# Carr v. Scandrett

> District Court, N.D. Georgia · July 30, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11111410

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Georgia
- **Decided:** July 30, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

MAURICE CARR,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:24-CV-3913-TWT

REGINALD B. SCANDRETT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights case. It is before the Court on the Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 6]. As explained below, the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. 6] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Background1
This action involves an alleged unlawful seizure and retaliation against
Plaintiff Maurice Carr. The Plaintiff was a Lieutenant with the Henry County
Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”). (Compl., [Doc. 1], ¶ 5). Defendant Reginald
Scandrett is and was, for all relevant times, the Sheriff of Henry County. (
¶ 8). Defendant Leontyne Daniel is and for all relevant times was a Colonel
and Commander of Jail Operations for the Sheriff’s Office. ( ¶ 9).
On July 27, 2023, a Captain of the Sheriff’s Office served the Plaintiff
with notice of written counseling alleging a policy violation. ( ¶ 13). The

1 The Court accepts the facts as alleged in the Complaint as true for
purposes of the present Motion to Dismiss. , 941
F.3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 2019).
notice of written counseling permitted the Plaintiff to submit a grievance
against the disciplinary action. ( ). Despite disagreeing with the notice, the
Plaintiff chose not to submit a grievance. ( ¶ 14). Then, on August 15, 2023,

Defendant Daniel summoned the Plaintiff to her office and told him that the
notice was being amended to reflect two counts of Neglect of Duty, which would
include a proposed sanction of a seventeen-hour suspension. ( ¶ 15). Two
days later, the Plaintiff submitted a timely rebuttal to the amended sanction
notice. ( ¶ 17).
After further reflection, the Plaintiff tendered his resignation on August
18, 2023, which would become effective on August 30, 2023. ( ¶ 18). Two

hours after the Plaintiff submitted his resignation, Defendant Daniel
instructed the Plaintiff to report to the executive conference room that
afternoon where he would meet with Defendant Scandrett and several
members of the Command Staff. ( ¶ 19). During that meeting, Defendant
Scandrett called the Plaintiff a “coward” for resigning and stated that the
Command Staff would “assess” his resignation, unequivocally asserting that

the Plaintiff was not permitted to resign without permission from the
Defendants. ( ¶ 20).
At approximately 3:50 p.m. the same day, the Plaintiff was summoned
to meet with Defendant Daniel and Office Investigator J.L. Boone for purposes
of conducting an administrative investigation. ( ¶ 21). The meeting was

2
captured by audio and video recording. ( ). At the meeting, Boone read a
document informing the Plaintiff that he was being placed on administrative
leave with pay. ( ¶ 22). The Plaintiff was then given the document with

direction to sign it. ( ¶ 23). The Plaintiff briefly considered it, and then said,
“all I need are my bags, and I terminate my employment today.” ( ¶ 24).
Defendant Daniel then asked the Plaintiff if he would sign it, and the Plaintiff
responded, “I will not be signing it, I quit.” ( ¶ 25).
The Plaintiff then stood to leave, and Defendant Daniel told him to sit
back down. ( ¶ 27). The Plaintiff then said, “I am about to leave,” and
Defendant Daniel replied, “No sir, you’re not.” ( ¶ 29). Defendant Daniel

then stood and blocked the Plaintiff’s path to the only way in or out of the room.
( ). Defendant Daniel was armed while the Plaintiff was not. ( ). The
Plaintiff perceived that he was not free to leave. ( ¶ 31). Defendant Daniel
continued to tell the Plaintiff that he needed to sit down and to prohibit him
from leaving. ( ¶¶ 32-33). Approximately sixteen minutes transpired until
the Plaintiff was escorted by Boone and another officer to his house to retrieve

various equipment, such as his agency identification. ( ¶¶ 35-36).
When the Sheriff’s Office failed to acknowledge his verbal resignation,
the Plaintiff followed it up with another one on August 27, 2023, noting that
the resignation was effective immediately. ( ¶ 37). Despite his verbal and
written resignations, Defendant Daniel generated a memo on August 30, 2023,

