# TIMKO v. NSPA LOUNGE LLC

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · July 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11111459

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11111459

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting tests for whether individuals are employees or independent contractors, whether entities are joint employers, and developing test for whether student-athletes are employees

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TERRI TIMKO; ANTHONY )
ROBINSON; and STEPHANIE )
DARNELL, ) No. 2:23-cv-1307
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
NSPA LOUNGE LLC d/b/a DAYS INN; )
NSPA SUITES LLC; MILAN, LLC )
d/b/a MOTEL M; YADWINDER )
SINGH a/k/a JERRY KING; )
BALJINDER KAUR a/k/a ROBIN )
a/k/a DIPPY; HIMANSHU BHATIA )
a/k/a HIMAN; DIPTI BHATIA f/k/a )
DIPTI MAISURIA; WYNDHAM )
HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION
Plaintiffs Terri Timko, Anthony Robinson, and Stephanie Darnell bring a mix
of federal- and state-law claims against eight defendants: individual and corporate
owners of a Pennsylvania hotel and a West Virginia motel, and a corporate franchisor
of the Pennsylvania hotel. Plaintiffs’ 14 claims can be divided into four buckets: (1)
forced-labor and labor-trafficking claims brought by Plaintiffs Timko and Robinson,
under federal and Pennsylvania law; (2) wage-and-hour claims brought by all
Plaintiffs, under federal and Pennsylvania law; (3) Section 1981 race-discrimination
claims brought by Plaintiffs Timko and Robinson; (4) and common-law equitable
claims brought by all Plaintiffs.
Before the Court now are two motions to dismiss, brought by Defendant
Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (ECF 13),1 and Defendants Himanshu Bhatia, Dipti
Bhatia, and Milan, LLC (the Motel M defendants) (ECF 23). As set forth below, the
Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Wyndham’s and the Motel M
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege a multi-state forced-labor and labor-trafficking scheme
between a “Days Inn” hotel in New Stanton, Pennsylvania, owned and operated by
non-moving Defendants husband-and-wife Yadwinder Singh and Baljinder Kaur, co-
owned by Defendant Himanshu Bhatia, and (formerly)2 franchised by Defendant
Wyndham; and a “Motel M” motel in Lewisburg, West Virginia, owned and operated
by Defendant Milan, LLC, a West Virginia company owned by Defendants husband-
and-wife Mr. Bhatia and Dipti Bhatia. ECF 1, ¶¶ 6, 23-25, 28, 33, 146-147, 252-256.3
Plaintiffs are three individuals, each of whom worked at the Days Inn, the
Motel M, or both. All allege wage-and-hour claims, but only two—Ms. Timko and Mr.
Robinson—have claims of forced labor and trafficking. The following facts are drawn
from Plaintiffs’ complaint and accepted as true.
Ms. Timko
Ms. Timko first arrived at the New Stanton Days Inn in March 2022. ¶¶
26-28. At the time, she was homeless, and accepted Mr. Singh’s offer to work at the

1 Wyndham notes that it is incorrectly named in the complaint as Wyndham Hotels
and Resorts, Inc. ECF 13, p. 10.

2 Defendants allege that Wyndham severed its franchise agreement with the Days
Inn around January 2023, but that it later re-branded as another Wyndham-owned
franchise. ECF 1, ¶¶ 173, 175.

3 Defendants NSPA Lounge LLC, NSPA Suites LLC, Yadwinder Singh, and Baljinder
Kaur (the Days Inn defendants) did not move to dismiss or otherwise answer the
complaint, and the Clerk of Court entered default against them. ECF 31. The Court
thus doesn’t address the claims against them (at Counts I, IV, and VI-XIII).
Days Inn—seven days a week, six hours a day, at $8 per hour—in exchange for
housing at the hotel for herself, her son, and their dogs. ¶¶ 28, 32. Ms. Timko
understood the offer to mean that, after a trial period, she would be hired as a
legitimate employee, and that lodging costs would be deducted from her paycheck
with money left over to pay for her car and other expenses. ¶¶ 30, 35.
Ms. Timko was misled. Mr. Singh and Ms. Kaur charged Ms. Timko $350 each
week for lodging, and controlled her hours so that her paycheck would cover that fee
alone. ¶¶ 37, 41, 336. So Ms. Timko was forced to borrow money from Mr. Singh
to pay for her expenses, making her indebted to Mr. Singh—who then threatened her
with arrest over the debt to coerce her into continuing to work at the hotel. ¶¶ 42,
60-62. Mr. Singh’s and Ms. Kaur’s control over Ms. Timko extended to restrictions
on her work and leisure. They conditioned Ms. Timko’s lodging on her continued sole
employment at the Days Inn, prevented her from associating with coworkers or
guests (on and off the hotel property), prevented her from having any visitors to her
room, and reprimanded her if she didn’t comply. ¶¶ 38, 43-51. They also cultured
a hostile work environment, which included “subtle sexual advances” from Mr. Singh,
and yelling and belittling her in front of guests. ¶¶ 52-59.
After four months of abuse, and never having been made a legitimate
employee, Ms. Timko made her escape—she and her son packed up in the middle of
the night on July 27, 2022, and left for another hotel in a neighboring town. ¶¶
36, 79.
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Robinson began working for the Motel M in June 2019. ¶ 82. Mr.
Bhatia agreed to pay him off-the-books and in cash, and he too worked under a so-
called “debt arrangement,” though the specifics of that arrangement aren’t clear.
¶¶ 84-85, 87.
At some point, Mr. Bhatia “traded” Mr. Robinson to Mr. Singh, and Mr. Singh
took Mr. Robinson to work and live at the Days Inn. ¶¶ 88-89. There, Mr. Singh
subjected Mr. Robinson to a debt arrangement like that he imposed on Ms. Timko.
¶¶ 93-94, 337. Mr. Singh likewise confiscated Mr. Robinson’s phones, and
prevented him from associating with coworkers or guests, from attending church,
from leaving his room when he wasn’t working, and from leaving the hotel without a
chaperone. ¶¶ 90-92, 108-111. Mr. Singh also increased Mr. Robinson’s work but
not his pay; withheld overtime payment; forced him to work at Mr. Singh’s personal
residence; threatened physical violence; and threatened to have Mr. Robinson, who
had outstanding warrants, arrested if he stopped working for the Days Inn—or even
left the property without supervision. ¶¶ 83, 97-101, 105-107.4 Mr. Singh was
prejudiced against Black people and trafficked Mr. Robinson, at least in part, because
he is Black. ¶¶ 80, 112-115.
For unknown reasons, Mr. Robinson was eventually “kicked out” of the Days
Inn on June 1, 2022. ¶ 116. Ms. Kaur locked him out of his room and didn’t allow
him to remove his personal belongings, which Mr. Singh and Ms. Kaur kept.
Ms. Darnell
Unlike Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson, Ms. Darnell wasn’t trafficked or
subjected to forced labor. Her claims, instead, are entirely wage-and-hour focused.
While she was employed at the Days Inn, she was shorted hours, not compensated
for extra labor, not paid at the overtime rate, and denied vacation pay. ¶¶ 123-
125, 127-128. Eventually, Mr. Singh fired her, and he refused to cooperate in her
unemployment claim. ¶ 132.

4 Mr. Robinson was, in fact, eventually arrested. After he finished his incarceration,
Mr. Singh transported him from West Virginia back to the Days Inn in Pennsylvania.
¶¶ 95-96.
Plaintiffs were not the only people caught in the forced-labor and
trafficking scheme
According to Plaintiffs, the forced-labor and trafficking scheme perpetrated by
Defendants went beyond Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson. ¶ 20. Mr. Bhatia and Mr.
Singh communicated about hiring homeless and other vulnerable victims and agreed
to share trafficked individuals for hotel labor. ¶¶ 25, 85-86. Mr. Robinson saw
others at the Motel M and Days Inn “working under the same debt agreement as he
was.” ¶¶ 87, 89. Ms. Darnell too “witnessed multiple individuals across multiple
years working in exchange for rooms” at the Days Inn. ¶ 130.
Defendant Wyndham
The Days Inn was, at that time, in a franchise relationship with Defendant
Wyndham. ¶ 147. In exchange for the Days Inn’s use of its brand, Wyndham
received royalties for rented rooms, ¶¶ 153-154, 157, and enjoyed the ability to
exercise control over the Days Inn in several ways: Wyndham mandated use of a
customer rewards program; controlled the online booking process; dictated facility
maintenance, modifications, and renovations; specified suppliers and vendors; had
the right to (and did) send inspectors to the hotel; had access to the Days Inn’s
database and electronic systems; and dictated technology. 146-164, 170-171.
Wyndham also enforced room pricing, controlled whether the Days Inn could send
business to competitors, and shared a central-reservation system with the hotel.
¶¶ 161, 163, 166. Wyndham had the right to terminate the franchise agreement
unilaterally. ¶¶ 151, 165.5

5 Wyndham filed the franchise agreement after the motion-to-dismiss hearing (ECF
37-1), and so neither party has addressed its contents or how it impacts Plaintiffs’
claims.

