# Kaminski v. Frederick Debt Management, LLC

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103917

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD KAMINSKI,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-80
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
FREDERICK DEBT MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Richard Kaminski’s Motion for Default
Judgment. (ECF No. 8.) The Motion is supported by an Affidavit submitted by counsel for
Plaintiff, Chad Eisenback. (ECF No. 9.) The time for filing a response to the Motion has passed,
and Defendant Frederick Debt Management, LLC, has not responded. For the reasons below, Mr.
Kaminski’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
Prior to filing this action, Mr. Kaminski took out a personal loan from My Quick Wallet
for approximately $2,000 (“subject debt”). (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 7.) As a result of financial
hardship, Mr. Kaminski failed to make timely payments on the loan and defaulted on the subject
debt. (Id. ¶ 8.) After Mr. Kaminski’s default, Defendant obtained the right to collect on the
subject debt as a third-party debt collector within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., in that it uses postal mail, an instrumentality
of interstate commerce for its business, the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts,
or it regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted
to be owed or due another. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 9); 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
On January 31, 2025, Mr. Kaminski filed a lawsuit against Defendant seeking redress for
violations of the FDCPA. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.) Mr. Kaminski alleges that Defendant
deceptively attempted to collect the subject debt around December 4, 2024, by disclosing private
information over the phone about Mr. Kaminski’s financial status to his employer and falsely

communicating to Mr. Kaminski that if he did not make a payment, Defendant would garnish his
wages. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12.)
Defendant was served with Mr. Kaminski’s complaint on February 11, 2025. (ECF No.
5.) A responsive pleading was due on or before March 4, 2025. (Id.) After Defendant failed to
answer or otherwise plead within the time allowed by law, Mr. Kaminski filed a Request for
Entry of Clerk’s Default. (ECF No. 6.) The Clerk entered default shortly thereafter. (ECF No.
7.)
Mr. Kaminski now requests an entry of judgment against Defendant. (Mot., ECF No. 8.)
Mr. Kaminski seeks statutory damages of $1,000 under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), to enjoin
Defendant from further communications with Mr. Kaminski, reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees

under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), post-judgment interest, and such other relief that this Court
deems just and proper. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 33; Mot., ECF No. 8.) In Mr. Kaminski’s Motion
for Default Judgment, Mr. Kaminski attached an itemized list for his attorneys’ fees and court
costs which amount to $2,920. (ECF No. 8-1, PageID 22–23.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs default and default judgments.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. The first step is to obtain an entry of default by the clerk, which is appropriate
“[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit, or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
Once default is entered, a party may move for default judgment from either the clerk or from the
Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); see also, e.g., Hoover v. 4 Seasons Motors Inc., No. 2:21-cv-4177,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130140, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2022) (describing the two-step process
in obtaining a default judgment).

Upon the clerk’s entry of default, the “complaint’s factual allegations regarding liability
are taken as true, while allegations regarding the amount of damages must be proven.” Hoover,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130140, at *4 (quoting United States v. Parker-Billingsly, No. 3:14-cv-
307, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15877, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2015) (Newman, M.J.)). But
allegations of damages may be “accepted as true, thereby bypassing the necessity of a hearing,
where ‘the amount claimed is capable of ascertainment from definite figures contained in
detailed affidavits.’” Bds. of Trs. Of the Ohio Laborers Bens. v. Karnak Concrete LLC, No. 2:20-
cv-1210, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120120, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2024) (Marbley, C.J.) (quoting
Iron Workers Dist. Council of S. Ohio & Vicinity Ben. Tr. v. NCR Clark, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-
0070, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119035, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2014) (Rose, J.)). Thus, the

“Court may enter an award without a hearing when a plaintiff’s claim is for sum certain or a sum
that can be made certain by computation.” Bds. of Trs. of the Ohio Laborers Bens. v. Kyle J.
Sherman Excavating, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-2476, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34246, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 28, 2024) (Graham, J.); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
ANALYSIS
Even though the Court accepts the factual allegations of liability as true, the Court still
must determine that the facts in the Complaint state a claim for relief against Defendant. See
Kuhlman v. McDonnell, No. 1:20-cv-510, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23846, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
10, 2022) (Cole, J.). Thus, the Court must first address the issue of Defendant’s liability.
I. FDCPA Violations
The FDCPA was enacted by Congress to eliminate “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt

collection practices” and protect consumers from the abusive debt collection practices engaged in
by many debt collectors which contributed to “the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital
instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a), (e).
Mr. Kaminski pleaded that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), b(3), c(b), e, e(4), e(5),
and f through its unlawful debt collection practices. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 23.) The Court
examines each subsection of the statute and corresponding allegations in turn.
A. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b
Mr. Kaminski alleges that Defendant violated §§ 1692b(2) and (3). Subsection b(2) states
that “[a]ny debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the
purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall not state that such

