the convictions involved guns, there is no
evidence in the record that L.G.M. possessed or fired a gun. (See Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 58:19–
23.) L.G.M. did use a knife against another individual in the attempted assault and attempted
robbery incident, but it is unclear whether this was in self-defense. (Compare Gov’t Bond Ex. 1,
Dkt. 38-1, at ECF 35 (police report detailing victim statement) with October 2024 Corral Report,
Dkt. 39-8, at 6 (describing the altercation as “self-defense” after L.G.M. “was in a physical
argument, and . . . defended himself, grabbed the man’s knife, and cut him”).)9 Indeed, the

9 Indeed, Government Respondents’ description of L.G.M.’s criminal history as “a bit of a
run” complete with “a charge of attempted murder” was misleading, given that he was never
criminal records on which Government Respondents rely to argue dangerousness contain only
arrest notes and court paperwork, which do not provide a complete picture of the underlying facts
relating to any of his convictions.
Although L.G.M.’s prior convictions are not trivial, without any information regarding

L.G.M.’s specific conduct during the crimes, these do not go far in demonstrating that L.G.M. is
dangerous. Furthermore, the fact that L.G.M. served only a year in total for all of his convictions
further undercuts the seriousness of his conduct.10 (Gov’t Bond Ex. 1, Dkt. 38-1, at ECF 17;
Hesser Decl., Dkt. 3-2, at 2.)
Government Respondents also rely on L.G.M.’s affiliation with the Gang more generally
to show dangerousness. Government Respondents dispute L.G.M.’s claim that he has renounced
his affiliation with the Gang, which he made in connection with his bond request, and argue that
L.G.M. will return to the Gang if released. (See Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 59:21–60:5.) In support,
Government Respondents point to L.G.M.’s testimony during the February 2025 removal
proceedings before the IJ in which L.G.M. confirmed that he was still part of the Gang. (See id.

at 12:20–23 (reading from IJ proceeding transcript L.G.M.’s testimony regarding being a member
of the Gang), 45:21–22 (L.G.M. testifying that he told the IJ in February 2025 that he was a
member of the Gang).)11 Government Respondents argue that the “inconsistency” between
L.G.M.’s two sworn statements shows that L.G.M. is testifying to whatever serves his purpose at

convicted of attempted murder. (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 58:13–18; see Gov’t Bond Ex.,
Dkt. 38-1, at ECF 17.)
10 The Court notes that L.G.M.’s sentence included multiple one-year sentences to run
concurrently.
11 The Court has reviewed L.G.M.’s testimony in front of the IJ, which was submitted as
an exhibit during the Bond Hearing. (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 10:2–12 (discussing transcript of
IJ proceedings).)
the moment—i.e., getting deferred removal in the IJ proceeding versus getting bond in this
proceeding. (Id. at 59:21–22.) As part of this argument, Government Respondents essentially
contend that, if released, L.G.M. will have to maintain his membership in the Gang, because
without it, he will lose his CAT claim that led to him being granted deferred removal. (See id.

at 61:15–24.)
However, the Court does not find inconsistent, and credits, L.G.M.’s testimony at the Bond
Hearing that while he still considered himself a member of the Gang when he testified at the
hearing before the IJ in February 2025, he no longer does and that he does not intend to rejoin the
Gang if released.12 (Id. at 42:13–18, 43:4–10.) It is neither implausible nor incredible that, in
February 2025, L.G.M. believed that he was still a member of the Gang—and, as importantly, that
the outside world perceived him as such13—yet, during the intervening four months, decided to
renounce that membership, especially at a time when he was not under pressure from the Gang to
associate with them. The operative question for this Court is the status of L.G.M.’s Gang affiliation
today and whether he intends to associate with the Gang if released from custody. The Court does

