# Walker v. Comes

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · July 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103180

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103180

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that to allege personal involvement, “a plaintiff must allege the official either actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordi…

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

ANGELA WALKER, CASE NO. 3:24 CV 2091

Plaintiff,

v.

NICHOLAS DANIELSKI, et al.,

Defendants.

ANGELA WALKER, CASE NO. 3:25 CV 36

Plaintiff,

v.

LUCAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

ANGELA WALKER, CASE NO. 3:25 CV 35

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

DON COMES, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court are three1 related cases brought by pro se Plaintiff
Angela Walker asserting civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court previously

1. These three cases originally consisted of more individual cases, but several were consolidated
in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas prior to removal to this Court.
consolidated two of these cases (Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (N.D. Ohio) (claims
against individual Lucas County Sheriff Deputies Nicholas Danielski, Hunter Baum, Steven
McClellan, and Joseph Navarre) and Walker v. Lucas County Sheriff’s Department, No. 25 CV
36 (N.D. Ohio)).2 The third case asserts claims against Toledo Police Department Officer Don
Comes, the K-9 Officer with Officer Comes, and the Toledo Police Department. Walker v.

Comes, et al., No. 25 CV 35 (N.D. Ohio).3
All three cases arise out of a September 3, 2023, traffic stop of a vehicle in which
Plaintiff was a passenger.4 The Complaints all contain similar allegations and attach the same
exhibits. All Defendants have moved for dismissal or judgment on the pleadings. Jurisdiction is
proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
claims against Baum and Danielski may proceed, but all other claims are dismissed.
BACKGROUND

For clarity and ease of analysis below, the Court quotes each case’s individual complaint
separately, and then sets forth the asserted facts common to all three complaints from the
attachments thereto.
Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091
Plaintiff’s Complaints (consolidated in state court) as to the individual Lucas County
Sheriff’s Office Deputies state, in their entirety:
On Sept[ember] 3, 2023 Sunday around two o’clock Supervisor Danielski,
Nicholas, was traveling in the opposite direction than the driver and myself.

2. The Court will refer to the Defendants in these two cases collectively as “Lucas County
Defendants” or “County Defendants”.
3. The Court will refer to the Defendants in this case collectively as “City of Toledo Defendants”
or “City Defendants”.
4. The driver of the car, Darnell Henson, Sr., also filed a separate suit in the Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas; his case was also removed to this Court. Henson v. Lucas Cnty. Sheriff’s
Office, et al., No. 24 CV 2089 (N.D. Ohio).
Danielski, Nicholas crossed Irwin & Angola @ the stop sign and did a u-turn and
stalk us through the community from Oak Bend Place[] back around to where
sitting Deputy Baum, Hunter was posted @ Angola & Crissey. At this point
Deputy Baum, Hunter turned on his lights and while the driver and I was [sic]
stop[ped] at the stop sign @ Angola & Crissey Road in Holland, OH. This
violated my 4th & 14th amendment rights that caused PTSD harm in me. He was
acting under color of law.

(Doc. 1, at 9) (Complaint against Danielski).
On Sept[ember] 3, 2023 the above deputy [Navarre] violated my 4th and 14th
amendment rights which caused PTSD harm in me. Please see attachments.

Id. at 41 (Complaint against Navarre).
On Sept[ember] 3, 2023 Sunday around two o’clock the above Deputy [Baum]
took over the following of Danielski, Nicholas and Baum, Hunter put his lights on
the vehicle after the community following. The driver ask why you pull me over.
Baum Hunter said he did a mark lane[.] [T]he driver say [“]come on you know I
did not do a mark lane[.”] Baum, Hunter said[,] [“]I had to fin[d] a reason to pull
you over[,] take it to court.[”] Baum, Hunter violated my 4th and 14th amendment
causing PTSD harm in me[] while acting under the color of law. This Deputy held
us detained to Toledo Police & their K-9 officer came.