3
recommending that the Plaintiff be terminated. ( ¶ 38). This action was
allegedly taken to retaliate against the Plaintiff for his verbal resignation
made on August 18th and to harm the Plaintiff’s ability to get future

employment. ( ¶¶ 39-40). The Sheriff’s Office mailed the Plaintiff his
belongings along with a notice of termination dated September 1, 2023, stating
the termination was effective immediately. ( ¶ 44).
On or about September 1, 2023, Defendant Scandrett reported or caused
to be reported to the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council
(“POST”) that the Plaintiff had been terminated. ( ¶ 47). POST is a Georgia
state agency responsible for certifying and disciplining peace officers, such as

the Plaintiff. ( ¶ 49). The report that the Plaintiff was fired triggered a POST
investigation, which is currently pending. ( ¶ 51). That investigation has
harmed the Plaintiff’s ability to secure and maintain employment as a peace
officer. ( ).
After these events, the Plaintiff sought legal representation. ( ¶ 52).
Plaintiff’s counsel made a request for “[a]ny and all audio/video recording of

any interview of Maurice Carr on August 18, 2023,” pursuant to the Georgia
Open Records Act. ( ¶ 53). Defendant Scandrett and the Director of Legal
Affairs for the Sheriff’s Office responded denying the existence of the audio and
video recording of the August 18, 2023, incident. ( ¶ 55). However, Plaintiff’s
counsel confirmed that a video does exist and obtained a copy through Boone,

4
who no longer worked at the Sheriff’s Office. ( ¶ 56). The Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants Scandrett or Daniel, acting alone or in concert, caused the
deletion of the audio and video recording because the Plaintiff exercised his

First Amendment rights. ( ¶¶ 58-59).
Based on these events, the Plaintiff has asserted claims for unlawful
seizure and First Amendment retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false
imprisonment, and libel and defamation. ( ¶¶ 60-101). The Defendants now
move to dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim and because of qualified
and official immunity.
II. Legal Standard

A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it
appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief.
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is
“improbable” that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the
possibility of recovery is extremely “remote and unlikely.”

, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court
must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
, 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir.
1983); , 40 F.3d

5
247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff
“receives the benefit of imagination”). Generally, notice pleading is all that is
required for a valid complaint. , 753

F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only
give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon
which it rests. , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing ,
550 U.S. at 555).
III. Discussion
The Court will start by considering the First Amendment arguments. It
will then address the Fourth Amendment claim. Finally, the Court will analyze

the state law claims.
A. First Amendment Retaliation
The crux of the Plaintiff’s First Amendment argument is that the
Plaintiff broke the employer-employee relationship at the time that he said “I
quit.” (Compl. ¶ 80). His actions after that point in time including speaking,
refusing to sign the document, and seeking records under the Georgia Open

Records Act were assertedly protected First Amendment activity. ( ¶ 81).
The Plaintiff then contends that the Defendants retaliated against the Plaintiff
for taking those protected activities by filing a report to POST falsely stating
that he was terminated when he actually resigned and by destroying the audio
and video of the meeting. ( ¶ 83).

6
i. Failure to State a Claim
The Eleventh Circuit has described the general standard for stating a
retaliation claim as follows: “[T]he commonly accepted formulation requires

that a plaintiff must establish first, that his speech or act was constitutionally
protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected
the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the
retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” , 423
F.3d 1247, 1250 (2005) (citations omitted),
, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). When the alleged retaliation
occurs against a government employee, the standard set forth in

, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) applies:
First, we consider whether the employee’s speech is fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public
concern. If it is, we apply the balancing test, which
weighs the employee’s free speech interest against the interest of
the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs. If the employee’s interests outweigh those
of the state as an employer, we turn to the third prong: whether
the speech played a substantial part in the government’s decision
to discharge the employee. If it did, we must address the fourth
prong, which is whether the government has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have discharged the
employee regardless of the protected conduct.

