# People of Michigan v. Karen Sue Boes

> Michigan Court of Appeals · July 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11105446

## Case

- **Court:** Michigan Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** July 22, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED
July 22, 2025
Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:30 AM

v No. 366916
Ottawa Circuit Court
KAREN SUE BOES, LC No. 02-026455-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and REDFORD and MARIANI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted the trial court’s order denying her successive
motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G). We vacate that order and remand for an
evidentiary hearing.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2003, defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of first-degree felony murder,
MCL 750.316(1). Defendant appealed by right to this Court, and we affirmed her conviction and
sentence. People v Boes, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, entered
December 21, 2004 (Docket No. 248289). The facts underlying defendant’s conviction and
sentence were summarized in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal:

Defendant’s conviction arises from the death of her fourteen-year-old
daughter, who died of smoke inhalation from a fire at their home. At trial, the
prosecution presented evidence that the fire was fueled by an accelerant, such as
gasoline; that it started in the hallway outside the victim’s bedroom; and that the
victim could not have started the fire and then retreated back into the bedroom
where she died.

* * *

In the instant case, the two expert witnesses presented by the prosecution
agreed that the fire started in the hallway, rather than the victim’s bedroom, and

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that the fire was necessarily fueled by an accelerant. They explained their positions
in detail and specifically testified that the fire was not accidental. Although no
evidence of an accelerant was discovered in the hallway, all of the expert witnesses,
including one presented by defendant, acknowledged that a fire might consume all
traces of an accelerant. All of the experts searched for accidental causes of the fire,
but none were found. . . .

With regard to defendant’s responsibility for the fire, the evidence indicated
that only defendant and the victim were in the house at the relevant time. Defendant
told witnesses that the victim was sleeping when she left the house at 8:55 a.m. and
that she had entered the victim’s bedroom and kissed her goodbye before leaving.
A passerby who noticed the fire called 911 five minutes later. Several weeks before
the fire, defendant told her husband that a gas can, which was ultimately found in
the victim’s bedroom, was missing. Traces of gasoline were found on a chair in
the master bedroom that defendant occupied by herself. Moreover, the evidence
showed that gasoline was poured around the victim’s bedroom and an accelerant
was used in the hallway outside the room, where the fire started. One of plaintiff’s
experts testified that the victim could not have started the fire in the hallway and
retreated back into her room.

Furthermore, during police interviews and when speaking to her husband,
defendant stated that she “could have” started the fire. She told numerous different
versions of the events, and several witnesses heard her declare her hatred of the
victim before the fire. Defendant also admitted that she had a violent streak directed
toward the victim, and that she was upset on the morning of the fire. Moreover,
within a week after the victim’s funeral, defendant joked that she would be in jail.
[Boes, unpub op at 1, 4 (Docket No. 248289).]

The prosecution’s two expert witnesses who testified as to the fire’s origin were Special
Agent Mike Marquardt and Dr. John De Haan. Both experts provided extensive testimony
concerning their belief as to the fire’s origin. Both experts opined that the fire had started in the
hallway and spread to the victim’s bedroom, where the ignition of gasoline vapors in a confined
area caused a “deflagration,” essentially a buildup of pressure from burning gasses, that pushed
the door to the bedroom closed and caused the corner of the house’s roof to briefly lift. Both
experts testified that they had not found any probable sources of ignition in the hallway, nor had
any traces of ignitable liquids been discovered in the hallway; further, the hallway did not appear
to contain a sufficient “fuel load” in the form of burnable materials to cause a fire of the duration
and intensity that resulted. Both experts testified to their conclusion that a flammable liquid had
been dispersed intentionally in the hallway. Defendant presented the testimony of an expert
witness, Adolf Wolf, who opined that the fire had started in the victim’s bedroom.

Video recordings of defendant’s interviews by law enforcement on July 30, August 7,
August 13, and September 12, 2002 were played for the jury. Transcripts of those interviews with
inadmissible information redacted were entered into evidence. Defendant testified and denied
starting the fire; she testified that police investigators had convinced her that she could have gone
insane and started the fire.

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Defendant was convicted and her conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to this Court as
stated. The Michigan Supreme Court denied her application for leave to appeal. People v Boes,
474 Mich 853; 702 NW3d 578 (2005).

In 2006, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court
denied that motion in 2008. Defendant applied to this Court for delayed leave to appeal, which
was denied. People v Boes, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 19, 2009
(Docket No. 290345). Our Supreme Court denied defendant leave to appeal this denial. People v
Boes, 485 Mich 974; 774 NW2d 903 (2009). The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan denied defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2013. See Boes v
Warren, unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, issued October 3, 2013 (Case No. 2:09-CV-12279).