After review, the Court finds that the franchise agreement corresponds with
Plaintiffs’ allegations about Wyndham’s rights under the agreement. Among other
things, the agreement: obligates the franchisee to renovate and improve the facility
as dictated by the franchisor, and conditions facility modifications on franchisor
Wyndham, Plaintiffs allege, was familiar with human trafficking. It had
knowledge about human trafficking at hotels generally and at its franchised locations
specifically. ¶¶ 133-145. It was also heavily involved in the development of
training and educational resources to raise awareness of human trafficking and its
indicia, and established methods through which employees could report suspected
trafficking. According to Plaintiffs, all of this, along with the franchise
relationship between Wyndham and the Days Inn, meant that Wyndham knew or
should have known about the forced-labor and trafficking scheme at issue now.

approval, ECF 37-1, ¶¶ 3.1, 3.12, 3.14 & Schedule D; gives the franchisor control over
the days of operation, maintenance and appearance of the facility, who can manage
the facility, how payment is accepted, and the choice of amenities, services, and
facilities, ¶ 3.2; gives the franchisor control over purchasing decisions, ¶¶ 3.10,
4.4; mandates the use and maintenance of a property management system and other
equipment and software as specified, including the franchisee’s exclusive use of the
franchisor’s reservation system, ¶¶ 3.15, 4.2; demands the franchisee participate
in intranet or extranet as required, the franchisor’s rewards program, including
additional standards pertinent to the program, and guest service and satisfaction
guaranty programs, ¶¶ 3.4.4, 3.11, 3.15; obligates the franchisee to resolve
customer complaints, Schedule C, § II.B; gives the franchisor control over facility
promotion or the advertising of competing businesses, ¶ 3.11; dictates the method
and timeliness of financial record keeping, and obligates participation in financial
audits and facility inspections ¶¶ 3.6.1, 3.6.2, 3.6.4, 3.7, 4.8.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS AGAINST MOVING DEFENDANTS
Count Claim Authority Plaintiff(s) Defendant(s)
I Labor TVPRA Timko, Milan, LLC,
Trafficking Robinson Himanshu Bhatia,
Dipti Bhatia

II Benefitted TVPRA Timko, Wyndham Hotels
from Human Robinson & Resorts, Inc.
Trafficking
III Vicarious TVPRA Timko, Wyndham Hotels
Liability for Robinson & Resorts, Inc.
Human
Trafficking
IV Labor PA Human Timko, Milan, LLC,
Trafficking Trafficking Robinson Himanshu Bhatia,
Law Dipti Bhatia
V Vicarious PA Human Timko, Wyndham Hotels
Liability for Trafficking Robinson & Resorts, Inc.
Labor Law
Trafficking
VI Labor RICO Timko, Milan, LLC,
Trafficking Robinson Himanshu Bhatia,
Dipti Bhatia
VII Conspiracy to RICO Timko, Milan, LLC,
Commit Labor Robinson Himanshu Bhatia,
Trafficking Dipti Bhatia
VIII Intentional 42 U.S.C. § Timko, Milan, LLC,
Race 1981 Robinson Himanshu Bhatia,
Discrimination Dipti Bhatia
IX Failure to Pay FLSA All plaintiffs Milan, LLC,
Overtime Himanshu Bhatia,
Dipti Bhatia
X Failure to Pay WPCL All plaintiffs Milan, LLC,
Overtime and Himanshu Bhatia,
Straight Time Dipti Bhatia
XI Failure to Pay PMWA All plaintiffs Milan, LLC,
Overtime Himanshu Bhatia,
Dipti Bhatia
XII Failure to Pay PMWA Timko, Milan, LLC,
Minimum Robinson Himanshu Bhatia,
Wage Dipti Bhatia
XIII Unfair and FDCPA; Timko, Milan, LLC,
Deceptive FCEUA Robinson Himanshu Bhatia,
Debt Dipti Bhatia
Collection
XIV Quantum PA All plaintiffs All defendants
Meruit/Unjust common
Enrichment law
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Bhatia will be dismissed.
To begin with, the Court will dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Bhatia
as insufficiently pled.
Plaintiffs’ allegations identifying Ms. Bhatia by name consist of nothing but
conclusory statements that she “owned and operated” the Motel M, ECF 1, ¶ 24, and
that she was a “corporate officer[], executive[], and/or equity owner[] of Defendant
Milan, LLC d/b/a Motel M[,]” pp. 22-23 (unnumbered paragraph under heading
“PARTICIPATION THEORY”). Beyond that, Plaintiffs offer only group-pled
allegations— , allegations referring to “Defendants” collectively—and allegations
pled in passive voice.
This is inadequate. “A complaint . . . that solely tenders naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement[] cannot survive a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6).” , No. 23-1446, 2023 WL 3862507, at *1 (3d
Cir. June 7, 2023) (cleaned up); , 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[C]onclusory or ‘bare-bones’ allegations will no longer survive a
motion to dismiss[.]”).
Plaintiffs’ group-pled or passive-voice allegations can’t make up the difference.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a plaintiff must “identif[y] discrete
defendants and the actions taken by these defendants in regard to the plaintiff’s
claims.” , 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
While group pleading or the use of passive voice is not inherently in tension with that
obligation, Plaintiffs’ effort as it relates to Ms. Bhatia falls well short. Reading the
complaint as a whole it becomes clear that many of the group-pled or passive-voice
allegations refer to other defendants who carried out the alleged actions. For
example, Plaintiffs allege in the TVPRA labor trafficking claim (Count I) that “The
Defendants obtained [hotel and personal] labor [from Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson]
by promising Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson that they could work in exchange for a
hotel room.” ECF 1, ¶ 181. Yet earlier in the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that it was
Mr. Bhatia, not Ms. Bhatia, who “agreed to pay Mr. Robinson in cash and off-the-
books[,]” ¶ 84, and Mr. Singh, not Ms. Bhatia, “who agreed to give her employment
in exchange for a room” at the Days Inn, ¶ 28. Maybe somewhere in the 48-page
complaint there are group-pled or passive-voice allegations that might apply to Ms.
Bhatia, but the Court need not “forever sift through its pages in search of the nature
of the plaintiff’s claim[.]” , 698 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2012) (cleaned
up).
So the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Bhatia and will not
discuss them further in the claim-specific analysis that follows.
, No. 21-2901, 2023 WL 12053001, at *4
(D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2023) (describing scenario where “the only allegations that could
plausibly apply to [defendants] are allegations directed at all Defendants” as one
where denial of a motion to dismiss would be inappropriate (cleaned up)).
II. The TVPRA claims (Counts I-III).
Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson bring claims for violations of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) against all moving Defendants.
ECF 1, ¶¶ 176-223.
The TVPRA criminalizes peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, forced labor,
human trafficking, and sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-91, and allows victims to
seek civil remedies for violations of its criminal provisions. § 1595.
The criminal provisions implicated here reside in Sections 1589 and 1590,
criminalizing forced labor and labor trafficking.
Section 1589, pertaining to forced labor, provides criminal penalties for
perpetrators, or “[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a
person . . . (1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of
physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or
threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse
or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or
pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform
such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or
physical restraint[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). Criminally liable too are beneficiaries of
forced labor, or “[w]hoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection (a), knowing
or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of such means[.]” § 1589(b).
Section 1590, addressing trafficking, applies in part to “[w]hoever knowingly
recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor
or services in violation of [the TVPRA].” § 1590(a). Thus, “[a] Section 1590 claim
is derivative— , it depends on a predicate TVPRA offense—such as forced labor.”
, No. 19-1658, 2020 WL 2541860, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
May 19, 2020) (Ranjan, J.) (cleaned up).
As for the TVPRA’s civil-remedies provision, like Section 1589, it targets both
perpetrators, and beneficiaries, or “whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or
conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation
in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in
violation of [the TVPRA].” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).6

6 Congress added the “ ” language in a January
5, 2023, amendment. Plaintiffs don’t suggest that this new language is retroactive or
even implicated, so the Court doesn’t consider it.
Plaintiffs bring both perpetrator and beneficiary claims under Section
1595(a).7 As relevant to the motions to dismiss, they allege that the Motel M
defendants are directly liable as perpetrators, and that Wyndham is directly liable as
a beneficiary. Plaintiffs also allege an “indirect liability” claim—that Wyndham is
vicariously liable under the TVPRA. The Court addresses each claim below.
A. The perpetrator claims against the Motel M defendants (Count
I).
Plaintiffs allege that the Motel M defendants are liable as “perpetrators” of
forced labor and labor trafficking. ECF 1, ¶¶ 176-196.8
Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient with respect to Mr. Robinson’s claims
against Milan, LLC, and Mr. Bhatia. Plaintiffs’ claims otherwise fail.
1. Only Mr. Robinson plausibly alleges a perpetrator claim
against Milan, LLC.
Plaintiffs argue that Milan, LLC, knowingly obtained Mr. Robinson’s labor by
three illegal methods. First, by “abuse of the legal process[,]” contrary to 18 U.S.C. §
1589(a)(3), by paying Mr. Robinson “‘off-the-books’ and ‘in cash,’ . . . in order to . . .
pressure . . . [Mr.] Robinson to . . . continu[e] work[ing] for the company, [and] to . . .
refrain from leaving his employment.” ECF 27, p. 4.9 Second, again by “the abuse or

7 Plaintiffs only explicitly discuss Section 1589, not Section 1590. Still, because Count
I is titled “labor trafficking,” the allegations under Count I discuss trafficking and
transporting for labor, and Count I is for a violation of the TVPRA generally, the
Court considers Plaintiffs to be premising their Section 1595 civil claims on criminal
violations of both Sections 1589 and 1590.

8 The Motel M defendants say it is unclear if Plaintiffs are bringing a Section 1595
perpetrator claim or beneficiary claim. ECF 24, p. 12 & n.3. In their response,
Plaintiffs only discuss a Section 1595 perpetrator claim. ECF 27, pp. 3-7. This aligns
with the complaint having a separate beneficiary count that includes only Wyndham.
So the Court proceeds as if Plaintiffs are alleging only a perpetrator claim against the
Motel M defendants.

9 “Abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process” is defined as “the use or
threatened use of a law or legal process . . . in any manner or for any purpose for
threatened abuse of law or legal process,” but this time by “contract[ing] with” Mr.
Robinson and subjecting him to “an unlawful debt arrangement[,]” before handing
him off to the Days Inn to work there under a similar debt arrangement. And
third, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(4), “by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern
intended to cause [Mr. Robinson] to believe that” if he didn’t work, he would suffer
physical restraint, by using his “outstanding criminal warrants as leverage to keep
him working for the hotels[.]” ECF 27, pp. 4-5.
Plaintiffs’ allegations about Motel M-specific conduct are wanting. From the
start, Plaintiffs insufficiently tie Mr. Robinson’s debt arrangement to a Section
1589(a)(3) violation for abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process. For one,
payment “in cash and off-the-books” doesn’t implicate any violation of Section 1589,
and it isn’t clear why that payment—which, as the Motel M defendants note, is pled
as if Mr. Robinson requested it, ECF 1, ¶ 84—would pressure Mr. Robinson to
continue working at the Motel M. Even more to the point, while Plaintiffs allege that
Mr. Bhatia placed Mr. Robinson in some sort of debt arrangement, they provide no
details about what that looked like for Mr. Robinson while he was at the .10
And Plaintiffs neither indicate that Mr. Robinson’s was used as
a threat, nor tie any threat to the specifically. ECF 1, ¶¶ 183-84
(alleging Ms. Timko was subject to a debt arrangement and threatened with arrest
and homelessness; “[s]pecifically,” she was told her debt would result in her arrest if

which the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on another person to cause
that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.” § 1589(c).

