# Howard v. Crain

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · July 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11105524

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 22, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11105524

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a grievance which complained about the administrative decision to cancel a religious service was sufficient to alert prison administrators as to the individuals it was targeting
- stating that prison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement
- rejecting the defendant’s argument that he was not identified where the defendant was given the opportunity to respond to the grievance during the administrative review process

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEROME HOWARD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:23-CV-3776-MAB
)
ANGELA CRAIN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Alisa Dearmond’s Motion for
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff’s Failure to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies (Doc.
45; see also Doc. 46). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Dearmond’s Motion for
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff’s Failure to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies is
DENIED (Doc. 45).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jerome Howard filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights that occurred while he was
incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 1; see also Doc. 9). Plaintiff’s Complaint
generally alleges that Defendants denied him medical care by failing to provide him with
his prescribed morning dose of pain medication after he underwent surgery on his right
hand and wrist on September 14, 2022 (Doc. 9 at pp. 1-2).
As it relates to Defendant Dearmond, Plaintiff claims that she was the nurse
practitioner at Menard who prescribed him tramadol to alleviate the pain following his
surgery, to be administered once in the morning and once at night for seven days (Doc. 1
at pp. 12-13; Doc. 9 at p. 2). However, after Plaintiff was discharged from Menard’s

medical unit on September 15, 2022, he was not given his morning pain medication on
September 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 (Doc. 9 at pp. 2-3). Plaintiff wrote Defendant Dearmond
about the missed doses at that time, but she did not assist him (Id.). Consequently, on
September 19, 2022, Plaintiff submitted Emergency Grievance No. 223-9-22 to grieve the
medication issues he was experiencing (Id.; see also Doc. 46-1, pp. 4-5). Two days later, on
September 21, 2022, Plaintiff began receiving his morning medication again (Doc. 9 at p.

4).
The Court conducted a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A and Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on the following claims:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants [Crain], Dearmond, Jane Doe for denying Plaintiff
his prescribed pain medications in the morning from
September 15, 2022-September 21, 2022;

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
John Doe sergeant for refusing to assist Plaintiff in securing
his medications.

(Doc. 9 at pp. 4-7).1

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint also raised an Eighth Amendment claim against Warden Wills and a Monell claim
against Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (see Doc. 1 at pp. 12-13). However, the Court’s Merit Review Order
dismissed both of those counts as insufficient (see Doc. 9 at p. 10). Similarly, the Merit Review Order
dismissed the Jane Doe Defendant named in Count 1 because Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient
information to identify her (Id. at pp. 5-6). Defendants Hursel King, Christopher Lindsay, Douglas Krause,
and Jimmy Holland were subsequently identified and substituted for the John Doe sergeant named in
Count 2 (see Doc. 32).
On September 16, 2024, Defendant Dearmond filed the instant Motion for
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff’s Failure to Exhaust his Administrative Remedies (Doc.

45; see also Doc. 46).2 Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant Dearmond’s motion.3
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(a). In making that determination, the Court “generally will construe all facts and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Apex Digital,
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013). This means courts cannot
resolve factual disputes in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. See Tolan v.
Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there

is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However,
“[t]he nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010).

2 Defendants Crain, King, Lindsay, Krause and Holland withdrew their affirmative defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies (Doc. 44). Consequently, this Order focuses upon Plaintiff’s efforts to
exhaust his administrative remedies as it relates to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Dearmond.
3 Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendant Dearmond’s Statement of Material Facts is deemed an
admission of those material facts to the extent they are supported by evidence in the record (see Doc. 46 at
pp. 3-4). See also SDIL-LR 56.1(g) (“All material facts set forth in a Statement of Material Facts . . . shall be
deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2); Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2012). The admission of Defendant
Dearmond’s material facts, however, does not automatically grant her motion for summary judgment; she
must still demonstrate that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561,
564 (7th Cir. 2012).
II. Exhaustion Requirements
As outlined in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “[a] prisoner may not bring a
federal suit about prison conditions unless he first has exhausted all available

administrative remedies.” Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). A remedy has not been exhausted if the prisoner failed to abide by the
procedures for pursuing relief. Id. Thus, to properly exhaust one’s administrative
remedies, “a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the
prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.