, 248 F.3d 1117, 1122-23 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff was a government employee
when he allegedly made his statements and failed to sign the document. (
7
Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 6-12, 16). The Defendants assert that
the Plaintiff failed to state a claim under because the Plaintiff’s
statements were not speaking on a matter of public concern and because the

Sheriff’s Office’s interests outweighed the Plaintiff’s interests. (Defs.’ Br. in
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 6-10). As for the video deletion, the Defendants
contend that that allegation does not state a claim because there is only
hypothetical harm since the Plaintiff now has the video and because the
Defendants’ actions would not deter a person of ordinary firmness. ( at
10-12).
The Plaintiff disagrees. First, he states that the Plaintiff was not a

public employee at the time he made the relevant statements and refused to
sign the document, and as a result, does not apply. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n
to Mot. to Dismiss, at 8-12). Next, he argues that destruction of requested
materials would prevent a person of ordinary firmness from requesting the
documents. ( at 12-15). The Court finds that the Plaintiff states a plausible
First Amendment retaliation claim.

1. Plaintiff’s Statements and Refusal to Sign Document
Starting with the arguments relating to the Plaintiff’s statements and
refusal to sign the document, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged that he was no longer an employee at the relevant time. The Plaintiff
alleges that he said “I quit,” and that he was retaliated against for his speech

8
and refusal to sign a document. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 81-85). The Defendants respond
in two ways. Neither is persuasive. First, they state that the Court is not
required to accept as true the Plaintiff’s legal conclusions. (Reply Br. in Supp.

of Mot. to Dismiss, at 1-2). While that is a correct statement of law, the Plaintiff
has provided legal authority indicating that he was an at-will employee. For
example, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 states that “[a]n indefinite hiring may be
terminated at will by either party.” Moreover, the “presumption of employment
at will applies to public and private employees.”
, 925 F. Supp. 777, 781 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citation omitted). In response,
the Defendants have offered zero legal authority indicating that the Plaintiff

was still an employee when he made those statements and refused to sign the
document. (Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 1-2; Defs.’ Br. in
Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 16). Based on what is before the Court, this
argument must fail.
The Defendants’ second response is that the Plaintiff’s oral resignation
should not be taken seriously because he sent a written resignation later.

(Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 2). That resignation stated that it
was effective immediately as of August 27, 2023, over a week after the alleged
statements. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 2, [Doc. 6-2]). The
Plaintiff asserts that he sent that written resignation because the Defendants
continued to treat him as if the verbal resignation was not effective. (Compl.

9
¶ 37). At this stage, it would be improper to infer that the oral resignation was
not serious. , 889 F.3d 1213,
1227 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[R]esolution of a motion to dismiss requires the court

to accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and to view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)). At the very least,
the factual dispute about the seriousness of the oral resignation prevents this
from being decided as a matter of law.
, 10 F.4th 1125, 1135-36 (11th Cir. 2021).
Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged he
ended his employment by saying “I quit.” Since he was not a government

employee at the time he engaged in the allegedly protected actions—and since
the Defendants have failed to point to any other basis for using it—the
test does not apply. All of the Defendants’ objections were based on
the test, so these objections fail. Accordingly, the Court will not
dismiss this Count for failure to state a claim with respect to the statements
and refusal to sign the document.

2. Plaintiff’s Request for Records
The Defendants’ argument relating to the alleged deletion of video
evidence applies the general retaliation standard and is thus not dependent
upon the Plaintiff being a government employee. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss, at 10-12). The Defendants assert that the Plaintiff has failed to

10
plausibly allege any adverse effect on the protected speech. ( ).
As stated above, a plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation
claim must demonstrate that “the defendant’s conduct adversely affected the

protected speech.” , 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016)
(citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “a defendant
adversely affects protected speech if his alleged retaliatory conduct would
likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First
Amendment rights. We use this objective standard because it gives
government officials notice of when their retaliatory actions violate a plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights.” at 481 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiff has failed to meet this standard
because he now possesses the video. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at
10-12). The Court disagrees. If a person of ordinary firmness knew that the
Defendants would delete sought-for records after they were properly requested
pursuant to state law, then that could reasonably deter them from making that
request.2 The Court doubts that the Plaintiff’s ability to track down the video