Id. at 68 (Complaint against Baum).
On Sept[ember] 3, 2023 Sunday around two o’clock the above Deputy
[McClellan] participate[d] in an illegal stop and search & the Deputy made me sit
on his road bar and when I tried to get up d[ue] to pain he . . . made me sit back
down on it. This Deputy violated my 14th amendment right that caused PTSD
harm in me.

Id. at 95 (Complaint against McClellan).
Walker v. Lucas County Sheriff’s Department, No. 25 CV 36
In Holland, OH around 2:00 p.m. September 3, 2023 Four of Lucas County
Deputies did a Tort Act on the Plaintiff while employed with the above
department violating the Plaintiff[’s] 4th and 14th amendment causing PTSD
harm. See U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio Case #: 3:24-CV-02091-
JJH and Exhibit A.

(Doc. 1-3, at 2).
Walker v. Comes et al., No. 25 CV 35
On Sunday Sept[ember] 3, 2023 around two o’clock Sgt. Comes did an illegal
search out of Toledo Police Department jurisdiction. In Holland, OH @ Angola &
Crissey Road the illegal stop was detained longer for the Sgt. to bring the Toledo
Police K-9 officer to illegal search the vehicle.

(Doc. 1-3, at 2).
Amended Complaint
Following the filing of Defendants’ pending motions, Plaintiff subsequently filed,
without leave of Court, an identical Amended Complaint in the consolidated case (24 CV 2091 /
24 CV 35) and the related case (24 CV 36). It states:
On Sept[ember] 3, 2023, around two o’clock in Holland, OH the Plaintiff was
riding down Crissey Road, passing a park[ed] deputy @ Crissey and Angola
(which was Hunter Baum) passing another deputy as the Plaintiff continue[d] up
Crissey Road. The Plaintiff driver turned right off Crissey to Old State Line and
right onto Irwin Road. As the Plaintiff and driver now approaching Irwin &
Angola Rd. stop sign a deputy is approaching in the opposite direction with the
left turn signal on[.] [T]he deputy turned off the left signal and crossed Irwin &
Angola[,] U-turned (racial profiling)[,] followed very closely through the
community maze from Oak Bend Place back around to the park[ed] deputy
Hunter Baum, maneuvered in front of Supervisor Nicholas Danielski[,] putting
the emergency lights on the Plaintiff and the driver while they was @ Angola &
Crissey Road stop sign. Steven McClellan came [and] made the Plaintiff sit down
on his vehicle road bar, Joseph Navarre acted in the unlawful search. Lucas
County deputies prolonged the traffic stop for a long period of time to bring a
drug sniffing K-9 officer from Toledo Police Department and it[s] handler Sgt.
Don Comes to come (Rodriguez v. United States) out Toledo Police jurisdiction
to violate the Plaintiff[‘s] Fourth and Fourteen[th] amendment rights which
cause[d] severe PTSD harm.

Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24-2091 (Doc. 14); Walker v. Comes, et al., No. 25-35 (Doc. 10).
Common Factual Allegations
In addition to the above, to each original Complaint, Plaintiff attached a document
entitled “Exhibit D: Original Complaint”. See, e.g., Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091
(Doc. 1, at 19-22). It contains an emailed narrative statement describing the traffic stop at issue.
The following facts are taken from that attachment.
Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Darnell Henson, Sr. in Holland, Ohio,
around 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, September 3, 2023. Id. at 19. Plaintiff and Henson noticed a
Deputy Sheriff5 (Baum) parked at the intersection of Crissey Road and Angola Road as they

drove by. Id. As they continued driving, they observed another Lucas County Deputy Sheriff6
(Danielski) driving towards them. Id. They made a complete stop at the stop sign, where
Danielski was approaching from the opposite side of the road with his left turn signal on. Id.
Danielski turned off the turn signal, crossed the intersection, performed a U-turn, and began
following behind their car. Id. Danielski continued to follow them through several turns. Id. at
19-20. This worried Plaintiff and Henson, so they “travel[ed] back around to public eyesight”
where the Baum was still parked at the Angola Road and Crissey Road intersection. Id. at 20.
Baum then “maneuvered in front of” Danielski and turned on his emergency lights. Id.
After pulling them over, “the Lucas County Deputies” asked to search the vehicle, but

Henson declined consent. Id. Plaintiff and Henson asked to be let go and requested a supervisor.
One of the Deputies said he was the supervisor. Id. All of the deputies “quickly attacked Darnell
and [Plaintiff] fast wanting [their] identification and [to] run it in their system.” Id. Plaintiff and
Henson were held for “one hour or longer.” Id. at 21.

