# Williams v. Hasenmyer

> District Court, E.D. Oklahoma · July 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107269

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** July 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

BLAKE WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-22-174-GLJ
)
HEATHER HASENMYER, individually, )
)
Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s incarceration at the Jess Dunn Correctional Center
in Taft, Oklahoma. Plaintiff Blake Williams alleges cruel and unusual punishment arising
out of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
remaining Defendant, Heather Hasenmyer, seeks summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendant Hasenmyer’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 80] is hereby GRANTED.
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this case on June 8, 2022, against Hasenmyer, Dr. Bruce Meyer,
Tiffany Woodfaulk, and Tabitha Smith. See Docket Nos. 1-2. Plaintiff dismissed Smith
on July 15, 2022. See Docket No. 10. Plaintiff then filed the First Amended Complaint on
December 8, 2022. See Docket Nos. 19, 23-24. Defendants Hasenmyer and Woodfaulk
moved to dismiss, and the Court invited Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint.
See Docket Nos. 27-28. Plaintiff then filed his Second Amended Complaint, which sole
claim is raised pursuant to § 1983 as to all Defendants, alleging cruel and unusual
punishment demonstrated by deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Defendants
Hasenmyer, Meyer, and Woodfaulk again moved to dismiss and for qualified immunity.

The Court granted the motion on December 23, 2023, as to Woodfaulk, but denied it as to
Hasenmyer and Meyer. See Docket No. 55. Plaintiff then dismissed Meyer on August 27,
2024. See Docket No. 69. The sole remaining Defendant, Hasenmyer, moved for summary
judgment on March 14, 2025, and the matter is now ripe.
II. Factual Background
The relevant undisputed facts reflect that Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Jess Dunn

Correctional Center (“JDCC”) in Taft, Oklahoma, during the relevant time period in this
case. Docket No. 80, pp. 12-13, ¶¶ 1-2. Defendant is a Physician Assistant (“PA”) working
at JDCC during the same time, at all times under color of law and within the scope of her
employment. Id., ¶¶ 3-4.
On November 6, 2020, Plaintiff injured his left bicep while moving tables at JDCC

and requested health services the same day. Id., ¶¶ 5-6. Defendant examined Plaintiff that
day and, inter alia, ordered him an MRI as well as pain medication. Id., ¶¶ 7, 9-10.
Woodfaulk scheduled Plaintiff’s MRI for November 27, 2020, and the physician approved
it. Id., ¶¶ 12-14. The November 27th MRI was cancelled by JDCC security due to a
security lockdown. Id., p. 14, ¶ 15. Woodfaulk called three providers to reschedule the

MRI, and the earliest available was December 2, 2020, and this appointment was kept as
scheduled. Id., ¶¶ 16-20. In the meantime, Plaintiff was tested for COVID-19 on
December 1, 2020, and the test returned positive on December 4, resulting in Plaintiff’s
quarantine from December 4 through December 15. Id., ¶¶ 18-22.

Woodfaulk received and uploaded the MRI results on December 7, 2020, and the
results confirmed that Plaintiff had a torn bicep with retraction. Id., ¶ 23. Defendant placed
a telehealth consult request that same day, requesting a response within 48 hours and
further notifying a nurse at Lindsey Municipal Hospital (“LMH”) regarding the consult
request and asking that the surgeon develop a treatment plan. An orthopedic surgeon, Dr.
Greisman, who routinely provided orthopedic consults for JDCC inmates, reviewed

Plaintiff’s MRI results on December 9, 2020. He recommended that Plaintiff be scheduled
at LMH the following week, and if not at LMH then through the OU medical system. Id.,
pp. 14-15, ¶¶ 23-30.
Because of Plaintiff’s positive COVID results, however, LMH would not schedule
Plaintiff the following week. On December 10, 2020, Hasenmyer asked her supervisor,

Dr. Meyer, for next steps, and he instructed her to contact the OU clinic to see if they could
find a local provider. The earliest the OU Clinic could see Plaintiff was the week of
December 21, so Defendant asked Dr. Meyer about other local providers, and he instructed
her to try that route. On December 10, Defendant put in a referral request to the Orthopedic
Center requesting an urgent evaluation. Id., pp. 16-17, ¶¶ 37-44. Plaintiff disputes that

Defendant was making efforts to find a provider who could provide the necessary bicep
repair surgery, but doesn’t not dispute she made efforts at finding a local provider. Docket
No. 83, pp. 9-10, ¶¶ 37-44.
On December 10, 2020, the Orthopedic Center scheduled Plaintiff for December
17, 2020, which was approved by Dr. Meyer. Defendant informed Plaintiff of his
appointment, and Plaintiff consented to being referred to a specialist. Docket No. 80, p.

