# Wilkins-Bailey v. Essity Professional Hygiene North America, LLC

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · July 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11109631

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** July 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that “[b]y failing to respond, Plaintiff concedes that he has not stated a hostile work environment claim”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DELSONYA WILKINS-BAILEY,

Plaintiff,
23-CV-00431 (TMR-DCK)
v.
OPINION
ESSITY PROFESSIONAL HYGIENE
NORTH AMERICA, LLC,

Defendant.

Dated: July 24, 2025

Erin E. Rozzelle, The Freedmen Law Group, of Charlotte, N.C., argued for plaintiff
Delsonya Wilkins-Bailey.

Emily C. DeSmedt, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, of Princeton, N.J., and Tory I.
Summey, Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, of Charlotte, N.C., argued for
defendant Essity Professional Hygiene North America, LLC.

TIMOTHY M. REIF, Judge, United States Court of International Trade, Sitting by
Designation:

Delsonya Wilkins-Bailey (“plaintiff”) brings the instant action against Essity
Professional Hygiene North America, LLC (“defendant,” or “Essity”), alleging: (1)
religious discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (2) race
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII; and (3) race discrimination
and retaliation in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (“Section
1981”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Plaintiff requests equitable and monetary relief in the form of lost wages,
compensatory damages for emotional distress, punitive damages and liquidated
damages. See Compl., ECF No. 1.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”),
defendant moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J., ECF No. 46; Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.
Br.”), ECF No. 47; Def.’s Reply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def. Reply
Br.”), ECF No. 55. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Parties in the instant action

Plaintiff, a Black woman, was hired by BSN Medical Inc. in August 2016.
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7; Def.’s Answer and Defenses to Pl.’s Compl. and Jury Demand
(“Answer”) ¶¶ 1, 7, ECF No. 11. Defendant acquired BSN Medical in 2017. Def. Br.
at 4; id., Ex. C at 43:8-44:12.
Plaintiff was hired originally as an e-Commerce Coordinator. Compl. ¶ 7;
Answer ¶ 7. Plaintiff later received a promotion to Customer Engagement Manager
in July 2017. Compl. ¶ 12; Answer ¶ 12. The title of plaintiff’s role changed to
Sales Administrator in November 2019. Compl. ¶ 13; Answer ¶ 13. Throughout the
course of her employment with defendant, plaintiff received yearly merit
compensation increases, merit bonuses and recognition at certain times for her
performance. Compl. ¶ 15; Answer ¶ 15.
Plaintiff has identified religiously as a Jehovah’s Witness, a follower of the
Nation of Islam and a Christian. Compl. ¶ 8. More recently, plaintiff described
herself as a “God fearing woman striving to be Christlike.” Def. Br., Ex. B

(“Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 1”) at 153:21-25.
Defendant is a global hygiene and health company that conducts business
within the state of North Carolina. Compl. ¶ 2; Answer ¶ 2; Def. Br., Ex. A ¶ 2.
II. Factual background

On September 29, 2021, defendant announced its COVID-19 vaccination
policy. Compl. ¶ 24; id., Ex. 5 (“Vaccination Policy”); Answer ¶ 24. The Vaccination
Policy required that U.S. employees of the company be fully vaccinated against
COVID-19 by November 30, 2021, unless they demonstrated their eligibility for an
accommodation. Compl. ¶ 24; Answer ¶ 24; Vaccination Policy at 2-3.
On or about October 4, 2021, through October 6, 2021, plaintiff discussed the
Vaccination Policy with her human resources manager. Compl. ¶ 31; id., Ex. 7;
Answer ¶ 31. On October 10, 2021, plaintiff submitted a religious accommodation

request for an exemption from the Vaccination Policy. Compl. ¶ 32; id., Ex. 8;
Answer ¶ 32. Sometime after plaintiff submitted her accommodation request, Fred
Albrecht, the human resources director for defendant’s North America branch,
called plaintiff to discuss her request. Compl. ¶ 41; Answer ¶ 41. Plaintiff
communicated to Albrecht that she did not intend to become vaccinated and had
submitted a request for a religious accommodation. Compl. ¶ 43; Answer ¶ 43.
On November 19, 2021, defendant informed plaintiff that her accommodation
request was denied because plaintiff was ineligible for a religious accommodation.
Compl. ¶ 44; id., Ex. 12; Answer ¶ 44. Defendant explained that providing

plaintiff’s requested accommodation would create “an undue hardship for the
company . . . [by posing] a health or safety risk to the individual and others.”
Compl. ¶ 45 (alteration in original); Answer ¶ 45.
On November 30, 2021, plaintiff received an email from Albrecht which
stated that: “Employees who choose not to comply with the Essity COVID-19
Vaccination Policy by November 30, 2021 will be considered to have abandoned

their position at Essity on December 31, 2021 and the Company will process their
separation as a voluntary resignation.” Compl. ¶ 62; Answer ¶ 62.
On December 3, 2021, a director of defendant’s human resources department
communicated to plaintiff that plaintiff’s employment would be terminated if
plaintiff chose not to comply with the Vaccination Policy by December 31, 2021.
Compl. ¶ 64; Answer ¶ 64. Plaintiff’s direct supervisor, Steven McNickle, also
participated in the December 3, 2021 call. Compl. ¶ 67; Answer ¶ 67.