10 Plaintiffs do allege that “[u]pon information and belief, Mr. Bhatia . . . subjected
[vulnerable individuals] to the same or similar debt arrangement at Motel M [as “that
the new Stanton Days Inn had with Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson.”].” ECF 1, ¶¶ 255-
56. But in context this doesn’t refer to Mr. Robinson, and the allegation is in the
RICO Count (Count VI), and so is not incorporated into the TVPRA trafficking claims
(Count I). ¶ 176 (TVPRA claims “incorporat[ing] all the paragraphs ”).
she didn’t continue to work at the Days Inn), ¶¶ 183, 185 (alleging Mr. Robinson
was subject to a debt arrangement and threatened with arrest and homelessness;
“[s]pecifically,” that he received threats to keep him working at the Days Inn).11 For
similar reasons, Plaintiffs’ argument as to a Motel M-based scheme or plan under
Section 1589(a)(4) too falls short. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Robinson was threatened
with arrest for his warrants by while he was working at the ,
but not that he was threatened in that way by Mr. Bhatia while he was working at
the Motel M. ECF 1, ¶¶ 105-06.
Considering the above, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ perpetrator claim against
Milan, LLC, depends on an underlying violation of Section 1589, it is insufficiently
pled.12 The claim survives complete dismissal, however, because there is another
hook to underlying criminal liability—a trafficking violation under Section 1590.
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bhatia “traded” Mr. Robinson to the Days Inn, so that
the Days Inn could benefit from his labor under a debt arrangement, and that Mr.
Bhatia had an agreement with Mr. Singh to locate and traffic other individuals in a
similar manner. ECF 1, ¶¶ 85, 88, 182. That plausibly alleges that the Motel M
“knowingly recruit[ed], harbor[ed], transport[ed], provide[d], or obtain[ed] by any

11 While Plaintiffs allege that “All of Defendants’ actions were done in order to exert
pressure on Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson to keep them working under an unlawful
debt arrangement[,]” this is conclusory and afforded no weight. ECF 1, ¶ 195.

12 At the end of this count, Plaintiffs also allege that “Defendants” threatened to use
law or legal process to jail Plaintiffs without justification or authority, by “dictat[ing
Plaintiffs’] housing situation through an employment agreement[,]” by “threatening
to evict Plaintiffs from their housing “immediately and without any notice[,]” and by
“restricting and attempting to restrict [Plaintiffs’] freedom of association[.]” ECF 1,
¶¶ 189-192. These are conclusory, contain legal conclusions, and are examples of the
kind of group pleading that is impermissible because it “broadly attribute[s] actions
to the Defendants as a group without any supporting factual allegations.”
, No. 20-194, 2021 WL 5911055, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2021) (Lanzillo, M.J.),
, No. 20-194, 2021 WL 5909807 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
14, 2021) (Baxter, J).
means, any person for labor or services in violation of [the TVPRA].” 18 U.S.C. §
1590(a). In that way, Plaintiffs can sidestep their deficiently pled allegations of Motel
M perpetrating forced labor for sufficiently pled allegations of perpetrating
, with the predicate forced-labor actions taken by the
(as explained below in the Court’s discussion of the Wyndham TVRPA
claims).
Since the Court can thus infer a plausible trafficking violation, it will not
dismiss Plaintiffs’ perpetrator-liability claims against Milan, LLC, in its entirety.
But only Mr. Robinson’s claim survives, because there aren’t any allegations that Ms.
Timko was trafficked by Milan, LLC.
2. Only Mr. Robinson plausibly alleges a perpetrator claim
against Mr. Bhatia.
Mr. Bhatia would typically be protected from individual liability because of his
position as a corporate officer of Milan, LLC. ,
, 689 F. Supp. 3d 35, 48 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (“Corporate
officers cannot be held personally liable for the torts allegedly committed by the
corporation simply by virtue of their office under Pennsylvania law.”). So Plaintiffs,
invoking one of the “two exceptions to this general rule[,]”
, No. 24-1393, 2025 WL 52009, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2025), argue that Mr. Bhatia
is individually liable under a Pennsylvania common-law “participation theory.” ECF
27, p. 5; ECF 1, pp. 22-23 (unnumbered paragraph under heading “PARTICIPATION
THEORY”).13

13 Plaintiffs “offer[] no basis for [their] extension of a state common law tort doctrine
to a federal statutory framework.” , No. 16-821,
2017 WL 569178, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2017) (rejecting opinion doing so in Title
VII case). That said, the Motel M defendants don’t challenge this theory on that basis,
and the theory exists under federal common law, as well. ,
, 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding, with
respect to Copyright Act violation, that “[a]n officer or director of a corporation who
knowingly participates in the infringement can be held personally liable, jointly and
“The participation theory of liability is not a cause of action in and of itself, but
rather a form of derivative liability.” , 689 F. Supp. 3d at 48-
49 (cleaned up). “Under this theory, a plaintiff may hold an officer of a corporation
liable as an individual actor, rather than as an owner, who personally participated in
the alleged tortious acts committed on behalf of the corporation.”
, No. 18-1335, 2023 WL 4685815, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2023)
(Ranjan, J.) (cleaned up). This requires the individual to “engage[] in misfeasance,
rather than nonfeasance.” (cleaned up). Likewise, “[t]he mere averment that a
corporate officer should have known the consequences of the liability-creating
corporate act is insufficient to impose liability.” , 2025 WL 52009, at *6
(cleaned up).14
Plaintiffs assert that among other things, Mr. Bhatia “contract[ed] with [Mr.]
Robinson outside the regular channels of proper employment[,] and agree[d] to funnel
him to the New Stanton Days Inn for continued labor[,]” employed Mr. Robinson “off-
the-books,” and “traded” him to the Days Inn. ECF 27, p. 6; ECF 1, ¶¶ 85, 88, 182.
That’s enough to make out Mr. Bhatia’s direct participation in the trafficking
portion of the scheme, at least for Mr. Robinson’s perpetrator claim. Since, however,

severally, with the corporate defendant”); , 587
F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying participation theory to Lanham Act violations).
This hasn’t been briefed but, as far as the Court can tell, there aren’t any substantive
differences in application between the theories, and so, consistent with the parties’
approach, the Court cites to cases applying Pennsylvania law.

14 The Motel M defendants argue in a footnote that the theory applies only to torts,
not to statutory claims. ECF 24, p. 11 n. 2. But the theory has been extended to
statutory claims by at least some Pennsylvania courts, ,
, 180 A.3d 812, 818 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) (“Although it was
initially adopted in tort actions, this Court has held that the participation theory
applies to statutory violations”), and, as cited above, by the Third Circuit in the
federal common-law context.
no allegations tie Mr. Bhatia to TVPRA violations against Ms. Timko, her perpetrator
claim against him fails.
B. The beneficiary-liability claims against Wyndham (Count II).
Plaintiffs allege that Wyndham is liable as a beneficiary of forced labor and
labor trafficking. ECF 1, ¶¶ 197-216.
A TVPRA beneficiary-liability claim requires allegations—in addition to a
predicate TVPRA criminal violation—that the defendant “(1) knowingly benefitted
financially or by receiving anything of value; (2) from participation in a venture; (3)
it knew or should have known has engaged in [forced labor/labor trafficking].”
, 455 F. Supp. 3d 171, 181 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs’
allegations suffice.
1. Plaintiffs plausibly allege predicate TVPRA violations.
The predicate violation is satisfied through Plaintiffs’ allegations of TVPRA
perpetrator liability in connection with Mr. Singh and the Days Inn.
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Singh threatened Ms. Timko with arrest for her
failure to pay back her debt, ECF 1, ¶¶ 42, 60-62, and that Mr. Singh threatened Mr.
Robinson with arrest if he stopped working for the Days Inn or left the property
without supervision, ¶¶ 83, 105-107. In other words, Plaintiffs allege that Mr.
Singh knowingly obtained Plaintiffs’ labor “by means of the abuse or threatened
abuse of law or legal process.” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(3).
So the Court turns to Wyndham-specific elements.
2. Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Wyndham “knowingly
benefited.”
This element requires allegations that a “defendant knew it was receiving
some value from participating in the alleged venture.” ,
21 F.4th 714, 724 (11th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs allege that Wyndham received royalties from room rentals at the
Days Inn. ECF 1, ¶¶ 153-154, 157, 201-204. Wyndham argues that that is too
attenuated; that what’s necessary is a causal nexus between conduct and the receipt
of a benefit, ECF 13, pp. 22-23, and that the benefit must come from participation in
a trafficking venture, not something else. ECF 19, p. 7.
For two reasons, “[t]he Court is persuaded by the vast majority of district
courts that have found allegations similar to Plaintiff[s’] sufficient to meet this
element.” , No. 24-217, 2025 WL 824369, at
*7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2025) (cleaned up) (collecting cases). First, Section 1595 “says
nothing about the sex-trafficker provides any benefit to the participant-
defendant.” , 76 F.4th 544, 565 (7th Cir. 2023). Instead,
“as the statutory text clearly dictates, where the defendant is simply aware that it is
benefiting, that is enough.” Second, as the Court discusses shortly, the
participation required is participation in a commercial or business venture, not
necessarily a criminal one, so the benefit can result from a commercial relationship
too.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs “plausibly allege[] that [Wyndham] knowingly
benefitted financially insofar as [it] received profits from rooms rented out” at the
Days Inn. , No. 24-8174, 2025 WL
1166519, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2025).
3. Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Wyndham “participated in
a venture.”
This element requires two things: (1) a “venture”; and (2) “participation” in
that venture by the defendant. Plaintiffs have plausibly pled both.
. There are generally two approaches to defining the term. Some
courts “incorporate section 1591’s criminal definition of ‘venture’—as ‘any group of
two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity’—into section
1595(a).” , No. 23-11422, 2025 WL 97620, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 14, 2025). But most decline to do so, and “instead adopt the Eleventh
Circuit’s approach in , 21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021),
which defines ‘venture’ as ‘an undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential
profit.’” , 2025 WL 97620, at *4 (quoting , 21 F.4th at 724).
Plaintiffs choose the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation, and argue that the
franchise relationship between Wyndham and the Days Inn meets it. ECF 18, p. 5.
While Wyndham cites the Eleventh Circuit’sdefinition, it doesn’t focus on it. Instead,
Wyndham imports the criminal definition of venture into the civil context and argues
by analogy to the definition of “venture” in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) that a commercial relationship—without a shared criminal
purpose—isn’t enough. ECF 13, pp. 16-19; ECF 19, p. 7.
Plaintiffs’ approach is the better one, as it is more faithful to the statutory text.
Section 1591’s definition of “venture” is expressly limited to the use of “venture” in
Section 1591. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e) (defining terms “[i]n this section”);
, 21 F.4th at 724; , 76 F.4th at 554 n.7. What’s more, the plain text of Section
1595 “does not say ‘[]trafficking venture,’ but only ‘venture.’ In other words, ‘venture’
is not described in criminal terms.” , 76 F.4th at 553-54 (cleaned up). So the
Court agrees with those courts declining to transpose Section 1591’s definition into
Section 1595, and holds that for civil-liability purposes, a TVPRA “venture” can be
either a business venture, or a criminal one. ,
, No. 24-6490, 2025 WL 342092, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2025);
, No. 23-3459, 2025 WL 961502, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31,
2025).15
As alleged by Plaintiffs, Wyndham was in a franchise relationship with the
Days Inn— , a commercial relationship with risk and profit. ECF 1, ¶¶ 146-165,
201-204. Plaintiffs have thus adequately pled that a qualifying “venture” exists.
, , No. 24-1588, 2025 WL 1920417, at *4
(M.D. Pa. July 11, 2025).
Wyndham argues that even if there were a venture, there are
no allegations that Wyndham “knew of, intended, facilitated, or in any way
participated in [the Days Inn’s owners’] conduct.” ECF 13, p. 18.
To the extent Wyndham’s argument is that participation requires an overt act
in furtherance of the criminal activity, the Court rejects it. ,
, 750 F. Supp. 3d 719, 731 (E.D. Tex. 2024) (“[T]here is a general
consensus that an overt act in furtherance of sex trafficking is not required for a
defendant to ‘participate in a venture.’” (cleaned up)); , 521
F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1062 (D. Colo. 2021) (noting “most district courts to have examined
the issue have rejected the overt act argument” because it “would void the ‘known or
should have known’ language of § 1595” (collecting cases)).