2 The Plaintiff’s argument is, at least in part, that this deletion was in
retaliation for requesting the records. ( Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss,
at 15) (“Leaving aside the issues of spoliation, if one knew that every time, they
requested records the records would be destroyed, secreted, or the opposing
party would perjure itself in order to avoid production of those records, would
that person pursue that action? The answer is obviously, no.”) It is unclear
whether the claim is broader than that. However, for present purposes, this is
sufficient to show an adverse effect.
11
despite the Defendants’ alleged deletion changes that conclusion. For starters,
even assuming that finding an alternative source of the video is possible (it will
not always be), the mere fact of deleting a record that a person is lawfully

entitled to and forcing them to find it on his or her own could reasonably deter
a person of ordinary firmness.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[i]t would be unjust to
allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely
because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity.”
, 423 F.3d at 1252 (quotation marks and citation omitted). It seems
similarly unjust to permit the Defendants to escape liability simply because

the Plaintiff—by luck, temerity, or both—was able to track down another copy
of the video. The Defendants do not raise any challenges related to the other
elements of the claim, so the Court does not reach them. The Court will not
dismiss the Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim on failure to state a
claim grounds.
ii. Qualified Immunity

The Defendants assert that qualified immunity bars this claim. (Defs.’
Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 14-17). “The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” , 555

12
U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If a public official
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden falls to
the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate.”

, 835 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The
burden is on the Defendants to demonstrate that they acted within their
discretionary authority. , 996 F.
Supp. 1390, 1400 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (“First, the Defendants must show that they
are performing an act within their discretionary authority.”). If the Defendant
does so, then the burden shifts to the Plaintiff, who must: “(1) allege facts that
establish that the officer violated his constitutional rights; and (2) show that

the right involved was clearly established at the time of the putative
misconduct.” , 835 F.3d at 1344 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Plaintiff contends that qualified immunity does not even apply
because the Defendants have not shown that these actions were done in under
their discretionary authority. (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, at 16-17).
“The term ‘discretionary authority’ covers all actions of a governmental official

that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2)
were within the scope of his authority.” , 927 F.3d 1103, 1116
(11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Defendants assert
that the alleged actions fall within their discretionary authority because they
were “employment-related actions.” (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at

13
15). However, as stated above, the Plaintiff has plausibly asserted that he was
no longer an employee of the Sheriff’s Office when the actions took place.
Moreover, even if that was not effective, the first written resignation stated

that it was effective August 30, and the second one stated that it was effective
immediately as of August 27. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. 1, 2).
These both occurred before the Defendants signed a termination notice for the
Plaintiff, before they told POST that the Plaintiff was terminated, and well
before they destroyed the video evidence. (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 47, 53, 58). Given that,
the Defendants have not offered any explanation for how falsely reporting that
the Plaintiff was terminated or destroying video evidence are “employment-

related actions.”
Moreover, the only substantive3 case they provide is ,
357 Ga. App. 99, 104 (2020). (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 15; Reply
Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 3-4). That case is entirely inapposite. It
discusses whether the remedies being requested in the case were forward-
looking or backward-looking. , 357 Ga. App. at 102-04. It does not even

use the word “discretionary” once. A defendant cannot meet
his or her burden to establish discretionary authority by ignoring the factual

3 The other cases that the Defendants provide are offered for the
propositions (1) that a court is to look at state law to determine whether a
function is discretionary and (2) that the burden to establish discretionary
authority is a light one. (Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 4).
14
allegations of the complaint or by pointing to clearly irrelevant case law.4
Accordingly, qualified immunity does not apply here.
Even if it did apply, the Plaintiff has plausibly asserted a violation of

the First Amendment, as described above. As for the “clearly established”
element, the Eleventh Circuit “has held since at least 1988 that it is settled
law that the government may not retaliate against citizens for the exercise of
First Amendment rights” , 423 F.3d at 1256 (quotation omitted). The
Court appreciates that the trend since this case has been decided has been to
apply constitutional provisions at a more specific level.
, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (“[W]e have repeatedly told courts not to

define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” (citation modified)
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, general propositions may
still be used to defeat qualified immunity in rare cases. , 843 F.3d at 484
(explaining that “a plaintiff may rely on a broader, clearly established principle
that should control the novel facts of the situation” to overcome a qualified
immunity defense. (citation modified) (quotation mark and citation omitted));

4 To be clear, the Court is not affirmatively finding that the actions
taken were outside of the Defendants’ discretionary authority. The Court
recognizes that the discretionary authority determination is a “low hurdle to
clear.” , 112 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1267 (M.D. Ala.
2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, it is still a hurdle, and
the Defendants must say something that is supported by the record or case law
before it can clear it. In sum, the Court is simply holding that, at this stage,
the Defendants have not provided any basis for concluding that they were
acting within their discretionary authority.
15
, 871 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that
“[c]ases do not often arise under” the broader, clearly established principle
exception (citations omitted)).