2002).
However, an inmate is not required to exhaust administrative remedies that are
not actually available to him. Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“Remedies that are genuinely unavailable or nonexistent need not be exhausted.”). The
Seventh Circuit has “found remedies unavailable in a number of instances in which the

inmate, through no fault of his own, could not have accessed the grievance procedure.”
Lanaghan v. Koch, 902 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2018). Furthermore, the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that the defendants carry the burden
of proving. See Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2018). “To meet their burden,
the defendants must show beyond dispute that remedies were available.” Id. at 533-34.

III. IDOC Grievance Procedures
Individuals incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) are
required to follow the grievance procedure outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code
to exhaust their administrative remedies. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.800, et seq. (2017).
To initiate the normal grievance process, an inmate must file a grievance with their
institutional counselor within 60 days of the discovery of the incident. Id. at § 504.810(a).

After the counselor provides a response, an inmate may submit his grievance to a
grievance officer who is to report his or her findings and recommendations to the Chief
Administrative Officer (the “warden”) within two months. Id. at 504.830(e). The warden
reviews the grievance officer’s findings and recommendations, and then provides a
written decision. Id. If an inmate is unsatisfied with the warden’s decision, he has 30 days
from the date of the warden’s decision to appeal to the Administrative Review Board

(ARB). Id. at § 504.850(a). The ARB then submits a written report to the Director of the
IDOC, who makes a final decision within six months, when reasonably feasible. Id. at §
504.850(e).
Alternatively, an inmate can request for his or her grievance to be handled on an
emergency basis by submitting the grievance directly to the warden. Id. at § 504.840. If

the warden determines the grievance should not be handled as an emergency, the inmate
is notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the grievance in accordance with the
standard grievance process. Id. at § 504.840(c). However, if the warden determines the
grievance is an emergency, the warden must expedite processing of the grievance and
respond by indicating what action shall be or has been taken. Id. at § 504.840(b).

Additionally, if an inmate appeals the warden’s decision on an emergency grievance, the
ARB is also required to expedite processing of the emergency grievance. Id. at § 504.850(f).
Discussion
I. Emergency Grievance No. 223-9-22, dated 9/19/22
As stated in Defendant Dearmond’s material facts, only one grievance from the

period in question was appealed through all stages of the administrative review process
(see Doc. 46 at p. 4; see also Doc. 46-1 at p. 1). Namely, in Emergency Grievance No. 223-9-
22, dated September 19, 2022, Plaintiff grieved that he was only receiving the evening
doses of his pain medication, even though he was “told that [he] would be receiving”
pain medication twice per day (Doc. 46-1 at pp. 4-5). Plaintiff wrote, “I’ve Complained to

Staff[,] health care staff etc[.] So far its been four days and I have only gotten them once
a day at night.” (Id. at p. 4). Plaintiff then emphasized that his evening dose of pain
medication wore off by the next morning, thereby leaving him in pain the majority of
each day (Id. at pp. 4-5). In the “Relief Requested” section, Plaintiff sought to “be given
my meds twice a day like the doctor prescribed” and for “someone [to be] held account

for this mistake because this could have cost me my hand or my life.” (Id. at p. 4).
Plaintiff’s grievance was deemed an emergency by the Warden on September 21,
2022, and subject to expedited review (Id.). On October 11, 2022, Health Care Unit
Administrator Angela Crain (who is also a named Defendant in this action) issued a
memorandum which found that, based upon a review of Plaintiff’s Medication

