# Coones v. Cogburn

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · July 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107829

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** July 25, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Prisoner w/ Counsel
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107829

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that plaintiff drank two cups of Gatorade at lunch and ate part of his meal and collapsed shortly afterward

## Opinion text

Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit

FILED
No. 24-10777 July 25, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Cynthia Coones, Individually, and as Surviving Parent and
Representative of the Estate of Jace Coones, Deceased,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Beverly Cogburn, Registered Nurse; Christi Baker, Licensed
Vocational Nurse; Edmundo Cueto, Warden; Jodi Hefner;
Regional Director of TDCJ Region V, In August 2020;
Bryan Collier; Mitchell County Hospital District;
Texas Tech University; Mitchell County, Texas;
Security Supervisor; John Does, Guards and Medical Staff;
Christine M. Heady, Registered Nurse; Jennifer A. Aguilar,
Licensed Vocational Nurse; Olivia Herrera, Registered Nurse; Susan
Boedeker, Licensed Vocational Nurse; Brad R. Baker, Medical
Doctor; Chad R. Morris; State of Texas; Texas
Department of Criminal Justice; FNU LNU, Security
Supervisor on duty at 16:51 on 8/28/2022,

Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:22-CV-90
______________________________

Before Stewart, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

Per Curiam: *
The subject of this appeal has long been familiar in the Fifth Circuit—
the deadly impact of the Texas heat on inmates. Jace Coones died in a Texas
prison due to excessive heat exposure. The district court dismissed the suit
for failure to state a claim. As the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged,
inmates have a right to be free from excessive heat. Accordingly, we
REVERSE in part, AFFIRM in part, and REMAND.
I. Background 1
Summers are fatal for many Texas inmates. Statewide, there have
been as many as 271 heat deaths in Texas prisons between 2001 and 2019—
30 times the national average. As summers continue to get hotter, the
problem continues to get worse. However, many Texas prisoners continue
to suffer the extreme heat without remedial measures such as air conditioning
or fans.
Coones was a prisoner in the custody of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) in Colorado City. He suffered from allergies
and asthma, both of which make it difficult to breathe, rendering him
especially susceptible to the stresses of extreme heat.
Like many cells in Texas, Coones’s cell did not have air conditioning.
In the summer, many parts of his unit reached temperatures in the 90s and
100s throughout the day. The unit did not use fans, ice water, or daily
showers to combat the heat.
The events in question took place in August 2020. Coones sought
medical care throughout the month. Coones visited Mitchell County

_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
1
This appeal comes to us on a motion to dismiss, so we accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true and resolve all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

2
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

Hospital twice in early August, including a two-night stay for dehydration
from excessive heat.
On August 28, 2020, the temperature in Colorado City was over 100
degrees for more than seven hours, reaching a high of 106 degrees. Coones’s
cell was as hot or hotter than outside. That afternoon, Coones visited the
medical unit. He complained to Registered Nurse Beverly Cogburn that his
cell was too hot, he needed to cool off, and he wanted a shower.
Cogburn took his pulse and respiration rate. Coones’s resting pulse
was 103, and his respiration rate was 98 breaths per minute—much higher
than his typical pulse of 80 and respiration rate of 18. Cogburn noted that
Coones’s skin was warm and dry; a typical response to the heat would be to
sweat, which helps cool the body, but Coones’s dry skin suggested he was
significantly dehydrated. Cogburn allowed Coones to rest on a gurney for an
unspecified amount of time. At some point, Cogburn told Coones to leave,
but he refused because he feared returning to his overheated cell given how
it had hurt him. Cogburn did not allow him to stay despite the medical issues
he was having and instead called security to return Coones to his cell.
On the morning of August 30, after another 100+-degree day,
Licensed Vocational Nurse Christi Baker saw Coones in his cell, “rolling
around on the floor naked” and unable to verbalize. She noted that Coones
was surrounded by four untouched trays of food. Baker did not provide any
medical treatment and merely “encouraged [Coones] to get up and get on
with his day.” 2

_____________________
2
The entirety of Baker’s medical note is as follows:
Offender is in his cell rolling around on the floor naked. Offender
is not verbalizing pain and no respiratory distress is noted. Offender does
not verbalize to nursing or security but does respond to verbal stimuli. The
offender has been offered food from meal service and there are 4 full trays
in the cell on the floor that has not been touched. This nurse encouraged
the offender to get up and get on with his day without response to