On December 6, 2021, Albrecht sent plaintiff an email in which he stated that
the decision to deny the accommodation request “is final.” Compl. ¶ 74; id., Ex. 13;
Answer ¶ 74. Defendant terminated plaintiff’s position in December 2021.1 See Pl.
Br. at 5; Def. Br. at 8. Plaintiff filed and was approved for disability benefits after
her termination. Compl. ¶ 83; Answer ¶ 83.

On June 1, 2022, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging religious
discrimination, race discrimination and retaliation. Compl. ¶ 97; id., Ex. 19;
Answer ¶ 97. Defendant submitted a position statement to the EEOC in which it
denied each of plaintiff’s allegations. Compl. ¶ 98; id., Ex. 6; Answer ¶ 98.
On March 29, 2023, the EEOC determined that “there is a reasonable cause

to conclude that [Defendant] violated Title VII by failing to grant [Plaintiff’s]
religious accommodation request and by discharging her based on her religion.”
Compl. ¶ 102 (alterations in original) (quoting id., Ex. 21 at 2); Answer ¶ 102. The
EEOC stated that “the evidence obtained during the investigation was insufficient
to establish a Title VII violation for racial discrimination or retaliation. This does
not, however, certify that [defendant] is in compliance with Title VII with respect to
[plaintiff’s] race and retaliation allegations.” Compl. ¶ 102 (quoting id., Ex. 21 at 2-

3); Answer ¶ 102. The EEOC then offered that the parties discuss settlement

1 Parties dispute the actual date on which defendant terminated plaintiff’s
employment. Compare Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl. Br.”) at
5 (“[Plaintiff] was . . . wrongfully terminated on Monday, December 6, 2021.”), ECF
No. 51, with Def. Br. at 8 (“[Plaintiff] was placed on administrative leave, effective
December 6, 2021, and her employment terminated on December 31, 2021.”). The
resolution of this dispute is not essential to the court’s decision. See infra
Discussion Sections I-III. For that reason, it suffices to state that parties agree that
the termination occurred in the month of December 2021.
options, but defendant refused to participate in any conciliation process. Compl. ¶
107; Answer ¶ 107.
On April 19, 2023, the EEOC terminated its conciliation efforts and

determined that it would not bring a lawsuit against defendant. Compl. ¶ 110; id.,
Ex. 21 at 4; Answer ¶ 110.
III. Procedural history

On July 18, 2023, plaintiff filed her complaint. Compl. On January 24, 2025,
defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Def. Mot; Def.
Br. On June 12, 2025, this Court heard oral argument. Oral Arg. Tr., ECF No. 64.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
FRCP 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Jones v.
Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir. 2016).
“[T]he dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine[]’ . . . if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Factual disputes that are irrelevant
or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, a fact is “material” if it “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.
Courts are “required to view the facts and all justifiable inferences arising
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Libertarian Party of
Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2013). To defeat a summary judgment

motion, the nonmoving party is required to point to “particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). “Under this standard, ‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence’
is insufficient to withstand an adequately supported summary judgment motion.”

Giles v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 59 F.4th 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2023) (alteration in
original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
Finally, “conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to
preclude granting [a] summary judgment motion.” Wai Man Tom v. Hosp. Ventures
LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020).
DISCUSSION

I. Religious discrimination claims

A. Failure to accommodate

1. Legal framework

Pursuant to Title VII, it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
“As originally enacted, Title VII did not spell out what it meant by
discrimination ‘because of . . . religion,’ but shortly after the statute's passage, the
EEOC interpreted that provision to mean that employers were sometimes required

to ‘accommodate’ the ‘reasonable religious needs of employees.’” Groff v. DeJoy, 600
U.S. 447, 457 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2)). The
statute defines “religion” to “include[] all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's

business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”) has set
out the following framework for analyzing religious accommodation claims:
To establish a prima facie religious accommodation claim, a plaintiff
must establish that: “(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that
conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the
employer of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply
with the conflicting employment requirement.”

Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985));
EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 2008).
2. Analysis

It is undisputed that plaintiff has established the second and third elements
of her prima facie religious accommodation claim: plaintiff “informed” defendant of
her belief regarding the COVID-19 vaccine and was terminated “for failure to
comply with the conflicting” Vaccination Policy. See Def. Br. at 6-8, 16; Pl. Br. at 4-
5; Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019. Parties agree also that plaintiff is a religious person
with sincere religious beliefs. See Pl. Br. at 18 (“Plaintiff is a religious person with

bona fide religious beliefs.”); Def. Reply Br. at 7 (acknowledging that “[plaintiff] is
certainly religious and holds religious beliefs” but arguing that “those beliefs did not
require her to object to the COVID-19 vaccine”).
As a result, the court is left to consider whether plaintiff’s specific belief
regarding the COVID-19 vaccine is “a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with
an employment requirement.” Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019. The court concludes

that it is not.
a. Sincerity

“To qualify for Title VII protection, a plaintiff must show her professed belief
is (1) sincerely held and (2) religious in nature.” Barnett v. Inova Health Care
Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 470 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 185 (1965)).
The sincerity prong “seeks to determine an adherent's good faith in the
expression of [her] religious belief and provides a rational means of differentiating
between those beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are
animated by motives of deception and fraud.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir.
1984)); Chinnery v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., No. 24-
1697, 2025 WL 1733959, at *2 (4th Cir. June 23, 2025).
The Fourth Circuit has stated that “the inquiry into sincerity is ‘almost
exclusively a credibility assessment’ and ‘can rarely be determined on summary
judgment, let alone a motion to dismiss.’” Barnett, 125 F.4th at 470 (quoting Kay v.

Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007)). Even so, courts will evaluate
sincerity on summary judgment where there is “no evidence to suggest” that a
plaintiff’s beliefs are “fraudulent, concocted for litigation, or otherwise not sincerely
held.” Leonhartt v. MedStar Health, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-01211-JRR, 2025 WL
744077, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2025); see also Ellison v. Inova Health Care Servs.,
692 F. Supp. 3d 548, 557 (E.D. Va. 2023) (stating that alleged religious beliefs are

sincere where “there is no evidence introduced . . . that suggests that the beliefs
have been concocted for litigation or are otherwise disingenuous”).
Plaintiff asks the court to follow Barnett and argues that “there is a vast
amount of evidence about what Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are, and picking it apart
at this stage, as Defendant has done in its Motion for Summary Judgment is
improper.” Pl. Br. at 20. Plaintiff insists that the sincerity inquiry “must be done
by a jury” and that “the validity of Plaintiff’s beliefs should not be decided at the

summary judgment stage and should proceed to trial.” Id. at 20-21.
Defendant does not challenge expressly the sincerity of plaintiff’s beliefs with
respect to the COVID-19 vaccine. Instead, defendant argues that plaintiff fails to
establish her prima facie claim because the beliefs that prohibited her from
becoming vaccinated against COVID-19 are “personal in nature.” Def. Br. at 15. In
any event, the court concludes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to
the sincerity of plaintiff’s beliefs.
The complaint states that plaintiff “rejects the use of vaccines generally, and

the COVID-19 vaccines specifically; and . . . believes that the Bible supports her
religious belief that she should abstain from the COVID-19 vaccines.” Compl. ¶ 32c-
d. Plaintiff asserted in her accommodation request, inter alia:
With all due respect, the authority and command that I honor and obey
is the Bible and that authority is derived from GOD – my LORD. . . .
Through my personal relationship, I give praise, honor and glory to the
Savior of my soul first and foremost. I don’t smoke, drink alcohol and
even have a strict diet watching sugar intake, gluten and any other
altered additives that may harm my body – my Temple. . . . I am a non
perfect humble Christian but the substances (i.e., experimental tech to
precious fetus/human samples etc) in these Covid 19 injections prevent
me from getting any Covid-19 vaccination due to my closely held
religious beliefs.

Id., Ex. 8 at 3.
It is undisputed that plaintiff received one dose of the Hepatitis A
vaccine as an adult. Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 1 at 145:19-147:8; Def. Br. at 7;
Pl. Br. at 5 n.1. Plaintiff explained that she received the Hepatitis A vaccine
after her exposure to blood contamination at a restaurant. Wilkins-Bailey
Tr., Day 1 at 145:24-146:6; Pl. Br. at 5 n.1. Plaintiff expressed that her
religious beliefs led her to feel apprehensive before she received the one dose.
See Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 1 at 146:7-25 (“[I]t was a long line of people and I
kept saying to my husband, dear, you know how I feel and I don’t think and
he said, well, let’s get up there and see what they say.”); id. (“I say prayers, I
don’t care who hears, who knows. Stood in line, said my prayers and I went
ahead and I took one dose.”). When asked the reason that plaintiff did not
receive a second shot to complete the full dose of the Hepatitis A vaccine, she
stated that she “felt like [her] body was fine, [and she] didn’t have to put

anything else in [her] temple.” Id. at 147:1-4.
In addition, plaintiff has never received a flu vaccine because she does
not believe that she “need[s] it.” Def. Br., Ex. D (“Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 2”)
at 87:7-88:24. Plaintiff stated: “It’s just a thing that I don’t like putting
anything in my body. It just – it’s backwards thinking to me.” Id. at 88:25-
89:4.