17, ¶¶ 45-48, 50. On December 17, Dr. Blackmon, a foot and ankle specialist, evaluated
Plaintiff, reviewed the MRI results, and recommended Plaintiff be seen “ASAP” for
surgical repair. Id., p. 19, ¶ 65. Plaintiff was scheduled for an appointment with Dr.
Chalkin on December 21, 2020, who evaluated him that day. Id., pp. 19-20, ¶¶ 66, 68.
Rather than recommend or schedule Plaintiff for surgery, Dr. Chalkin recommended
physical therapy based on his examination, the MRI results, medical history, medical,

surgical history, and family history. At that December 21 appointment, Dr. Chalkin
described Plaintiff’s November 6 injury as occurring “almost three months ago.” Id., p.
20, ¶¶ 68-72. Plaintiff asserts Defendant had a duty to review and correct inaccuracies in
the medical record. Docket No. 83, pp. 12-13, ¶¶ 73-78. Though the parties dispute who
created the paperwork, it appears Dr. Chalkin gleaned the mistaken date of injury from

intake paperwork.
Following the appointment with Dr. Chalkin, Defendant was not required to follow
up with Plaintiff. Docket No. 80, p. 21, ¶ 85. However, Defendant received Dr. Chalkin’s
recommendation for physical therapy on December 23, 2020, and scheduled him for
physical therapy beginning December 31. Plaintiff was transported for this appointment,

but it did not occur due to an issue at the service provider location and his appointment was
rescheduled. Id., pp. 21-22, ¶¶ 89, 92. On January 6, 2021, Plaintiff completed paperwork
consenting to physical therapy, but ultimately declined his January 25 physical therapy
appointment as well as his February 23 eight-week follow-up appointment with Dr.
Chalkin. Defendant was uninvolved in Plaintiff’s decisions regarding these appointments.
Id., p. 22, ¶¶ 92-98.

During Plaintiff’s time at JDCC after November 6, Plaintiff requested medication
adjustments twice, on November 12, 2020, and July 8, 2021, and filed no other requests
with staff members related to his injury. Id., pp. 22-23, ¶¶ 100-101. Plaintiff was
discharged from JDCC August 9, 2021, and filed the present case on June 8, 2022. He
underwent a bicep surgical repair on September 6, 2022. Id., p. 23, ¶¶ 102-104 & Docket
Nos. 1-2. In 2023, Plaintiff had some loss of strength. Docket No. 83, p. 19, ¶ 36; Docket

No. 87, p. 7, ¶ 37.
III. Applicable Law
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “there is sufficient

evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The moving party must show
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986), with the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). However, “a party asserting that

a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to
particular parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
IV. Analysis
Defendant moves for summary judgment, asserting that she is entitled to qualified

immunity as Plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation of clearly established law.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s actions constituted deliberate indifference to his serious
medical need. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendant’s summary
judgment motion should be granted.
“‘The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Clark v. Wilson,
625 F.3d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009)). “Additional steps are taken when a summary judgment motion raises a defense
of qualified immunity.” Cunningham v. New Mexico, 2014 WL 12791236, at *4 (D. N.M.
May 12, 2014) (citing Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009)).

“When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and
(2) the constitutional right was clearly established. The court may consider either of these
prongs before the other ‘in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.’”
Cunningham, 2014 WL 12791236, at *4 (emphasis added) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236). “In other words, immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). “If, and only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a
defendant then bear the traditional burden of the movant for summary judgment—showing
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Rojas v. Anderson, 727 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation

omitted).
A. Constitutional Violation.
“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions
under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials must
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must

‘take reasonable measures to guaranty the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527
(1984)). Allegations of failure to provide medical care “must be judged against the
‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs’ test of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976).” Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Martin

v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Pueblo, 909 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir.
1990)); see also Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Failure
to provide adequate medical care is a violation of the Eighth Amendment if it is a result of
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S.
97). “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle,
429 U.S. at 104 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Certainly, not every
twinge of pain suffered as the result of delay in medical care is actionable.” Sealock v.
Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). “Prison personnel ‘may thus be liable
under § 1983 for indifference manifested in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with

treatment once prescribed.’” Gray v. Sorrels, 744 Fed. Appx. 563, 567-568 (10th Cir.
2018) (quoting Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 429 (10th Cir. 2014) (ellipses
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
“Our cases recognize two types of conduct constituting deliberate indifference.
First, a medical professional may fail to treat a serious medical condition properly. . . . The
second type of deliberate indifference occurs when prison officials prevent an inmate from