5. Based on the other allegations in the Complaint and documents attached thereto, this is Deputy
Baum.
6. Based on the other allegations in the Complaint and documents attached thereto, this is Deputy
Danielski.
One of the Deputies requested assistance from the Toledo Police Department. Id. at 21.
Two Toledo Police Officers arrived, including a canine officer. The TPD Officer7 (Comes)
indicated the dog “hit” on the vehicle. Id. Plaintiff was scared, “could have passed out,” and was
“afraid to get medical attention.” Id. The officers then searched the vehicle and found a plastic
bag containing balled up hair. Id. They asked Plaintiff and Henson what it was, and they

explained Plaintiff attended a hair appointment and took hair to discuss with her stylist. Id. No
drugs were found during the search. Plaintiff states: “This traffic stop was unlawful there was no
crime committed.” Id.
Plaintiff also attaches to her Complaints one citation the driver received; it cites a
violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4513.02 and the offense of “Driving an Unsafe Vehicle”. The
description states: “This individual stated that he has plans to fix the window. Charge can be
dropped if fixes window.” Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (Doc. 1, at 76). Deputy
Baum is listed as the charging and issuing law enforcement officer and the citation lists the total
number of offenses as “2”. Id. To their answer, the County Defendants attach a second citation

issued to the driver the same date, a violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4511.33, “Driving in
Marked Lanes”. Id., Doc. 9-1, at 1.8 It is similarly signed by Deputy Baum and similarly lists two
total offenses. Id.
To their Answer, the County Defendants also attach Sylvania Municipal Court records
indicating the charges against Henson were dismissed without prejudice because the arresting
officer did not appear. Id. at 4-8.

7. Based on the other allegations in the Complaint and documents attached thereto, this is Officer
Comes.
8. This Court may take judicial notice of the citation, because that information is in the public
record and the fact that the citation was issued is not subject to reasonable dispute. See Passa v.
City of Columbus, 123 F. App’x 694, 697 (6th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff also attaches to her Complaints medical records regarding treatment for post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) after the traffic stop. (Id., Doc. 1, at 56-61). She seeks
monetary damages against each Defendant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Civil Rule 12(c) is reviewed under
the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Coley v. Lucas Cnty., 799 F.3d 530, 536-37 (6th
Cir. 2015). When considering either a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, this Court presumes all
well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings are true and draws all reasonable inferences in
the non-moving party’s favor. Total Benefits Plan. Agency v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Additionally, this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th

Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.”
Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants
does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on
behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Bassett v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir.
2008); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (district courts “have no obligation to act as
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants”); Payne v. Sec’y of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th
Cir. 2003) (district courts are not “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for her). Rather,
the complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests. Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996). The
complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION

Operative Complaint
At the outset, although no party directly addresses the issue, given Plaintiff’s filing of an
Amended Complaint in each case, the Court must determine which complaint is operative.
Federal Civil Rule 15 provides:
(a) Amendments Before Trial.
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once
as a matter of course no later than:

(A) 21 days after serving it, or

(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days
after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is
earlier.

(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The
court should freely give leave when justice so requires.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
In the consolidated cases of Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091, and Walker v.
Lucas County Sheriff’s Department, No. 24 CV 36, Defendants filed their Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings on February 5, 2025. (Doc. 10). Seven days later, Plaintiff filed her own Motion
for Judgment (Doc. 11), and then on March 12, 2025, she filed, without leave of Court, an
Amended Complaint (Doc. 14).
In Walker v. Comes, et al., No. 25 CV 35, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on
January 15, 2025. (Doc. 5). Eight days later, Plaintiff filed an opposition (Doc. 7), and then on
March 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed, without leave of court, an Amended Complaint (Doc. 10).
The Court finds neither Amended Complaint properly filed under Rule 15, as neither was
filed within the time frame for an amendment as of right nor was Court leave or consent