Administration Record, Plaintiff had not received his prescribed, morning dose of pain
medicine for the mornings of September 16, 2022, through September 20, 2022 (Id. at p.
6). Defendant Crain stated that it was unclear why Plaintiff’s pain medication was not
dispensed as prescribed on those days, but Plaintiff was seen by “NP Dearmond on
9/26/22 to follow up and [he] reported his ‘pain is better.’” (Id.).
In light of Defendant Crain’s memorandum, the Grievance Officer found “the

issue was appropriately addressed by the medical professionals” and recommended
Plaintiff’s grievance be affirmed (Id. at p. 3). The Warden concurred in the Grievance
Officer’s recommendation on October 14, 2022 (Id.). Plaintiff then appealed the grievance
to the ARB, which similarly affirmed his grievance and found that Plaintiff’s morning
dose of pain medication was not provided from September 16 to September 20, 2022 (Id.
at p. 2). The ARB concluded by stating that the “Warden is to reiterate staff’s compliance

with A.D. 04.03.110 – Control of medication and medical instruments.” (Id.).
II. Analysis:
Defendant Dearmond argues that she is entitled to summary judgment based
upon Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies because Emergency
Grievance No. 223-9-22 does not identify her by name or description (see generally Doc.

46 at pp. 6-8). Relatedly, Defendant Dearmond avers that Plaintiff’s grievance did not
identify the claim he is currently proceeding upon against her—that she failed to assist
him after he complained to her about the missing morning doses (Id. at pp. 7-8). In
support, Defendant Dearmond points out that “[t]here does not appear to have been any
investigation or determination on the merits of Plaintiff’s grievance that he complained

to ‘staff[,] health care staff[,] etc.’ about nurses not dispensing his medication, and they
did not assist him.” (Id. at p. 8).
Defendant Dearmond correctly notes that the Illinois Administrative Code
instructs inmates to name or describe each person who was involved in their grievance
(Id. at p. 4). Specifically, section 504.810(c) provides that a “grievance shall contain factual
details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including what happened,

when, where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise
involved in the complaint.” However, “[t]his provision does not preclude an offender
from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the offender
must include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id. In
interpreting this provision, numerous cases have held that a grievance must identify who
their target is or implicate their target in the alleged wrongdoing. See Roberts v. Neal, 745

F.3d 232, 235-36 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The grievance has a fatal defect, but it lies elsewhere; it
lies in the absence of anything in it to indicate that Davis was the target.”); Cunningham
v. Isaacs, No. 3:21-CV-247-MAB, 2022 WL 3026854, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2022) (“In short,
the grievance must provide sufficient information to identify the defendant as the target
of the complaint or to implicate them in the alleged wrongdoing.”).

Notably, however, a grievance that is addressed on the merits, whose contents
either identifies or implicates its target may be sufficient for purposes of exhaustion. See,
e.g., Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that a grievance which
complained about the administrative decision to cancel a religious service was sufficient
to alert prison administrators as to the individuals it was targeting). “Indeed, we have

found exhaustion as to defendants not named in a grievance when, from the content of
the grievance and the nature of the complained of conduct the prison was clearly on
notice that those unnamed defendants were involved.” Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 960
(7th Cir. 2024) (citing Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722). For instance, in Gordon v. Rogers, the
plaintiff complained about “Healthcare staff” not taking his situation seriously following
his surgery. 3:17-CV-1302-DRH-DGW, 2018 WL 6977338, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2018). The

defendants argued the plaintiff’s grievance was insufficient to identify them because the
grievance only generally named healthcare staff and did not adequately name or describe
them. Id. The Court rejected the defendants’ argument because “[i]t could have been no
mystery to the prison who Plaintiff was complaining about when he indicated that he
was not receiving adequate post-operative care. A simple review of his medical records,
which is what occurred, would have informed the prison of who Plaintiff was

complaining about.” Id. See also Zepeda v. Shah, 3:22-CV-03040-GCS, 2025 WL 958360, at
*6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025) (“Not naming defendants in a grievance itself is a mere technical
defect where the inmate sufficiently describes the alleged wrongdoing to allow prison
officials a fair opportunity to respond.”); Walker v. Robinson, 3:23-CV-01466-GCS, 2025 WL
915743, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2025) (“Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a

grievance need only provide enough information to allow prison officials to investigate
the issue, even if a specific defendant is not explicitly named in the original grievance.”).
Similar to the grievance in Gordon, here Plaintiff grieved the actions of health care
staff in not providing him with his medication as prescribed following his surgery (see
Doc. 46-1 at pp. 4-5).4 Naturally then, the prison would have been alerted to Plaintiff’s

