# Eppinger v. University of Tennessee

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · July 24, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107268

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 24, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107268

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that an “unprofessional email” and “insubordination” toward supervisors are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment action
- explaining that a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA requires a plaintiff to show she was qualified for the relevant position

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

CATHY EPPINGER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:21-CV-268-KAC-CHS
)
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, )
AT CHATTANOOGA, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action is before the Court on Defendant University of Tennessee at Chattanooga’s
“Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc. 106] and Plaintiff Cathy Eppinger’s “Motion for Leave
to File Fourth Amended Complaint” [Doc. 129]. For the below reasons, the Court grants
Defendant’s Motion and denies Plaintiff’s Motion.
I. Background1

Defendant hired Plaintiff Cathy Eppinger, “an African American female” “over the age of
40,” “in 2012 as an Administrative Support Assistant” for its “Department of Occupational
Therapy” [Docs. 106-4 at 2 (Declaration of Laure Pou (“Pou Decl.”) ¶ 8); 61 ¶ 2; 106-6
at 4; 106-7]. Plaintiff holds a “bachelor of Science Degree from Covenant College in
Organizational Management, and Associated Degree of Applied Science in Office
Administration” [Doc. 61 ¶ 26].2

1 Because Plaintiff is the nonmoving Party, the Court describes the facts in the light most favorable
to her. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
2 The Third Amended Complaint is verified [See Doc. 61 at 27]. At summary judgment, a verified
complaint “carries the same weight as would an affidavit.” See, e.g., El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407,
414 (6th Cir. 2008).
“In 2015,” Defendant’s “Division of Academic Affairs underwent a significant
reorganization” [Doc. 106-4 at 2 (Pou Decl. ¶ 9)]. As a result, Defendant needed to “reassign[]”
“two Administrative Support employees” to vacant positions “in Facilities and Emergency
Services” [Doc. 106-2 at 2 (Declaration of Tom Ellis (“Ellis Decl.”) ¶ 5)]. Plaintiff was one of
the employees reassigned to the Facilities Department [Id.].

“In 2017,” the Facilities Department’s “Construction Services area” requested that
Defendant’s Human Resources Department “post a position called Project Support
Specialist” [Doc. 106-4 at 4 (Pou Decl. ¶ 22)]. The required “qualifications included,” among
other things, “familiarity with the construction industry” such as “knowledge and experience in
electronic archiving of project documents, project management, architectural drawings and
floorplans, and other concepts of value to the Construction Services unit” [Doc. 106-2 at 2-3 (Ellis
Decl. ¶ 7)]. The position also required an “[a]ssociates degree in construction
management” [Doc. 106-5 at 9 (Project Support Specialist Job Description)]. The position further
required “1-3 years of related project management experience” [Id. at 13 (Project Support

Specialist Job Description)]. Plaintiff “was not one of the applicants” for the position [Doc. 106-4
at 4 (Pou Decl. ¶ 23)]. There is a dispute regarding where Defendant posted the
position [See Docs. 61 ¶ 41 (“job was never posted on [Defendant’s] job website”); 106-2 at 2-3
(Ellis Decl. ¶ 7 (“Construction Services unit posted an internal position”))]. But there is no dispute
that Plaintiff did not possess the required experience and qualifications for the position [Doc. 106-
1 at 27 (Deposition of Cathy Eppinger (“Eppinger Dep.”) 103:4-9)].
In 2018, Defendant chose Amanda Winesburgh, a white woman, for the Project Support
Specialist position [Docs. 106-4 at 4 (Pou Decl. ¶ 23); 61 ¶ 41]. Winesburgh had “expertise in

2
contract and procurement matters” and her “background included ownership of a construction
company” which made her a “valuable resource” [Doc. 106-2 at 3 (Ellis Decl. ¶ 9)].
“In early 2020,” the Facilities “Department needed a dedicated full-time business manager”
to “handle accounting for UTC’s capital projects as well as department clearing accounts and
billing” [Id. (Ellis Decl. ¶ 10)]. The Business Manager position required, among other things, “2+

years of experience” in “tracking and managing multiple project costs related to construction,
renovations, and technology upgrades using” particular software [Doc. 106-4 at 16 (Business
Manager Job Description)]. The position also required at least “2+ years of fund accounting in a
lead role” [Id.]. Because Winesburgh had the “necessary accounting skills,” Defendant added the
Business Manager responsibilities to Winesburgh’s portfolio and reclassified her to a Business
Manager position [Doc. 106-2 at 3-4 (Ellis Decl. ¶ 11)].
Plaintiff “began sending emails to” Laure Pou, Defendant’s Vice Chancellor for Human
Resources, “demanding to know” why the Business Manager position “was not posted” and how
Winesburgh’s reclassification complied with Defendant’s “EEO guidelines” [Doc. 106-4 at 5 (Pou