3
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

Coones was found dead in his cell the next morning. Rigor mortis with
mottling had set in, meaning that Coones had been dead for a significant
period. Coones had no food in his stomach, meaning he had not recently
eaten. His body weighed 24 pounds less than three days prior.
Plaintiff Cynthia Coones is the mother of Jace Coones. She asserts
Eighth Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
medical malpractice claims against three categories of defendants:
(1) Supervisory Defendants: Executive Director of TDCJ
Bryan Collier and Warden Jody Hefner.
(2) Care-Providing Defendants: RN Beverly Cogburn and
LVN Christi Baker, among other care providers. 3
(3) Entity Defendants: Mitchell County, Texas Tech
University, Mitchell County Hospital District, TDCJ, and Texas.
The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.
Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 2014). At
this early stage, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim when it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

_____________________
suggestions. Security was advised to let medical know if the offenders
condition worsens or changes in any way.
(Capitalization removed.)
3
The remaining Care-Providing Defendants include Christine M Heady, RN,
Olivia Herrera, RN; Jennifer A. Aguilar, LVN; Susan Boedeker, LVN; Brad R. Baker,
MD; and Chad R. Morris.

4
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

III. Discussion
A. Eighth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. To state an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff
must plausibly allege (1) a sufficiently serious deprivation of rights (2) carried
out with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Defendants assert that qualified immunity shields them from liability.
However, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity if the alleged
actions violated a right that was “clearly established” at the time of the
violation. Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001)).
We conclude that Plaintiff plausibly states a violation of clearly
established Eighth Amendment law against Executive Director of TDCJ
Bryan Collier, Warden Jodi Hefner, RN Beverly Cogburn, and LVN Christi
Baker. Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants fail.
1. Supervisory Defendants
Plaintiff alleges that Collier and Hefner violated the Eighth
Amendment by failing to maintain humane conditions. “[T]he Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane
ones.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 592 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Prison officials “must
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and must take reasonable measure to ensure the safety of the inmates.”
Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2004).
The first element of an Eighth Amendment claim—requiring a
sufficiently grave deprivation—is satisfied. “It is well-established in our

5
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

circuit that the Eighth Amendment guarantees inmates a right to be free from
exposure to extremely dangerous temperatures without adequate remedial
measures.” Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see Gates, 376 F.3d at 339–40
(affirming injunction directing prison to provide fans, ice water, and daily
showers when the heat index is 90 degrees or above); Smith v. Sullivan, 553
F.2d 373, 381 (5th Cir. 1977) (“If the proof shows the occurrence of extremes
of temperature that are likely to be injurious to inmates’ health[,] relief
should be granted . . . .”).
The second element is also satisfied—Defendants disregarded a
known substantial risk of serious harm “by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. We can infer that Defendants
knew of the risk, given its open and obvious nature—the brutality of the
Texas heat is well known, and Defendants would have been reminded of it
every time they stepped outside. See Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 667
(5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he open and obvious nature of the dangerously hot
conditions would also support an inference of deliberate indifference.”).
Although the open and obvious nature of the extreme heat is enough
to infer knowledge, this case presents more. There have been as many as 271
heat deaths in Texas prisons between 2001 and 2019. Supervisor Defendants
are also likely aware of the many lawsuits regarding the extreme heat in Texas
prisons. See Yates, 868 F.3d at 360 (“TDCJ officials are, or have been,
defendants in numerous other cases alleging Eighth Amendment violations
based on excessive heat in prison.”); Webb v. Livingston, 618 F. App’x 201,
204 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (considering case involving the “heat-
related deaths of five prisoners who died while housed in facilities operated
by [TDCJ]”); Valigura v. Mendoza, 265 F. App’x 232, 233–34 (5th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (deciding appeal involving prisoner who alleged that
“temperatures in the bunk area reached into the nineties and hundreds due
to poor ventilation”). Indeed, Collier and another TDCJ official testified in
previous litigation that summer temperatures in prisons are so high that