receiving treatment or deny him access to medical personnel capable of evaluating the need
for treatment.” Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1211. Plaintiff contends the second type applies here
because Defendant denied him access to medical personnel capable of evaluating his need
for treatment and failed to coordinate his care. “[T]he Tenth Circuit has recognized that
conduct constituting deliberate indifference may arise in the form of ‘a prison official

preventing an inmate from receiving medical treatment or denying access to medical
personnel capable of evaluating the inmate’s condition.’” Welsh v. Bishop, 2015 WL
1064155, at *4 (D. Colo. March 9, 2015) (quoting Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1231-1232
(10th Cir. 2006) (“A claim is therefore actionable only in cases where the need for
additional treatment or referral to a medical specialist is obvious.”)). As discussed in detail

below, “[t]hese claims include both an objective and a subjective component.” Gray, 744
Fed. Appx. at 568; see also Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088 (“The test for deliberate
indifference is both objective and subjective.”) (citing Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155,
1159 (10th Cir. 2006)).
1. Objective Component. The Tenth Circuit has explained that the objective
component is based on the harm claimed by the Plaintiff, and “whether the harm suffered

rises to a level ‘sufficiently serious’ to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.’” Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834). “Once the prisoner selects the harm, however, the focus of the objective
prong should be solely on whether that harm is sufficiently serious.” Mata, 427 F.3d at
753. A prisoner first must produce objective evidence that the deprivation at issue was in
fact “sufficiently serious.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991)). “For

the objective component of a failure-to-treat claim, the inquiry is whether the prisoner’s
‘medical need is sufficiently serious[, that is,] if it is one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Gray, 744 Fed.
Appx. at 568 (quoting Estate of Booker, 745 F.3d at 430 (ellipsis and internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A

medical need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When a prisoner
alleges that a delay in treatment caused him pain, if ‘the pain experienced during the delay
is substantial, the prisoner sufficiently establishes the objective element of the deliberate

indifference test.’” Gray, 744 Fed. Appx. at 568 (quoting Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d
1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[D]elay in medical care
can only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if there has been deliberate
indifference which results in substantial harm”; this “requirement may be satisfied by
lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.” Hardeman v. Smith, 2018 WL
1528160, at *8 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2018) (quotations omitted) (citing, inter alia,

Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001)).
As found at the dismissal stage, Plaintiff has shown his medical condition is
sufficiently serious as to Defendant. Defendant understood that Plaintiff needed additional
testing in the form of an MRI. Plaintiff alleges he was in considerable pain and that the
delay in obtaining surgery following the MRI confirmation of injury could cause
permanent damage. Furthermore, evidence shows Defendant was aware Plaintiff had a

torn bicep with retraction, and that Dr. Greisman in his referral had indicated that, although
the radiology report was difficult to read, Plaintiff’s injury was likely time sensitive and in
need of surgical intervention depending on the diagnosis. Docket No. 80, Ex. 5, p. 29. A
confirmed torn bicep with retraction satisfies the objective component. See Watson v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 2018 WL 1474895, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2018) (“Once the facility

physician examined Plaintiff, it was determined that he needed additional testing and then
surgical treatment. Therefore, the objective component of deliberate indifference has been
met.”). Indeed, “providing some care does not insulate a medical professional from
liability when the professional delays referral to a specialist.” Lucas v. Turn Key Health
Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1138 (10th Cir. 2023).

2. Subjective Component. In contrast to the objective component, Plaintiff fails to
meet his burden as to the subjective component. The subjective component is met if a
prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Farmer, 511 at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id; see also Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089 (“‘[T]he prisoner must show that the

defendants knew he faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to
take reasonable measure to abate it.’”) (quoting Callahan, 471 F.3d at 1159). Additionally,
“[a] prisoner may satisfy the subjective component by showing that defendants’ delay in
providing medical treatment caused either unnecessary pain or a worsening of h[is]
condition. Even a brief delay may be unconstitutional.” Mata, 427 F.3d at 755 (collecting
cases); Winrow v. Stell, 2015 WL 3645702, at *7 (W.D. Okla. March 5, 2015) (“Denying

or delaying a prisoner's access to medical professionals capable of assessing or treating the
prisoner’s condition can establish the subjective component, particularly when unnecessary
pain or a worsened condition results.”). However, “[m]ere negligence by prison officials
or medical staff will not suffice to meet the subjective prong of deliberate indifference.”
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 2011 WL 13157058, at *6 (D.N.M. Sept. 1, 2011) (internal citations