Decl. ¶ 31); see also id. at 26]. “In July 2020,” Plaintiff sent an email to Richard Brown,
Defendant’s Vice Chancellor for Finance and Administration, expressing personal misgivings with
Winesburgh [See Doc. 106-4 at 23]. Plaintiff stated that Winesburgh “walks[] and talks the
majority of her day making people think she knows more than God,” and “needs to sit down, shut
that mouth, and work for all that money the state is paying her” [Id.]. Plaintiff went on to say that
Plaintiff “show[s] love to all, but if [she is] pushed, well ....you know the rest of the story, and you
know I’m not afraid” [Id.]. In December 2020, Defendant “received notice from the Tennessee
Human Rights Commission” that Plaintiff “filed a complaint proposing that” Winesburgh’s

3
reclassification “constituted race discrimination” [Doc. 106-4 at 7 (Pou Decl. ¶ 46);
see also Doc. 61 ¶ 39].
Defendant’s “Executive Director of Facilities Planning and Operations,” Anthony
McClellan, an “African American,” “began supervising [Plaintiff] on December 1,
2020” [Docs. 106-3 at 2 (Declaration of Anthony McClellan (“McClellan Decl.”) ¶ 5);

106-6 at 5]. Under McClellan’s supervision, Plaintiff “often engaged in unpredictable and
unprofessional behavior” [Doc. 106-3 at 5 (McClellan Decl. ¶ 17)]. Indeed, Plaintiff had a “hostile
encounter” with Winesburgh in “early 2021” [Id. (McClellan Decl. ¶ 19)].
Defendant’s IT Department “was upgrading the Administrative Services Building” by
implementing a new phone system [Id.]. Winesburgh’s office was the first to receive a new phone
as part of the upgrade [Id.]. Plaintiff “aggressively questioned her about the new phone,”
“create[ing] an uncomfortable environment” [Doc. 106-3 at 13 (Final Written Warning)].
When McClellan “attempted to speak with” Plaintiff about this incident, “and her inappropriate
language toward” Winesburgh, Plaintiff responded by telling McClellan: “[e]very day you walk

in here with your face in your butt, and you’re supposed to be an example” [Id. at 5-6 (McClellan
Decl. ¶ 20)].
During this time, Plaintiff’s job “performance was inconsistent” too; Plaintiff “made many
mistakes in processing invoices, paying bills, and other basic responsibilities” [Id. at 2 (McClellan
Decl. ¶ 7)]. For example, Plaintiff “inadvertently paid” a “tree services vendor” “twice for the
same job” [Id. at 8 (McClellan Decl. ¶ 27)]. When the “vendor then came to campus seeking
assistance” to rectify the overpayment, Plaintiff “responded unprofessionally,” requiring
McClellan to “smooth out the relationship” [Id.]. As a result of this and other incidents, the

4
Facilities Department “spent many hours correcting [Plaintiff’s] mistakes, clearing up late fees,
and completing tasks that were her responsibility” [Id. at 2 (McClellan Decl. ¶ 7)].
Thereafter, Defendant “elected to give [Plaintiff] a Final Written Warning” on “April 16,
2021” [Id. at 6 (McClellan Decl. ¶ 22); see also id. at 13 (Final Written Warning))].
Defendant’s “System-wide” disciplinary policy provides that although Defendant uses a

“progressive discipline system,” “a supervisor is not required to utilize every step in th[e] process,”
and may “skip or repeat any or all steps if warranted by the circumstances” [Doc. 106-4 at 35
(System-Wide Policy)]. The Final Written Warning informed Plaintiff that “[a]ny further
instances of unsatisfactory work performance or work-related behavior” could “result in further
disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination” [Doc. 106-3 at 13 (Final Written
Warning)].
On “July, 1, 2021,” Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County,
Tennessee, under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and various state law tort
theories [See Doc. 1-1 at 4]. Plaintiff later amended her state court complaint to add federal law

