# Perry County, Indiana v. Keith D. Huck

> Indiana Supreme Court · July 22, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11105233

## Case

- **Court:** Indiana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** July 22, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming injunction where payments were not being made on care for high-risk individuals with life-threatening diseases

## Opinion text

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 24S-PL-297

Perry County, Indiana; The Board of Commissioners
of the County of Perry (Indiana); Randy Cole; Randy
Kleaving; Rebecca Thorn, FILED
Appellants (Defendants below), Jul 22 2025, 10:10 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
–v– and Tax Court

Keith D. Huck,
Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

Argued: October 31, 2024 | Decided: July 22, 2025

Appeal from the Perry Circuit Court
No. 62C01-2401-PL-31
The Honorable Justin B. Mills, Special Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
No. 24A-PL-418

Opinion by Justice Massa
Justice Slaughter and Justice Molter concur.
Chief Justice Rush concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.
Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion.
Massa, Justice.

Indiana law permits public employers to provide their employees with
health insurance. Our law also allows local governmental units to exclude
part-time employees from group health insurance. In this case, the Perry
County Board of Commissioners voted to exclude Keith Huck, an elected
county councilman, from group health insurance coverage, because they
deemed him to be a part-time employee under the relevant statutes. As we
read the statutes, Perry County was permitted to do so. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s ruling to the contrary, vacate the preliminary
injunction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Facts and Procedural History
Prior to January 1, 2024, Perry County provided group health insurance
to its employees, retired employees, and dependent family members.
Keith Huck, an elected member of the Perry County Common Council,
receives a salary for his service and was covered under the group plan. In
2023, he earned an annual salary of $4,783.00, which amounted to
approximately $186.96 per paycheck. All Perry County elected officials are
considered county salaried employees. Huck’s salary is paid by Perry
County through its General Fund and, pursuant to Indiana Code Section
36-2-5-3(a), the amount of a Perry County Council member’s salary is set
by County ordinance. In 2023, Huck and his wife participated in the group
health insurance program offered and paid for by Perry County. The
health insurance plan selected by Huck cost Perry County an additional
$28,863.12 on top of his annual salary.

In 2023, the Perry County Board of Commissioners (Randy Cole, Randy
Kleaving, and Rebecca Thorn) (hereafter “the County”) voted to exclude
part-time employees from health insurance coverage. The County
classified elected officials—along with the commissioners themselves,
other council members, and certain additional elected officials—as part-
time employees, resulting in Huck and his spouse losing health insurance
on January 1, 2024. Huck received notice of his eligibility to apply for

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 2 of 10
continuation of health coverage through the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Huck also was eligible to purchase
replacement insurance through the health care exchanges under the
Affordable Care Act. He did not, however, obtain any health insurance
through COBRA or otherwise.

Huck instead sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
County. He asked the court to require the County to provide him with
health insurance coverage because, as an elected county official, he is by
definition a full-time employee regardless of his actual hours worked. The
trial court agreed and granted his request for a preliminary injunction,
ordering the County to immediately reinstate his insurance coverage. The
County then moved for expedited consideration of its interlocutory
appeal, which the Court of Appeals granted. In a unanimous published
opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that Huck was an “employee”
under Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-1(1)(A) and that Section 5-10-8-2.6(b)
“confer[s] on local boards the authority to exclude employees from health
insurance coverage based on their status as full-time or part-time
employees, and the statutes neither define full-time or part-time
employees nor exempt elected officials from that consideration.” Perry
Cnty. v. Huck, 232 N.E.3d 141, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). As a result, the
Court of Appeals concluded that “under the plain language of the
statutes, the Board had the authority to discontinue health insurance
coverage for an elected official who was also a part-time employee.” Id.

Huck sought transfer to this Court, which we granted, thereby vacating
the appellate opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
“Appellate review of a preliminary injunction decision is ‘limited and
deferential.’” In re Paternity of H.F.D.S., 247 N.E.3d 834, 837 (Ind. Ct. App.
2024) (quoting State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ind. 2011),
reh’g denied). The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court, and thus we limit our review to
whether there was an abuse of that discretion. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 3 of 10
Admin. v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 2002) (citing Harvest Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Inter–Ocean Ins. Co., 492 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ind. 1986)). In
determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we consider
whether the evidence supports the trial court’s special findings of fact and
whether the findings support the judgment. Hannum Wagle & Cline Eng’g,
Inc. v. Am. Consulting, Inc., 64 N.E.3d 863, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We will
reverse the trial court’s judgment only when it is clearly erroneous, and a
judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with
a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Gleeson v. Preferred
Sourcing, LLC, 883 N.E.2d 164, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