15 The RICO cases are thus irrelevant. ,
No. 21-619, 2021 WL 5579117, at *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2021) (rejecting use of RICO
to inform interpretation of Section 1595 claim); , No. 22-625,
2023 WL 5725574, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2023) (same);
, No. 23-235, 2024 WL 4204906, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2024)
(“Congress elected to write RICO and the TVPRA differently, so as to diminish
significantly the force of RICO authority as applied to the TVPRA. . . . RICO authority
therefore has little utility here.”).
So what must be alleged to find “participation”? Some courts follow the
Eleventh Circuit’s guidance that participation in a venture means “taking part” in
the commercial venture. , No. 24-4895,
2025 WL 1119736, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2025). Others find persuasive the Seventh
Circuit’s wording, that participation exists “where the participant provides
assistance, support, or facilitation to the trafficker through a continuous business
relationship that would allow an inference that the participant and trafficker have a
tacit agreement.” (quoting , 76 F.4th at 559 (cleaned up)). And some find no
distinction between the two. (collecting cases). The common thread appears to be
that what must be alleged are facts that “‘connect[] the dots’ between the alleged
trafficking and the franchisors.” ; , 750 F. Supp. 3d at 734
(same).
Ordinarily, in cases involving franchisors, “it is generally more difficult to
allege participation on the part of the franchisors because they are not the entities
that own or operate the hotels; rather, they are one step removed from the franchisees
and their employees.” , 750 F. Supp. 3d at 734; , 76 F.4th
at 562 (same). So the dots are “connected” by “link[ing] the franchisors to the
traffickers through the franchisors’ oversight of the franchisees and hotel operations.”
, 2025 WL 1119736, at *4. But this is not an ordinary case. That is, the more
common trafficking case involves traffickers who stay at and use hotels for their
trafficking activities. Unlike this more common scenario, here, the alleged traffickers
are the , not customers of the franchisee. Eliminate
that intermediary and you are left with something resembling the relationship
between trafficker and hotel, suggesting the mere existence of a franchise
relationship is enough. , 425 F. Supp. 3d
959, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (holding hotels participated in a venture by renting rooms
to traffickers).
In any event, even if this were the more common trafficking case, Plaintiffs’
allegations would meet this test. Plaintiffs allege that Wyndham “had ongoing
control over [the Days Inn’s] daily duties[,]” that Wyndham required use of its
customer rewards program, that it provided training, controlled maintenance,
dictated suppliers, vendors, and technology, controlled online booking, maintained
access to the Days Inn’s database and electronic systems, shared a central reservation
system, and (in some way) controlled pricing. ECF 1, ¶¶ 56, 146-166. Courts have
found similar allegations sufficient. , , 2025 WL 1119736, at *5
(franchisor alleged to have control and oversight over renting rooms via central
reservation system, check-in, payment, and identity-verification procedures, room
rates, and cancellation policies); , 2025 WL 342092, at *3 (franchisor had
control over hiring, training, and policy enforcement);
, No. 22-3202, 2023 WL 5935646, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2023) (franchisor
profited from franchise relationship, failed to implement trafficking policies, and
maintained expansive control over the hotel operation standards); , No.
23-1012, 2024 WL 2955728, at *8 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2024) (franchisor had control
over training staff, response, policies, and procedures regarding human trafficking,
the room reservation system, pricing and policies for payment and identification, and
security), , No. 23-
1012, 2024 WL 4373374 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2024).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Wyndham participated in a
venture.16

16 Wyndham warns that this would essentially impose strict liability on hotel
franchisors. ECF 19, p. 8 n.2. The Court’s holding shouldn’t be read so broadly. The
Court doesn’t “read the [TVPRA] as requiring hotels (and other businesses or
professions possibly earning money from trafficking) to affirmatively stop the
trafficking. [Rather, the Court] construe[s] the [TVPRA] under its terms as imposing
liability should a jury find the business benefitted from participating in a venture it
4. Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Wyndham “knew or should
have known.”
Before the Court can resolve this element, it must answer a threshold question:
whether the required knowledge must be of the specific plaintiff. That is, Plaintiffs
often advance “the majority view among federal courts that direct-beneficiary claims
do not require plausible allegations that the defendant knew or should have known
of the specific victim who has brought the civil action[,]” ,
No. 23-11422, 2025 WL 97620, at *5 n.3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2025), as set forth by
the Seventh Circuit in Franchisors tend to push for the minority position,
developed by the Eleventh Circuit in , “that direct beneficiary liability
requires a plausible showing that the defendant had constructive or actual knowledge
that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA ”
(cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that the standard is the former, but that they have
alleged facts sufficient to meet either one. ECF 1, ¶ 206; ECF 18, pp. 9-10.
Apparently viewing the two formulations as compatible, Wyndham cites to both, but
ultimately seems to advocate for the Eleventh Circuit’s more restrictive
interpretation. ECF 13, p. 20; ECF 19, pp. 8-11.
The Court agrees with the majority position that knowledge of a particular
plaintiff’s trafficking isn’t necessary. Rather, the statute requires knowledge as to
the venture—in other words, knowledge that the venture engaged in trafficking of
some kind. “The express terms of the statute . . . impose [civil] liability for benefiting
from a venture that the Defendants knew or should have known was engaged in

knew or should have known engaged in trafficking.” , 455
F. Supp. 3d 171, 182 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Put differently, liability under Section 1595 is
circumscribed by the scienter requirement. Participation in a business venture isn’t
enough to subject a franchisor to liability; it still must know or should have known
that the venture was engaging in acts violating the TVPRA.
[criminal] violations of [the TVPRA], not [criminal] violations of [the TVPRA]
.” , 2025 WL 961502, at *6.
That isn’t to say that generalized knowledge of trafficking in the hotel
industry, or even at Wyndham’s other properties, is enough. Section 1595 “speaks in
singular terms – participation in a venture which that person . . . should have known
has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.” ,
473 F. Supp. 3d 147, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (cleaned up). So Plaintiffs must still allege
that Wyndham knew or should have known that the in which it
participated engaged in a trafficking crime. ,
No. 23-01676, 2025 WL 85831, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2025) (“[T]he knowledge
requirement attaches to the venture, and not a particular victim.”);
, No. 23-00871, 2024 WL 2186173, at *6 (N.D. Ohio May 15,
2024) (“[T]he knowledge element is specific to the venture that trafficked [the
plaintiff]”). Otherwise, as Wyndham observes, “to conclude that franchisors like
Wyndham . . . are liable under the TVPRA simply because they were generally aware
that sex trafficking sometimes occurred on their franchisees’ properties unjustifiably
bridges the scienter gap between ‘should have known’ and ‘might have been able to
guess.’” ECF 13, p. 21 (quoting , 473 F. Supp. 3d at 154).
So what qualifies under this standard? Plaintiffs propose placing the
allegations along “a spectrum of culpability interpreting the beneficiary theory of
liability[,]” ECF 18, p. 11, “bookended by two cases, , 853 F.3d 553
(1st Cir. 2017), and , 2018 WL 2012869 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2018).”
, No. 23-928, 2025 WL 1097335, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2025).
At the sufficiently pled end is , where the motel owner high-fived the trafficker
about “getting this thing going again,” there was a past business relationship between
the two, the owner ignored the victim’s physical state, and the trafficker stopped the
victim from escaping in front of the motel office. , 853 F.3d at 555. And at the
opposite is , where allegations of one police visit to a condo after a fight and
one ambulance sent in six years weren’t enough to hold the condo owner liable.
, 2018 WL 2012869, at *13-14.
Plaintiffs argue that their case against Wyndham falls somewhere in the
middle of this spectrum. That is a reasonable enough conclusion, but it doesn’t
answer the question of where in the spectrum the sufficiency line lies. On that point
there is no consensus. “Some courts have found that simply alleging general
knowledge of sex trafficking in the hotel industry, facts specific to the victim’s
trafficking, and an allegation of the franchisors’ failure to implement policies to
combat sex trafficking in their hotels was sufficient[.]” , 750 F. Supp. 3d
at 736-37 (collecting cases). Some require more, like allegations “that the franchisor
monitored the franchisee hotels or that the staff reported sex trafficking activity to
the franchisor.” at 737. And absent franchisor-specific allegations, some courts
look for an agency relationship between the franchisor and franchisee. ,
, No. 23-2530, 2024 WL 3927382, at *10 (D. Minn.
Aug. 23, 2024) (“What saves [plaintiff’s] claim, however, is that she has plausibly
alleged an agency relationship between Wyndham and [its franchisee], and thus she
may impute [the franchisee’s] knowledge to Wyndham.”);
, No. 24-204, 2025 WL 725268, at *9 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2025) (“[F]or
Wyndham and Choice to be liable under Section 1595, knowledge or constructive
knowledge of the plaintiff’s sex trafficking must be imputed to them from the
franchisee employees.”).
Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged notice of trafficking generally and at
Wyndham-branded hotels; indicia of trafficking at the Days Inn specifically,
including of Plaintiffs themselves; that Wyndham should have known of these indicia
based on its control over Days Inn’s operations; and that Wyndham has failed to
adequately train and combat trafficking. ECF 18, pp. 11-14.
That is enough (perhaps barely) at this early stage, regardless of the approach
the Court takes. For instance, Plaintiffs have alleged “general knowledge of sex
trafficking in the hotel industry, facts specific to [their] trafficking[/forced labor], and
. . . [Wyndham’s] failure to implement policies to combat sex trafficking in their
hotels[.]” , 750 F. Supp. 3d at 736-37. They have also alleged that
Wyndham monitored the Days Inn. And, as explained below, they have alleged an
agency relationship between Wyndham and the Days Inn. All of this together
presents a plausible picture of knowledge or constructive knowledge. That said,
discovery certainly will be critical here as to this particular element, and depending
on what is discovered, this may be an issue to re-visit at summary judgment.
With all elements thus met, Plaintiffs have plausibly pled their beneficiary-
liability claims against Wyndham.
C. The vicarious-liability claims against Wyndham (Count III).
Plaintiffs allege that, in addition to being directly liable as a beneficiary,
Wyndham is also vicariously liable for the Days Inn’s actions. ECF 1, ¶ 221.
Wyndham asserts that a vicarious-liability claim is not cognizable under the TVPRA,
but even if it is, it isn’t alleged here. ECF 13, p. 24; ECF 19, p. 11. Plaintiffs’ claims
will survive.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs can bring a vicarious-liability claim. ,
521 F. Supp. 3d at 1064 (“[N]umerous district courts have rejected the argument that
the TVPRA does not permit agency liability.” (collecting cases));
, 773 F. Supp. 3d 628, 708 (N.D. Iowa 2025 (“A civil
liability claim under § 1595 is essentially a tort action. Because the TVPRA
essentially creates a tort action, Congress typically intends its legislation to
incorporate tort-related vicarious liability rules[.]” (cleaned up)).17