claims [See id. at 24]. Thereafter, Defendant removed that state action to this Court [See Doc. 1].
For more than a year, the Final Written Warning “had no impact on [Plaintiff]’s
behavior” [Doc. 106-3 at 6 (McClellan Decl. ¶ 23)]. “On May 12, 2022,” Defendant placed
Plaintiff on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), requiring her to complete various tasks to
improve her behavior and job performance [See id. at 20-24 (Performance Improvement Plan)].
Plaintiff responded to the “PIP with a 128-page ‘rebuttal,’” and “made few, if any, efforts to
improve” [Id. at 9 (McClellan Decl. ¶ 30)].
“In the fall of 2022,” Defendant placed Plaintiff “on paid administrative leave in order to
investigate her unauthorized access to confidential information and her use of this information for

5
personal reasons” [Doc. 106-2 at 5 (Ellis Decl. ¶ 23)]. Plaintiff obtained “a list of all [Facilities]
Department employees who had received disciplinary actions or who were on leave associated
with the Family Medical Leave Act,” “with no authorization,” and attached it to her filings in this
action [See Docs. 106-4 at 11 (Pou Decl. ¶ 65); 38-1 at 143]. Ultimately, Defendant terminated
Plaintiff’s employment on “September 13, 2022” [Doc. 106-3 at 26].

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint is operative [See Doc. 61]. Though unclear, it appears
to assert several claims against Defendant: “violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 . . . Americans with Disabilities Act of
19903 . . . Section 207(f) of GINA,” and “the Privacy Act of 1974” [See Doc. 61 ¶ 1]. Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se [See Doc. 30]. Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment,
asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff’s
claims [Doc. 106]. Plaintiff opposed the Motion [see Doc. 120], Defendant replied [Doc. 121],
and Plaintiff filed a sur-reply with leave from the Court [Docs. 122, 125]. Plaintiff further requests
leave from the Court to file a fourth amended complaint [See Doc. 129]. Defendant opposes

Plaintiff’s motion to amend [See Doc. 131]. Plaintiff replied and filed a supplement to her
reply [Docs. 132, 133].
II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the Court “shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the facts in the

3 Although unclear from the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to premise her disability
discrimination claim on a 2014 exchange between an employee of Defendant and Pou where the
employee informed Pou that Plaintiff wore “hearing aids” [See Doc. 106-1 at 66 (Eppinger Dep.
259:2-23)].
6
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts
in her favor. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. See Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr.,
86 F.4th 314, 323 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Once the moving party meets this burden, the
nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

See Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 464 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Rule 56, however, “does not require a court to draw every possible inference, no matter how
stretched, in the nonmovant’s favor.” Walden v. Gen Elec. Int’l, Inc., 119 F.4th 1049, 1061 (6th
Cir. 2024). Indeed, a “party may not avoid summary judgment by resorting to speculation [or]
conjecture.” K.V.G. Props., Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 900 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2018) (quotation
omitted). Instead, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists” only if “there are disputes over”
specific facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
See Regions Bank v. Fletcher, 67 F.4th 797, 802 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation and quotation omitted).
The Court does “not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.” See Smith v. City of

Toledo, 13 F.4th 508, 514 (6th Cir. 2021).
III. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s Title VII Race Discrimination Claim Fails.

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect
to” her “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where, as here, a plaintiff relies only on
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting rule applies.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); Boshaw v. Midland
Brewing Co., 32 F.4th 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2022).
7
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. See Levine v. DeJoy, 64 F.4th 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). If a
plaintiff succeeds, the “burden shifts to” the defendant “to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s” treatment. See id. (quotation omitted). And if the
defendant succeeds there, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff “to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons but were
a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
To establish a prima facie case here, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she: (1) is a member of
a protected class; (2) was qualified for the job she sought; (3) suffered an adverse employment
decision; and (4) was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than
similarly situated non-protected employees. See id.
Here, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Liberally
construed in her favor, Plaintiff appears to premise her race discrimination claim on the theory that
Defendant’s hiring of Winesburgh for the Project Support Specialist position and then

reclassifying Winesburgh into the Business Manager position—instead of Plaintiff—constitutes
discrimination because of her race [See Docs. 61 at 8; 106-1 at 29 (Eppinger Dep. 111:17-22);
120 at 17, 19-20]. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, however, she
fails at the second element because Plaintiff was not qualified for either position.
The Project Support Specialist position required an “[a]ssociates degree in construction
management,” [Doc. 106-5 at 9 (Project Support Specialist Job Description)], which Plaintiff
admits she did not have and does not have [See Doc. 61 ¶ 26]. The position further required “1-3
years of related project management experience” [Doc. 106-5 at 13 (Project Support Specialist Job
Description)]. Plaintiff concedes that she did not have and does not have that experience,