Discussion and Decision
The standard for granting preliminary injunctions is high. A
preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary equitable remedy that should
be granted with caution.” Combs v. Daniels, 853 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006). We have reiterated that a preliminary injunction is not a final
judgment and “should be granted only in ‘rare instances.’” Econ. Freedom
Fund, 959 N.E.2d at 801 (quoting Gary Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Eldridge, 774
N.E.2d 579, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). In order to obtain a
preliminary injunction, the moving party must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that (1) it has a reasonable likelihood of success at trial, (2)
its remedies at law are inadequate and it is at risk of irreparable harm
unless an injunction is issued, (3) its threatened injury outweighs the
potential harm of granting the injunction, and (4) the public interest
would not be disserved. Id. at 803. If the movant fails to satisfy any one of
these four requirements, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in
denying injunctive relief. Great Lakes Anesthesia, P.C. v. O'Bryan, 99 N.E.3d
260, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Zimmer, Inc. v. Davis, 922 N.E.2d 68, 74
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).

This case turns on the first element—whether Huck has proven that he
is likely to succeed on the merits by showing that he is not a part-time
employee under the relevant statutes. Based on a plain reading of the
statute, we find that Huck has not established his burden of proof as to

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 4 of 10
this element. Huck is employed by a local unit public employer; therefore,
he is a local unit public employee and, as such, the County reserves the
right to classify him as a part-time local elected official. Given that local
unit public employers may provide or exclude part-time employees from
group insurance coverage, the County was within its power to do so.

Because we find that Huck failed to establish one of the required
elements for a preliminary injunction, we need not address the others. Id.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing
the injunction. Walgreen, 769 N.E.2d at 161.

Huck does not have a reasonable probability of
success on the merits.
The question before the Court is whether local elected officials may be
designated as part-time employees, which would therefore permit the
County to exclude them from group health insurance. The answer, as
found in the statutes, is yes.

When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give
effect to the Legislature’s intent. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind.
2012). The best evidence of that intent is the statute’s language. Id.
“When interpreting a statute, we begin by reading its words in their plain
and ordinary meaning, taking into account ‘the structure of the statute as
a whole.’” Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023) (quoting
ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind.
2016)). It is important that meaning be given to each and every word used
in a statute. We do not presume that the Legislature intended to enact a
statutory provision that is superfluous, meaningless, or a nullity. SAC Fin.,
Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 894 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. T.C. 2008).
When conducting statutory interpretation, “we are mindful ‘of what the
statute says and what it doesn’t say’ and ‘avoid interpretations that
depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational
and disharmonizing results.’” Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind.
2024) (quoting Town of Linden, 204 N.E.3d at 237). Finally, and
importantly, “when a statute contains both a specific provision and a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 5 of 10
general one, the specific provision will control; the general provision will
be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular provision.” SAC Fin., 894 N.E.2d at
1120; see also State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 155 (Ind. 2022) (citing Grether
v. Ind. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 159 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ind. 1959)) (“As a
matter of interpretation, general statutes yield to more specific statutes.”).

Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-2.6(b), which applies to local unit public
employers and employees, specifies that “a public employer may provide
programs of group insurance for its employees . . . . The public employer
may, however, exclude part-time employees . . . from any group
insurance coverage that the public employer provides to the employer’s
full-time employees.” (Emphasis added). The parties agree, as do we, that
the County is a local unit public employer. Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-
1(5) provides that a “local unit” includes a city, town, county, township,
public library, municipal corporation, school corporation, or charter
school. Subsection 1(7) defines a “public employer” as the “state or local
unit, including any board, commission, department, division, authority,
institution, establishment, facility, or governmental unit under the
supervision of either, having a payroll in relation to persons it
immediately employs, even if it is not a separate taxing unit.” Thus, the
County “may provide programs of group health insurance for its
employees” and may also “exclude part-time employees” from its group
plan. I.C. § 5-10-8-2.6(b).