17 Wyndham points to
, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), and cases applying it, to argue otherwise. ECF
The next question is whether federal common law or Pennsylvania common
law controls the analysis. Reflecting what is clearly a common theme with TVPRA
cases, courts are split on this issue. ,
, 728 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778-79 & n.43 (N.D. Ohio 2024) (collecting cases and
holding that even if federal common law applied, federal common law should
incorporate state common law); , No. 24-02420, 2025 WL
755165, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2025) (noting “growing body of case law” applying
federal common law, but holding analysis is the same). Plaintiffs proceed under
Pennsylvania law, and Wyndham seems to acquiesce to that choice, ECF 18, pp. 23-
26; ECF 19, pp. 11-12, so the Court will apply Pennsylvania law.
“Under Pennsylvania law, . . . . [t]he mere existence of a franchise relationship
does not necessarily trigger a master-servant relationship, nor does it automatically
insulate the parties from such a relationship.” , 455 F. Supp. 3d at 195 (cleaned
up). Rather, “[t]he key focus . . . is the right to control the way the servant’s work is
accomplished. . . . [T]his means the focus of the inquiry should be whether the alleged
master has day-to-day control over the manner of the alleged servant’s performance.”
(cleaned up). Relevant are “both (1) the right to control, regardless of whether the
right was actually exercised, and (2) the exercise of actual control, whether or not

13, pp. 24-25; ECF 19, p. 11. In , the Supreme Court
concluded that aiding and abetting liability was unavailable under the Securities
Exchange Act because the statute didn’t expressly provide that cause of action or
mention aiding and abetting liability. , 511 U.S. at 176-77. But
as the Third Circuit explained soon after, “[t]he Supreme Court’s wariness . . . rested
on the nature of aiding and abetting liability itself. . . . By contrast, courts imposing
liability on agency theories are not expanding the category of affirmative conduct
proscribed by the relevant statute; rather, they are deciding on whose shoulders to
place responsibility for conduct by the relevant statute.”
, 42 F.3d 1421, 1430-31 (3d Cir.
1994) (permitting agency theory of vicarious liability in Lanham Act claim).
doing so was within the franchisor’s rights.” , 330 A.3d 1270, 1279
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2025).
Plaintiffs allege that Wyndham had exclusive control of online bookings and
the franchise agreement’s terms, including the unilateral ability to terminate;
Wyndham had plenary access to the Days Inn’s computer systems and shared a
central reservation system; it controlled approval rights for building modification or
renovation; it prevented the Days Inn from diverting business to a competitor; and it
had conversations with the Days Inn about overcharging guests, false advertising,
and bad reviews. ECF 1, ¶¶ 146-168.
That’s enough for now. , 455 F. Supp. 3d at 196 (finding sufficient
allegations that the franchisor “exercise[d] ongoing and systemic right of control over
its franchisee hotels[,] . . . including sharing profits, standardized training methods
for employees, building and maintaining the facility in a manner specified by [the
franchisor]; regular inspection of the facility and operation by [the franchisor]; and
fixing prices” (cleaned up)); , 2025 WL 1920417, at *6 (finding sufficient
allegations that the franchisor (Wyndham) “conduct[ed] all staff training, regulat[ed]
all policies and procedures followed by the hotel, require[ed] the hotel to use
Wyndham’s property management system, ha[d] final approval over all substantial
changes to the hotel, inspect[ed] the hotel, determin[ed] room rental rates at the
hotel, and maintain[ed] control over staffing decisions at hotel”); , 330 A.3d
at 1283-84 (in non-TVPRA case, finding instructive prior decision in
, 431 A.2d 1073, 1078 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981), which sent agency question
to jury where there was evidence franchisor could do random inspections; compel
appearance of franchise and franchisee clothing; control the hours of operation; set
prices; require the addressing of customer grievances; control products offered;
prohibit the posting of unauthorized signs; and prohibit selling products of a
competitor, all under the threat of termination).
Wyndham counters that Mr. Singh and Ms. Kaur “made all of the personnel
decisions relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims[,]” made all hiring decisions, managed and
supervised all employees who worked there and the facility itself, ECF 19, p. 12, and
the other items relate only to its ability to maintain brand standards. ECF 13, p. 26.
But the agency determination is a fact-specific one usually left to the jury, ,
330 A.3d at 1280, so weighing these factors is inappropriate, particularly before
discovery. Moreover, “Pennsylvania does not distinguish between controls put in
place to protect a franchise’s goodwill and intellectual property and controls for other
purposes.” , No. 9-1738, 2015 WL 1055700, at *14
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2015), , 837 F.3d
314 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, even if certain aspects of Wyndham’s alleged control were
just Wyndham’s “imposition of brand standards aimed at promoting uniformity and
quality across a franchise system,” ECF 13, p. 26, those allegations aren’t shielded
from consideration.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an agency relationship.
III. The Pennsylvania human-trafficking-statute claims (Counts IV-V).
Plaintiffs bring trafficking claims under Pennsylvania’s human-trafficking
statute, a TVPRA analogue. ECF 1, ¶¶ 224-239.
The human-trafficking statute criminalizes forced labor against a person who
“knowingly . . . subjects an individual to labor servitude” through any of thirteen
means. 18 Pa. C.S. § 3012.18 It also criminalizes labor trafficking against both
perpetrators (“if the person recruits, entices, solicits, advertises, harbors, transports,
provides, obtains or maintains an individual if the person knows or recklessly

18 “Labor servitude” is defined as “[l]abor which is performed or provided by another
individual and is induced or obtained by any of the means set forth in section 3012(b).”
§ 3001.
disregards that the individual will be subject to labor servitude”), § 3011(a)(3),and
beneficiaries (“if the person knowingly benefits financially or receives anything of
value from an act which facilitates any activity under paragraph (3)”), §
3011(a)(4).19
The Pennsylvania human-trafficking statute provides a civil remedy as well,
to “victim[s] of human trafficking . . . against any person that participated in the
human trafficking of the individual[,]” § 3051(a)(1), and to “individual[s] who [are]
victim[s] of the sex trade . . . against a person that: (i) recruits, profits from
or maintains the victim in any sex trade act; (ii) abuses or causes bodily harm to the
victim in any sex trade act; and (iii) knowingly advertises or publishes
advertisements for purposes of recruitment into sex trade activity[,]” § 3051(a)(2).
Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson bring Pennsylvania human-trafficking-statute
perpetrator claims against the Motel M defendants, and allege that Wyndham is
vicariously liable under the statute.20
These claims are largely co-extensive with the TVPRA claims. Wyndham
zeroes in on two differences between the TVPRA and the Pennsylvania human-
trafficking statute, but they don’t compel a different result. First, Wyndham argues
that it is expressly exempt from liability under the human-trafficking statute’s “safe
harbor.” ECF 13, pp. 28-30. “Pennsylvania’s statute creates an exception, or safe
harbor, to civil liability [for] ‘any person who provides goods or services to the general

19 Plaintiffs’ complaint also references Section 3014, pertaining to, among other
things, the destruction or confiscation of passports or identification to prevent travel.
ECF 1, ¶ 226. But Plaintiffs neither appear to plead any facts relevant to a violation
of Section 3014, nor cite to Section 3014 in their briefing.
20 It isn’t clear from the complaint whether Plaintiffs are bringing a perpetrator claim,
a beneficiary claim, or both. Since Plaintiffs don’t differentiate their argument on
this point between the TVPRA and the Pennsylvania human-trafficking statute, the
Court infers that it is a perpetrator claim only.
public and to a person who would be liable under subsection (a)(2) [relating to sex
trafficking], absent a showing that the person: (1) knowingly markets or provides its
goods or services to a person liable under subsection (a)(2); (2) knowingly receives a
higher level of compensation from a person liable under subsection (a)(2); or (3)
supervises or exercises control over a person liable under subsection (a)(2).” , 455
F. Supp. 3d at 198 (quoting 18 Pa. C.S. § 3051(b)). The statute is not precisely written,
but what is clear, based on the language of subsection (a)(2) and the exception at
subsection (b)(1)-(3), is that the safe harbor is a defense to trafficking. Plaintiffs
don’t allege that sex trafficking is at issue here, and so the safe harbor is inapplicable.
Second, Wyndham argues that Plaintiffs’ vicarious-liability claims fail because
the Pennsylvania human-trafficking statute doesn’t permit a civil-beneficiary claim
unless it derives from sex trafficking. ECF 13, pp. 29-30; ECF 19, pp. 13-14.
Plaintiffs’ theory, however, isn’t that Wyndham is liable for benefitting from the
trafficking, but that Wyndham is liable because the Days Inn was an
agent of Wyndham, and the directly “participated in the human
trafficking[.]” 18 Pa. C.S. § 3051(a)(1).21
Accordingly, for the same reasons the TVPRA claims survived in part,
Plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania human-trafficking statute claims survive in part. That is,
the Court will not dismiss Mr. Robinson’s claims against Milan, LLC,22 and Mr.