omitted). Therefore, “[t]he question is: ‘were the symptoms such that a prison employee
knew the risk to the prisoner and chose (recklessly) to disregard it?’” Martinez, 563 F.3d
at 1089 (quoting Mata, 427 F.3d at 753); see also Whiteman v. El Paso Criminal Justice
Ctr., 2011 WL 2610202, at *4 (D. Colo. July 1, 2011) (“[A] general awareness of the
potential for harm is not enough; there must be a connection between the subjective

disregard of a risk of serious harm and the objective harm actually claimed.”) (emphasis
added) (citing Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089 n.8).
“For the subjective component[,] the prisoner must present ‘evidence of the prison
official’s culpable state of mind. He must show that the prison official acted or failed to
act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Gray, 744 Fed. Appx. at
568 (quoting Estate of Booker, 745 F.3d at 430). This is “akin to ‘recklessness in the

criminal law,’ where, to act recklessly, a ‘person must ‘consciously disregard’ a substantial
risk of serious harm.’ And ‘[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including
inference from circumstantial evidence.’ The fact that a serious medical need was
‘obvious’ could be evidence of deliberate indifference, although a ‘prison official may
show that the obvious escaped him’ and avoid liability.” Self, 439 F.3d at 1231 (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 839, 842-843 & n. 8).
“Defendants will not be entitled to qualified immunity if the symptoms displayed
by Plaintiff were obvious enough to warrant a finding that Defendants knew of the risk of
a serious medical condition but disregarded that risk.” Marquez v. Board of County
Commissioners Eddy County, 2012 WL 12895017, at *5 (D. N.M. Dec. 3, 2012). “[A]

factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact
that the risk was obvious. . . .[I]t remains open to the officials to prove that they were
unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety. That a trier of fact may infer
knowledge from the obvious, in other words, does not mean that it must do so.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 842-844.

Defendant contends Plaintiff has not shown an Eighth Amendment violation on this
prong, and the Court agrees. The intake form referenced by Dr. Chalkin in his evaluation
appears to indicate Plaintiff’s injury was three months old, rather than two months old.
Plaintiff contends Defendant had a duty to review and identify mistakes such as this in the
record. Plaintiff’s expert asserts that Defendant’s failure to correct this in the record
deviated from the standard of care. Docket No. 83, Ex. 6, p. 10. Deviation from the

standard of care, however, does not establish deliberate indifference. [T]he ‘negligent
failure to provide adequate medical care, even one constituting medical malpractice, does
not give rise to a constitutional violation.’ So long as a medical professional provides a
level of care consistent with the symptoms presented by the inmate, absent evidence of
actual knowledge or recklessness, the requisite state of mind cannot be met.” Self, 439
F.3d at 1233 (quoting Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir.

1999)). The mistake as to Plaintiff’s date of injury as relayed to Dr. Chalkin was out of
Defendant’s control.1 The records from the appointment with Dr. Chalkin reflect that
Plaintiff was told on that day (December 21) that surgery was too risky because they were
too far out from his injury. Docket No. 80, Ex. 12, p. 7. Defendant was not present for
this discussion, and the parties agree that Defendant had no obligation to follow up with

Plaintiff after his appointment with Dr. Chalkin.
Furthermore, whether Defendant was aware of all Dr. Chalkin’s qualifications or
not (a point upon which the parties disagree), Dr. Chalkin is a board-certified orthopedic
surgeon with a subspecialty in hand and upper extremity injuries, traumatic reconstruction,
and tendon and nerve repair. While Defendant had experience as an athletic trainer prior

to becoming a PA, any general understanding she had of treatment timelines for these types

1 Plaintiff denies completing two pages of his intake form for Dr. Chalkin, despite stating that he
signed a third page regarding his pain scale. Docket No. 83, p. 13, ¶ 80. However, he does not
allege that Hasenmyer took any part in completing this form.
of injuries could not override Plaintiff’s surgeon’s actual treatment plan. Once the MRI
was obtained, Defendant began that day the process of coordinating care for Plaintiff,

which ultimately involved consultation with and referral to multiple locations given the
complications of Plaintiff’s COVID diagnosis and scheduling conflicts at various clinics
around JDCC.
Plaintiff nevertheless propounds the “gatekeeper” theory of deliberate indifference,
whereby he contends Defendant’s role was “solely to serve as a gatekeeper for other
medical personnel capable of treating the condition,” Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1211, and that