The proposition set forth in has been applied as such.
, 843 F.3d at 484 (“Here, the reasoning of and the broad
principle it establishes should have put Wheeler on notice that he could not
potentially endanger Bailey's life in retaliation for Bailey’s exercise of his First
Amendment rights.”); , 2021 WL 5174526, at *9
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2021) (“In , the Eleventh Circuit recognized a broad,
clearly established principle that the government may not retaliate against

citizens for the exercise of First Amendment rights.” (quotation marks and
citations omitted)).5 The Defendants do not mention , let alone explain
why it does not apply here or provide any relevant cases in which the Eleventh
Circuit has limited or overruled it. ( , Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss; Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss).
Therefore, the Court finds that the broad principle that the government

5 The court in ultimately found that qualified immunity applied,
but that decision was based on a “more specific holding” from another Eleventh
Circuit case. , 2021 WL 5174526 at *9. Namely, the Eleventh Circuit
held in , 611 F.3d 828, 851 (11th Cir. 2010) that “the specific
right to be free from a retaliatory investigation is not clearly established.”
, 2021 WL 5174526, at *9 (quotation marks and citation omitted). That
specific rule does not apply here, and the Defendants do not point to any other
specific rule that would apply here.
16
cannot retaliate against citizens for the exercise of First Amendment rights
was clearly established at the time relevant here. Since the Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged that the Defendants retaliated against him for his First

Amendment activity, he has alleged a violation of clearly established law. The
Court will not dismiss this count.
B. Fourth Amendment
The Plaintiff’s theory of its Fourth Amendment claim goes as follows.
When the Plaintiff stated, “I quit,” he ended his employment with the Sheriff’s
Office and became a private citizen. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26). After that point,
Defendant Daniel told the Plaintiff to sit down, stood, and blocked the

Plaintiff’s path to the only door. ( ¶¶ 27, 29). The Plaintiff told Defendant
Daniel “I am about to leave,” and Defendant Daniel replied, “No sir, you’re not.”
( ¶ 29). Defendant Daniel was armed at the time, and the Plaintiff was not.
( ). Then, Defendant Daniel said even more forcefully, “I have said it three
times and I am now directing you to sit down.” ( ¶ 32). Defendant Daniel
refused to allow the Plaintiff to leave even though the Plaintiff reiterated that

his resignation was already effective. ( ¶¶ 33-34). The alleged detention
lasted for approximately sixteen minutes. ( ¶ 35). The Plaintiff alleges that
he actually and reasonably believed he was not free to leave during that time
and that no reasonable officer would have believed that there was probable
cause to believe that the Plaintiff committed a crime. ( ¶¶ 28, 30-31).

17
Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Daniel unlawfully seized him.
( ¶¶ 60-72). The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim
and that qualified immunity bars this claim. (Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to

Dismiss, at 12-18).
The Court will start and end its analysis with the Defendants’ qualified
immunity argument. Unlike the actions taken under the First Amendment,
the Plaintiff concedes in the Complaint that Defendant Daniel was acting
within her discretionary authority during the alleged unlawful seizure.
(Compl. ¶ 69) (“ , as previously
enumerated, to wit: While acting under color of her lawful authority as a

Colonel in the Henry County Sheriff’s Office, Defendant Daniel unlawfully and
with malice seized Plaintiff on August 18, 2023 and unlawfully confined him.”
(emphasis added)). Therefore, the Court finds qualified immunity analysis
applicable to the Fourth Amendment claim.
Pretermitting whether the Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional
violation,6 the Court finds that any such violation was not clearly established

at the time it was committed. The Plaintiff argues, “[i]t has been firmly and
roundly established that citizens have the right to be free from seizure absent

