# Havens v. Mills

> District Court, S.D. Texas · July 18, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103697

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** July 18, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 18, 2025
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER DALE HAVENS, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:22-CV-00299
§
BILL MILLS, et al., §
§
Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. D.E. 77. On March 3, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Mitchel
Neurock issued his “Memorandum and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge.”
M&R, D.E. 93. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion be granted in part and
denied in part. Plaintiff and Defendants timely filed their objections (D.E. 95, 97). The Court
considers each party’s objections.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court conducts a de novo review of any part of a magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3); Warren v. Miles, 230 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2000). “Parties filing objections must
specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections
need not be considered by the district court.” Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419,
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421 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (discussing pro se petitioner’s objections to M&R), overruled
on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)). As
to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous
factual findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir.

1989) (per curiam).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Objections
Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s statement that Plaintiff did not respond
to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, claiming this is untrue. D.E. 95, p. 1. While

there is no response to the motion on record, Plaintiff’s amended complaint and questionnaire
answers include a signed declaration under penalty of perjury stating that the foregoing
pleadings are true and correct, and therefore these serve as relevant summary judgment
evidence that the Court may consider. D.E. 44, 46; see Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765
(5th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff], however, attached to his original complaint a signed declaration

under penalty of perjury that ‘the foregoing is true and correct.’ On summary judgment,
factual allegations set forth in a verified complaint may be treated the same as when they are
contained in an affidavit.”). The Magistrate Judge’s observation regarding a lack of a response
as well as his consideration of Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence were accurate and
proper. The objection is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff next contends that Defendants have submitted edited video without audio,
which Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to inspect, and which he represents as inaccurate
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or altered. D.E. 95, p. 1. He also states that there is missing evidence not considered, related
to grievances, witness statements, medical records, and request forms. Id. at p. 2. However,
the video evidence is supported by other summary judgment evidence, including declarations
with a perjury clause from Sheriff Bill Mills, Deputy Chief Armando Chapa, and Sergeant

Miles Dugger, as well as post-incident reports. See D.E. 77-1, 77-3, 77-5, 77-6, 77-7. Plaintiff
could have requested additional time to respond with additional evidence if he required it. His
protestations that the evidence, which he has not reviewed, is inaccurate are without
evidentiary basis. This objection is OVERRULED.
A. Excessive Force Claim

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment on the excessive force
claim because the evidence shows that the officers’ conduct during the relevant event did not
amount to a constitutional violation. D.E. 93, p. 32. The Magistrate Judge thoroughly analyzed
the Kingsley factors to assess the reasonableness of the force used. Id. at pp. 32-36; see
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).

Plaintiff objects to this recommendation, analyzing the Kingsley factors himself to
assess whether the use of force was reasonable. D.E. 95, p. 6-10. Plaintiff points to what he
contends to be inaccuracies in the video evidence, including that the video does not show that
he was dragged, the use of force lasted more than two minutes, an officer kneeled on his
throat, and Officer Arisola spit chewing tobacco on him. D.E. 95, p. 3.

Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s interpretation of the video evidence
from the isolation cell, stating that he was carried and then dropped which damaged his back,
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and that he had the weight of the officers press down on him while a female guard kicked his
legs. D.E. 95, p. 4. He states that he was in extreme pain and had difficulty breathing, all while
he remained handcuffed. Id. Plaintiff states that he was not struggling, rather he had an asthma
attack and fainted, and he alerted the officers to his need for medical attention, which was

denied. Id. He states that the Magistrate Judge failed to observe his arms being hyperextended
and pulled, causing pain to his shoulders. Id. He also states that though he was given a bucket
of water to rinse off the OC spray (pepper spray), it was insufficient to rinse off the spray. Id.
at p. 5. Plaintiff states that he received a positive diagnosis for chronic and severe eczema a
year later, which was attributed to the OC spray that covered his body for three to four hours.