8
either [Doc. 106-1 at 27 (Eppinger Dep. 103:4-9)]. The Business Manager position required,
among other things, at least “2+ years of experience” in “tracking and managing multiple project
costs related to construction, renovations, and technology upgrades using” particular software
[Doc. 106-4 at 16 (Business Manager Job Description)]. Plaintiff conceded that she did not have
that experience [See, e.g., Doc. 106-1 at 31 (Eppinger Dep. 121: 14-19)]. Plaintiff further

demonstrated that she was unfamiliar with basic concepts in the construction
industry [Id. at 33-34 (Eppinger Dep. 127:1-130:2)]. For these reasons, Plaintiff was unqualified
for the Project Support Specialist and Business Manager positions and therefore cannot establish
a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Plaintiff seeks to resist this conclusion in two (2) ways. First, Plaintiff appears to assert,
pointing to no evidence, that Defendant fabricated the job requirements for both
positions [See, e.g., Doc. 120 at 20]. That unsupported speculation cannot overcome summary
judgment. See Walden, 119 F.4th at 1061; see also K.V.G. Props., Inc., 900 F.3d at 823.
Second, Plaintiff argues that even if she was unqualified for the position, Defendant had an

obligation to train her so she would have the requisite experience and
qualifications [See, e.g., Doc. 120 at 4 (arguing that Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case
because Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with “qualification[s]/credential[s]”)]. But Title VII
does not require employers “to give special training and guidance” to employees.
See Johnson v. Michigan St. Univ., 547 F.Supp 429, 441 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, her race discrimination
claim would still fail. Defendant has presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
selecting Winesburgh over Plaintiff for the Project Support Specialist and Business Manager
Positions—Winesburgh had the requisite experience and qualifications to perform each of these

9
roles [Doc. 106-2 at 2-3 (Ellis Decl. ¶ 7)]. Plaintiff’s response to this evidence is, essentially, that
it is all “fabricated” too [See, e.g., Doc. 106-1 at 24 (Eppinger Dep. 92:17-19)]. But Plaintiff’s
unsupported claim of misrepresentation does not create a genuine dispute of material fact.
See Walden, 119 F.4th at 1061; see also K.V.G. Props., Inc., 900 F.3d at 823.
Even if Plaintiff’s claim made it to the third step in the McDonnell Douglas framework,

she “must identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reason
is actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” See Jackson, 814 F.3d at 778 (quotation
omitted). Under the law, Plaintiff could attempt to show pretext in several different ways.
See Chen v. Dow Chemical Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
But Plaintiff has pointed to no competent evidence that Defendant’s reasons for its actions
were pretextual. Speculation and unsupported arguments that Defendant fabricated
documents, [see, e.g., Doc. 106-1 at 24 (Eppinger Dep. 92:17-19)], will not do.
See Walden, 119 F.4th at 1061; see also K.V.G. Props., Inc., 900 F.3d at 823.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII race discrimination claim fails.

B. Plaintiff’s Age, Sex, and Disability Discrimination Claims Fail Too.
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint focuses primarily on Plaintiff’s Title VII race
discrimination and retaliation claims, but it makes some references to potential claims of age, sex,
and disability discrimination [See Doc. 61]. These claims, however, fail for the same reason
Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim fails: she has not identified a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding whether she was qualified for either of the positions at issue. See Thompson v. Fresh
Products, 985 F.3d 509, 526 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining that a prima facie case of age
discrimination under the ADEA requires a plaintiff to show she was qualified for the relevant
position); Baggett v. City of Cincinnati, No. 22-3338, 2022 WL 17337851, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30,

10
2022) (“To establish a prima facie case for [sex] discrimination, a plaintiff must show she was . .
. qualified for the position.”); Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 320 (6th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (explaining that an element of the prima facie case for disability
discrimination is that a plaintiff must be “otherwise qualified for the position”). Accordingly, the
Court dismisses these claims.

C. Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation Claim Fails.