Given plaintiff’s longstanding and undisputed apprehension around
vaccines, the court is unable to conclude that plaintiff’s vaccine-related
statements in her accommodation request were “animated by motives of
deception and fraud.” Barnett, 125 F.4th at 470. The fact that plaintiff took
a single dose of a Hepatitis A vaccine does not undermine the sincerity of her
vaccine-related beliefs, especially where plaintiff made that decision
fearfully. To that end, there is nothing to suggest that plaintiff’s beliefs are

“fraudulent, concocted for litigation, or otherwise not sincerely held.”
Leonhartt, 2025 WL 744077, at *7. Plaintiff’s religious accommodation claim
meets the sincerity prong.
b. Religious in nature

“The second prong, religious in nature, limits the factfinder's inquiry to a
determination whether the beliefs professed are, in the claimant's own scheme of
things, religious.” Barnett, 125 F.4th at 470 (cleaned up) (quoting Patrick, 745 F.2d
at 157-158); Chinnery, 2025 WL 1733959, at *2. For this inquiry, “the claim of the
adherent that her belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great

weight.” Barnett, 125 F.4th at 470 (quoting Patrick, 745 F.2d at 158); Chinnery,
2025 WL 1733959, at *2.
The EEOC has defined religious beliefs “to include moral or ethical beliefs as
to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional
religious views.” 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (citing Seeger, 380 U.S. 163; Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)). And the Fourth Circuit has stated that the beliefs in

question must be “plausibly connected with [plaintiff’s] refusal to receive the
COVID-19 vaccine.” Barnett, 125 F.4th at 471 (citing Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic,
Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 900-903 (8th Cir. 2024)); accord Sturgill v. Am. Red
Cross, 114 F.4th 803, 808-811 (6th Cir. 2024).
Finally, a “genuine issue of material fact is not created where the only issue
of fact is to determine which of the two conflicting versions of the plaintiff's
testimony is correct.” Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984);

Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab’ys, Inc., 916 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990).
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s “reasons for objecting to the COVID-19
vaccine are personal and secular.” Def. Reply Br. at 7. Defendant explains that
plaintiff “has religious beliefs and secular beliefs; her secular beliefs, and not her
religious beliefs, led her to forgo vaccination.” Id. Defendant asserts that “[d]espite
[plaintiff’s] claim, ‘a reputation of being a woman of faith and a religious person’ is
not the same as a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment
requirement.” Id. (quoting Pl. Br. at 18).
According to the complaint, plaintiff “follows[] and . . . tries to adhere to the

principles of the Bible.” Compl. ¶ 32a. And plaintiff described the allegedly
religious reasons for her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine in her accommodation
request. See Compl., Ex. 8 at 3; see also supra Section I.A.2.a. Plaintiff’s two main
reasons may be categorized as (1) abortion-related reasons; and (2) body-as-a-
temple reasons. The court will address first plaintiff’s abortion-related reasons for
her rejection of the COVID-19 vaccine.

Plaintiff stated that she heard colleagues allege that the COVID-19 vaccines
contained experimental technology and fetus samples. See, e.g., Wilkins-Bailey Tr.,
Day 1 at 200:5-12 (“I worked with colleagues that are medical professionals that
worked around hospitals and doctors and sold doctors devices and products in the
medical field and some of them that I work with, a lot of them I took to heart what
they said.”); id. at 200:17-21 (“I trusted in my fellow colleagues, especially upper
echelon that were higher ups than me that would voice their opinions in chats or

private text, group texts, chats, whatever.”); id 201:5-13 (“I think [the reference to
experimental technology] was something that I wrote because it was someone, as I
said, someone I regarded and respected at Essity that I know in my heart believe
would not lie . . . .”).
However, plaintiff later conceded that her objection was not based on the
purported presence of fetus samples in the vaccines. See id. at 201:23-203-6.
Plaintiff testified that her “mind was already made up” to not take the vaccine
before she learned of her colleagues’ abortion-related objections to it. Id. at 202:6-
14.

