# Hicks v. Jacksonville Sheriff's Office

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103890

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103890

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration omitted)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

EDWARD L. HICKS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-225-MMH-LLL

JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.
_________________________________

ORDER
Plaintiff Edward L. Hicks, an inmate in the custody of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action on February 28, 2025, by filing a pro se Complaint
for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1). He names the following Defendants: (1)
the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO); (2) Officer S. Stewart; (3) Christina
Bennett Jeffries; (4) Officer H.C. McCollum; (5) Officer A. Martin; (6) Officer
M.L. Jones; and (7) Officer C.L. Johns. See Doc. 1 at 2–3, 13. In the Complaint,
Hicks alleges that Defendants “fabricated evidence” in the criminal proceeding
against him. See id. at 4. According to Hicks, he was arrested on March 7, 2022,
based on Jeffries’s false accusation that he shot and beat her. See id. at 5. Hicks
also appears to assert that Officers Stewart, McCollum, Martin, Jones, and
Johns falsely testified during his trial. See id. at 12. As relief, he requests
damages. See id. at 5.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss
this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable
merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A
complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should
only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,
or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims
‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district
judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

1 Hicks requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 2).
2
that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517
F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of
state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under
Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show
“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306
n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
3
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal
pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”
the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to
include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
4
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration
omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a
federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff
cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Hicks’s pro se
allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,
while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not
give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air
Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

5
v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),
overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

Hicks’s Complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to the Court’s
screening obligation. Hicks alleges that Defendants violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments when they fabricated evidence in the criminal
proceeding against him. See Doc. 1 at 4. Similar to a malicious prosecution

claim, a due process claim regarding fabrication of evidence requires Hicks to
show the criminal proceeding against him has been terminated in his favor.
See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 117–118 (2019). In other words, Hicks
cannot bring a § 1983 action for that claim until “his conviction [has] been

invalidated in some way.” Id. at 119 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486 (1994)). “Only once the criminal proceeding has ended in the [criminal]
defendant’s favor, or a resulting conviction has been invalidated . . . will the
statute of limitations begin to run.” Id. at 119–20. Here, Hicks has failed to

allege that his state criminal proceeding has terminated in his favor. See
generally Doc. 1. And a review of the state court docket confirms that his
conviction has not been overturned or invalidated. See State v. Hicks, No.
2022-CF-002178 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct.).3 Thus, Hicks fails to allege that the

3 The Court takes judicial notice of Hicks’s state court docket. See Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)(2) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable
6
proceeding terminated in his favor, and to that end, he fails to state a plausible
claim for relief.

For additional reasons, Hicks fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim
against Jeffries and JSO. A plaintiff can only raise § 1983 claims against “a
person acting under the color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261
F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Hicks does not allege that Jeffries, who

appears to be a civilian, is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983, nor
does the Complaint contain factual allegations suggesting a close nexus
between Jeffries and the state such that her activity may be attributable to the
state. Moreover, JSO is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, and

therefore is not a proper defendant. See Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013)4 (per curiam) (“Florida law has
not established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities with the capacity to
be sued.”). As such, the Complaint is due to be dismissed,

dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947
F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020) (“State court records of an inmate’s postconviction
proceedings generally satisfy [the Rule 201(b)(2)] standard.”).
4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;
however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a
particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61
(11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished
opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive
authority.”).
7
Therefore, it is now ORDERED:
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of
July, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD
United States District Judge

Jax-9 7/17
C: Edward L. Hicks, #462957

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103890. Public record. Not legal advice.