12 As discussed supra, in assessing L.G.M.’s credibility and testimony, the Court takes into
consideration L.G.M.’s significant mental deficits, which are thoroughly documented in Dr.
Corral’s reports. (See generally October 2024 Corral Report, Dkt. 39-8.) Relatedly, because of
L.G.M.’s mental deficits, the Court does not find that he is capable of the cunning necessary to, as
Government Respondents argue, (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 70:15–23), calculate what would best
serve his interests with respect to his testimony at the removal proceeding versus the Bond Hearing
in this case.
13 L.G.M.’s counsel argues, and L.G.M.’s July testimony corroborates, that, at the IJ
hearing, L.G.M. was trying to communicate that he faced a significant risk of gang-related of
torture if removed to El Salvador. (See Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 43:11–16, 55:13–56:2.) Indeed,
the IJ granted deferral of removal based on the risk of torture without distinguishing between
whether L.G.M. was still a member of the Gang or not. (See generally, IJ Decision, Dkt. 14-1
(describing this risk as stemming from L.G.M.’s tattoos and socio-economic status as well as the
gang information-sharing between the U.S. and Salvadorean governments, whose identification of
L.G.M. as having been a Gang member at some point in time would be sufficient to trigger his
arrest and torture under the current state of exception in El Salvador).)
not find that the evidence establishes either and finds that any risk of L.G.M. associating with the
Gang upon release can be lessened by restrictions placed on his release.
2. L.G.M.’s Custodial Disciplinary Record
Turning to L.G.M.’s disciplinary record during his ICE detention, which Government
Respondents also rely on to show dangerousness, the Court similarly does not find this evidence

sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard, even when considered in conjunction with
L.G.M.’s criminal history. According to the records produced by Government Respondents,
L.G.M. was cited for a number of disciplinary code violations and behavioral issues during his
ICE detention. (Gov.’t Bond Ex. 3, Dkt. 38-3, at ECF 2, 9, 11, 19, 36 (prison hearing reports
detailing excessive noise/disorderly conduct, possession of facility contraband (modified pens),
possession of any item used as a weapon, conduct that disrupts or interferes with facility, defacing
county property, disobeying correction officer, and fighting).) In particular, L.G.M. participated
in at least one fight while detained. (Id. at ECF 38.) Government Respondents proffer this to
suggest that L.G.M.’s criminal and purportedly violent behavior and his Gang affiliation are
current. (See Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 62:11–13.) But, without a fuller record as to the

circumstances surrounding each of these incidents, the Court cannot find that this disciplinary
record is proof of L.G.M.’s dangerousness as opposed to proof of the dangerousness of prison.
(See G-M Aff., Dkt. 39-1, at ECF 8 (“Even when [L.G.M.] was incarcerated, they beat him up a
lot in the jail and one time so badly that they had to take him to Nassau hospital.”).) Additionally,
as the Court confirmed at the Bond Hearing, Government Respondents have failed to prove that
L.G.M.’s infractions were gang-related. (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 62:25–63:3 (THE COURT:
“So [you] don’t know and you don’t have any evidence that it was gang related, right?”
MR. KNAPP: “His friend -- I don’t have -- I can’t say definitively that it was gang related.”).) The
Court therefore does not find that L.G.M.’s disciplinary record while in ICE detention shows that
he presents a danger to the community if released, especially given his disassociation from the
Gang and the conditions that will be placed on his release, see infra.
3. L.G.M.’s Mental Capacity
The Court also considers the risk posed by L.G.M.’s mental health issues and deficits.
Government Respondents contend that mental illness may be a reason to continue detaining an

individual. (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 68:17–69:14 (citing Black, 103 F.4th at 143 (itself citing
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691)).) While that might be true where a person’s mental illness leads them
to engage in violence or other anti-social behavior, that is not the situation here.
Although the evidence indicates that L.G.M. might be suggestible due to his diminished
mental capacity14 and that he is currently suffering from depression and anxiety, the Court does
not find that these conditions make him more dangerous or weigh in favor of incarceration. As
the Court stated at the Bond Hearing, despite L.G.M. suffering from “all sorts of mental health
issues,” including “anxiety and depression [that] are being exacerbated by his continued
incarceration,” “[n]o one has made a connection between that behavior and violence perpetrated
by him [or] that led to his arrest.” (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 69:16–21.) Indeed, Dr. Corral15

found L.G.M.’s anger to be “situationally determined and transient.” (June 2025 Corral Report,
Dkt. 39-10, at 5.) Ultimately, the Court does not believe these concerns—especially the possibility
that L.G.M. will be pressured or convinced to re-associate with Gang members—cannot be