Accordingly, the undisputed facts demonstrate that plaintiff did not object in
actuality to the vaccine on the grounds of “precious fetus/human samples.” Compl.,
Ex. 8 at 3. For that reason, such grounds cannot demonstrate that plaintiff’s beliefs
are religious in nature. Cf. Leonhartt, 2025 WL 744077, at *7 (concluding that
plaintiff’s objections against the COVID-19 vaccine were religious in nature because
her detailed affirmation of her anti-abortion beliefs, “in conjunction with her

citation of her Church’s guidance regarding the morality of receiving the COVID-19
vaccine” and a letter from her priest, “demonstrate[d] the religious nature of her
opposition to the vaccine mandate”); Davis v. Reliance Test & Tech., LLC, No. CV
DKC 22-1760, 2025 WL 266664, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2025) (concluding that a
plaintiff's assertion in his religious accommodation request that he is a “baptized
Catholic Christian,” and that he must “refuse the use of medical products including
certain vaccines and gene therapy, that are produced using human cell lines derived

from direct abortions” was sufficient evidence that his professed beliefs were
religious in nature). The court will address next plaintiff’s body-as-a-temple
reasons for her rejection of the vaccine.2 See Compl. ¶ 32b.

2 Plaintiff cites the following Bible verse in her accommodation request: “Or do you
not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have
from God? You are not your own, for you were bought with a price. So glorify God
in your body.” 1 Cor. 6:19-20; see Compl., Ex. 8 at 3.
When asked whether plaintiff would consider taking the flu vaccine in light
of her pre-existing medical conditions, plaintiff stated:
So I don't look at it in terms of doctors throwing it in my face, I need to
take it. I have to examine and research and understand what it is that
they're trying to make me administer into my body. And my body is my
temple.

Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 2 at 87:24-88:3. Plaintiff later stated:
If I don't feel like it's something that God wants me to impose on myself,
in myself, my temple, that's it. That's all it takes. . . . I don't know what
all the vaccines causes. This is my temple. And until God pricks my
spirit to think otherwise, I have not – I don't see why I would take
something that's poisonous in my mind and put it in my body. And
anything poisonous to me in terms of man made products, I have to –
it's not natural. That's how I feel.

Id. at 141:11-14, 143:19-25.
As mentioned above, plaintiff has identified religiously as a Jehovah’s
Witness, a follower of the Nation of Islam and a Christian. Compl. ¶ 8. It is
undisputed that the Nation of Islam discourages its followers from receiving
vaccinations. See id., Ex. 9. However, the following exchange occurred in the
deposition of plaintiff:
Q: So P15 is an article in which it states that Jehovah’s Witnesses
are not opposed to COVID-19 vaccination, correct?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: And it says that Jehovah’s Witnesses believe that whether to get
vaccinated is a personal decision for each Christian to make?

A: There you go. It’s a personal decision.

Q: Is that your belief as well?
A: Absolutely.

Q: So none of your religious beliefs require you to object to COVID
vaccination; is that right?

A: Nor does it require me to accept it.

Q: Right. So it’s up to you as an individual to make that decision?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 1 at 157:21-158:11.
In Foshee v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, No. CV SAG-23-00894, 2023 WL
6845425 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2023), a court in this circuit explained that “beliefs
amounting to a declaration that an employee has the right to make unilateral
decisions do not constitute religious beliefs, even where religion is expressly invoked
in communicating the beliefs.” Id. at *4; see also Bodtker v. Wal-Mart Inc., No. 1:21-
CV-00213-MR-WCM, 2024 WL 3240658, at *6 (W.D.N.C. June 27, 2024).
And in Ellison, another court in this circuit considered specifically a
plaintiff’s claims that “as a Christian, he has a right to refuse the [COVID-19]
vaccine” because “the Bible requires Christians to treat their bodies as ‘temple[s] of
the Holy Spirit,’ meaning that he is ‘compel[ed]’ to care for his mind and body.” 692
F. Supp. 3d at 558 (second and third alterations in original). The Court concluded
that “though couched in religious terms, Ellison refused the vaccines based on
concerns of vaccine safety.” Id. The Court noted that the plaintiff supported his
claims “through references to his ‘personal analyses’ of CDC and FDA databases
that he believe[d] prove” the harmfulness of the vaccine. Id. For that reason, the
Court dismissed the plaintiff’s “body-as-a-temple claims.” Id.
The instant case is analogous. Plaintiff did not offer personal analyses of
data, but her claims are nonetheless “based on concerns of vaccine safety” even if
they are “couched in religious terms.” Id. In her accommodation request, plaintiff

expressed concern over “experimental tech . . . in the[] Covid 19 injections.” Compl.,
Ex. 8 at 3. Moreover, plaintiff has demonstrated a general preference for natural
remedies over “man made medicines.” See Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 2 at 35:23-36:1;
id. at 36:8-11 (noting that she selected a physician after learning that “their method
is to exhaust always naturally and then try to bring in man made products,
different things like that, medicines”); id. at 143:19-25 (“I don't know what all the