21 Beneficiary liability “is a separate consideration from” direct or vicarious (indirect)
liability. , 2025 WL 1119736, at *7. Indeed, a “plaintiff may allege that the
defendant’s acts, omissions, and state of mind establish each element. This is
known as direct beneficiary liability. Alternatively, a plaintiff may advance an
agency theory that imputes the acts, omissions, and state of mind of an agent to the
defendant; this is known as indirect beneficiary liability.”
, No. 25-05057, 2025 WL 1837620, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 3, 2025) (discussing
TVPRA).

22 There are some additional allegations pled under the Pennsylvania human-
trafficking statute count that might, at first glance, suggest that Plaintiffs’ claim
against Milan, LLC survives based on forced labor and not just trafficking. For
Bhatia, but the Court will dismiss Ms. Timko’s claims against them. Likewise, as
Plaintiffs’ TVPRA vicarious-liability claims against Wyndham survived, so too do
Plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania claims.
IV. The RICO claims (Counts VI-VII).

Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson allege that the Motel M defendants’ actions
violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). ECF 1, ¶¶
240-273.
“RICO imposes criminal and civil liability upon those who engage in certain
‘prohibited activities.’ It provides civil remedies for ‘any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.’”
, 43 F.4th 126, 135 (3d Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
“Section 1962[, in turn,] contains four separate subsections, each addressing a
different problem.” , 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir.
1991). At issue are two of them: Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of both Section
1962(c), for labor trafficking, and Section 1962(d), for conspiracy. Each are addressed
below.
A. The Section 1962(c) RICO claim (Count VI).
Section 1962(c) renders it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful

instance, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants” used a mandatory hotel rent to extort
Plaintiffs into working for Defendants; that “Defendants” committed fraud by hiring
Plaintiffs under the table; and that “Defendants” coerced Plaintiffs with debt,
prevented them from working enough to pay off the debt, and prevented them from
working other jobs to pay off the debt. ECF 1, ¶¶ 229-231. But these allegations are
group pled, and there are too many defendants, locations, and plaintiffs, to say with
any certainty that they apply to Milan, LLC.
debt.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To state a Section 1962(c) claim, a plaintiff must plead
“(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity, plus
an injury to business or property.” , 802 F.3d 469, 483 (3d
Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).
The Motel M defendants challenge the third and fourth elements. Specifically,
they argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege any predicate “racketeering activity,” much
less the multiple predicate acts of racketeering activity necessary to establish a
pattern. ECF 24, p. 16. While Plaintiffs allege individual predicate acts, the Court
agrees that they don’t allege a pattern.
“Racketeering activity” is defined expansively, and includes “any act which is
indictable under . . . sections 1581-1592 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking
in persons).” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). A “pattern of racketeering activity,” meanwhile,
requires a showing that the defendant committed “at least two acts of racketeering
activity” within a ten-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). “[E]ach individual defendant
[must have] engaged in at least two predicate acts,” “the racketeering predicates
[must be] related, and . . . they [must] amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity.” , 650 F.3d 257, 267, 270 (3d Cir. 2011) (cleaned
up); , 205 F. App’x 48, 54 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“To plead a pattern of racketeering activity, [plaintiff] must aver not only that each
defendant committed at least two acts of prohibited racketeering activity but also
that the predicate acts are related and that they amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity.”).
While Plaintiffs’ allegations of TVPRA liability make out a single predicate act
for Milan, LLC, and Mr. Bhatia,23one predicate act doesn’t make a pattern. Plaintiffs

23 , 60 F.4th 25, 41 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[F]or the same reason that
plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged predicate TVPA venture liability as to [defendant],
they have sufficiently alleged predicate RICO liability as to [defendant].”),
, 143 S. Ct. 2662 (2023).
suggest that the pattern consists of Ms. Timko’s and Mr. Robinson’s forced labor and
trafficking, ECF 27, p. 9, as well as the larger “human trafficking scheme” involving
the Motel M and the Days Inn, “encompass[ing] multiple victims, in multiple states,
in multiple hotels, and at multiple different times[,]” ECF 1 ¶¶ 252-256; ECF 27, pp.
9-10, but neither cuts it. Two points on this.
First, Ms. Timko couldn’t sustain her TVPRA claims against the Motel M
defendants. As noted above, for a Section 1962(c) RICO claim, the predicate acts
must be committed by all defendants in order to establish a pattern. Thus, Ms.
Timko’s failure to implicate the Motel M defendants means that conduct that involves
her cannot count towards a pattern.
Second, the allegations of “other vulnerable individuals” working at the Motel
M and Days Inn under a “similar debt arrangement[,]” ECF 1, ¶¶ 255-256, are far too
generalized to create a pattern. While there isn’t a heightened pleading standard at
issue here, this type of generalized allegation still isn’t enough. This is why there is
a requirement for a RICO case statement—so all know the precise predicate acts, and
the Court can determine whether there is a pattern, continuity, and relatedness—all
necessary elements of a RICO claim. W.D. Pa. LCvR 7.1(B);
, 952 F.2d 702, 712 n.9 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Courts may consider the RICO case
statement in assessing whether plaintiffs’ RICO claims should be dismissed.”)
(overruled on other grounds). Compounding this problem is the complaint’s disparate
allegations and group pleading.
For example, Mr. Robinson’s TVPRA claim against the Motel M and Mr. Bhatia
survives based on trafficking, not forced labor, so even more abstract allegations of
forced labor at the Motel M can’t support a predicate TVPRA forced-labor claim.24 As

24 The allegation that Mr. Bhatia subjected individuals at the Motel M to a debt
arrangement like the Days Inn imposed would be fair game here since it is pled under
the RICO count. ECF 1, ¶¶ 255-256. Still, it doesn’t close the gap because the Court
must speculate as to the meaning of “debt arrangement.” It could refer, as the Court
for allegations that other people worked at the Days Inn, Plaintiffs allege that Mr.
Singh and Mr. Bhatia had an agreement to trade individuals for labor, that they did
trade Mr. Robinson, and that Mr. Robinson witnessed other individuals working at
the Days Inn under a debt arrangement like that to which Mr. Singh subjected him
and Ms. Timko. ECF 1, ¶¶ 25, 88-89, 255. It is just speculation, though, that Milan,
LLC, and Mr. Bhatia trafficked some of those individuals—particularly since “Mr.
Singh [himself] also recruited other homeless individuals . . . before he recruited Ms.
Timko.” ¶ 254. There is a “thin line between speculation and reasonable
inferences[.]” , 760 F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1985).
The conclusion Plaintiffs need the Court to draw falls just on the wrong side of it.
The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1962(c) RICO claim against
the Motel M defendants. , No. 22-4143, 2025
WL 1810206, at *10-11 (D.N.J. June 30, 2025) (dismissing Section 1962(c) claim
against certain defendants for failure to allege two predicate acts committed by each
defendant).
B. The Section 1962(d) RICO conspiracy claim (Count VII).
Section 1962(d), governing RICO conspiracy claims, provides that “[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a),
(b), or (c) of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). “To state a claim under § 1962(d), a
plaintiff must allege that the members of the conspiracy had: (1) knowledge of the
corrupt enterprise’s activities and (2) agreement to facilitate those activities.”
, No. 23-297, 2025 WL 964099, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025) (Colville, J.).
The Motel M defendants argue that if there is no Section 1962(c) claim, then
there can be no Section 1962(d) conspiracy. ECF 24, p. 18. Not so.

interprets the phrase, to the payment structure, but that doesn’t include the
connection between the debt and the “subsequent threats [to ‘keep working or else’]
that amount to abuse of legal process or law[.]” ¶ 248. In other words, the part
missing is the one that makes it a predicate TVPRA forced labor violation.
“[A] violation of section 1962(c) [is] not a prerequisite to a violation of section
1962(d).” , 247 F.3d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, “one who opts into
or participates in a conspiracy is liable for the acts of his co-conspirators which violate
section 1962(c) even if the defendant did not personally agree to do, or to conspire
with respect to, particular element.” In other words, “a defendant may be
held liable for conspiracy to violate section 1962(c) if he knowingly agrees to facilitate
a scheme which includes the operation or management of a RICO enterprise.” at
538.
Thus, while the Court has found there isn’t a pled pattern here for a Section
1962(c) claim against the Motel M defendants because Ms. Timko didn’t implicate the
Motel M defendants and the allegations of other victims are too generalized, that is
irrelevant for purposes of a Section 1962(d) claim. There is a pattern of at least two
predicate acts by the Days Inn defendants (the forced labor involving Mr. Robinson
and Ms. Timko), and there are allegations of knowledge and an agreement to
facilitate by Milan, LLC, and Mr. Bhatia. For example, the complaint alleges that
Mr. Bhatia and Mr. Singh had an agreement to traffic people for forced labor. ECF
1, ¶¶ 25, 85-86.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Section 1962(d) RICO conspiracy claim against Milan,
LLC, and Mr. Bhatia will survive.
V. The Section 1981 claims (Count VIII).
Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson assert intentional race discrimination claims
against the Motel M defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. ECF 1, ¶¶ 274-283.
Section 1981 provides “[a]ll persons” with the right “to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “To establish a discrimination claim
under § 1981, a plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a racial minority; (2) an
intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination
concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in § 1981.”
, 863 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
The Motel M defendants argue that Ms. Timko, who is not alleged to belong to
a racial minority, has failed to establish standing for her claims, and that both Ms.
Timko and Mr. Robinson have failed to allege that the Motel M defendants
intentionally discriminated. ECF 24, p. 19; ECF 28, pp. 10-11. Because Plaintiffs
fail to allege any discriminatory actions by the Motel M defendants, much less intent
to discriminate, the Court agrees with the Motel M defendants and will dismiss the
claims.
The only allegation in the entire complaint relating to racial discrimination
and directed to the Motel M defendants is that the “Motel M employed Mr. Robinson
but did not pay him like similarly-situated white employees.” ECF 1, ¶ 277. For
several reasons, this comes up short. First, “it merely states in a conclusory fashion
that those employees were ‘similarly situated[,]’” the type of threadbare recital of the
cause of action that “fail[s] to plausibly allege discriminatory intent based on
comparator evidence.” , No. 24-5126, 2025 WL 1004359, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2025). Second, it doesn’t tie Milan, LLC, or Mr. Bhatia to the
discriminatory action. , No. 15-555, 2016 WL
3920477, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2016) (Hornak, J.) (“Plaintiff must also plead that
the particular defendant was personally involved in the discriminatory act”
(collecting cases)). And third, it is contradicted by the allegation that “Mr. Bhatia
also recruited other vulnerable individuals and subjected them to the
debt arrangement at Motel M.” ECF 1, ¶ 256 (emphasis added).
, No. 22-82, 2023 WL 2088169, at *11 n.8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2023) (Lanzillo,
C.M.J.) (noting plaintiff’s “conflicting allegations further undermine the validity of
his . . . claim”).
The Court will therefore grant the Motel M defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Section 1981 claims.