4 Alternatively, given that Plaintiff’s grievance was written at a time when Plaintiff was not receiving his
morning medications, it would be fair to interpret Plaintiff’s grievance as challenging the decision to
prescribe him pain medication once per day, while also inaccurately telling him he would receive it twice
per day (see, e.g. Doc. 46-1 at p. 4) (Stating, “I was told that I would be receiving pain meds twice a day”
but “I only been getting meds once a day.”). While the medical records demonstrate this is not what
occurred, there may not have been a way for Plaintiff to know that fact at the time he wrote his grievance.
complaint against the health care staff that he interacted with between 9/16/22 and
9/20/22.5 See id. And the medical records readily identify Defendant Dearmond as a

member of health care staff who provided treatment to Plaintiff during the time in
question (see Doc. 1 at pp. 23, 31-35; Doc. 46-1 at p. 6). See also Todd v. Shaw, 3:17-CV-359-
DRH-DGW, 2018 WL 5904455, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2018), (“Here, Todd specifically
identified that Wexford health care staff were involved in the denial of his [medical
needs]. Thus, the State was placed on notice that the Wexford health care employees
providing Todd with his medical care were implicated by the grievance.”); Bakaturski v.

Brookhart, 2022 WL 1093633 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2022) (finding grievances that named
“healthcare” provided sufficient information to identify a healthcare administrator
where the grievance described conduct attributable to someone in the defendant’s
position); Bandala-Martinez v. Bebout, 188 F. Supp. 3d 836, 842 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (“This
information should have provided the ARB enough details to look into Plaintiff’s

allegations of an assault and the possible individuals involved given the time and
location.”); c.f. Brown v. Porter, 3:24-CV-669-CCB-APR, 2025 WL 1445350, at *2 (N.D. Ind.

And, had the underlying issue been a mistake made by the prescriber, Plaintiff’s grievance would have
been sufficient to identify that individual (which, he alleges was Defendant Dearmond) (see also Id. at p. 6).
5 Furthermore, to the extent raised, the Court rejects the general argument that Plaintiff’s grievance failed
to adequately identify any individual because it only identified “staff” or “health care staff.” Here,
Plaintiff’s “grievance was [reviewed and affirmed] on the merits at every stage of review without any
indication from prison officials that it was procedurally deficient.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th
Cir. 2011). “Where prison officials address an inmate’s grievance on the merits without rejecting it on
procedural grounds, the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action,
and defendants cannot rely on the failure to exhaust defense.” Id. at 722. See also Keith Allen v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., et al., 23-CV-3775-DWD, 2025 WL 1909465, at *5 (S.D. Ill. July 11, 2025) (“The grievances were
addressed by the prison on the merits, which suggests they contained enough information for prison to be
on notice of underlying issues and those involved even if they were not individually named. As such, the
grievances are sufficient to exhaust the claim against Defendant Florence.”).
May 20, 2025) (Finding the grievance failed to identify correctional officers when it only
complained about inadequate medical care by “nursing staff.”). In fact, Defendant Crain’s

memorandum confirms that prison officials identified Defendant Dearmond as a health
care staff member who treated Plaintiff (Doc. 46-1 at p. 6). See Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that he was not identified where the defendant was
given the opportunity to respond to the grievance during the administrative review
process). Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s grievance sufficiently identified Defendant
Dearmond.