consumer owes any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2). Subsection b(3) st—ate .s . t. hat in the same
circumstances where a debt collector is communicating with a person, the debt collector shall not
communicate with the person more than once unless requested by the person or the debt collector
“reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that
such person now has correct or complete location information.” Id. § 1692b(3).
Mr. Kaminski alleges Defendant violated §§ 1692b(2) and b(3) when it called Mr.
Kaminski’s place of employment and disclosed to Mr. Kaminski’s supervisor that Mr. Kaminski
owed a debt. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 24.) The Complaint alleges that around December 4, 2024,
Defendant contacted Mr. Kaminski’s place of employment and disclosed Mr. Kaminski’s
personal details about the subject debt to Mr. Kaminski’s supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 10 11.) So, while
Mr. Kaminski does allege Defendant violated § 1692b(2) because it told Mr. K–aminski’s
employer about the subject debt, he does not allege a violation of § 1692b(3) because he does not
allege Defendant contacted his employer on more than one occasion. (See id. generally.)

B. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)
Mr. Kaminski alleges that Defendant violated § 1692c(b) when it called Mr. Kaminski’s
place of employment, disclosed that it was attempting to reach Mr. Kaminski to collect on the
subject debt, and divulged personal information. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 26.) Subsection c(b)
states that:
Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the
consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court
of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment
judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the
collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a
consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney
of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.

15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). Because Mr. Kaminski’s employer falls into none of these categories, Mr.
Kaminski has put forth facts supporting a violation of § 1692c(b).
C. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e
Mr. Kaminski also asserts violations of §§ 1692e(4) and e(5). (Compl. ¶¶ 28 31.)
Subsection e states: –
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or
means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general
application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . .

(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in
the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the . . . garnishment . . . of any .
. . wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or
creditor intends to take such action.
(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not
intended to be taken.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(4), (5).
Mr. Kaminski alleges Defendant violated § 1692e by falsely communicating to Mr.
Kaminski that if he did not make a payment then Defendant would garnish his wages. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, ¶ 28.) Defendant allegedly violated § 1692e(4) when it misled Mr. Kaminski into
believing that nonpayment of the subject debt would lead to garnishment of Mr. Kaminski’s
wages when it was not Defendant’s intention to do so. (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendant violated § 1692e(5)
when it threatened to garnish Mr. Kaminski’s wages when it had no intentions to take such
action and merely used threats to deceive and scare Mr. Kaminski into agreeing to make
payments on the subject debt. (Id. ¶ 30.) Mr. Kaminski’s alleges facts sufficient to support a
violation or violations of § 1692e, specifically subsections (4) and (5).
D. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f
Finally, Mr. Kaminski alleges a violation of § 1692f, which provides: “A debt collector
may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without
limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this
section: [listing various actions].” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
Mr. Kaminski alleges that Defendant violated this subsection when it threatened to
garnish his wages and disclosed private information regarding his debt to his supervisor.

(Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 32.) But Mr. Kaminski fails to point to a subsection of § 1692f or caselaw
in his Motion for Default Judgment explaining why these activities by Defendant violated
§ 1692f in addition to other subsections of the FDCPA. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1; Mot.,
ECF No. 8.) The Court need not make this determination, though, having already determined that
Defendant’s call on December 4, 2024, to Mr. Kaminski’s employer violated several other
provisions of the FDCPA.
Mr. Kaminski has successfully pleaded several violations of the FDCPA under 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692b(2), c(b), e(4), and e(5) committed by Defendant, and the Court takes the allegations as

true. See Hoover, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130140, at *4. Mr. Kaminski’s factual allegations as
pleaded satisfy the factors necessary to state a claim under the FDCPA. The Court thus finds that
Mr. Kaminski is entitled to default judgment on his claim against Defendant.
II. Actual and Statutory Damages
The FDCPA provides that a person may recover “any actual damage sustained by such
person as a result of” an FDCPA violation and “such additional damages as the court may allow
but not exceeding $1,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); see In re Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,
No. 24-0103, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7648, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025). Although Mr.
Kaminski’s prayer for relief references actual damages (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID 5), his
Motion for Default Judgment only makes one reference to actual damages and does not elaborate

or explain what he believes actual damages to be (Mot., ECF No. 8, PageID 20). Mr.
Kaminski’s request at the end of his Motion makes no mention of actual damages. (Id. PageID
21.) The Court assumes he is not seeking actual damages.
Mr. Kaminski does seek $1,000 in statutory damages. (Id.) Proof of actual damages is not
a prerequisite to recover such statutory damages. Thompson v. Renner, No. 21-1366, 2022 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11706, at *34 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2022); McKeehan v. TForce Freight, No. 1:22-cv-
94, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83081, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2025) (citing Brown v. Halsted Fin.
Servs., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26144, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2013)).
Section 1692k(b) directs the Court to consider “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance
by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such
noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b).
The pleading indicates Defendant contacted Mr. Kaminski’s employer once, so
Defendant’s noncompliance was not frequent or persistent. The nature of Defendant’s violations