The statute defines an “employee” eligible for health insurance,
though it does not define “part-time employee” specifically. Section 5-10-
8-1(1) defines an “employee” as:

(A) an elected or appointed officer or official, or a full-time
employee;

(B) if the individual is employed by a school corporation, a full-
time or part-time employee;

(C) for a local unit public employer, a full-time or part-time
employee or a person who provides personal services to the
unit under contract during the contract period; or

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 6 of 10
(D) a senior judge appointed under IC 33-24-3-7;

whose services have continued without interruption at least
thirty (30) days.

Huck argues the County, in withholding healthcare coverage from him,
violated this statutory scheme. Under Huck’s reading of Section 5-10-8-
1(1)(A), the use of a comma and the word “or” creates five classes of
employees: “elected officers,” “elected officials,” “appointed officers,”
“appointed officials,” and “full-time employees.” He argues he is an
“employee” eligible for healthcare coverage because the statute defines
“employee” to include “an elected or appointed officer or official,” and he
is an elected official. And because he is an “employee” given his status as
an elected official, he asserts he cannot be a “part-time employee”
excluded from healthcare coverage under Subsection 5-10-8-2.6(b). Put
differently, Huck argues that an “elected official,” for the purposes of
defining an employee, does not have to be a full-time employee but
nonetheless enjoys the same status for coverage purposes.

We agree with Huck that he is a county “employee,” but not for the
reason he asserts. As the County notes, Subsection 1(1)(A) broadly applies
to any type of “elected or appointed officer or official,” whereas
Subsection 1(1)(C) is a more specific statute that applies only to a “local
unit” like the County. “For a local unit public employer, [employee
means] a full-time or part-time employee or a person who provides
personal services to the unit under contract during the contract period.”
I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1)(C). As the more specific provision dealing with local
units, Subsection 1(1)(C) applies here, not Subsection 1(1)(A), a general
provision that does not reference local units. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d at 155;
SAC Fin., Inc., 894 N.E.2d at 1120. And under Subsection 1(1)(C), it does
not matter that Huck is an elected official. He is an “employee” and thus
eligible for health insurance so long as the County classifies his position as
either full- or part-time. Huck acknowledges that Subsection 1(1)(C) might
also apply here but nonetheless insists we should apply Subsection
(1)(1)(A). But this reading asks us to engage in selective reading of
individual words, which would lead to disharmonizing results. Spells, 225
N.E.3d at 772. All local elected or appointed officers or officials paid under

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 7 of 10
the County’s salary ordinance are included under Subsection 1(1)(C),
giving the County the flexibility to treat elected officials as part-time
employees if it so chooses. Therefore, under Section 5-10-8-2.6(b), the
County may deny him group health insurance.

While Huck’s reading of the statute may be accurate for state elected
officials, it overlooks a crucial distinction as Subsection 1(1)(C) acts as a
qualifier for all local unit public employees. Indeed, the rest of Chapter 8
confirms our conclusion that 1(1)(C) refers to all employees of a local unit
public employer, elected or otherwise. Within Chapter 8, there are specific
rules for state-level elected officials, but not local-unit elected officials.
Subsection 5-10-8-7(b), for example, specifically governs state-level
“employees who hold elected offices.” Thus, the Chapter as a whole
confirms that Subsection 1(1)(A)’s reference to elected officials relates to
state-level elected officials, not local-level elected officials.

As a result, while local unit public employers are not required to do so,
they may categorize their locally elected officials as full-time or part-time
employees. Thus, local unit public employers may exclude group health
insurance for those they designate as part-time employees. I.C. § 5-10-8-
2.6(b) (emphasis added). We read the statute as the Legislature
distinguishing local unit public employees from other employees. By
doing this, we find that the Legislature intended for local unit public
employers to retain discretion in the classification of their employees as
full-time or part-time. This reading then correlates with the discretion the
Legislature has given to local unit public employers in Subsection 5-10-8-
2.6(b), allowing them to provide or exclude group health insurance for
those deemed part-time.

Huck contends that even if Subsection 1(1)(C) governs exclusively, he
cannot be a part-time employee and thus cannot be excluded from health
insurance. This argument rests on Indiana Code Section 36-2-5-13(b)
(“Compensation Statute”), which specifies that “[a]n elected county officer
is not required to report hours worked and may not be compensated
based on the number of hours worked.” The statute defines
“compensation,” in turn, to include “health insurance” benefits. I.C. § 36-
2-5-13(a). Thus, he says, the County may not classify Huck’s position as

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 8 of 10
part-time because doing so would mean the County was compensating
him “based on the number of hours worked.”