Defendant filed a successive motion for relief from judgment in the trial court in 2021. In
her successive motion, defendant argued that she was entitled to relief from judgment based on
newly discovered evidence involving (1) the validity of the expert testimony given by the
prosecution’s fire origin and causation experts and (2) the validity and admissibility of her
statements to police made during her interrogation. In support of her motion, defendant provided
a report from a proposed expert witness, John Lentini, a certified fire investigator, indicating that
since defendant’s trial, the “negative corpus” method, by which a fire investigator determines that
an ignitable liquid must have been present despite a lack of physical evidence, was no longer
recommended for use in fire investigation; additionally, Lentini’s report discussed changes in the
analysis of burn patterns in “flashover” fires. Defendant also provided evidence that Dr. De Haan
had resigned his membership in the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) in 2015,
following an internal investigation in which the AAFS Ethics committee found that Dr. De Haan
had acted unethically while testifying as an expert witness in 2008. Defendant also provided the
report of another proposed expert witness, James Trainum, a former homicide detective and current
consultant in the field of police practices and interrogation, opining that there had been a shift in
scientific consensus regarding the understanding of false confessions and the validity of
interrogation techniques used by law enforcement in interviewing defendant.

In response, the prosecution provided the reports of two proposed expert witnesses. Jamie
Lord, a fire protection engineer and instructor in fire dynamics, fluid dynamics, and fire protection
systems, opined in his report that Lentini had incorrectly concluded that major changes to the field
of fire investigation had occurred since defendant’s trial. Dr. Matthew DeLisi, Ph.D., opined in
his report that Trainum had incorrectly characterized advances in the study of interrogation
techniques and false confessions as new scientific evidence or consensus.

The trial court denied that motion without an evidentiary hearing in 2023. Regarding
defendant’s fire origin evidence, including the evidence regarding Dr. De Haan’s resignation from
the AAFS, the trial court found defendant had shown the existence of newly-discovered evidence.
However, the trial court found that the introduction of this evidence would not make a different
result probable on retrial. Regarding defendant’s false confession evidence, the trial court held
that defendant had not established the existence of newly-discovered evidence. Defendant applied
to this Court for delayed leave to appeal that denial, which this Court granted “limited to the issues
raised in the application and supporting brief.” People v Boes, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered February 28, 2024 (Docket No. 366916).

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion for a new
trial (including a motion for relief from judgment seeking a new trial). See People v Johnson, 502
Mich 541, 564; 918 NW2d 676 (2018), citing People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174
(2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes. Id.

This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s factual findings. Id. “Clear error occurs
if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.”
Id. at 565 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘[A]ppellate courts need not refrain from
scrutinizing a trial court’s factual findings, nor may appellate courts tacitly endorse obvious errors
under the guise of deference.’ ” Id., quoting People v McSwain, 259 Mich App 654, 683; 676
NW2d 236 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her successive motion
for relief from judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing. We agree.

A. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A successive motion for relief from judgment is governed by MCR 6.502(G). See also
Johnson, 502 Mich at 566. Generally, a criminal defendant may only file one post-appellate
motion for relief from judgment. MCR 6.502(G)(1); Johnson, 502 Mich at 565. “However, a
defendant may file a successive motion based on ‘a claim of new evidence that was not discovered
before the first such motion.’ ” Johnson, 502 Mich at 566, quoting MCR 6.502(G)(2). If the
successive motion is not barred by MCR 6.502(G), then its merits are considered under
MCR 6.508(D). A trial court may not grant a motion for relief from judgment premised on grounds
for relief that could have been previously raised on appeal or in a prior motion for relief from
judgment, unless a defendant shows good cause for failing to raise such grounds earlier and actual
prejudice. See Johnson, 502 Mich at 565, citing MCR 6.508(D)(3).

In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a
defendant must show that: “(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was
newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the
party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the
evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on
retrial.” [Johnson, 502 Mich at 566, quoting Cress, 468 Mich at 692 (quotation
marks and citations omitted).]

MCR 6.502(G)(3) provides that, “[f]or purposes of MCR 6.502(G)(2), ‘new evidence’ includes
new scientific evidence.” “This includes, but is not limited to, shifts in science entailing changes:
(a) in a field of scientific knowledge, including shifts in scientific consensus; (b) in a testifying
expert’s own scientific knowledge and opinions; or (c) in a scientific method on which the relevant
scientific evidence at trial was based.” Id.