obtained. Moreover, each was filed after Plaintiff had already filed a response to the respective
Defendants’ dispositive motion. The Court therefore finds the original Complaints, as removed
to this Court, are the operative ones for purposes of the present motions.9
For the same reasons, having found Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint not properly filed,
the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (Walker v. Danielski, et al., No.
24 CV 2091, Doc. 17) related to that Amended Complaint not well-taken and denies the motion.
County Defendants
The County Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings in the consolidated cases of
Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091, and Walker v. Lucas County Sheriff’s Department,

No. 25 CV 36, arguing: (1) the Lucas County Sheriff’s Office lacks capacity to be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; (2) alternatively, Plaintiff failed to allege plausible claims against the Lucas
County Sheriff’s Office; and (3) the Complaint does not state plausible § 1983 claims against the
individual Defendants and those Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff responded with a “Motion for Judgment to Plaintiff”, in which she contends she is
entitled to judgment because she was subjected to an unlawful traffic stop which was prolonged

9. In each Amended Complaint, however, it appears Plaintiff attempts to combine all three cases.
Indeed, the Amended Complaints filed in both cases are identical and cite both case numbers.
The City Defendants filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss in response to the Amended Complaint.
Walker v. Comes, No. 25 CV 35 (Doc. 12). The Court notes that even though it finds the
Amended Complaints not properly filed, it also finds that even if they were considered, dismissal
would still be proper for the same reasons set forth herein.

in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, and she was subject to an unreasonable search in
violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 11). The County Defendants
oppose / reply. (Doc. 13).
Lucas County Sheriff’s Department
First, the County Defendants are correct that the Lucas County Sheriff’s Department is

not sui juris, meaning it lacks capacity to be sued. Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347
(6th Cir. 2007) (“[U]nder Ohio law, a county sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being
sued for purposes of § 1983.”), overruled on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-62.
Even assuming the Sheriff’s Department were capable of being sued, or liberally
construing Plaintiff’s Complaints to name the correct governmental entity, dismissal remains
proper. Plaintiff contends the “Lucas County Sheriff’s Department need[s] to be held
accountable for the tort act claim they acted as state actors for their department.” (Doc. 11, at 1).
Under § 1983, local governments are not liable simply because they employ someone who
commits a constitutional violation—that is, they cannot be held liable under a respondeat

superior theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “Instead, it is when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694; see also Heyerman v. Cnty. of
Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Municipal liability only attaches where a custom,
policy, or practice attributable to the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the violation of
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”).
Plaintiff’s Complaints contain no suggestion of a custom or policy of Lucas County
which deprived her of a federally protected right. For these reasons, the Lucas County Sheriff’s
Department is entitled to dismissal of the claims against it.
Individual Defendants
To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: “(1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a
person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542
F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th
Cir. 2006)). To sufficiently plead the second element, a plaintiff must allege “personal
involvement.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). To do so,
“a plaintiff must show that the official either actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional
conduct or ‘implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordinate.’” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647,
659 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scott v. City of Cleveland, 555 F. Supp. 2d 890, 896 (N.D. Ohio

2008)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”)
(emphasis added). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific
conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal even under the liberal construction afforded to pro
se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004)
(dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in
the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged
violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir.) (requiring
allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, 1990 WL
82722, at *1 (6th Cir.) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as
the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement
in the events leading to his injuries”).