In our view, Huck overreads the Compensation Statute. While the
Compensation Statute bars local unit public employers from paying its
elected officials at an hourly rate, it does not prevent local public
employers from classifying an elected official as being part-time or full-
time. The opening sentence to Subsection 13(b) requires a local unit to pay
its elected officials “using an annual, monthly, or biweekly salary
schedule.” I.C. § 36-2-5-13(b). And the next sentence, the one Huck relies
on, bars local units from compensating their elected officials based on the
number of hours worked. Read in full, Subsection 13(b) compels
the County to pay its elected officials a salary and not an hourly wage; but
it does not compel the County to pay or treat its elected officials as full-
time employees. Put differently, the statute does not provide the necessary
link that Huck is relying on, nor does it define or use the terminology
“part-time” or “full-time.” Even though elected officials can be paid only a
salary, and thus need not report their hours worked, that does not
automatically mean they cannot be part-time.

It is true that in certain roles, people may be paid a salary regardless of
hours worked or the amount of work completed. Elected officials’ hours
ebb and flow with demand, which the Compensation Statute recognizes.
But this does not mean that by virtue of being paid a salary, local elected
officials cannot also be considered part-time employees. Therefore, we
read Section 36-2-5-13(b) as only requiring Huck’s compensation to be on
a salary schedule. And while Huck is correct that the County cannot
compensate him based on the number of hours worked, nor are they
required to ask him to report his hours worked, the statute does not
prevent the County from identifying his role as part-time. For this reason,
we do not find any relief for Huck in the Compensation Statute.

Conclusion
A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary equitable remedy that
should be granted with caution,” Combs, 853 N.E.2d at 160, and thus an

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 9 of 10
injunction should be issued only where the moving party has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it has a reasonable likelihood of
success at trial. Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Planned Parenthood
Great Nw., Haw., Alaska, Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 964 (Ind. 2023).
Indiana Code Section 5-10-8-1 enables local unit public employers to
classify their employees and deny insurance benefits to part-time
employees. The County was within its power to first designate Huck as a
part-time employee and subsequently exclude him from group health
insurance. For these reasons, Huck has not shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that he is likely to succeed on the merits. The trial court,
therefore, abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. Great
Lakes Anesthesia, P.C., 99 N.E.3d at 268. We therefore reverse the trial court,
vacate the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. If we are mistaken in our interpretation, the
General Assembly remains free to revise its statutes to provide more
clarity.

Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur.
Rush C.J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Anthony W. Overholt
Maggie L. Smith
Alexander P. Will
Frost Brown Todd, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Keith W. Vonderahe
Robert L. Burkart
Dirck H. Stahl
Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders, LLP
Evansville, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 10 of 10
Rush, C.J., concurring in the judgment.

The Court concludes that Perry County may classify Keith Huck, an
elected official, as a part-time employee and exclude him from the
county’s group insurance plan on that basis. Accordingly, the Court
vacates the preliminary injunction in Huck’s favor. I agree with this
outcome but for different reasons. The statute on group plans for local-
unit public employees does not cover elected officials. And even if it does,
Huck demonstrated only financial harm for which the remedy is damages.
Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must make four
showings by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) they have a reasonable
likelihood of success at trial; (2) they face irreparable harm pending
resolution of the case; (3) this harm outweighs any harm to the
nonmovant from granting an injunction; and (4) the requested injunction
will not disserve the public interest. Leone v. Comm’r, Ind. Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, 933 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Ind. 2010). Huck failed to meet his burden
of proof on the first two requirements.