6 The Court is “permitted to exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” , 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
18
arguable probable cause or in certain cases reasonable suspicion.” (Pl.’s Br.
in Opp’n of Mot. to Dismiss, 21 (citations omitted)). The Plaintiff then states
that he did nothing that any reasonable officer could think was the commission

of a crime. ( ). Consequently, the argument goes, Defendant Daniel lacked
any arguable probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain the Plaintiff.
( at 21-22). The Court finds this argument unpersuasive.
Unlike in the First Amendment context described above, courts have
applied qualified immunity in the seizure context at a specific rather than
general level. , , 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988)
(noting “this Court’s clear direction that any assessment as to whether police

conduct amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take
into account all of the circumstances surrounding the incident in each
individual case.” (quotation marks and citation omitted));
, 446 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Because claims brought
under the Fourth Amendment are context specific, a review of prior decisions
is helpful in discerning how the Fourth Amendment applies in the public

employment context.”). The cases to which the Plaintiff cites all involve
situations in which a police officer claimed that the detained person committed
a crime. , 992 F.3d 1216, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021)
(“Hardigree was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, obstruction,
and simple battery.”); , 821 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir.

19
2016) (“Filbeck contends that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for
three crimes: burglary, criminal trespass, and theft by taking.”);
, 892 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Jeffrey Cozzi was

arrested for the robbery of one pharmacy and the attempted robbery of
another.”); , 97 F.4th 1343, 1348, 1357-58, 1360 n. 8
(11th Cir. 2024) (describing the officers’ argument that the plaintiff committed
criminal activity by moving a barricade and trying to flee). Accordingly, those
courts considered whether a reasonable officer in the defendant’s position had
reasonable suspicion or arguable probable cause that a crime had been
committed. , 992 F.3d at 1230; , 821 F.3d at 1320; ,

892 F.3d at 1294; , 97 F.4th at 1356.
Here, Defendant Daniel did not detain the Plaintiff because she thought
he had committed a crime. Instead, she detained him pursuant to her
(allegedly mistaken) authority as his supervisor, as she was keeping him there
to sign the administrative leave form. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-24). Thus, the relevant
inquiry is not whether it was arguable that the Plaintiff had committed a

crime, but rather whether he was arguably still under Defendant Daniel’s
supervisory authority.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “a claim that a government
supervisor has seized a public employee in violation of the Fourth Amendment
must allege circumstances that implicate more than the obligations that arise

20
from the employment relationship.” , 446 F.3d at 1204. “However,
workplace interactions can become seizures.” (citation omitted). “The
clearest example of this type of transformation is from a citizen’s consensual

conversation with law enforcement personnel to an arrest of that citizen.”
(citation omitted). As an initial matter, it is unclear what circumstances
“implicate more than the obligations that ar[o]se from the employment
relationship.” . No criminal arrest was made, and the purpose of the meeting
was to sign a form about being put on administrative leave from his
employment. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-24, 35-36).
Moreover, even if the Complaint plausibly allege that Defendant

Daniel’s actions rose to the level of a seizure, that alone is not sufficient.
“[Q]ualified immunity operates to ensure that before they are subjected to suit,
officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.” , 536 U.S. 730,
739 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, it must have
been apparent from the law at the time of these events that if an officer is
having a meeting to inform an employee that they are being placed on

administrative leave and the employee states that he quits, then she must
immediately let him go and not try to get him to sign the acknowledgement or
identify the location of his work-issued items. The Plaintiff provides no basis
from which Defendant Daniel would be on such notice. Therefore, the Court
finds that Defendant Daniel did not violate any clearly established law and

21
will consequently dismiss Count I.
C. State Law Claims
Finally, the Defendants challenge the Plaintiff’s state-law claims of false

imprisonment and defamation as barred by official immunity. Under Georgia
law, “[t]he doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity,
offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their
personal capacity.” , 274 Ga. 122, 123 (2001) (citation
omitted). Through this doctrine, “public officers and employees may be held
personally liable for negligence relating to their official duties only when
performing ‘ministerial’ acts; ‘discretionary’ acts are only subject to suit when

performed with actual malice or intent to cause injury.”
, 366 Ga. App. 153, 159 (2022).
“The Georgia Supreme Court has defined actual malice in th[e official
immunity] context to mean a deliberate intention to do wrong.”
, 884 F.3d 1290, 1304 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Likewise, the phrase ‘actual intent to cause injury’—as used in

Georgia's official immunity provision—means an actual intent to cause harm
to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to do the act purportedly resulting in the
claimed injury.” (quotation marks and citation omitted).
i. False Imprisonment
Starting with the claim for false imprisonment, the Plaintiff again