14 In particular, the Court recognizes that this diminished capacity appears to have played
a significant role in L.G.M. joining the Gang in the first place. (See, e.g., G-M Aff., Dkt. 39-1, at
ECF 8–9 (discussing how L.G.M.’s “trouble understanding things” made him a target for bullying
and increased the value of the protection the Gang could provide).)
15 At the Bond Hearing, Government Respondents accepted Dr. Corral’s credentials and
qualifications as an expert, (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 25:18–19), and the IJ previously found her
testimony “credible and persuasive,” (IJ Decision, Dkt. 14-1, at ECF 20).
mitigated by conditions of bail and does not believe they rise to a level that requires L.G.M.’s
ongoing and potentially indefinite detention16—detention that has demonstrably aggravated
L.G.M.’s mental health issues. (See June 2025 Report, Dkt. 39-10, at 4.) Rather, if released,
L.G.M.’s mental health and behavioral issues could and should be addressed by professionals like
those identified by L.G.M.’s counsel.17

B. Release Conditions That Would Mitigate any Dangerousness Posed by L.G.M.
Subject to input from the parties, the Court finds that the below bond conditions would
mitigate any risk of danger posed by L.G.M. and should therefore be imposed in some form, if
feasible.
The first and most important bond condition is to limit L.G.M.’s ability to leave his family
home. L.G.M.’s past crimes were all perpetrated with other individuals, i.e., members of the Gang.
(See Gov’t Bond Ex. 1, Dkt. 38-1, at ECF 32–33.) Therefore, restricting or curtailing L.G.M.’s
ability to interact with non-family members, in particular Gang members, should significantly
lessen the risk of L.G.M. being involved in violence or other illegal activity. The Court relies on
Government Respondents to advise on how to effectuate and monitor such restrictions, including

the viability of an ankle monitor. The Court also invites L.G.M.’s counsel to advise whether and
how L.G.M.’s family might be able to facilitate or ensure L.G.M.’s adherence to any such
restrictions.

16 The parties do not appear to dispute that, even if Government Respondents’ appeal of
the IJ’s deferred removal decision is successful, L.G.M.’s immigration proceedings could last
years. (See Bond Hr’g Tr. at 56, 74.)
17 L.G.M.’s counsel provides information from two such professionals, a social worker
with the Bronx Defenders and the Executive Director of S.T.R.O.N.G. Youth, Inc., a
gang-prevention, intervention, and reentry non-profit, who have indicated their readiness to
provide support to L.G.M. if he is released. (Dkts. 39-2, 39-3.)
The second bond condition involves treatment for L.G.M.’s mental health issues and
participation in pro-social programs, such as those recommend by L.G.M.’s counsel. (See Release
Plan, Dkt. 39-2, at 2; S.T.R.O.N.G. Ltr., Dkt. 39-3.) Both will significantly help to reduce the risk
of recidivism by L.G.M. and to increase the likelihood of L.G.M.’s success on pre-adjudication

release. The Court also invites Government Respondents to provide their views on the propriety,
efficacy, and/or sufficiency of the treatment and programming proposed by L.G.M.’s counsel.
Both parties should also address the issue of how to effectuate these measures within the
framework of home confinement.
Finally, the third bond condition is for L.G.M. to resume working in construction with his
stepfather, as suggested by L.G.M.’s family. (M-G Aff., Dkt. 39-1, at ECF 2; A-P Aff., Dkt. 39-1,
at ECF 12.) Steady employment will provide financial support and stability for L.G.M. and
thereby facilitate L.G.M.’s re-entry into society after his prolonged detention. The advantage of
the current proposal is that L.G.M. will be supervised and monitored by a family member. The
Court therefore invites submissions from both parties regarding the feasibility of L.G.M.’s return