VI. The wage-and-hour claims (Counts IX-XII).
Plaintiffs assert four counts of wage-and-hour claims against the Motel M
defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment
and Collection Law (WPCL). ECF 1, ¶¶ 284-339.25 The Court discusses each below.

25 As a threshold argument, the Motel M defendants assert that the wage-and-hour
claims should be dismissed because the complaint violates the Rule 8(a) pleading
standard. ECF 24, p. 20. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a “short
and plain statement of [a] claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Complaints that violate Rule 8 are often referred to as ‘shotgun
pleadings.’” , No. 22-5893, 2023 WL 5928319,
at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2023). “[A]lthough there are several characteristics that can
make a complaint a shotgun pleading, they all have in common one thing: failure to
give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon
which each claim rests.’” (cleaned up).

Plaintiffs’ wage-and-hour claims have “some of the hallmarks of a shotgun pleading,
[but are] not so vague or ambiguous that [they] fail[] to give [Defendants] notice of
the claims against [them].” , 741 F. Supp.
3d 265, 274 (E.D. Pa. 2024). The complaint separates the wage-and-hour claims into
specific counts, specifies which plaintiffs bring which counts and which counts apply
to which defendants, and there are “factual allegations specific to each claim under
the related count . . . such that Defendants are generally put on notice of their alleged
wrongdoing.” To be sure, the complaint is not a model of clarity. But the Court
does not find the wage-and-hour claims so poorly pleaded to have violated Rule 8(a);
indeed, the Motel M defendants responded to the wage-and-hour claims with a motion
to dismiss instead of a motion for a more definitive statement.
, No. 23-4092, 2024 WL 2077036, at *5 (D.N.J. May 9, 2024);
, 938 F.3d at 95 (defendants’ brief “demonstrate[d] that it was possible to
understand and engage with [plaintiff’s] claims on their merits”). Instead, the Court
addresses these issues, such as group pleading, in the context of its Rule 12(b)(6)
analysis, as it has done with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims.
A. The FLSA and PMWA claims (Counts IX, XI-XII).
Ms. Timko, Mr. Robinson, and Ms. Darnell bring claims for failure to pay
overtime in violation of the FLSA and PMWA, and Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson bring
claims of failure to pay minimum wage under the PMWA.
“The FLSA and PMWA require employers to pay employees the minimum
wage, plus overtime if the employee is non-exempt[,]” as well as “to compensate
employees time and a half for any time worked in excess of forty hours in a
workweek.” , No. 23-606, 2024 WL 98378, at *3-4
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2024) (Wiegand, J.) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207; 43 Pa. C.S. §
333.104).26 To state a minimum-wage claim, “a plaintiff must [allege] three elements:
(1) the plaintiff was an employee; (2) the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer; and
(3) the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff the wage required . . . . [And i]f a plaintiff
seeks unpaid overtime wages, he or she must [also] sufficiently allege forty hours of
work in a given workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the forty
hours.” , No. 21-1600, 2022 WL 2293969,
at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2022) (Stickman, J.) (cleaned up) (PMWA elements);
, 765 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2014) (FLSA elements).
The Motel M defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege any basis for
imposing personal liability on them. ECF 24, pp. 21-23. This argument focuses on
the “first inquiry in most FLSA cases[,] . . . whether the plaintiff has alleged an
actionable employer-employee relationship.” ,
748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014).
“The roles of employee and employer are broadly defined in the FLSA. To
‘employ’ is defined as ‘to suffer or permit to work.’ 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). An ‘employee’

26 “Generally, the FLSA and PMWA are analyzed under the same framework.”
, 2024 WL 98378, at *2. Unless otherwise noted, the Court analyzes them
together.
is ‘any individual employed by an employer.’ § 203(e)(1). And an ‘employer’ can
be either a business entity or an individual—it includes ‘any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.’ . § 203(d).”
, No. 21-482, 2022 WL 819096, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18,
2022) (Hornak, C.J.) (citations omitted) 27
In practice, “[t]he standard to determine whether an entity is the ‘employer’ of
a worker-plaintiff raising an FLSA [or PMWA] claim is whether that entity exercised
‘significant control’ over the worker. The Third Circuit has announced a
nonexhaustive list of factors for determining whether an entity is an employer or joint
employer of a given employee[,]” which captures both “direct” and “indirect” control.
, No. 17-1573, 2018 WL 6715725, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21,
2018) (Hornak, J.) (cleaned up). Under this “ test,” courts ask “[d]oes the
alleged employer have: (1) authority to hire and fire employees; (2) authority to
promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including
compensation, benefits, and hours; (3) day-to-day supervision, including employee
discipline; and (4) control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes,
and the like.” (quoting ,
683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012)). These factors are not to be “blindly applied[,]” and
are to be joined by “consider[ation of] all the relevant evidence, including evidence
that does not fall neatly within [the factors].” , 683 F.3d at 469 (cleaned
up); , No. 18-5063, 2019 WL

27 Similarly, the PMWA explains “employ[] includes to suffer or to permit to work[,]”
43 P.S. § 333.103(f); defines “employe[e]” as “any individual employed by an
employer[,]” § 333.103(h); and defines “employer” as “any individual, partnership,
association, corporation, business trust, or any person or group of persons acting,
directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer in relation to any employe[e,]”
§ 333.103(g).
2897697, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2019) (collecting cases discussing the “other
circumstances which aided in the determination of employment statuses”).28
The Court examines this employment-relationship element against each
defendant below.
1. Only Mr. Robinson plausibly alleges FLSA and PMWA
claims against Milan, LLC.
Plaintiffs’ allegations against Milan, LLC are scant, but just enough at this
stage for Mr. Robinson’s claim to survive.
Setting aside the conclusory allegations that the Motel M employed Mr.
Robinson, ECF 1, ¶¶ 286, 277, 318, 320, 327, Plaintiffs allege that Milan, LLC “owns
and operates [the] Motel M,” Mr. Robinson began working for the Motel M in June
2019, and Mr. Bhatia—as owner of Milan, LLC—agreed to pay Mr. Robinson “in cash
and off-the-books.” ¶¶ 6, 82, 84.
In test terms, Plaintiffs allege that Milan, LLC had the authority
to (and did) hire Mr. Robinson, and, through Mr. Bhatia, set his compensation.
Joined with other indicia—Plaintiffs’ allegations that Mr. Robinson worked on-site at
the Motel M, and that Milan, LLC, owned the Motel M—Plaintiffs’ allegations just
barely “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.” , 748 F.3d at 147 (cleaned up);
, No. 14-4824, 2015 WL 2337273, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2015)
(considering that plaintiffs worked at the addresses of alleged employers). So Mr.