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“In order to determine whether newly discovered evidence makes a different result
probable on retrial, a trial court must first determine whether the evidence is credible.” Id. at 566-
567. In the context of considering whether newly-discovered evidence satisfies the fourth Cress
factor (i.e., makes a different result probable on retrial), the trial court’s credibility determination
is limited to “whether a reasonable juror could find the testimony credible on retrial.” Id. at 597.
When determining whether newly-discovered evidence is credible, the trial court must keep in
mind its “gatekeeping” role; it is not the ultimate fact-finder and should conduct its analysis while
“contemplating a future trial and the role of a future fact-finder.” People v Rogers, 335 Mich App
172, 200; 966 NW2d 181 (2020). Put another way, “[i]f a witness’s lack of credibility is such that
no reasonable juror would consciously entertain a reasonable belief in the witness’s veracity, then
the trial court should deny a defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. However, if a witness
is not patently incredible, a trial court’s credibility determination must bear in mind what a
reasonable juror might make of the testimony, and not what the trial court itself might decide, were
it the ultimate fact-finder.” Johnson, 502 Mich at 566. “[W]hen evaluating a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, the court must consider the evidence admitted at the original
trial and all of the record evidence that has come to light to-date that could be used at the retrial.”
Rogers, 335 Mich App at 197.

B. FIRE ORIGIN EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY

In her successive motion for relief from judgment, defendant argued that a new scientific
consensus on fire investigation had occurred since her trial, specifically in the area of burn pattern
analysis and the use of “negative corpus” evidence and the process of elimination; additionally,
defendant argued that newly-discovered evidence cast doubt on Dr. De Haan’s credibility as an
expert witness. The trial court held that defendant had satisfied the first three Cress factors.
However, the trial court held that defendant had failed to show that a different result was probable
at retrial. See Cress, 468 Mich at 692.

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s successive
motion for relief from judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Johnson, 502 Mich
at 566-567. The trial court’s holding was based primarily on its finding that Lentini’s report was
“not particularly credible” for several factual reasons: (1) that Lentini’s opinion that a flashover
fire had occurred contradicted Marquardt’s and Dr. De Haan’s opinions that a flashover fire had
not occurred, (2) that Lentini’s report did not discuss deflagration or mention a roof separation,
and (3) that Lentini’s report did not discuss the victim’s bedroom door. The trial court also found
that Marquardt and De Haan were credible experts who had appropriately determined that an
ignitable liquid must have been used in the hallway. The trial court also found, regarding Lord’s
report, that the prosecution had presented “a credible expert that has clearly reviewed the whole of
the evidence and offered an opinion supportive of De Haan and Marquardt’s.”

The trial court exceeded its gatekeeping role by prematurely denying defendant’s motion
without an evidentiary hearing. The trial court did not make an initial determination regarding
whether Lentini’s report was “patently incredible” and, if not, “what a reasonable juror might make
of the testimony” at retrial. See Johnson, 502 Mich at 568. Rather, the trial court substituted itself
as the ultimate fact-finder. Id. Moreover, the trial court found, without much explanation, that
Marquardt and Dr. De Haan were credible witnesses; however, the judge presiding over
defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment was not the judge who had presided over

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defendant’s trial. Therefore, without a hearing, the trial court was not in a superior position to
judge the credibility of witnesses appearing before it. See Shann v Shann, 293 Mich App 302,
307; 809 NW2d 435 (2011); see also MCR 2.613(C). At a minimum, the conflicting expert
opinions provided by the parties in support of their positions necessitated a hearing to ascertain
those witnesses’ credibility. See MCR 6.508(B). Moreover, the trial court should not have
assumed Marquardt’s and Dr. De Haan’s credibility, or indeed assumed that their expert opinions
would remain the same and be offered at retrial. An evidentiary hearing would have permitted
defendant to address the trial court’s concerns engendered by Lentini’s report, and would have
aided in determining whether Lentini’s expert testimony would make a difference at retrial. See
Cress, 468 Mich at 692.

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the trial court found that defendant had also
presented newly-discovered evidence regarding Dr. De Haan’s resignation from the AAFS after
an ethics investigation and finding that he had acted unethically while testifying as an expert
witness for the prosecution. Although the trial court quoted our Supreme Court in stating that
“[n]ew impeachment evidence is particularly significant when the only evidence that an offense
was ever committed was largely based on the testimony of an individual whose credibility might
be put into question,” see People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 363-364; 255 NW2d 171 (1977), it
concluded that this new evidence did not qualify because Marquardt provided “credible testimony”
similar to De Haan’s. Again, the trial court did not determine if the new evidence was “patently
incredible” or what a reasonable juror might make of the evidence. See Johnson, 502 Mich at 568.
Additionally, the credibility of Marquardt’s testimony, and his possible testimony on retrial, was
simply assumed. Finally, the trial court did not consider the effect at retrial of the newly-
discovered evidence regarding De Haan in conjunction with defendant’s other newly-discovered
evidence. Rogers, 335 Mich App at 197. An evidentiary hearing would have allowed resolution
of these issues.