I. Huck failed to show a reasonable likelihood of
success at trial because he is not an “employee” for
purposes of the statute on local-unit group plans.
The merits of Huck’s claim rest on three statutes. He asserts he is Perry
County’s “employee” because Indiana Code section 5-10-8-1(1)(A) defines
that term as “an elected or appointed officer or official, or a full-time
employee,” and he is an elected official. Ind. Code § 5-10-8-1(1)(A). Next,
he maintains he is not a part-time employee because, under Section 36-2-5-
13(b), county elected officials are “not required to report hours worked
and may not be compensated based on the number of hours worked.” Id.
§ 36-2-5-13(b). And finally, while acknowledging he is one of the
“employees” for whom Perry County may provide a group plan under
Section 5-10-8-2.6, he contends he is not one of the “part-time employees”
whom the county may “exclude” from its plan. Id. § 5-10-8-2.6(b).
These arguments misconstrue the statutory scheme. The four
definitions of “employee” in Section 5-10-8-1(1) apply throughout Chapter
5-10-8. Id. § -1. Two of those definitions are relevant here. Subsection
(1)(A), on which Huck relies, defines an “employee” as “an elected or
appointed officer or official, or a full-time employee.” Id. § -1(1)(A).
Subsection (1)(C), however, defines “employee” specifically “for a local
unit public employer” as “a full-time or part-time employee or a person
who provides personal services to the unit under contract during the
contract period.” Id. § -1(1)(C). So while this definition aligns with
Subsection (1)(A) with respect to full-time employees, it omits elected and
appointed officials. These definitions therefore conflict. And Subsection
(1)(C), the more specific definition, controls in the local-unit context. See
State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 155 (Ind. 2022) (“As a matter of
interpretation, general statutes yield to more specific statutes.”). As an
elected official, Huck falls outside Subsection (1)(C). And accordingly, he
is not Perry County’s “employee” for purposes of Section 5-10-8-2.6,
because that statute “applies only to local unit public employers and their
employees.” I.C. § 5-10-8-2.6(a).

This conclusion is bolstered by reviewing the related statutes in
Chapter 5-10-8 on group plans for both local-unit and state-level
employees. The local-unit public employee statute tellingly mentions all
three categories of employees from Subsection (1)(C) but, like that
provision, omits elected or appointed officials. Id. § -2.6(b). Indeed, the
statute imposes no restrictions on a local-unit public employer’s treatment
of elected officials. It simply provides that such an employer “may”
provide group plans for employees and that, if it does provide a plan for
full-time employees, it may exclude part-time employees and persons
working under contract. Id. Meanwhile, the statute on group plans for
state-level public employees specifically mentions “employees who hold
elected offices.” Id. § -7(d). Thus, a review of the chapter as a whole
indicates that the definition of “employee” in Subsection (1)(A) applies at
the state level but not at the local level. In sum, these statutes do not
prevent Perry County from excluding elected officials from its group plan.

The Court ultimately reaches the same conclusion, reasoning that
local-unit public employers may “categorize their locally elected officials

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 2 of 4
as full-time or part-time employees” and thus exclude part-time elected
officials from a group plan. Ante, at 8. But the problem with that approach
is that it may violate a statute that precludes counties from compensating
an “elected county officer . . . based on the number of hours worked.” I.C.
§ 36-2-5-13(b). Though the Court concludes this statute merely prohibits a
local-unit public employer from paying an elected official “at an hourly
rate,” ante at 9, the statute also includes “health insurance” benefits within
the scope of “compensation,” I.C. § 36-2-5-13(a). Section 36-2-5-13
therefore corroborates the conclusion that elected officials are neither full-
time nor part-time employees for purposes of local-unit group plans.

For these reasons, Huck failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood
of prevailing on his claim. But even if he had made that showing, he
would still not be entitled to a preliminary injunction because he did not
provide evidence that he faces a risk of irreparable harm.

II. Huck failed to demonstrate that losing insurance
benefits posed a risk of irreparable harm.
Turning to the irreparable-harm element, we have recognized that a
“party suffering mere economic injury is not entitled to injunctive relief
because damages are sufficient to make the party whole.” Ind. Fam. & Soc.
Servs. Admin. v. Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 2002). At its core,
the loss of health-related benefits is an economic injury because it shifts
the burden of securing insurance or paying for medical care directly to the
individual. Tilley v. Roberson, 725 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Thus, courts typically enter injunctions only when a loss of health
insurance produces an appreciable risk of harm to health. 1

1See Avemco Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. McCarty, 812 N.E.2d 108, 111–13, 120–21, 126 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (affirming injunction where payments were not being made on care for high-risk
individuals with life-threatening diseases); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 488 (3d
Cir. 2000) (concluding some plaintiffs failed to show “such financial straits that they would be
forced to choose between medical care and other necessities”); Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x
804, 813 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming injunction where plaintiffs likely faced “significant

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 3 of 4
Here, Huck has not shown harm beyond economic injury. He
presented no evidence that he was unable to obtain other insurance, faced
difficulty affording medical care, lost access to existing providers, or
encountered any risk to his or his wife’s health. While Huck argues he was
ineligible for COBRA and lost continuous coverage, nothing in the record
indicates he cannot obtain equivalent coverage. Accordingly, he did not
prove a risk of irreparable harm.