The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary
functions where their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982). This defense “can be raised at various stages of the litigation including at the
pleading stage in a motion to dismiss”. English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1089 (6th Cir. 1994).
When a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show “that the
challenged conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was so clearly
established at the time of the conduct ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he was doing violated that right.’” T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (citation modified).
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals from: (1) traffic
stops when the officer lacks probable cause to believe that a civil infraction occurred or
reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed; and (2) arrests or detentions without
probable cause. See Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] vehicle
stop by a police officer is a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) (citation
modified). In the traffic stop context, the probable cause determination “is fact-dependent and
will turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.” United States v. Ferguson, 8
F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993).
“Generally, a dog sniff does not require separate reasonable suspicion because it is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment. If a dog sniff is conducted while someone is otherwise
properly seized, such as in a lawful traffic stop, the dog sniff may render an otherwise lawful

seizure unlawful only if it unreasonably prolongs the initial stop and the officer lacked an
independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.” United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 663
(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)). In Rodriguez v. United
States (the case upon which Plaintiff relies), the Supreme Court held that officers may not
prolong a traffic stop to have a drug dog sniff a car—a crime detecting action not ordinarily
incident to a traffic stop—absent independent reasonable suspicion to detain the motorist. 575
U.S. 348, 354-57 (2015). Finally, “[a]n alert to the presence of drugs by a properly trained
narcotics detection dog is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle.” United
States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2012); Nykoriak v. Wileczek, 666 F. App’x 441, 445

(6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he positive indication by the canine was sufficient to establish probable
cause for the presence of a controlled substance to justify the warrantless search of [the]
vehicle.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Baum
As noted above, in the context of a traffic stop, the probable cause determination turns on
“what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.” Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391. Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges Baum told Henson he was pulled over for a marked lane violation, but Henson
denied committing such a violation. The County Defendants rely on the fact that Henson was
also cited for driving with a cracked windshield and that he acknowledged the violation,
contending this provides a constitutional basis for the stop. The fact that Henson was cited is
accurate. However, it does not show that Baum knew about the cracked windshield prior to
making the stop. That is, the Complaint at least plausibly alleges that Baum lacked probable
cause to pull the car over. This claim may proceed to the discovery phase.
The Court also finds at this juncture that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Baum

unreasonably prolonged the stop to bring in the Toledo Police Officer (Comes) and the canine.
The Complaint alleges, as to Baum: “This Deputy held us detained [until] Toledo Police & their
K-9 officer came.” Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (Doc. 1, at 68). It further alleges
Plaintiff was held for “one hour or longer.” Id. at 53.
Although County Defendants argue “the facts—i.e., the reasonable suspicion for—
justifying that extension [of the traffic stop] are contained in the Exhibits now before the Court”
(Doc. 13, at 7), the Court finds the material Defendants reference not appropriate for
consideration at this stage. Defendants ask the Court to consider exhibits attached to their
answer, including a statement from an Internal Affairs Bureau response to a complaint that

states: “After the stop[,] Mr. He[n]son’s driving pattern, criminal history and acting suspicious
were reasons given for calling the Toledo Police K9 unit.” (Doc. 9-1, at 10). But Defendants’
argument asks the Court to take this statement as established fact. Defendants contend the Court
can consider these documents because they are attached to the pleadings and because they are
matters of public record. Generally, in evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, like a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings. See Hammond v. Baldwin, 866
F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1989). A court may, however, consider exhibits attached to the
complaint, public records, and exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss if they are referred to in
the complaint and central to the plaintiff’s claims. Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641
F.3d 673, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2011). “[I]n general, a court may only take judicial notice of a public
record whose existence or contents prove facts whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” Passa v. City of Columbus, 123 F. App’x 694, 697 (6th Cir. 2005).
Because Plaintiff could reasonably question the accuracy of the contents of the Internal
Bureau Affairs complaint response, and because it is not central to Plaintiff’s complaint, the

Court finds consideration of such documents better suited for a summary judgment motion. Cf.,
e.g., Linden v. City of Lansing, 2013 WL 6858459, at *3 (W.D. Mich.) (“Most courts that have
considered the issue have determined that police reports may not be considered as public
records”) (citing Blackwell v. Kalinowski, 2009 WL 1702992, at *2 (N.D. Ill.) (“[T]he factual
allegations contained in the police report do not become matters of public record suitable for
consideration on a motion to dismiss.”)).
Whether a dog sniff unreasonably prolonged a traffic stop “is the type of circumstance-
specific Fourth Amendment inquiry that, in the civil context, is generally reserved to the jury[.]”
Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 257 (6th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Baxter, 2018