28 The Third Circuit has developed several multi-factor tests to analyze, under
different circumstances, whether an employer relationship exists.
, 108 F.4th 163, 177 (3d Cir. 2024) (noting tests for
whether individuals are employees or independent contractors, whether entities are
joint employers, and developing test for whether student-athletes are employees).
Though no party cited to it, the Court believes the test is most appropriate
here, and, indeed, the Third Circuit recently applied to joint-employer
claims in the forced-prison-labor context. , 60 F.4th at 46.
Robinson’s FLSA and PMWA claims against Milan, LLC, survive the Motel M
defendants’ challenge.
Neither Ms. Timko nor Ms. Darnell, however, are alleged to have worked at
the Motel M, or otherwise to have had any interaction at all with Milan, LLC. Their
FLSA/PMWA claims against Milan, LLC, will thus fail.
2. Only Mr. Robinson plausibly alleges FLSA and PMWA
claims against Mr. Bhatia.
“Aside from the corporate entity itself, a company’s owners, officers, or
supervisory personnel may also constitute ‘joint employers’ for purposes of liability
under the FLSA.” , 748 F.3d at 153. The question is whether the
individual defendant “exercises supervisory authority over the complaining employee
and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation while acting in the
employer’s interest.” (cleaned up). “The focus is on the totality of the
circumstances rather than on technical concepts of the employment relationship[,]”
at 154, and the factors assist with this analysis. , 2022 WL 819096,
at *5.
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bhatia “owned and operated” the Motel M, and that
Mr. Bhatia is a co-owner of the Days Inn. ECF 1, ¶¶ 24, 84, 253 & pp. 22-23
(unnumbered paragraph under heading “PARTICIPATION THEORY”). “Providing
titles or positions, without more, however, is insufficient to demonstrate control.”
, 2022 WL 819096, at *6; , No. 18-806, 2018
WL 6258604, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2018) (Hornak, J.) (“[C]ommon ownership or
membership in a common enterprise is insufficient to yield liability under the FLSA.”
(cleaned up)).
So what else is alleged? Plaintiffs allege that at the Motel M, Mr. Bhatia
“agreed to pay Mr. Robinson in cash and off-the-books[,]” and that Mr. Bhatia
“traded” Mr. Robinson to the Days Inn. ECF 1, ¶¶ 84, 88. Considering the totality of
the circumstances, Mr. Robinson plausibly alleges that Mr. Bhatia was a joint
employer of Mr. Robinson with Milan, LLC. Plaintiffs’ allegations pertaining to Mr.
Bhatia and the Days Inn, however, are far more tenuous. Plaintiffs allege that Mr.
Bhatia was a co-owner of the Days Inn, and that he “traded” Mr. Robinson to the
Days Inn. ECF 1, ¶¶ 88, 253. Even if the Court charitably assumes that the “trading”
counts as hiring authority at the , that’s only one test factor.
, 2019 WL 2897697, at *5 (holding no joint employer relationship
pled where only one factor weighed in plaintiff’s favor). There isn’t much
else to bolster Plaintiffs’ position. At most, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Bhatia hired a
“surveyor or inspector” to check on the Days Inn, ECF 1, ¶ 170, and that Mr. Bhatia
is alleged to have communicated with Mr. Singh about hiring vulnerable individuals
under a debt arrangement, ¶ 85. But neither shed any light on whether Mr. Bhatia
and the Days Inn defendants “share[d] or co-determine[d] those matters governing
essential terms and conditions of employment” at the Days Inn. , 683
F.3d at 468, 470.
Plaintiffs don’t offer any serious argument otherwise. They assert, without
citation to authority, that Mr. Bhatia remained Mr. Robinson’s employer at the Days
Inn. ECF 27, p. 15. And they argue that Mr. Robinson’s labor allowed the Days Inn
to reduce the workload of its legitimate employees, meaning the Motel M defendants
“acted ‘directly or indirectly’ in the” Days Inn’s interest. ECF 27, p. 15. Maybe, but
that says nothing about what really matters—whether the Motel M defendants had
“significant control” or supervisory authority over any Plaintiff at the Days Inn.
Accordingly, Mr. Robinson’s FLSA/PMWA claims against Mr. Bhatia will
remain, but will be limited to the time Mr. Robinson worked at Motel M. Without
any allegations pertaining to Ms. Timko or Ms. Darnell, their FLSA/PMWA claims
against Mr. Bhatia will be dismissed.
B. The WPCL claims (Count X).
Rounding out the wage-and-hour claims are Ms. Timko’s, Mr. Robinson’s, and
Ms. Darnell’s claims for failure to pay overtime and straight time in violation of the
WPCL. “The [WPCL] provides employees a statutory remedy to recover wages and
other benefits that are contractually due to them.” ,
696 A.2d 148, 150 (Pa. 1997). “Thus, to state a plausible WPCL claim, a plaintiff
employee must allege facts demonstrating that he or she was deprived of
compensation the employee has earned according to the terms of his or her contract
with the defendant employer.” , No. 22-1599, 2025 WL
745224, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2025) (Colville, J.); ,
No. 21-5314, 2023 WL 5432508, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2023) (“To prevail on a
WPCL claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the entity that withheld wages from the
plaintiff is an ‘employer’ under the WPCL; (2) the plaintiff is contractually owed the
withheld wages; and (3) the employer, in fact, withheld the contractually owed
wages.”), , No. 23-2737, 2024 WL 4403873 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2024).
The Motel M defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Motel M
defendants employed anyone in Pennsylvania. ECF 24, p. 23; ECF 28, p. 13. The
Court agrees.
The WPCL defines “employer” as “every person, firm, partnership, association,
corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this Commonwealth and any agent
or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes employing any person in this
Commonwealth.” 43 P.S. § 260.2a. “[T]he existence of an employer-employee
relationship under the WPCL centers on whether the employer not only controls the
result of the work but directs the manner in which the work is accomplished.”
, 222 F. Supp. 3d 432, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(citing , 878 A.2d 58, 62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)). The
WPCL also “imposes personal liability on high-ranking corporate officers for
employees’ unpaid wages.” , No. 13-5970, 2013 WL
6476555, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2013). “To hold an ‘agent or officer’ personally liable
for unpaid wages, evidence of an active role in decision making is required.”
(cleaned up).
As explained in the above discussion relating to the FLSA and PMWA,
Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that the Motel M defendants controlled any aspect
of Plaintiffs’ employment at the Days Inn. And because the Motel M is in West
Virginia, Milan, LLC is a West Virginia company, and Mr. Robinson wasn’t alleged
to have resided in Pennsylvania, any allegations pertaining to Mr. Robinson there
aren’t relevant.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ WPCL claims.
VII. The debt-collection claims (Count XIII).
Ms. Timko and Mr. Robinson assert claims of unfair and deceptive debt
collection against the Motel M defendants under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) and Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act (FCEUA).
ECF 1, ¶¶ 340-351.
“The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from engaging in certain practices
deemed harmful to consumers[,]” , No. 22-1090,
2023 WL 2058054, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2023) (Stickman, J.), including the “use
[of] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with
the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e. Likewise, “[t]he FCEUA prohibits
‘unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices with regard
to the collection of debts[,]’” , 838 F. App’x 671, 675
(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting 73 P.S. § 2270.2), including violations of the FDCPA by “debt
collector[s,]” 73 P.S. § 2270.4(a), as well as “creditor[s’] . . . use [of] any false, deceptive
or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”
§ 2270.4(b)(5).
The Motel M defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Motel M
defendants engaged in any conduct prohibited by the statutes. ECF 24, pp. 24-25.
The Court agrees.
Plaintiffs don’t allege that Ms. Timko worked at the Motel M, or that any of
the Motel M defendants collected any debt at the Days Inn. To the extent that
Plaintiffs allege debt-collection actions at the Days Inn by “Defendants” generally,
, ECF 1, ¶ 183, or in the passive voice, , ¶ 347, without more, those
allegations are insufficient, since any inference that they apply to the Motel M
defendants is undercut by the rest of the allegations specifically recounting Mr.
Singh’s use of the debt. , 731 F. Supp. 3d 670, 683-
84 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (“Although there is no categorical prohibition against group
pleading, a complaint is insufficient where there is genuine uncertainty regarding
who is responsible for what, such as when multiple defendants are accused of acting
jointly.” (cleaned up)).29
The Court will thus dismiss Plaintiffs’ FDCPA and FCEUA claims against all
of the Motel M defendants.

29 Plus, Plaintiffs’ allegations pertaining to Mr. Bhatia and Mr. Robinson at the Motel
M don’t count. An FCEUA “creditor” claim applies to “debt collection activities of
creditors in [Pennsylvania,]” and the Motel M is in West Virginia. 73 P.S. § 2270.4(b).
And while the allegations might have sufficed for a “debt collector” claim under the
FDCPA or FCEUA subsection (a), a “debt collector” under either statute can’t be
collecting its own debts. , 898 F.3d 364, 366 (3d Cir.
2018) (“Specifically excluded from the [FDCPA’s] definition’s reach [of ‘debt collector’]
are, in relevant part, a creditor’s officers and employees collecting debts for the
creditor, . . . [and] an entity collecting a debt it originated[.]” (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6)); 73 P.S. § 2270.3 (excluding from definition of “debt collector” “[a]ny
officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for
such creditor[,]” and any person collecting “a debt which was originated by such
person”).
VIII. The equitable claims (Count XIV).
Lastly, Ms. Timko, Mr. Robinson, and Ms. Darnell allege common-law
quantum-meruit and unjust-enrichment claims against all Defendants, which all
moving Defendants seek to dismiss. ECF 1, ¶¶ 352-356.
“Pennsylvania . . . does not consider unjust enrichment to be either an action
in tort or contract. Unjust enrichment, rather, an equitable remedy and synonym for
, is a form of restitution.” , 328 F. App’x
121, 126 (3d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up);
, 179 A.3d 1093, 1102 (Pa. 2018)
(“A claim for damages in is fundamentally an equitable claim of
unjust enrichment[.]”). “A plaintiff must [thus] prove the same elements for quantum
meruit and unjust enrichment.”
, No. 23-1732, 2024 WL 624036, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2024) (Horan, J.).
Under Pennsylvania law, those elements “are (1) conferring a benefit on [a]
defendant; (2) [the] defendant’s knowledge of the benefit; and (3) circumstances are
such that [the] defendant’s retention of that benefit would be unjust.” , 60
F.4th at 50.
The Motel M defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ unjust-enrichment claims fail
because they do not meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. ECF 24, p. 25; ECF 13, pp.
30-31. The Court agrees.
Plaintiffs’ equitable claims, in total, account for five numbered paragraphs and
a request-for-relief clause in a 48-page, 356-paragraph, complaint. ECF 1, ¶¶ 352-
356. Four of those paragraphs are no more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action” properly discarded on a motion-to-dismiss challenge.
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); , 2022 WL 819096, at *6 (striking
“boilerplate allegations”). What’s left is a single paragraph, incorporating all prior
allegations by reference. ECF 1, ¶ 352. “[T]hose who incorporate prior pleadings by
reference must do so with a degree of specificity and clarity which would enable a
responding party to easily determine the nature and extent of the incorporation.”
, No. 17-438, 2019 WL 13275789, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2019)
(cleaned up). Plaintiffs’ execution instead “force[s the Court] to search through [the]
complaint like a pig hunting for truffles.” , No. 18-14,
2018 WL 6790167, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 2018) (Eddy, C.M.J.). A few other
characteristics of Plaintiffs’ complaint makes this exercise even harder: the equitable
claims are brought by “all” Plaintiffs against “all” Defendants; some Plaintiffs seem
to “lack any allegations against some combination of Defendants[,]”
, No. 24-4762, 2025 WL 1194479, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24,
2025); and, as noted many times, Plaintiffs are partial to group pleading.
The Court will thus dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable claims in their entirety for
failing to conform with Rule 8(a).
IX. Plaintiffs may amend their complaint.
The Court finds that amendment would not be inequitable or futile, and so all
dismissals will be without prejudice to Plaintiffs amending their complaint.
, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). Any amended complaint shall
ensure that generalized and group-pled allegations are eliminated.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Wyndham’s
motion to dismiss (ECF 13), and the Motel M defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF 23).
A separate order follows.

Dated: July 30, 2025 BY THE COURT:

United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11111459. Public record. Not legal advice.