vaccines causes. This is my temple. And until God pricks my spirit to think
otherwise, I have not – I don't see why I would take something that's poisonous in
my mind and put it in my body. And anything poisonous to me in terms of man
made products, I have to – it's not natural.”).
As discussed, plaintiff concedes that none of her religious beliefs requires her
to object to the COVID-19 vaccine. See Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 1 at 157:21-158:11.
It is insufficient for the purposes of the prima facie claim to say that, on the other

hand, none of her beliefs “require[s] [her] to accept” the vaccine either. Id.
(emphasis supplied). The point is that plaintiff’s vaccine-related beliefs do not go to
“an essential part of a religious faith” and are thereby not religious in nature.
Barnett, 125 F.4th at 470.
Accordingly, plaintiff has not established her prime facie failure to
accommodate claim. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to
this point.

B. Disparate impact

In its opening brief, defendant argues that plaintiff’s “religious
discrimination disparate treatment claim (to the extent she brings one) also fails.”
See Def. Br. at 20-22.
Plaintiff does not address defendant’s arguments regarding a potential
disparate treatment claim. See Pl. Br. at 17 (“Defendant is not entitled to Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim under Title VII because
Wilkins-Bailey has established a prima-facie [sic] claim for failure to accommodate.”
(emphasis supplied)).
The Fourth Circuit has affirmed that “[a]gainst . . . well-reasoned arguments
for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s failure to respond amounts to an effective
waiver of [those] claims.” Jimoh v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hous. P’ship, Inc., No.

3:08-CV-495-RJC-DCK, 2010 WL 1924480, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 12,
2010), aff'd, 428 F. App’x 241 (4th Cir. 2011); accord Brand v. N.C. Dept. of Crim.
Control and Pub. Safety, 352 F. Supp. 2d 606, 618 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (concluding that
“[b]y failing to respond, Plaintiff concedes that he has not stated a hostile work
environment claim”).
For that reason, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to
any religious disparate treatment claim that plaintiff may have brought.
II. Race discrimination claims

A. Legal framework

Pursuant to Title VII, it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Pursuant to Section 1981, “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts.” Id. § 1981(a). And because the “at-will employment relationship is
contractual . . . such relationship may therefore serve as predicate contracts for §
1981 claims.” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (4th Cir.
1999).
The Fourth Circuit has clarified that the elements of race discrimination
claims brought under Title VII and Section 1981 “are effectively the same” and
should be reviewed together. Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208,

219 (4th Cir. 2016); Krehbiel v. BrightKey, Inc., No. 22-1385, 2023 WL 7984747, at
*1 n.* (4th Cir. Nov. 17, 2023). At the summary judgment stage, race
discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII and Section 1981 are evaluated
under the three-step, burden-shifting framework set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Haynes v.
Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019).
The first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires that the plaintiff
establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. Id.; Wannamaker-Amos v.
Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244, 255 (4th Cir. 2025). To establish a prima facie race

discrimination claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) membership in a protected
class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4)
different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”
Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
Second, if a plaintiff establishes her prima facie claim, then the burden shifts
to the employer “to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action.” Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223. Third, if the employer “meets th[e]
burden of production, the employee must then demonstrate that the defendant’s
proffered reason is pretextual.” Id.
B. Analysis

It is undisputed that plaintiff has established three of the four elements of a
prima facie race discrimination claim. Plaintiff, as a Black woman, holds
“membership in a protected class.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a). Defendant disputes that plaintiff was an “exemplary employee,” Compl. ¶ 15;
Answer ¶ 15, but does not dispute that plaintiff “was promoted, received yearly
merit increases and bonuses, and was recognized at times for her work
performance.” Compl. ¶ 15; Answer ¶ 15. For that reason, plaintiff has
demonstrated “satisfactory job performance” such that the second element of her
prima face claim is met. Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190. Parties agree also that plaintiff
was subject to an “adverse employment action” in the form of her separation from
defendant in December 2021. Def. Br. at 8; Pl. Br. at 5.
Accordingly, the remaining question before the court is whether plaintiff

received “different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the
protected class.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190. The court concludes that plaintiff did
not.
1. Margaret Hilborn as comparator