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concedes in the Complaint that Defendant Daniel was performing a
discretionary act when she allegedly detained the Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 76) (“The
of Defendant Daniel were . . . Defendant Daniel unlawfully

and with malice detained Plaintiff on August 18, 2023, depriving him of his
personal liberty. This interaction, as described herein, constitutes false
imprisonment under state law and caused Plaintiff damage.” (emphasis
added)). Consequently, the Plaintiff must allege actual malice or intent to
cause injury to avoid official immunity.
The Plaintiff argues that he has done enough to allege actual malice and
intent to harm because the Complaint states, “[a]ll Defendants were acting

with not only callous indifference to those clearly established rights of plaintiff
but acting with actual malice with the intention of doing Plaintiff harm and
doing wrong.” (Compl. ¶ 12). He then cites to a case applying Rule 9(b)—
, 671 F.3d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir.
2012)—to support the argument that he may plead intent generally. (Pl.’s Br.
in Opp’n of Mot. to Dismiss, at 24)

This argument fails. For starters, it appears that the Plaintiff
misunderstands the pleading standard.
It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when pleading
“fraud or mistake,” while allowing “[m]alice, intent, knowledge,
and other conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally.”
But “generally” is a relative term. In the context of Rule 9, it is to
be compared to the particularity requirement applicable to fraud
or mistake. Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading
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discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It
does not give him license to evade the less rigid—though still
operative—strictures of Rule 8. And Rule 8 does not empower
respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix
the label “general allegation,” and expect his complaint to survive
a motion to dismiss.

, 556 U.S. at 686-87 (citations omitted).
Put simply, the Plaintiff’s bald allegation that the Defendants acted
with actual malice and the intent to cause injury is insufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. If a plaintiff could allege intent and malice so facilely, it
would vitiate the protection of an immunity that is meant to be an immunity
from litigation, not just liability. , 274 Ga. at 123 (“The doctrine
of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers
and employees limited protection in their personal capacity.”
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). The Plaintiff fails to marshal a single fact
related to the alleged detention that plausibly shows that Defendant Daniel
acted with actual malice or intent to cause injury to the Plaintiff. ( Pl.’s Br.
in Opp’n of Mot. to Dismiss, at 24). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count II
on official immunity grounds.
ii. Libel and Defamation
As for the libel and defamation claim, the Plaintiff does not seem to
contest that the Defendant Scandrett was performing discretionary acts under
Georgia law. Even so, the Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a resignation that
would be effective on August 30, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 18). Then, in a meeting
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occurring just hours after the Plaintiff submitted that resignation, Defendant
Scandrett called the Plaintiff a “coward” for resigning. ( ¶¶ 18-20). Later
that afternoon, the Plaintiff verbally resigned during his meeting with Boone

and Defendant Daniel, which was said to be effective immediately. ( ¶¶ 24-
25). Then on August 27, 2023, the Plaintiff submitted a second written
resignation that was said to be effective immediately. ( ¶ 37). The Plaintiff
later received a notice of termination dated September 1, 2023, stating that he
was terminated effective immediately. ( ¶ 44). On or about September 1,
2023, Defendant Scandrett falsely reported or caused to be reported to POST
that Plaintiff was terminated. ( ¶ 47).

In other words, the Plaintiff alleges that he informed the Defendants of
his resignation three separate times, and after all of those resignations became
effective, the Defendant Scandrett—who had called Plaintiff a “coward” for
resigning—falsely told POST that the Plaintiff was fired. Contrary to the
Defendants’ assertions otherwise, these allegations do not suggest that the
statement that the Plaintiff was termination was “the product of reasoned

conclusions reached” by Defendant Scandrett from his personal observations
or careful deliberation. , 317 Ga. App. 37, 46 (2012) (citations
omitted). Based on the above facts, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
to support a plausible finding that Defendant Scandrett acted with actual

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malice or intended to cause the Plaintiff (and his career prospects) harm by
reporting him to POST. The Court will not dismiss Count IV at this time.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 6] is
GRANTED as to Counts I & II and DENIED as to Counts HI & IV.
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of July, 2025.

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11111410. Public record. Not legal advice.