was serious. The disclosures to Mr. Kaminski’s employer caused him embarrassment because his
coworkers learned of private information about his financial status. (See Compl., ECF No. 1,
¶ 27.) Defendant’s action disrupted Mr. Kaminski’s daily life and general well-being, and Mr.
Kaminski suffered emotional distress and mental anguish because he was led to believe his
wages would be garnished when Defendant made threats to coerce payment toward the subject
debt. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) Given the procedural posture of this case, the Court does not have evidence
about whether Defendant’s noncompliance was intentional.
The Court finds statutory damages of $1,000 are warranted given the serious nature of the
violations and the disruption the violations caused to Mr. Kaminski’s daily life.
III. Injunction

Mr. Kaminski also seeks to enjoin Defendant from further communication with him. His
Motion for Default Judgment includes only one mention of such requested relief, however, with
no citations to any statute, case law, or other applicable authority. (Mot., ECF No. 8, PageID 21.)
Absent from Mr. Kaminski’s brief is analysis explaining why such “extraordinary” relief is
warranted. Barnhart v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 16-1244, 2016 WL 11005038, at *2 (6th Cir.
Oct. 28, 2016) (finding the district court had properly denied injunctive relief where the plaintiff
had not demonstrated success on the merits or irreparable harm).
Moreover, the text of the FDCPA does not include injunctive relief as a remedy for a
FDCPA violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)–(a)(2)(A). The law in this Circuit is unclear
about whether the FDCPA authorizes injunctive relief. See Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., 719
F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2013); Midland Funding LLC v. Brent, 644 F.Supp.2d 961, 977 (N.D.
Ohio 2009) (“The Sixth Circuit has yet to rule directly on the issue of whether injunctive relief
and declaratory judgment are appropriate under the FDCPA.”).

Because Mr. Kaminski provides no support for his injunctive relief request, Mr.
Kaminski’s request to enjoin Defendant is denied.
IV. Reasonable Costs and Attorneys’ Fees
Mr. Kaminski also seeks reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees. Mr. Kaminski is entitled to
such an award under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Mr. Kaminski attaches an
itemized description of the attorneys’ fees and costs he has accumulated throughout this suit to
his Motion. (ECF No. 8-1.) Mr. Kaminski seeks attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of
$2,920. (Id.)
The Court finds the fees charged by Mr. Kaminski’s attorney are reasonable. Mr.
Kaminski attorneys’ fees total $2,390. (Id.) The chart submitted by Mr. Kaminski shows that

there was one attorney working on the case with an hourly rate of $425 and one paralegal or
clerk working on the case at an hourly rate of $125. (Id.) Together, they spent 6.4 hours on this
litigation. (Id.) The rates and amount of timed billed is reasonable considering other FDCPA case
in this Court. See e.g., Fordyce, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65397, at *3 (approving a $7,453
attorneys’ fees award in an FDCPA case and finding the time and fees are reasonable). Mr.
Kaminski requests $530 in costs, which includes the $405 filing fee and $125 in service costs.
(ECF No. 8-1.) These costs are also reasonable.
V. Post-Judgment Interest
In addition to reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, Mr. Kaminski seeks post-judgment
interest to be added. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 states “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment
in a civil case recovered in a district court.” Courts cannot deny post-judgment interest because it

is mandatory. Cabatech, LLC v. Nextlight, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-59, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141124,
at *12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2024) (citing Caffey v. UNUM Life Ins., 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir.
2002)). Such interest “shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate
equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the
judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). The purpose of post-judgment interest is to “compensate the
prevailing plaintiff for the time-value of money lost between the occurrence of damages and the
defendant’s payment at a later date.” CAPSA Sols., LLC v. Concord Healthcare Grp., LLC, No.
2:18-cv-594, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172714, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2019) (Vascura, M.J.)
(awarding post-judgment interest on default judgment).

Defendant is therefore ordered to pay post-judgment interest at the applicable statutory
rate from the date of this Opinion and Order until the judgment is satisfied.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Kaminski’s Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. (ECF No. 8.) The Motion is granted as to Mr. Kaminski’s request to enter a default
judgment against Defendant Frederick Debt Management, LLC and in his favor. The Motion is
denied in its request to enjoin Defendant from further communication with Plaintiff.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Mr. Kaminski and against Frederick
Debt Management, LLC on Mr. Kaminski’s claim for violations of the FDCPA. Mr. Kaminski is
AWARDED $3,920 total, which includes $1,000 in statutory damages, $2,390.00 in attorneys’
fees, and $530 in costs. Defendant must also pay Mr. Kaminski post-judgment interest at the
applicable statutory rate from the date of this Opinion and Order until the judgment is satisfied.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

7/18/2025 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103917. Public record. Not legal advice.