Id. Plaintiff also challenges the finding that he is a combative inmate. Id. at p. 9.
In sum, Plaintiff objects to the finding that there was no unconstitutional use of force
and objects to the recommendation to grant qualified immunity to Defendants on this claim.
D.E. 95, p. 5. He argues that the missing audio of the video recordings has made it difficult
for the Court to ascertain whether the amount of force used against him was objectively
unreasonable. Id.1

A pretrial detainee has the right to be free from excessive force. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at
395 (analyzing pretrial detainee’s excessive use of force claim). To establish an excessive
force claim, a pretrial detainee must show “that the force purposely or knowingly used against
him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396-97. In order to determine whether use of force

1 Additional objections by Plaintiff, such as his statements that he was being moved to solitary confinement without a
hearing and that this act was retaliatory (D.E. 95, pp. 8, 9), are the subject of different causes of action.
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was unreasonable, courts must consider several factors, which include: (1) the relationship
between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; (2) the extent of the
plaintiff's injury; (3) any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force;
(4) the severity of the security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably perceived by the

officer; and (6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Id. at 397. The Court analyzes
each factor in turn.
Regarding the first Kingsley factor—the relationship between the need for force and
amount of force used—it appears from the video evidence that Plaintiff was asked to exit the
cell and refused, prompting the use of OC spray and the subsequent altercation with the

officers. See Ex. 2-E. When the officers first step into the cell, they motion to Plaintiff to step
out, seen clearly as an officer gestures toward the door with his arm. Id. at 22:39:43. Plaintiff
refuses to move, thereby prompting the use of some degree of force by the officers. See
Sanchez v. Griffis, 569 F. Supp. 3d 496, 510 (W.D. Tex. 2021), aff'd, No. 21-51160, 2023 WL
7984732 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2023) (collecting cases to show that officials are justified in using

some degree of force when a prisoner refuses to cooperate with an officer’s legitimate
directives). This factor weighs in favor of finding that the officer’s use of force was
reasonable.
The second factor—the extent of Plaintiff’s injury—is disputed. The video evidence
does not show Plaintiff being injured disproportionately to the amount of force used, as he is

seen moving about the isolation cell freely and without noticeable injuries after the altercation.
See Ex. 2-F. However, Plaintiff was pepper-sprayed and spent nearly ten minutes trying to
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wash the spray off. See Ex. 2-E, 2-F. Additionally, Plaintiff and the officers are out of the
frame for a brief portion of the video so the officers’ actions cannot be seen during this time.
Ex. 2-E at 22:41:04-22:41:17. Plaintiff claims that he was elbowed in the face and back of the
head, punched in the face and stomach, kneed on his side, and his feet and legs were stepped

on. D.E. 44, pp. 6-7. He states that he had so much weight on him that he could not breathe
properly, and he blacked out at some point during this event. Id. at p. 7. He states that he was
in extreme pain and could not turn his neck properly afterward. Id. at pp. 7-8. Due to the
injuries described by Plaintiff, this factor weighs in favor of finding that the use of force was
unreasonable.

Regarding the third factor—efforts made by the officers to temper or limit the amount
of force—the multiple incident reports (D.E. 77-5) describe that the officers only attempted
to do what was necessary to obtain Plaintiff’s compliance and escort him out of the cell. The
video evidence also demonstrates this—once the officers were able to place Plaintiff on the
ground face down to handcuff him, they stood him up and escorted him out of the cell. Ex. 2-

E at 22:41:24. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the use of force was reasonable.
The fourth factor—the severity of the security problem at issue—weighs in favor of
finding that the use of force was unreasonable. There is no evidence regarding any particular
incident occurring at the time of the event, and though Plaintiff was resisting orders, he did
not appear to be lashing out in a threatening way. He did not react menacingly to the OC spray.

He merely wiped it from his face while continuing to stand in the same location before the
officers converged on him, at which point he began to physically resist. Ex. 2-E at 22:40:56.
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The video does not demonstrate that Plaintiff was posing a particularly dangerous security
problem. This factor favors a finding of unreasonable use of force.
The fifth factor—the threat reasonably perceived by the officer—weighs in favor of
finding that the use of force was reasonable. As Sheriff Mills’s affidavit states, Plaintiff was

known as a verbally and physically combative detainee. D.E. 77-1, p. 1. This reputation,
combined with the fact that Plaintiff was refusing to follow orders, demonstrates that the
officers did not unreasonably respond to the perceived “threat” of obtaining Plaintiff’s
compliance.
The sixth and final factor—whether Plaintiff was actively resisting—is answered in

the affirmative. From the video evidence, Plaintiff had to be pepper-sprayed, and once officers
converged on him, it took a few moments before they were able to place him face down on
the ground with his arms behind his back to handcuff him. See Ex. 2-E at 22:40:54-22:42:55.
This factor weighs in favor of finding that the use of force was reasonable.
On balance, the majority of the Kingsley factors—factors one, three, five, and six—

weigh in favor of finding that the use of force during this event was reasonable. Plaintiff’s
objection is OVERRULED.
B. Denial of Medical Care
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant’s summary judgment regarding
Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied medical care after the use of force incident because