she delayed or refused to serve that role due to deliberate indifference. Failure to properly
act as a gatekeeper occurs when a person “prevents an inmate from receiving treatment or
denies access to someone capable of evaluating the inmate’s need for treatment.” Lucas,
58 F.4th at 1137. “[I]t is possible to have some medical care and still state a claim under
the gatekeeper theory.” Id., at 1139. The Tenth Circuit instructs that the proper

determination on this question is “whether there was the functional equivalent of a
complete denial of care in light of the specific circumstances.” Id. Here, Defendant’s
actions do not cross that line. Defendant, a PA, promptly acquired a referral for Plaintiff
to a board-certified surgeon who assessed Plaintiff and prescribed a specific course of
treatment. There is no obligation for a PA to question a surgeon’s treatment decisions

under these circumstances, even if Defendant was both aware that the six-week window
was critical and that there was a date discrepancy on one of the multiple documents
reviewed by the surgeon. Defendant’s “good faith effort” to obtain care for Plaintiff was
sufficient here. Self, 439 F.3d at 1232. Defendant’s actions do not rise to the level of a
“complete denial of care.” Lucas, 58 F.4th 1139.
Despite the numerous setbacks in obtaining care for Plaintiff, most out of

Defendant’s control, Plaintiff was seen by a board-certified specialist within fourteen days
of the MRI. Plaintiff agrees that Defendant was not required to follow up with Plaintiff
after his appointment with Dr. Chalkin.2 See Docket No. 80, p. 21, ¶ 85 & Docket No. 83,
p. 13, ¶ 85. Plaintiff himself chose to refuse Dr. Chalkin’s prescribed course of treatment,
including physical therapy. Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference cannot rest on a
disagreement as to diagnosis or treatment. Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir.

1993) (A Plaintiff’s “difference of opinion does not support a claim of cruel and unusual
punishment.”). Plaintiff therefore fails to establish a constitutional violation.
B. Clearly Established Law.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Clark v. Wilson,
625 F.3d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009)). Even assuming Plaintiff established a constitutional violation, the question
remaining is whether the violation was of clearly established law.
“Ordinarily, a plaintiff may show that a particular right was clearly established at

the time of the challenged conduct ‘by identifying an on-point Supreme Court or published

2 Plaintiff’s response to this proposed undisputed fact admits only that Defendant did not provide
Plaintiff with information regarding his visit with Dr. Chalkin but does not challenge that
Defendant had no further obligations.
Tenth Circuit decision; alternatively, ‘the clearly established weight of authority from other
courts must have found the law to be as [he] maintains.’” A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123,

1135 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1005 (10th Cir. 2015)).
However, “‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’”
Pauly, 580 U.S. at 79 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). Instead, it
“must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case. Otherwise, plaintiffs would be able to
convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply
by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 639-640 (1987)). In this Circuit, “[t]he right to custodial medical care is
clearly established.” Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2002)
(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); see also Martin v. Bliss, 2016 WL 7046766, at *4 (E.D.
Okla. Dec. 2, 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.’”) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (internal
quotations and citations omitted)); Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir.
2013) (“By 1997 this court had clearly held that the Eighth Amendment is offended not
only by medical professionals who fail to treat, but also by prison officials who assume
“gate keeping” authority over prisoner access to medical professionals.”).

Even though a delay in medical care “only constitutes an Eighth Amendment
violation where the plaintiff can show that the delay resulted in substantial harm[,]”
Oxendine, 241 F.3d at 1276 (quotation omitted), the Tenth Circuit has held “that the
substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or
considerable pain.” Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff
contends Defendant violated clearly established law by denying him access to medical

personnel who could evaluate him for treatment. Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1211 (“The second
type of deliberate indifference occurs when prison officials prevent an inmate from
receiving treatment or deny him access to medical personnel capable of evaluating the need
for treatment.”). Despite Defendant’s efforts to coordinate Plaintiff’s care, Plaintiff
contends that Defendant’s failure to find a second specialist who would perform a surgery
was a violation of clearly established law. Plaintiff asserts that he is not required to show

a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, but he neglects the rest of that
rule from the Supreme Court, which clarifies that such is the case only when “existing
precedent must have [previously] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (quoting Pauly, 580 U.S. at 79).
Plaintiff fails to meet his burden when he points to case law at such a high level of

generality. There is no clearly established law that a PA at a jail must order a second
opinion for a course of treatment where one supporting document (of many) contains an
inaccuracy but the inmate has not requested one and a specialist has already set a course of
treatment, nor has existing precedent placed this question beyond debate. Accordingly,
Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendant Hasenmyer’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [Docket No. 80] is hereby GRANTED. A separate Judgment will follow.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of July, 2025.

GERALD L. JACKSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107269. Public record. Not legal advice.