Nevertheless, while Defendant Dearmond acknowledges that she was a health
care staff member who was identifiable from Plaintiff’s medical records, she attempts to
distinguish herself from Plaintiff’s claim by arguing that “medication line nursing staff
failing to dispense prescribed medication is not the type of grievance where the prison
would know that Dearmond – a nurse practitioner – was involved just by the nature of

the grievance.” (Doc. 46 at p. 7). While the premise underlying this contention is certainly
reasonable, the fatal flaw with this contention is that Defendant Dearmond did not
provide any evidence to support the claimed distinction between herself and “medication
line nursing staff.” (Id.). See Anderson v. Larry, 21-CV-944, 2022 WL 17357434, at *13 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 1, 2022) (“It is the JTC Defendants’ burden to demonstrate in their summary

judgment briefing that neither the October 2018 Grievance nor the April 2019 Grievance
properly exhausted Anderson’s claims against them.”).
Put simply, as the movant, Defendant Dearmond bore the burden of proving that
she did not dispense medications and therefore, would not have been easily identified by
any inquiry into the actions of the health care staff members who dispensed Plaintiff’s
medication. Yet, she did not provide any evidence to do so. See, e.g., Anderson, 2022 WL

17357434 at *13; Davis v. Mason, 881 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 2018) (“It was not Davis’s
burden to establish that the grievance process was unavailable; it was the officers’ burden
to show that Davis did not exhaust available remedies.”); Jones v. Pfister, 17 C 8789, 2021
WL 1020996, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2021) (“That said, a prisoner does not bear the burden
of pleading and proving exhaustion. Rather, the defendant bears the burden to show that
an inmate did not properly exhaust available remedies.”). Thus, Defendant Dearmond

has failed to establish that she was not identified or would not have been readily
identified by Plaintiff’s grieving of health care staff.
Similarly, Defendant Dearmond argues that Plaintiff’s grievance only challenged
the failure to provide him with his morning medication and did not grieve staff’s refusal
to assist him after he complained to them of his missing medication (Doc. 46 at pp. 7-8).

Defendant Dearmond supports this assertion by emphasizing that the IDOC’s analysis of
Plaintiff’s grievance only addressed Plaintiff’s claim of not being given morning
medication doses, meaning it did not address Plaintiff’s claim that staff ignored his
requests for help (Id.). Ultimately, regardless of how prison officials interpreted Plaintiff’s
grievance, the Court’s analysis must focus upon the contents of Plaintiff’s grievance. See

McDaniel v. Meisner, 617 Fed. Appx. 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We are not persuaded by
the defendants’ argument that McDaniel’s mistake in listing December 13, 2011, at the
top of the form prevented them from understanding that McDaniel was seeking relief for
the March 8 assault.”); Brian A. Patterson v. Candace Whitman, et al., 24-CV-939-PP, 2025
WL 1885743, at *6 (E.D. Wis. July 8, 2025) (Finding the complaint examiner’s erroneous
rejection of a complaint as having been previously addressed “rendered administrative

remedies unavailable to the plaintiff for any claim tangentially related to his first
complaint.”). And here, Plaintiff’s grievance stated that he “complained to … health care
staff” about the issue and it had yet to be resolved after four days (Doc. 46-1 at p. 4). To
put it plainly, that contention sufficiently identified Plaintiff’s claim that health care staff
ignored his complaints about not receiving morning medication. Any other ruling would
create an incentive to mischaracterize an inmate’s grievance so they could later argue that

the actual issue had not been exhausted. See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.
2006) (stating that prison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion
requirement).
Consequently, Defendant Dearmond’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED
(Doc. 45). As the other Defendants have already withdrawn their affirmative defense of

exhaustion (Doc. 48), this action is now moving beyond the exhaustion of administrative
remedies phase. Accordingly, the stay on merits-based discovery is LIFTED and the
parties can proceed with discovery on the merits. A new scheduling order will be entered
by separate order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant Dearmond’s Motion for Summary

Judgment for Plaintiff’s Failure to Exhaust is DENIED (Doc. 45).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 22, 2025
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11105524. Public record. Not legal advice.