6
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

inmates are at serious risk of harm unless adequate measures are taken.
Order at 76–77, Tiede v. Collier, No. 1:23-CV-1004 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26,
2025), ECF No. 202. Despite this knowledge, Collier and Hefner did not
implement remedial measures for the heat. The second element is thus
satisfied at this stage.
We note that the district court dismissed this claim by pointing to
TDCJ policy to provide fans, ice water, and daily showers. See Enhanced
Heat Protocols, TDCJ, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/offender_
info/enhanced_heat_protocols.html [https://perma.cc/64F5-5QS7]. But
the mere presence of remedial measures is not a sufficient defense—remedial
measures must adequately ensure prisoners do not experience excessive heat
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Yates, 868 F.3d at 360; Blackmon
v. Garza, 484 F. App’x 866, 871 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that
despite remedial efforts by prison officials, inmates were still denied access
to adequate cooling measures). Regardless, neither the district court nor
Defendants indicate when TDCJ adopted the policy. If the policy did not
exist in August 2020, the policy is irrelevant to Coones’s case. The district
court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim at this stage, without further discovery,
was premature.
Further, Collier and Hefner are not entitled to qualified immunity.
We have repeatedly recognized that supervisory defendants’ failure to
provide adequate measures to remediate the Texas heat violates the Eighth
Amendment. E.g., Yates, 868 F.3d at 361. What’s more, in later stages of
litigation, “we have consistently found evidence sufficient in these cases to
support an Eighth Amendment violation, even when certain mitigating
measures were available.” Id. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim against Collier and Hefner.
2. Care-Providing Defendants
Plaintiff next alleges that Care-Providing Defendants violated
Coones’s Eighth Amendment rights. “A prison official violates the Eighth

7
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

Amendment when he shows deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs, which equates to the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.’” Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “A serious medical need is one for
which treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so apparent
that even laymen would recognize that care is required.” Gobert v. Caldwell,
463 F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006). “To prevail on a claim for deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff must show that a federal actor denied him
treatment, ignored his complaints, knowingly treated him incorrectly, or
otherwise evidenced a wanton disregard for his serious medical needs.”
Carlucci, 884 F.3d at 538.
We conclude that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Cogburn and
Baker committed a clearly established Eighth Amendment violation.
However, Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim as to the remaining Care-
Providing Defendants.
a. Beverly Cogburn
Plaintiff alleges that Cogburn was aware of the hot conditions and that
Coones did not have air conditioning. She also knew that Coones was not
sweating, he was taking 98 breaths per minute, and his pulse was 103—all of
which are signs of severe dehydration. Cogburn allowed Coones to rest on a
gurney, although we do not know how long he was allowed to rest. Cogburn
then called security to escort him back to his overheated cell despite
Coones’s obvious need (at least based on the facts alleged in the complaint at
this stage) for medical care. 4 Coones died less than three days later.
At this early stage of litigation, these facts state a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim. Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Cogburn was aware of the

_____________________
4
At this stage, based on the facts in the pleadings of how Cogburn acted, it is
arguable that her forcing him out despite his deep need to remain was much more than
negligent and knowingly and wantonly placed his life at risk.

8
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

excessive risks to Coones’s health and safety—Cogburn knew about
Coones’s medical conditions that made him more susceptible to the heat,
that Colorado City was experiencing a hot summer, and that Coones was
exhibiting classic signs of significant dehydration from exposure to excessive
heat. Cf. Huffman v. Linthicum, 265 F. App’x 162, 163 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (plaintiff alleging failure to treat tooth pain with dentures pleaded an
Eighth Amendment violation). As Plaintiff alleges, a nurse would know those
symptoms were signs of severe dehydration (especially when coupled with
Coones’s repeated complaints about the heat). These allegations give rise to
the inference that Cogburn subjectively knew that Coones faced a significant
risk of harm. See Ford v. Anderson County, 102 F.4th 292, 308 (5th Cir. 2024)
(per curiam) (explaining that basic knowledge of inmate’s condition gives
rise to such an inference).
Despite awareness of the excessive risk, Cogburn disregarded that risk
by failing to provide medical treatment other than allowing Coones to
temporarily rest on a gurney for some period of time. Although Coones was
scared to return to his cell and asked Cogburn to allow him further respite
from the heat or other remedial measures, Cogburn called a guard to take him
back to his cell. By denying him sufficient treatment despite repeated
complaints, Cogburn evidenced a wanton disregard for his needs, and thus,
at this point, Plaintiff established a plausible Eighth Amendment violation.
Several cases require our conclusion. In Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459
(5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), the plaintiff had a heart condition, was
experiencing severe chest pain, and did not have his prescribed medication.
Id. at 463. The defendant told him to go to the pharmacy. Id. at 463. The
pharmacy was closed, so the defendant sent the plaintiff back to his cell
without providing any treatment. Id. at 463–64. We concluded that the
plaintiff stated a clearly established Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 463–65.
Here, Cogburn sent Coones back to his cell with essentially no treatment,
despite Plaintiff’s plausible allegations that Cogburn knew the dire
consequences that could—and did—result from her inaction.