WL 1598950, at *6 (E.D. Tenn.) (“To evaluate the reasonableness of a stop, a court considers the
diligence of the officer. A court must conduct a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry in each
case to determine whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop indicates that the
duration of the stop as a whole . . . was reasonable.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)),
report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1594778; Davila v. N. Reg’l Joint Police Bd.,
2016 WL 1252986, at *3 (W.D. Pa.) (“While it may indeed turn out, with the benefit of
discovery, that [the officer] had probable cause or at least a reasonable basis to suspect [plaintiff]
had violated some law other than that requiring her headlights to be on, the Court concludes that
at this juncture, it is just too soon to tell as a factual matter.”).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to proceed to discovery
regarding what information Baum knew and/or acted upon. Discovery will also reveal whether,
as the County Defendants assert, Baum had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop if it
was so extended. The Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s claim that Baum unreasonably prolonged
the traffic stop may proceed.

By contrast, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the search of the car
itself violated her rights. As the County Defendants correctly contend, a drug dog’s alert
establishes probable cause for a search. See Sharp, 689 F.3d at 618; Nykoriak, 666 F. App’x at
445. And Plaintiff provides no argument in opposition. Although Plaintiff’s Complaints assert
the dog alerted incorrectly (because no drugs were ultimately found in the car), she pleads that
the dog alerted. Thus, under the facts as asserted in the Complaint, officers had probable cause
for the search.
Danielski
As to Danielski, Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies him as a supervisor and describes how he

followed the car in which Plaintiff was a passenger before Baum pulled it over. Walker v.
Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (Doc. 1, at 9). Elsewhere in Plaintiff’s narrative description of
the events, Plaintiff asserts that she and Henson “ke[pt] asking to be let go” and when she “asked
for a supervisor, he said he is the supervisor.” Id. at 52. Although Plaintiff does not identify
specifically who “he” is, in context and with Danielski identified as the supervisor elsewhere, the
Court liberally construes this to allege Danielski participated in the traffic stop detention.
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no further specific factual allegations as to actions taken by
Danielski.
Although a close call, the Court finds that the Complaint plausibly alleges Danielski’s
personal involvement in both the traffic stop and the subsequent decision to call in the Toledo
Police Department officer and canine. See, e.g., Webb, 789 F.3d at 659 (stating that to allege
personal involvement, “a plaintiff must allege the official either actively participated in the
alleged unconstitutional conduct or implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced

in the alleged unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordinate.”). Plaintiff’s claims against
Danielski may proceed.
Navarre / McClellan
As to Navarre, the Complaint simply alleges that he “violated [Plaintiff’s] 4th and 14th
Amendment rights.” Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 1, at 41). As
to McClellan, Plaintiff simply asserts he “participate[d] in an illegal stop and search & . . . made
me sit on his road bar[.]” Id. at 95. There are no other specific factual allegations as to either of
these Defendants.
The pleading standard requires more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a
simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In
contrast to the claims against Danielski, which the Court finds just barely pass the plausibility
standard, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly pled a § 1983 claim against either Navarre or
McClellan and they are entitled to dismissal. Id. at 676 (“a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution”); Frazier, 41 F. App’x at 764 (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint
did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally
involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights).
In sum, as to the Lucas County Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged claims against Danielski and Baum, but her claims against Navarre, McClellan, and the
Lucas County Sheriff’s Department must be dismissed.
City of Toledo Defendants
The City of Toledo Defendants also move to dismiss the claims asserted in Walker v.

Comes, et al., No. 25 CV 35. (Doc. 5). Following the filing of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
these Defendants renewed their motion. (Doc. 12). Specifically, they argue: (1) the claims
against Sergeant Comes fail to raise an inference of plausibility, or alternatively he is entitled to
qualified immunity; (2) the claims against the canine officer must be dismissed as a police dog
may not be sued under § 1983; and (3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Toledo Police
Department as it is not an entity subject to suit, and even if it were, Plaintiff has not identified
facts plausibly suggesting liability. Plaintiff opposes, alleging that “the unlawful traffic stop was
prolonged to involve Sgt. Don Comes and K-9 officer” and that Comes “conduct[ed] a[n]
unlawful dog sniff around the outside of the vehicle[.]” (Doc. 7).