to this construction job, given the anticipated restrictions on L.G.M.’s ability to leave his home
and the need to minimize the risk of L.G.M. being approached by, or re-affiliating with, the Gang.
* * *
In sum, the Court finds that Government Respondents have failed to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that, if released, L.G.M. presents a risk of danger to the community that
cannot be sufficiently ameliorated through restrictive release conditions. See Bonilla, 2024
WL 182315, at *6 (affirming IJ’s assessment that “no bond or alternatives to detention could
ameliorate the danger of recidivist drunk driving or gang activity”). To hold otherwise, without
any evidence of L.G.M.’s actual conduct or the circumstances surrounding L.G.M.’s prior
convictions and disciplinary infractions, would amount to improper speculation. Compare
Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 240–41 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding “mere
speculation” based on past convictions inadequate to draw conclusions with the certainty required
to meet the “clear and convincing” standard) with Bonilla, 2024 WL 182315, at *3 (upholding IJ

finding of ongoing dangerousness of convicted drunk driver because of “recidivist drunk driving”
and “credible allegations of [ongoing] gang affiliation” (citation omitted)); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 691 (upholding preventative, dangerousness-based detention “only when limited to specially
dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections”); Black, 103 F.4th at 151
(questioning criminal adjudication-adjacent deprivation under § 1226(c) absent “new or
unpunished conduct”); (Bond Hr’g Tr., Dkt. 42, at 67:4–12 (conceding that any future danger
posed by L.G.M. is “speculative”)).
III. Risk of Flight
The Court next considers the risk of flight posed by L.G.M., which it finds to be minimal.
In support of their argument that L.G.M. presents a risk of flight, Government Respondents point
to (1) L.G.M.’s March 2018 removal order, decided in absentia because L.G.M. failed to appear

at his initial removal hearing on March 14, 2018, (Gov’t Bond Ex. 2, Dkt. 38-2, at 1); and (2) the
possibility that L.G.M. will be deported if his deferred removal status is revoked, (see Bond Hr’g
Tr., Dkt. 42, at 64:2–65:21). Neither fact, either separately or in combination, amounts to clear
and convincing evidence that L.G.M. poses a risk of flight.
Regarding L.G.M.’s failure to appear in connection with his removal proceedings,
L.G.M.’s counsel explained at the Bond Hearing that this failure was due to an error that was
rectified within what appears to be 30 days. (Id. at 55:3–19.) Given this explanation, together
with the facts that L.G.M. later appeared as directed at his removal proceeding and that the IJ
ultimately vacated the March 2018 removal order, the Court finds that this one-time lapse nearly a
decade ago has no bearing on whether L.G.M. will reappear as directed in his removal proceedings.
(Id. at 17:19–19:12.)
Regarding the argument that L.G.M. will flee if he thinks he will be deported, this is
speculation that is rebutted by L.G.M.’s personal circumstances. L.G.M. submits three letters from

family members in Long Island demonstrating that L.G.M. has a loving family who is eager for
him to return home. (See Dkt. 39-1 (notarized affirmations from L.G.M.’s sister, mother, and
stepfather).) L.G.M. also appears to have held down a job working with his stepfather in
construction prior to his incarceration, which, as discussed, should be available to L.G.M. upon
his release. (See id.) Furthermore, there is no evidence that L.G.M. has anywhere to go if he
leaves his family in Long Island or has any means to flee the area. The only other family L.G.M.
has is in El Salvador, the very place to which he is trying to avoid being deported. Indeed, L.G.M.’s
entire legal fight is aimed at returning him to, and keeping him at, his family home in Long Island.
Thus, the Court finds that Government Respondents have failed to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that L.G.M. poses a risk of flight if released from ICE detention. The

Court further finds that any risk of flight would be mitigated by the same bond conditions discussed
above that would ameliorate any risk of danger to the community posed by L.G.M. Accordingly,
the Court invites the parties to propose measures that would decrease the risk of flight, such as
regular reporting to the government agency identified by Government Respondents as the primary
point of contact for L.G.M.’s release.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court grants L.G.M. release on bond, subject to the conditions to be set
after the Court has heard from the parties. The parties shall file their submissions regarding bond
conditions within two (2) weeks of this Memorandum & Order. The parties’ submissions may
include a proposed bond order. The Court will thereafter either (1) convene a conference with the
parties to discuss the proposed bond conditions, or if the Court finds such a conference
unnecessary, (2) issue an order releasing L.G.M. on bond with conditions.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: July 31, 2025
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11112572. Public record. Not legal advice.