9
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

In Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003), we concluded that
a defendant’s two-hour delay in calling an ambulance after the plaintiff
became unconscious rose to the level of deliberate indifference. Id. at 210.
Because of “the serious medical consequences of dehydration, a reasonable
person would not have waited nearly two hours to call an ambulance.” Id.
We reached this conclusion even though defendants allowed the plaintiff to
cool off inside and provided first aid. Id. at 206. Similarly, Cogburn cannot
avoid liability because she allowed Coones to rest for some unspecified period
of time. See Ford, 102 F.4th at 308 n.7 (“Responding to a serious medical
issue with such a cursory level of care may still constitute deliberate
indifference.”); Lawson v. Dall. Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002)
(providing minimal treatment did not preclude an deliberate indifference
claim); Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999) (inadequate
medical care may rise to the level of deliberate indifference); Ledesma v.
Swartz, No. 97-10799, 134 F.3d 369, 1997 WL 811746, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 16,
1997) (per curiam) (unpublished) (treating broken jaw with only over-the-
counter pain medication and liquid diet could constitute deliberate
indifference); see also Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 789 (11th Cir. 1989)
(“When the need for treatment is obvious, medical care which is so cursory
as to amount to no treatment at all may amount to deliberate indifference.”).
Additionally, Cogburn sent Coones back to his cell, despite knowing that
Coones would experience extreme temperatures in his cell; this would be
akin to telling the Austin plaintiff suffering from heat stroke to go back outside
to continue experiencing the heat. In sum, based on our caselaw, Plaintiff
plausibly states an Eighth Amendment claim against Cogburn at this stage of
litigation.
Further, these cases described above demonstrate that Cogburn is not
entitled to qualified immunity at this early stage of the litigation. “Since
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), state officers have been on notice
that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the
Eighth Amendment.” Austin, 328 F.3d at 210. Cogburn’s decision to send

10
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

Coones back to his overheated cell while she knew he was experiencing
symptoms of dehydration and potential heat exhaustion was a violation of
clearly established law. Accordingly, Cogburn is not entitled to qualified
immunity.
b. Christi Baker
The allegations against Baker are quite shocking. Plaintiff alleges that
the day before Coones was found dead, Baker saw Coones rolling around on
the ground naked, unable to talk, and surrounded by four untouched trays of
food. Instead of providing medical treatment, Baker merely encouraged
Coones to get on with his day.
Based on the complaint, Baker plausibly knew of the risk—she knew
that the prison was experiencing a hot summer in a state known for annual
heat-related illnesses and deaths and that Coones was in medical distress at
the time of her visit. Based on the allegations, even a layperson would have
identified the danger Coones was in and recognized that Coones needed
immediate medical attention. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345 n.12 (explaining
that serious medical needs include those “for which the need is so apparent
that even laymen would recognize that care is required”). However, Baker
disregarded that risk and provided no treatment, and Coones died within a
day. Plaintiff thus states a plausible claim against Baker.
The above-discussed cases illuminate that Baker is not entitled to
qualified immunity. Just like in Easter, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Baker
knew of the inmate’s medical conditions and the severity of the inmate’s
symptoms yet refused to provide treatment. See 467 F.3d at 463. Further, in
Austin, the defendants at least provided first aid and eventually called an
ambulance. 328 F.3d at 206. Here, Baker did nothing—she did not call an
ambulance or provide any medical care, and it is reasonable to infer that she
never followed up on Coones. Baker could also tell that Coones had been
suffering a long time, given that there were four untouched trays of food
surrounding him. This also suggests that Coones’s heat-related illness was

11
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

more dire than the plaintiff’s in Austin. See 328 F.3d at 206 (noting that
plaintiff drank two cups of Gatorade at lunch and ate part of his meal and
collapsed shortly afterward).
Based on these cases, Baker is not entitled to qualified immunity at
this stage because her alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment is contrary
to clearly established law.
c. Remaining Care-Providing Defendants
Plaintiff alleges that Coones informed the remaining Care-Providing
Defendants that he was suffering from extreme heat, that Coones sought
medical care from these Defendants, but that these Defendants sent Coones
back to his cell. 5
As the district court held, these accusations are conclusory and
collective, and do not plausibly state an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff
does not allege facts regarding any specific interaction between Coones and
the remaining Care-Providing Defendants or whether they provided medical
attention. We therefore affirm as to the remaining Care-Providing
Defendants.