A plaintiff can establish the fourth element of her prima facie race
discrimination claim by demonstrating that “comparators,” similarly situated
employees who are not members of the protected class, were treated differently. See
Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff identifies Margaret Hilborn as a comparator for her race
discrimination claim. See Compl. ¶¶ 48-58; Pl. Br. at 9-14. Hilborn, a white
woman, is a former employee of defendant who worked in the rebates department of
Essity. Compl. ¶ 48; Def. Br., Ex. E (“Hilborn Tr.”) at 21:1-10. Hilborn objected to

the Vaccination Policy and decided to retire instead of seeking a religious
accommodation. Id. at 64:17-73:25, 83-85. Defendant later asked Hilborn to
continue at Essity past December 31, 2021, as an independent contractor. Id. at
92:21-97:9. Hilborn worked as an independent contractor until April 2022. Id. at
53:16-22, 96:18-97:9. At no point did she become vaccinated. Id. at 69. Defendant
did not offer a similar independent contractor arrangement to plaintiff. Id. at 150-
151.
The Fourth Circuit has stated that “plaintiffs are required to show that they
are similar in all relevant respects to their comparator.” Haywood, 387 F. App’x at
359; Spencer v. Va. State Univ., 919 F.3d 199, 207-208 (4th Cir. 2019). In making

this determination, courts in this circuit typically consider “whether the employees
(i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were
subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education,
and other qualifications—provided the employer considered these latter factors in
making the personnel decision.” Spencer, 919 F.3d at 207 (quoting Bio v. Fed.
Express Corp., 424 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Thomas v. City of

Annapolis, Md., 851 F. App’x 341, 347 (4th Cir. 2021).
However, in a situation such as this one, the sole “relevant” factor in making
the comparator determination is whether the plaintiff and her proposed comparator
submitted religious accommodation requests. It is not clear that the job
descriptions, supervisory structure or qualifications of two employees have any
bearing on whether their employer applied a company-wide vaccination policy
consistently.

Hilborn, unlike plaintiff, did not seek a religious accommodation from
defendant. See Compl. ¶ 52. She decided to retire instead. See Hilborn Tr. at 65-
66, 71-72. The two individuals differ on the sole “relevant respect[]” on which they
should be compared. Haywood, 387 F. App’x at 359. For that reason, plaintiff has
not established Hilborn as a valid comparator for her prima facie race
discrimination claim.
2. Other white employees

Plaintiff argues also that defendant approved the accommodation requests of
“several of [plaintiff’s] white colleagues who expressed the same logic to support
their sincerely held religious beliefs.” Pl. Br. at 14. The identities of the other
white employees are unknown, as are their job descriptions and backgrounds.
Regardless, plaintiff and the other white employees are similarly situated in that
they sought religious accommodation requests at the same time and through the
same administrative process. See supra Section II.B.1.
Assuming arguendo that the other white employees are valid comparators,

defendant’s varying treatment of the white employees’ requests indicates that
plaintiff did not receive “different treatment from similarly situated employees
outside the protected class” that would establish the fourth element. Coleman, 626
F.3d at 190.
To start, plaintiff insists that the approved accommodation requests resemble
her denied request in six ways:

[B]oth Wilkins-Bailey and these white employees of faith express (1)
their body is their temple which prevents them from putting substances
into it, altering it, or modifying it; (2) recognizing their body’s natural
immune system and respecting it the way God made it as not to alter it;
(3) recognizing their conscious [sic] and following the “holy bible and
holy spirit”; (4) expressed concerns about taking the COVID-19 vaccine
because of the usage of aborted fetal cells in the testing and production
of the vaccines which was against their religious beliefs; (5) expressed
their willingness to get tested frequently and ability to work remotely
as an alternative to being vaccinated; and (6) indicated they had not
taken any vaccines either ever or in their adult lives.

Pl. Br. at 15 (citing id., Ex. E).
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s “cherry-picked sample” of religious
accommodation requests “does not contain any evidence that Essity treated
her less favorably than white comparators because each of the

accommodation requests that Wilkins-Bailey attached to her Response is
distinguishable.” Def. Reply Br. at 3-4. Defendant notes that “[s]everal of
the white employees whose accommodation requests Essity denied also
referenced fetal cells in their requests, just as Wilkins-Bailey did.” Id. at 6.
Of the granted accommodation requests that plaintiff attaches, several
provide more detail than plaintiff’s request as to the connection between the

employee’s religious beliefs and specific objections.3 However, other granted
requests contain statements that offer the same level of depth as plaintiff’s
statements. See, e.g., Pl. Br., Ex. E at 9 (“[M]y conscience does not permit me