Plaintiff failed to show a severe injury that the officers knew about and that Defendants
responded to his medical needs with deliberate indifference. D.E. 93, pp. 36-37.
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Plaintiff objects to this finding, stating that he experienced more force than that
depicted in the video and that he was not treated by a medical professional or given adequate
medical care. D.E. 95, p. 10. He repeats his claim that the videos in evidence have been
doctored. Id. at p. 11.

To state a claim for an episodic act or omission for the unconstitutional denial of
medical care, a plaintiff must show that an officer “had subjective knowledge of a substantial
risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate indifference to that
risk.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). To establish that
officials responded with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that officials “refused

to treat [plaintiff], ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in
any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical
needs.” Robinson v. Midland Cnty., Tex., 80 F.4th 704, 711 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alderson
v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
1010 (2024).

The available summary judgment evidence does not show that the officers responded
to Plaintiff’s medical problems with deliberate indifference. Approximately ten minutes after
Plaintiff was placed in the isolation cell, officers came in to take Plaintiff’s blood pressure
and to leave a bucket of water. D.E. 2-F at 22:53:44. The attempt to check the blood pressure
lasted approximately four minutes and was not successful. See Ex. 2-F; D.E. 77-5, p. 3.

Plaintiff then washed his face with the water for several minutes. Id. The video has no audio
so there is no evidence regarding what Plaintiff may have stated as to his injuries.
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While Defendants may have had knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to
Plaintiff following the altercation depicted in Exhibit 2-E, the video evidence demonstrates
that they did not act with deliberate indifference. Minutes after his placement in the isolation
cell, officers attended to Plaintiff and provided him with a bucket of water to wash off the OC

spray. This conduct does not clearly evince a wanton disregard for Plaintiff’s medical needs.
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that there was deliberate indifference. Thus, Plaintiff’s objection
is OVERRULED.
C. Retaliation: Solitary Confinement (June 2023 Incident)
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment for Defendants on

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim regarding placement in solitary confinement because Plaintiff did
not establish a constitutional violation. D.E. 93, p. 47. Plaintiff objects, stating that he was not
given the opportunity to have a hearing on this issue, and that the officers, taking orders from
Deputy Chief Chapa, planned to document that he had refused a hearing in order to keep him
in solitary confinement. D.E. 95, p. 13.

This claim stems from Plaintiff’s 20-day disciplinary confinement due to a June 19,
2023 incident. See D.E. 46, p. 10; D.E. 77-6. According to Deputy Chief Chapa’s affidavit,
Plaintiff had been constantly pushing the intercom button and alerting to an emergency when
there was not one. D.E. 77-3, p. 2. Officers served Plaintiff with a Discipline Procedure and
Notice Form, which he did not sign, and the officers deemed this a waiver of a disciplinary

hearing. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was placed in solitary confinement in retaliation for filing
a grievance or this lawsuit. D.E. 46, p. 10.
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A claim for retaliation requires that a plaintiff establish: (1) the exercise of a specific
constitutional right, (2) a defendant’s intent to retaliate for the exercise of the right, (3) a
retaliatory act, and (4) causation. Baughman v. Seale, 761 F. App'x 371, 382 (5th Cir. 2019)
(citing McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998)). To prove the causation

element, a “plaintiff must establish that but for the retaliatory motive, the defendants’ act of
retaliation would not have occurred.” Id. (citing McDonald, 132 F.3d at 231).
Plaintiff has failed to establish the causation element. He is able to “allege a chronology
of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred,” id. (citing Woods v. Smith, 60
F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995), because the solitary confinement occurred shortly after the