Because I conclude the trial court erred for reasons different from those
relied on by the Court, I concur only in the judgment.

interference in care”); Mamula v. Satralloy, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 563, 577 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (entering
injunction where many plaintiffs could not afford individual plans and would consequently
forego care); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Exide Corp., 688 F. Supp. 174, 187 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 857 F.2d 1464 (3d Cir. 1988) (entering
injunction to avert “substantial risk” that workers would “forego necessary medical treatment
or diagnosis because of their inability to pay their share of the costs”); Cabral v. Olsten Corp.,
843 F. Supp. 701, 703–04 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (entering injunction where uninsurable cancer
patient lost coverage).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 4 of 4
Goff, J., dissenting.

Keith Huck is an elected member of the Perry County Common
Council. Perry County (or the County), as a local unit public employer,
provides and pays in part group health-insurance coverage for employees,
retired employees, and their dependent family members. In June 2023, the
Perry County Board of Commissioners publicly voted to discontinue
health-insurance coverage for its part-time employees effective January
2024. See Ind. Code § 5-10-8-2.6(b). Because Huck only worked an average
of nine hours per month as a councilman, Perry County concluded that he
was a part-time employee, and he and his wife lost health-insurance
coverage. Huck sought a preliminary injunction against Perry County,
arguing that if the County is going to provide health insurance to its
employees, it must do the same for him because, as an elected official, he
is an “employee,” no matter how many hours he works. See I.C. § 5-10-8-
1(1). The trial court agreed and granted the preliminary injunction. In
reversing, this Court concludes that the County has the statutory
authority to identify Huck’s role as part-time and to exclude him from
coverage. Ante, at 2.

I disagree. As an elected official, Huck is an “employee,” not a “part-
time” employee that the County may exclude from group health
insurance. See I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1). And Huck’s compensation, which
includes health insurance, cannot be reduced based on hours worked. See
I.C. §§ 36-2-5-13(a), (b).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it granted Huck’s preliminary injunction.
Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies “within the
sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d
794, 799 (Ind. 2011) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, we review a
trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion.
Members of Med. Licensing Bd. v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Haw., Alaska,
Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 964 (Ind. 2023). An abuse of discretion
occurs when “the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 1 of 8
of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has
misinterpreted the law.” Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 165,
167 (Ind. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To the
extent this Court’s analysis of the reasonable-likelihood-of-success
requirement turns on the trial court’s interpretation of purely legal issues,
this Court reviews the issues de novo. Med. Licensing Bd., 211 N.E.3d at
965.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the moving party has a reasonable
likelihood of success at trial, (2) the remedies at law are inadequate and
irreparable harm will occur while the case is pending, (3) the threatened
injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving
party from the granting of an injunction, and (4) the public interest would
not be disserved by granting the requested injunction. Thind v. Delaware
Cnty., 207 N.E.3d 434, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023); Vickery v. Ardagh Glass Inc.,
85 N.E.3d 852, 859–60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

I. Huck has a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits because he’s not a part-time employee
and the County cannot exclude him from group
health insurance based on hours worked.
When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine the legislature’s
intent. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. State, 181 N.E.3d 960, 968 (Ind. 2022). We
will first “give [the statute’s] words their plain meaning and consider the
structure of the statute as a whole.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police
Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). We read the statutory language
“logically and consistently with the statute’s underlying policy and goals,”
and to avoid conflicts with other statutes. Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass’n v. Ind.
Educ. Emp. Rels. Bd., 174 N.E.3d 601, 604–05 (Ind. 2021) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 392 (Ind.
2025). We can also turn to legislative history to “offer analytical support,
facilitating our process—and ultimate goal—of uncovering and giving
proper effect to the legislature’s intent.” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 388.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 2 of 8
Indiana Code chapter 5-10-8 addresses legislative mandates for
“Group Insurance for Public Employees.” For purposes of group
insurance, “employee” is defined in pertinent part as “an elected or
appointed officer or official, or a full-time employee,” or, “for a local unit
public employer, a full-time or part-time employee or a person who
provides personal services to the unit under contract during the contract
period” and “whose services have continued without interruption at least
thirty (30) days.” I.C. §§ 5-10-8-1(1)(A), (C) (emphases added). If a local
unit public employer, such as a county, chooses to provide group
insurance, it may “exclude part-time employees” from coverage. See I.C.
§§ 5-10-8-2.6(a), (b); I.C. § 5-10-8-1(5). An insurance contract for local
employees “may not be canceled by the public employer during the policy
term of the contract.” I.C. § 5-10-8-2.6(d).