3 See, e.g., Pl. Br., Ex. E at 15 (“My religion is Greek-Melkite Catholic, and we do not
support or believe in abortion as well as birth control. . . . I have found that the
production of said vaccines have used fetal cell lines of aborted fetus's in the testing
and production phases. This is where my sincerely held religious belief's come into
play as I have a strong stance against abortion as I believe that all human life is
sacred and begins at the moment of conception.”); id. at 21, 23 (stating that “there
are components within the vaccine ‘Aborted human fetal tissue’ that goes against
everything I believe in and I cannot and will not disobey the Lord” and attaching a
letter of support from their pastor); id. at 34, 36 (“All three covid-19 vaccines use
cell lines originating from aborted babies in their manufacturing and testing. As a
Christian, I believe life begins at conception. . . . The covid-19 vaccines were
developed and tested using cell lines that were generated from tissues of aborted
fetuses. J&J used aborted fetal cell lines in its manufacturing. Moderna and Pfizer
used aborted fetal cell lines in the testing of their vaccines.”); id. at 40 (“I have
strong convictions concerning abortion. Fetal cells were used in the making and
testing of the Covid-19 vaccines. Passages from the Bible - including Exodus 21:22-
25, Psalm 139:13-16, Jeremiah 1:4-5 and Luke 1:39-45, all affirm the personhood of
the unborn. I believe that receiving the Covid-19 vaccine would be a violation of my
conscience and supports the killing of unborn children in the womb.”).
to undergo certain medical interventions. Specifically, I cannot violate my
conscience to participate in an activity, such as COVID-19 vaccination, that is
designed to alter my God-created immune system.”). One white employee

who was granted an accommodation stated the following:
I do not believe in vaccines and I put my faith in God and that he will
protect me. . . . I have declined every vaccine. I have never actively set
out to obtain a vaccine in my adult life. Approximately 20 years ago I
had a rusty nail through my foot. My doctor whom I trusted advised I
get a Tetanus shot which I never believed to be a vaccine rather a reactive
treatment. My doctor is aware that I was infected with COVID-19 in
2021 and aware of my positive antibody test and supported my
belief/reason for declining the COVID-19 vaccine.

Id. at 28-30 (emphasis supplied). This individual’s experience receiving a
Tetanus shot in extenuating circumstances resembles plaintiff’s experience
receiving the Hepatitis A vaccine after her exposure to blood contamination.
See Wilkins-Bailey Tr., Day 1 at 145:19-147:8.
Defendant argues that “[i]n contrast to [plaintiff’s] cursory, inaccurate
suggestion that COVID-19 vaccines contain ‘fetus/human samples’ and
‘experimental tech,’ the language from the requests that Essity approved
made clear (1) that the employees submitting them are anti-abortion because
of their religious beliefs, (2) the vaccines were developed and/or manufactured
using cells from an aborted fetus, and therefore, (3) receiving the vaccine
violated their anti-abortion beliefs.” Def. Reply Br. at 5-6. But such qualities
are reflected also in certain requests of white employees that defendant
denied.4
The sample of accommodation requests before the court indicates that

white employees who offered substantially similar explanations with respect
to abortion-related and body-as-a-temple beliefs had their requests granted in
some cases and denied in others. This set of results may demonstrate a lack
of disciplinary consistency on the part of defendant, but it does not
demonstrate a preference for white employees over Black employees with
respect to religious accommodation requests. For that reason, plaintiff does

not establish that plaintiff received “different treatment from similarly
situated employees outside the protected class” for the purposes of her prima
facie race discrimination claim. Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190.
Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as
to the race discrimination claim.

4 See, e.g., Def. Reply Br., Ex. G, Ex. 1 at 9 (“I am . . . anti-abortion and any product
that was created either during the research and development phase or otherwise
which uses fetal tissue is in direct conflict with my sincere faith. The COVID 19
vaccines violate this belief as well.”); id. at 15 (“As a Christian I strongly oppose
abortion. Based on my extensive research on the Covid-19 vaccine to make an
informed decision, I could not overlook that fetal cell lines were used in the testing
and production phases of this vaccine. . . . I believe that life begins at conception
and the thought of putting something into my body that stems from an aborted
fetus goes against everything that I believe.”); id. at 39 (“All of the vaccines have
used aborted fetal cell lines in the development of the vaccine. The Bible clearly
states that human life begins at conception, Psalm 139:13-16 and consequently any
baby that is aborted is murder based on scripture.”).
III. Retaliation claims

Plaintiff brings various retaliation claims in her complaint. See Compl. ¶¶
111-134. But in her response brief, plaintiff does not address defendant’s
arguments regarding the alleged retaliation. See Pl. Br. Plaintiff’s silence
constitutes a waiver of these claims. 5 See Jimoh, 2010 WL 1924480, at *3 (“Against
. . . well-reasoned arguments for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s failure to
respond amounts to an effective waiver of [those] claims.”). Accordingly,
defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to all retaliation claims in
the complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motion
at ECF No. 46.

/s/ Timothy M. Reif
Dated: July 24, 2025 Timothy M. Reif, Judge
New York, New York United States Court of International Trade
Sitting by Designation
United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina

5 Plaintiff conceded to the waiver at oral argument. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 73:6-14.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11109631. Public record. Not legal advice.