June 19, 2023 incident, for which Plaintiff was written up for conduct that disrupts the safety
and security of the facility (D.E. 77-6). However, the reports make clear that Plaintiff would
have faced this disciplinary action, even in the absence of any retaliatory motive, because his
actions in alerting to a false emergency had disrupted the safety and security of the facility.
See D.E. 77-6. Because Plaintiff pled a retaliation claim, not a due process claim for lack of a

hearing regarding this incident, and the causation prong cannot be established, Plaintiff’s
objection is OVERRULED.
D. Additional Objections
Plaintiff makes additional comments and objections that do not directly address the
M&R. First, he states that his claim for denial or confiscation of medical passes and mats

should include additional defendants. D.E. 95, p. 11. The Court has previously addressed this
objection and will not address it further. See D.E. 35, p. 14; D.E. 81, p. 4. It is OVERRULED.
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Next, Plaintiff provides further statements and information regarding his prehearing
detention, the disciplinary hearing, and the retaliation claim for being transferred to the
Kleberg County jail. D.E. 95, pp. 12-13. These do not appear to be specific objections to the
M&R and are not analyzed further. See Battle, 834 F.2d at 421 (“Parties filing objections must

specifically identify those findings objected to.”). The objections are OVERRULED as
improper or insufficient.
II. Defendants’ Objections
A. Three Strikes Rule
Defendants first object by stating that Plaintiff has filed three cases in which a

magistrate judge has recommended dismissal, and he is therefore subject to the three strikes
rule. D.E. 97, p. 3. This argument was not brought before the Magistrate Judge in the first
instance and has been waived. Freeman v. Cnty. of Bexar, 142 F.3d 848, 851 (5th Cir. 1998).
Moreover, the M&Rs in those cases have not yet been adopted by the district court and the
cases have not been counted as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) or been noticed to

the Manager of the Three Strikes List for the Southern District of Texas. Furthermore, those
cases were filed after the present case was filed. See Porter v. Lemire, No. 24-504, 2024 WL
5006296 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2024), adopted, 2024 WL 4719507 (Nov. 8, 2024) (“the PLRA’s
three strikes rule is one to be applied at the time suit is filed, when the court considers the
application to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.

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B. Failure to Respond to Motion
Defendants next object to Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the summary judgment
motion, stating that this failure should be taken as no opposition pursuant to Local Rule 7.4,
and the motion should be granted in its entirety. D.E. 97, p. 3.

“[S]ummary judgment may not be awarded by default ‘simply because there is no
opposition, even if the failure to oppose violated a local rule.’” Howe v. Adams, No. 3:14-CV-
349, 2018 WL 1427175, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2018) (quoting Hibernia Nat'l Bank v.
Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985)). Defendants’
objection is OVERRULED.

C. Clearly Established Law
Defendants object that the law was not clearly established that any of their conduct
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. D.E. 97, p. 4. They note that Plaintiff did not respond
to the summary judgment motion or identify a case demonstrating that Defendants’ actions
violated clearly established law. Id. They state that once they pled qualified immunity, the

burden shifted to Plaintiff to rebut the defense. However, the M&R incorrectly places the
burden on Defendants to show that the law is not clearly established. Id. at pp. 4-5.
Some portions of the M&R might be construed as placing the burden on Defendants
to establish a lack of clearly established law. See D.E. 93, pp. 39-40, 42 (“While these
defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on ‘all constitutional claims

made against them,’ they do not offer any specific argument in support of their qualified
immunity claim.”). However, the Magistrate Judge properly applied clearly established law
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to Plaintiff’s evidence, and the Court further delineates the clearly established law on a claim-
by-claim basis in the sections below.
Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.
D. Denial or Confiscation of Medical Passes

The Magistrate Judge recommends denying Defendants’ motion on the deliberate
indifference claim regarding the denial or confiscation of medical passes, finding that Plaintiff
met the burden of showing an issue of material fact regarding Deputy Chief Chapa’s conduct
and whether the conduct violated clearly established law. D.E. 93, p. 38.
Defendants object that the evidence conclusively establishes that Chapa did not

confiscate Plaintiff’s mattress or blanket, and did not deny him medical passes or bottom bunk
privileges. D.E. 97, p. 5. Instead, the evidence shows that these actions were taken by Officer
Arisola. Id. In any event, Defendants argue that the law is not clearly established that Chapa’s
alleged conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at pp. 5-6.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state has a duty to provide for a detainee’s basic

human needs, including medical care. Hare, 74 F.3d at 639 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). This is a clearly established
constitutional right and interference with prescribed medical treatment can rise to deliberate
indifference. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain .

. . [t]his is true whether the indifference is manifested by . . . prison guards in intentionally

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denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once
prescribed.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Deputy Chief Chapa states in his affidavit that he did not confiscate Plaintiff’s medical
passes and double mattress, and that he was not aware of Plaintiff’s double mattress being

removed. D.E. 77-3, pp. 1-2. In his complaint, Plaintiff states that Chapa confiscated his
passes, and claims, in his questionnaire, that he spoke directly to Chapa about his medical
needs. Thus, Chapa was aware of the need for the passes and the extra mattress. D.E. 44, p.
9; D.E. 46, p. 3. The summary judgment evidence shows that Plaintiff had a medical pass that
authorized him to have an additional mattress. See D.E. 46-1, p. 4. Whether Chapa actually

denied Plaintiff’s passes is a fact question that cannot be decided through summary judgment.
Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.
E. Prehearing Segregation Prior to the August 2022 Disciplinary Hearing
The Magistrate Judge recommends denying summary judgment on the due process
claim regarding prehearing disciplinary segregation because Defendants do not offer a

specific argument in support of their qualified immunity defense. D.E. 93, p. 40. Defendants
object that the M&R incorrectly places the burden on them to show that the law is not clearly
established for this claim, and that, based on the events leading to the disciplinary hearing,
Plaintiff’s prehearing detention would not be unconstitutional. D.E. 97, p. 6.
“When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to

demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 416 (5th Cir.
2021) (quoting McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
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Plaintiff has made a due process claim for the time he spent in disciplinary segregation from
August 23-26 before his disciplinary hearing on August 25. D.E. 44, p. 10. “[U]nder the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. However, “[n]ot every disability imposed

during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 537.
“Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security
do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment . . . .” Id. at 540. The question
is whether Plaintiff’s prehearing segregation was an action meant to further a legitimate
governmental purpose, or whether it amounted to punishment. See Martinez v. Harris Cnty.

Jail, 71 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If no legitimate governmental purpose for the action can
be ascertained, then we may infer an intent to punish.”).
Sergeant Dugger’s affidavit states that on August 23, 2022, officers attempted to move
Plaintiff to another cell. D.E. 77-7, p. 1. This move resulted in an altercation, requiring officers
to administer OC spray and then physically gain control of Plaintiff and escort him out of his

cell. Id. at p. 2. This altercation led to the disciplinary hearing held on August 25, 2022. D.E.
77-3, p. 2. The reason behind the officers’ attempt to get Plaintiff out of his cell initially is not
clear to the Court. Deputy Chief Chapa’s declaration suggests that the August 23, 2022 move
was initiated because there had been a dispute between Plaintiff and the officers regarding the
removal of Plaintiff’s mattress. Id. Defendants state that after removing Plaintiff’s mattress,

he “became noncompliant and verbally and physically combative with the correction
officers.” D.E. 77-3, p. 2. Additionally, Plaintiff began to cause a disturbance as he demanded
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that officers bring back his second mattress. See D.E. 77-5, p. 3. Plaintiff was then placed into
segregation (the reports refer to placing him in cell “A-8”) due to his failure to follow orders
and for conduct which disrupts the safety and security of the facility. Id. at p. 5.
Plaintiff contends that his prehearing segregation was a form of punishment because

Sheriff Mills told him it was “his [the Sheriff’s] jail,” and Sheriff Mills and Chapa stated that
“[they] make the rules.” D.E. 46, p. 7. The reason behind Plaintiff’s prehearing segregation is
a genuine issue of material fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Defendants’
objection is OVERRULED.
F. Disciplinary Hearing Due Process Claim

The Magistrate Judge recommends denying summary judgment on Plaintiff’s due
process claim regarding the disciplinary hearing. D.E. 93, p. 40. The M&R notes that while
there was a hearing notice that stated Plaintiff had a right to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence, nothing in the summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff
was actually afforded that opportunity. Id. at p. 41.

Defendants again object that the M&R incorrectly places the burden on them to
establish that the law in this regard is not clearly established. They argue they are entitled to
qualified immunity. D.E. 97, p. 6. They also state that though there is no audio of the hearing,
“notice of the hearing was provided and a hearing was conducted and, as such, due process
was afforded to Plaintiff.” Id. at pp. 6-7.