Plaintiff has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her Title VII retaliation
claim either. Under Title VII, an employee may sue an employer for retaliating against her for
opposing a discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The McDonnell Douglas rule
applies here too because Plaintiff purports to rely on circumstantial evidence of
retaliation [See. e.g., Doc. 106-1 at 41 (Eppinger Dep. 159:20-23)].
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation here, Plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged
in a protected activity, (2) the defendant knew of her conduct, (3) the defendant took an adverse
employment action against her after her protected activity, and (4) there was a causal connection
between the exercise of Plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse action. See Wehrly v. Allstate
Ins., No. 23-5736, 2024 WL 1308245, at *4 (6th Cir. May 27, 2024) (citation omitted). The law on
causation is exacting. Binding precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove causation by traditional “but-for cause” principles.
See Boshaw, 32 F.4th at 605.
Here, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case because she has not raised a genuine
dispute of material fact regarding whether engaging in a protected activity was the but-for cause
of the adverse employment actions she experienced [See Doc. 61 ¶¶ 56-74 (describing the
purported adverse employment actions taken against Plaintiff)]. Plaintiff points to no evidence of

11
causation; and at summary judgment, that failure is fatal to her claim. See Zakora, 44 F.4th at 464.
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, though, Defendant has proffered at
least one legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions:
Plaintiff’s unprofessional behavior [See Doc. 106-3 at 5-6 (McClellan Decl. ¶ 20)].
See, e.g., Velzat v. Williamson Med. Ctr., 627 F. App’x 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that

an “unprofessional email” and “insubordination” toward supervisors are legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment action). And as with her race
discrimination claim, Plaintiff points to no evidence showing pretext. Plaintiff’s Title VII
retaliation claim thus fails.
D. Plaintiff’s Purported Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act And Privacy Act
Claims Fail.

Plaintiff’s two remaining claims also fail. The Third Amended Complaint makes a brisk
reference to “Section 207(f) of GINA,” which the Court infers is a reference to the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) [See Doc. 61 ¶ 1]. But any GINA claim Plaintiff
sought to raise would fail. GINA provides that it is “an unlawful employment practice for an
employment agency to request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an
individual or family member of the individual.” See Williams v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc.,
790 F. App’x 745, 754 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-2(b)). Plaintiff points to no
evidence that Defendant requested, required, or purchased relevant genetic information or
retaliated against Plaintiff on a qualifying basis. The Third Amended Complaint also alludes to a
claim under the “Privacy Act of 1974” [See Doc. 61 ¶ 1]. To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert
such a claim, however, it would fail. “[T]he Privacy Act applies exclusively to federal agencies,”
which Defendant is not. See Schmitt v. City of Detroit, 395 F.3d 327, 331 (6th Cir. 2005).
Therefore, these two potential claims fail.
12
E. The Court Denies Plaintiff’s Motion To Amend Her Third Amended Complaint
Because It Is Untimely And The Proposed Amendment Would Be Futile.

Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint a fourth time [See Doc. 129], but the Court denies
that request for two (2) independent reasons. First, the deadline for Plaintiff to amend her pleading
had long passed when Plaintiff made her request [See Docs. 22 at 3; 57 at 3]. And she has not
even attempted to establish good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P 6(b). Second, amendment would be
futile. As applicable here, Rule 15 provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The Court may, however, deny
a motion to amend if the amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962). Permitting amendment would be futile “when, after including the proposed changes,
the complaint still could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” See Stanley v. W. Mich.
Univ., 105 F.4th 856, 867 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would be futile. Plaintiff wishes to amend her Third
Amended Complaint to add a claim under “42 U.S.C. § 1981” [See Doc. 129 at 1].
Defendant, however, is a public university and “arm of the State.” See Johnson v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2000). The Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution makes Defendant “immune from suit” on Plaintiff’s Section 1981 theory. See id.
Plaintiff points out—correctly—that Congress may abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity in some

instances [See Doc. 133 at 1]. But Plaintiff points to no binding precedent holding that Section
1981 abrogated the State’s immunity here [See id.]. In fact, prevailing precedent holds that Section
1981 does not abrogate Defendant’s sovereign immunity. See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506,
512 (6th Cir. 1999).

13
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Court (1) DENIES Plaintiffs “Motion for Leave to File Fourth
Amended Complaint” [Doc. 129] and (2) GRANTS Defendant University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 106] and DISMISSES this action.
An appropriate judgment shall enter.

SO ORDERED.

KATHERINE A. 4 Wa
United States Distritt Jidge

14

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11107268. Public record. Not legal advice.