The Court concludes that Perry County can exclude Huck from
coverage because the County categorized him as a “part-time” employee. I
disagree. As I explain further below, Huck is not a “part-time” employee,
and his compensation cannot be reduced based on hours worked.

A. The text of the statute is ambiguous as to whether
elected officials can be categorized as “part-time”
employees.
Huck reads subsection 5-10-8-1(1)(A) as creating the following categories
of employees: elected officers or officials, appointed officers or officials, and
full-time employees. See I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1)(A). He then reads subsection 1(C)
as creating additional categories of employees for local unit public
employers: full-time, part-time, and contract employees. See I.C. § 5-10-8-
1(1)(C). Under Huck’s reading, “elected officials” like him are a category of
employees separate from “full-time” and “part-time” employees. And
because he’s neither a part-time employee nor a full-time employee, Huck
submits, he’s simply an employee. Thus, Huck concludes, Perry County
cannot exclude him from health-insurance coverage using Indiana Code
subsection 5-10-8-2.6(b).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 3 of 8
For its part, Perry County argues that for local governments, all
employees, including elected officials, fall into three categories: “full-time,”
“part-time,” or “a person who provides personal services to the unit under
contract during the contract period.” See I.C. § 5-10-8-1(1)(C). Perry County
acknowledges a conflict between the two subsections: whereas subsection
1(A) broadly defines an employee to include an elected official, subsection
1(C) defines employee more narrowly as full-time employees, part-time
employees, or persons who provide personal services under contract. But,
Perry County contends, citing our canons of construction, subsection 1(C)
applies here—to local unit public employers—as the more specific
definition. Appellant’s Br. at 24 (citing State v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 223
N.E.3d 1148, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)). If Huck needs to be categorized as
either a full-time, part-time, or contract employee, the County contends, it
can categorize him as part-time because he works only nine hours per
month. And as a part-time employee, the County can exclude Huck from
health insurance.

Given these reasonable competing interpretations of the statute, we can
conclude that its text is ambiguous. See Loomis v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 244
N.E.3d 908, 922 (Ind. 2024). To resolve this ambiguity and discern the
legislature’s intent, we can look to the statute’s legislative history and its
interaction with other statutes.

B. The legislature intended elected officials to be their
own category of employees, separate from part-time
employees, and an elected official’s health insurance
cannot be discontinued based on the number of hours
worked.
The legislature intended local elected officials to be “employees” for
health-insurance purposes, regardless of the number of hours they work.
In 1957, legislation was enacted to empower public employers to contract
for insurance coverage for their employees. Act of Mar. 14, 1957, ch. 296,
1957 Ind. Acts 769, 769. The statute defined “employee” as a “full-time
employee whose services have continued uninterruptedly for a period of

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 4 of 8
at least thirty (30) days.” Id. Later that year, the Attorney General issued
an advisory opinion interpreting the statute to conclude that elected
officials do not qualify as “employees” for purposes of coverage. 1957 Ind.
Op. Atty. Gen. No. 21 at 88 (1957). In response, the legislature in 1961
amended the statute to include “elected” officials. Act of Mar. 4, 1961, ch.
98, 1961 Ind. Acts 199, 200. And in 1978, the Attorney General issued an
advisory opinion commensurate with this change, concluding that a
school-board member (an elected official) was entitled to participate in
their employer’s group-health insurance plan. 1978 Ind. Op. Atty. Gen.
No. 20 at 60 (1978). In short, the legislative changes to the definition of
“employee” to specifically include elected officials—a definition
recodified in 1980—shows the legislature’s intent to include them in
group-health insurance plans. See Pub. L. No. 8-1980, § 41, 1980 Ind. Acts
31, 67.

Next, Indiana Code section 36-2-5-13 (or the Compensation Statute)
shows that elected officials are a separate category of employees from “part-
time” and “full-time” employees. The Compensation Statute states in
pertinent part that “[a]n elected county officer is not required to report hours
worked and may not be compensated based on the number of hours
worked.” I.C. § 36-2-5-13(b) (emphasis added). The statute expressly
includes “health insurance” benefits within the scope of “compensation.”
I.C. § 36-2-5-13(a). Because hours worked is the method for distinguishing
part-time from full-time employees, the legislature, by specifying that
elected officials cannot be compensated based on hours worked, intended
for elected officials to be a category separate from full-time and part-time
employees. As the trial court recognized, elected officials do “a lot of work
that goes on behind the scenes, day-to-day, night-in, night-out, that isn’t in a
meeting or isn’t documented in minutes somewhere.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 16.
Because there is no way to distinguish “full-time” and “part-time” elected
officials for insurance purposes without violating the Compensation Statute,
the legislature intended elected officials to be their own category of
employees.