Plaintiff has alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
based on a lack of an adequate hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)
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(“Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. They may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”). It is clearly established law
that pretrial detainees have the same due process protections as convicted prisoners at a
disciplinary hearing. See Frank v. Larpenter, 234 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The best approach

is to treat pretrial detainees and convicted inmates equally at disciplinary hearings.”). The
elements of due process in a disciplinary hearing are: “(1) advance notice of claimed violation,
(2) a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and a reason for
disciplinary action taken, and (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence.” Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Smith v. Rabalais,

659 F.2d 539, 542 (1981)).
As Deputy Chief Chapa has stated in his affidavit, Plaintiff was provided with notice
and a hearing, which is evident in the video recording of the hearing itself. However, Plaintiff
has stated that he was not allowed to call witnesses or present evidence at the hearing, a
violation of his clearly established due process right. D.E. 46, p. 8. Defendants do not address

this point in any of their affidavits. Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.
G. Retaliation: Transfer to Kleberg County Jail
The Magistrate Judge recommends denying summary judgment to Defendants on
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim for being transferred to the Kleberg County jail because there
exists a question of fact as to the reason Plaintiff was transferred to another facility. DE. 93,

pp. 43-44. Defendants object that the evidence “conclusively establishes” that the temporary
transfer of Plaintiff to another facility was an attempt to restore order and security within the
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Aransas County Detention Center. Thus, the transfer did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Additionally, the law is not clearly established that the transfer would violate Plaintiff’s
rights. DE. 97, p. 7.
“The law of this circuit is clearly established . . . that a prison official may not retaliate

against or harass an inmate for exercising the right of access to the courts . . . .” Woods, 60
F.3d at 1164. A claim for retaliation requires that a plaintiff establish: (1) the exercise of a
specific constitutional right, (2) a defendant’s intent to retaliate for the exercise of the right,
(3) a retaliatory act, and (4) causation. Baughman, 761 F. App'x at 382 (citing McDonald, 132
F.3d at 231). “A plaintiff must ‘produce direct evidence of motivation’ or ‘allege a chronology

of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’” Id. (citing Woods, 60 F.3d at
1166).
Plaintiff exercised his constitutional right of access to the courts by filing the present
lawsuit in December 2022. See D.E. 1. He was transferred to the Kleberg County jail on July
15, 2023, which he claims was in retaliation for filing the lawsuit. D.E. 46, p. 12. He claims

he was placed in solitary confinement, drugged, and assaulted during his time at the Kleberg
County jail. D.E. 44, p. 19. The transfer to a more dangerous prison can support the
“retaliatory act” element of the retaliation claim. See Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 192
(5th Cir. 1992) (“[pretrial detainee] has plead that his transfer to the violent inmate section
was an act of punishment which is a legal claim cognizable under a § 1983 claim.”).

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There is a fact question regarding the reason for the transfer, precluding summary
judgment. If the transfer was effectuated for retaliatory purposes, the law is clearly established
on this point. Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.
CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s memorandum and recommendation, as well as Plaintiff’s and
Defendants’ objections, and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a de
novo disposition of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s memorandum and recommendation
to which objections were specifically directed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s and

Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and conclusions of the
Magistrate Judge (D.E. 93). Specifically, the Court:
• GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Officer Maddox, Sergeant Dugger,
Officer Arisola, and Corporal Urrea on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim;
• GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Officer Maddox, Sergeant Dugger,

Officer Arisola, and Corporal Urrea on Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim;
• GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Deputy Chief Chapa on Plaintiff’s
solitary confinement retaliation claim arising from the June 2023 incident;
• DENIES summary judgment for Deputy Chief Chapa on Plaintiff’s claim
regarding the denial or confiscation of medical passes;

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e DENIES summary judgment for Sheriff Mills and Deputy Chief Chapa on
Plaintiff's claim regarding prehearing segregation arising from the August 2022
incident;
e DENIES summary judgment for Deputy Chief Chapa, Lieutenant Martinez,
Corporal Tober, and Officer Alvarado on Plaintiff’s due process claim for the
August 2022 disciplinary hearing; and

e DENIES summary judgment for Sheriff Mills on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim
for the transfer to the Kleberg County jail.
ORDERED on July 18, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103697. Public record. Not legal advice.