C. FALSE CONFESSION EXPERT WITNESS

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress her statements to police on the grounds that they
were not voluntarily-made. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently moved to
present expert testimony from a psychologist regarding defendant’s emotional state during the
interrogation and her susceptibility to suggestion from her interrogators. The trial court permitted
the psychologist to testify regarding defendant’s psychology in general, but ruled that she could
not testify that defendant’s psychological “profile or make-up” caused her to act a certain way or
answer questions a certain way, or that defendant was acting in conformity with “any condition
she might have” when she gave her statements to police. In light of this limitation, defendant opted
not to present the expert’s testimony. Defendant raised the issue of the denial of her motion to
suppress on direct appeal, but did not raise the issue of the trial court’s limitation of her expert
witness and testimony regarding false confessions. See Boes, unpub op at 3.

In her first motion for relief from judgment, defendant offered the testimony of the
psychologist who testified at the hearing on defendant’s suppression motion, stating that the
psychologist would have testified regarding defendant’s emotional state and passivity, and how
her nature and emotional state would have made her feel like she was not free to leave and rendered
her vulnerable to suggestion from her interrogators. The trial court held that defendant had not

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demonstrated good cause for failing to raise this issue in her original appeal, and accordingly
denied defendant’s motion for relief from judgment on that issue.1

In his report that accompanied defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment,
Trainum opined that the August 7, 2002 and September 12, 2002 interviews were “accusatory
interrogations” in which the investigators used techniques that could lead to false confessions.
Trainum further opined that a consensus view by “researchers and leading interrogation schools”
regarding these tactics and their likelihood of causing false confessions arose after 2006 (when
defendant filed her first motion for relief from judgment). The prosecution provided a report from
an expert witness, Dr. DeLisi, who opined that “[n]othing in the research from 2006 onward has
demonstrated how police interrogation practices contribute to false confessions or that [defendant]
offered a false confession, or how.”

The trial court held that defendant had not demonstrated that the evidence she offered
regarding false confessions constituted newly-discovered evidence, noting that “false confessions
have been a well-known phenomenon for decades” and concluding that defendant had not
demonstrated “actual changes in evidence or consensus” in this area since 2006. Accordingly, the
trial court held that defendant had failed to satisfy MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b).

While a closer question, we conclude under these particular circumstances that the trial
court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before making its ultimate determination
regarding defendant’s false-confession evidence. As the prosecution does not meaningfully
dispute on appeal,2 defendant’s motion as to this topic is “based on ‘a claim of new evidence.’ ”
Johnson, 502 Mich at 566, quoting MCR 6.502(G)(2). And while the trial court did not purport to
reach MCR 6.508(D) and Cress, here, much like the fire origin evidence, the court was provided
with competing opinions in reports from experts who indicated that they were willing to testify at
trial, but the trial court did not avail itself of the opportunity to have those witnesses appear before
it and judge their credibility; rather, the trial court seems to have simply found Dr. DeLisi to be
more credible. Moreover, it appears that defendant’s prior attempts to challenge her confession
were based on her allegedly unique susceptibility to suggestion and passivity, not a challenge to
the validity and reliability of the methods used by her police interrogators. On this record, and
given the importance of defendant’s statements to the determination of her guilt, we hold that the
trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on this issue. See MCR 6.508(B).

1
Defendant did raise the issue of the trial court’s limitation of her proposed expert witness
testimony in her habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, arguing that the trial court’s ruling amounted to a denial of her right to present a
defense; as stated, the District Court denied her petition.
2
Instead, the prosecution “[a]ssum[ed] for the sake of argument” that defendant’s successive
motion for relief from judgment is based on new evidence for purposes of MCR 6.502(G).

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D. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s successive
motion for relief from judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing. Johnson, 502 Mich
at 564. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for an evidentiary hearing.3 We
do not retain jurisdiction.4

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

3
Our opinion should not be construed as offering any opinion as to the proper outcome following
an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the trial court should apply the ordinary standards under
MCR 6.508(D).
4
Defendant requests that we remand for an evidentiary hearing before a new judge. Although we
conclude that the trial judge erred by deciding this matter without holding an evidentiary hearing,
we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated either actual bias or a risk of the appearance of
impropriety. See MCR 2.003(1)(b); MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b); see also In re MKK, 286 Mich App
546, 566; 781 NW2d 132 (2009) (“Disqualification on the basis of bias or prejudice cannot be
established merely by repeated rulings against a litigant, even if the rulings are erroneous.”); Kern
v Kern-Koskela, 320 Mich App 212, 231-232; 905 NW2d 453 (2017)(“[J]udicial rulings, in and
of themselves, almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial
opinion displays a ‘deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible and overcomes a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.’ ”) (citations omitted).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11105446. Public record. Not legal advice.