But the Court’s conclusion that Huck can be categorized as a “part-time
employee” and excluded from health insurance conflicts with the
Compensation Statute. Because Perry County cannot reduce an elected

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 5 of 8
official’s compensation based on hours worked, and compensation
includes health insurance, Perry County cannot end Huck’s health
insurance simply because he only works nine hours per month. The
legislature intended elected officials to be eligible for health insurance
regardless of the number of hours they work.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding Huck faces irreparable harm.
The party seeking a preliminary injunction must also show injury
beyond a pure economic injury. See Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v.
Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 163 (Ind. 2002). Here, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the loss of health-insurance
coverage is an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060,
1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding a “threatened termination of benefits such
as medical coverage for workers and their families obviously raised the
spectre of irreparable injury”); Mamula v. Satralloy, Inc., 578 F.Supp. 563,
577 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (“To presume that one not able to afford health
insurance coverage is harmed only in a monetary sense is to ignore the
realities of the situation.”). Because the loss of health-insurance coverage
can impact health, a harm beyond economics, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding Huck faced irreparable harm.

The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
health insurance through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) or the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is an
inadequate substitute for the insurance Huck and his wife lost. A person
qualifies for temporary health insurance under COBRA after a “qualifying
event” occurs. 29 U.S.C. § 1163. But Huck does not qualify for COBRA
because no qualifying event—such as termination or reduced hours—
occurred here. See id. § 1163(2). And even if Huck could have obtained
health insurance through the ACA, the trial court concluded that it may
not be realistic to obtain or provide him with the same level of coverage.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 6 of 8
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the threatened injury to Huck
outweighs the potential harm to Perry County
from granting the injunction.
The party seeking a preliminary injunction must also show that the
threatened injury to the moving party (if the injunction is not granted)
outweighs the potential injury to the non-moving party (if the injunction
is granted). Vickery, 85 N.E.3d at 859. In its order, the trial court concluded
that the injury to Huck from loss of health-insurance coverage outweighed
the potential harm to the County by requiring it to provide coverage. The
County did not argue on appeal the trial court abused its discretion when
weighing the harms, thus arguably waiving the issue. See French v. State,
778 N.E.2d 816, 826 (Ind. 2002). Potential waiver aside, considering the
deferential standard of review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The trial court reasonably concluded that the harm Huck faces from losing
health insurance outweighs the additional costs to the County in
providing health insurance.

IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that granting the injunction does not
disserve the public interest.
The party seeking a preliminary injunction must also show that
granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Vickery, 85
N.E.3d at 860. Perry County argues that the cost associated with granting
Huck’s preliminary injunction disserves the public because it paid
$28,863.12 towards his health insurance—more than six times his annual
salary of $4,783—for just nine hours of work per month. Perry County has
also spent $200,000 more than anticipated on insurance for its employees
and expended twenty-five percent of its reserve funds to pay those
insurance costs. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 30, 31, 37. Granting Huck’s
preliminary injunction, the County contends, could place a significant
financial burden on small counties with limited resources.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 7 of 8
But not providing insurance may also disserve the public because
quality candidates might not run for office. During a board meeting, one
County commissioner commented that Perry County is one of the lowest
paid counties, and providing insurance can help attract good quality
leaders. Considering the deferential standard of review, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the preliminary injunction
would not disserve the public interest. The trial court could have
reasonably concluded that, despite the cost to the taxpayers, the injunction
would keep quality leaders in elected positions which ultimately benefits
the public.

Conclusion
From my reading of the relevant statutes, the legislature intended local
elected officials to be a separate category of employees from part-time and
full-time employees for health-insurance purposes, regardless of the
number of hours they work. Therefore, the County cannot exclude Huck
from health insurance because he only works nine hours per month.
Ultimately, the issue of health-insurance coverage for local elected officials
is an important policy issue best left for the legislature to address, and I
welcome further clarification.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-PL-297 | July 22, 2025 Page 8 of 8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11105233. Public record. Not legal advice.