_____________________
5
The entirety of the factual allegations are as follows:
Christine M. Heady RN, Jennifer A. Aguilar L.V.N., Olivia
Herrera, R.N., Susan Boedeker L.V.N., Brad R. Baker M.D., and Chad R.
Morris all were aware of the extreme heat conditions at Wallace and that
Jace Coones was suffering from the heat as he had informed them and he
had presented several times complaining of the heat and showing symptom
of overheating to point of being dangerous to his life. Jace sought medical
care from each of these individual doctors and nurses, presented
increasingly worse and more worrying symptoms of the heat-induced
medical problems that ultimately resulted in his death, but was
consistently sent back into a cell that these Defendants knew was
overheated. The specific interactions between Jace and these Defendants
are unknowable at this time due to Jace’s death and Hefner’s refusal to
provide Jace’s medical records.

12
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

3. Entity Defendants
We also affirm dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim against the
Entity Defendants.
As to Mitchell County Hospital District, Plaintiff fails to allege any
facts that could support a claim against the Hospital. 6
As to Texas and Texas Tech, the district court correctly concluded
that these entities are not “persons” under § 1983, see Stotter v. Univ. of Tex.
at S.A., 508 F.3d 812, 821 (5th Cir. 2007), and Plaintiff fails to refute the
district court’s analysis on appeal, see Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25
(5th Cir. 1993) (an appellant “abandon[s] [her] arguments by failing to argue
them in the body of [her] brief.”).
Finally, as to Mitchell County, Plaintiff failed to plead factual
allegations against the County, and Plaintiff does not explain why the district
court’s decision is erroneous with respect to the County. See id.
We thus affirm as to Entity Defendants.
B. ADA Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Coones’s asthma and allergies made him
particularly susceptible to the extreme heat, and that Entity Defendants
failed to accommodate those disabilities. Under the ADA, “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Plaintiff states a failure-to-accommodate claim
if she alleges (1) Coones is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) the

_____________________
6
The only facts Plaintiff alleges are that “the nurses work by a contract between
TDCJ, Mitchell County Hospital District, and Texas Tech University,” and that Coones
visited Mitchell County Hospital on August 13, 2020. Plaintiff does not appear to allege
that anything went wrong during his hospital visit.

13
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

covered entity knew about the disability and its consequential limitations, and
(3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations. See Neely v. PSEG
Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 2013); Ball, 792 F.3d at 596 n.9.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the ADA claim based on
the second element. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the entities
“underst[ood] the limitations [Coones] experienced as a result of his
disability.” Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 290 (5th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff
has the burden of identifying “the disability, the limitation, and to request an
accommodation in direct and specific terms.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Although Coones complained of the heat, Coones did
not connect his complaints to his disabilities or to Entity Defendants.
Accordingly, we must affirm.
C. Medical Malpractice Claim
Finally, Plaintiff asserts a state law medical malpractice claim against
the individual Care-Providing Defendants. However, under the Texas Tort
Claims Act, “only a governmental unit can be sued for a governmental
employee’s work-related tortious conduct.” Garza v. Harrison, 574 S.W.3d
389, 393–94 (Tex. 2019). Because the Care-Providing Defendants are sued
here as government employees acting in their official capacities, the district
court properly dismissed them. See DeHorney v. Talley, 630 S.W.3d 297, 302
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the medical malpractice claim as to Care-Providing Defendants.
Plaintiff also asserts that Entity Defendants are also liable, but she
does not address the basis of the district court’s dismissal of Entity
Defendants.
Regarding Texas and Texas Tech, the district court concluded they
were entitled to sovereign immunity. “Absent waiver, neither a state nor
agencies acting under its control are subject to suit in federal court.”
Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1996). The Texas Tort

14
Case: 24-10777 Document: 92-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/25/2025

No. 24-10777

Claims Act waives sovereign immunity in state court, but not federal court.
Id. at 852.
The district court then dismissed the claim against Mitchell County
Hospital District because hospital districts are “governmental unit[s]
immune from suit under the TTCA,” and Plaintiff failed to plead waiver.
Aguocha-Ohakweh v. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 731 F. App’x 312, 316 (5th Cir.
2018) (per curiam) (citing Martinez v. Val Verde Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 140
S.W.3d 370, 371 (Tex. 2004)).
And finally, the district court dismissed the claim against Mitchell
County because Plaintiff failed to allege any facts indicating a valid waiver of
governmental immunity.
Plaintiff fails to identify any error in the district court’s dismissal of
Entity Defendants, and we cannot find one. We thus affirm dismissal of the
medical malpractice claim.
IV. Conclusion
We REVERSE and REMAND as to the Eighth Amendment claim
against Collier, Hefner, Cogburn, and Baker; with respect to all other claims,
we AFFIRM.

15

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107829. Public record. Not legal advice.