Toledo Police Department
As discussed above in relation to the Lucas County Sheriff’s Department, the Toledo
Police Department is similarly not an entity capable of being sued. See Lawson v. City of
Youngstown, 912 F. Supp. 2d 527, 531 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (collecting cases and holding that Ohio
courts and police departments are not sui juris for purposes of suit under § 1983); see also
Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We note at the outset
that the named defendant in this action, the Police Department of the City of Zanesville, is not a
juridical entity subject to suit under Ohio law.”).
And, as with the Lucas County Sheriff’s Department, even if the Complaint were
liberally construed to identify the correct municipal entity, it does not identify a policy, custom,
or practice that was the moving force behind the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. As
such, the Toledo Police Department is entitled to dismissal.
Canine Officer

In opposition to the City Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff contends “[t]he K-9 officer and
it[]s handler Sgt. Don Comes communicated and one (1)-or-both made a false statement that
drugs were inside the vehicle (the K-9 officer was excessive force. [I]t was not necessary for it to
be present)[.]” (Doc. 7, at 1). But the Court finds Defendants correctly assert the dog is not a
“person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hicks v. City of Barberton, 2011 WL
3022089, at *3 (N.D. Ohio) (“[Plaintiff] cannot bring a civil rights action against the police dog.
. . . A dog is not a ‘person’ for purposes of § 1983 litigation.”) (collecting cases); see also Dye v.
Wango, 253 F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding a police dog is not a suable “person”). As
such, the canine officer is entitled to dismissal.

Sergeant Comes
Finally, the City Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Comes.
The specific allegations against Comes in the Complaint are simply that Comes arrived at the
request of Lucas County Deputies and performed a dog sniff of the vehicle. See Walker v.
Comes, No. 25 CV 35 (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 1-3, at 2) (“the illegal stop was detained longer for the
Sgt. to bring the Toledo Police K-9 officer to illegal[ly] search the vehicle”); (Doc. 10, at 1)
(stating that Lucas County Deputies “prolonged the traffic stop for a long period of time to bring
a drug sniffing K-9 officer from Toledo Police Department and it[s] handler Sgt. Don Comes to
come (Rodriguez v. United States) out Toledo Police jurisdiction to violate the Plaintiff[’s]
Fourth and Fourteen[th] [A]mendment[.]”); Doc. 1-3, at 14 (“Lucas County Deputy sheriff
requested assistance from Toledo Police Department[.] John Does 1-2 officers came and assisted
Lucas County sheriffs asking Darnell and I to step out of the vehicle[.] [O]ne of the Toledo
police John doe was a K-9 officer.”). In her opposition to the City Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff
contends Comes performed “an unlawful sniff around the vehicle” that took part “out of Toledo

Police Department jurisdiction.” (Doc. 7, at 1).
That is, the only factual allegations against Sergeant Comes are that (1) his dog
performed an “unlawful sniff” of the car in which Plaintiff was a passenger; and (2) he acted
outside of his jurisdiction. As Defendants point out, “Sgt. Comes is not alleged to have either
conducted the stop, or prolonged it.” (Doc. 12, at 4).
As to Plaintiff’s first contention that Comes violated her constitutional rights, the Court
reiterates that “a canine sniff is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment[.]”
United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998); Stepp, 680 F.3d at 663 (holding a dog
sniff is not a search). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff contends Comes violated her rights by means

of conducting the canine sniff alone, she is incorrect.
Plaintiff’s argument in opposition focuses on the extension of the stop to bring Comes
and the dog to the location and that Comes acted outside his jurisdiction. As to the first
argument, she cites Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. See Doc. 7, at 1. As noted above, Rodriguez
stands for the proposition that police may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent
reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff. 575 U.S. at 354-57. But the Complaint
contains no factual allegations plausibly alleging Comes took any action that unreasonably
prolonged the stop; instead it simply alleges Comes arrived and performed the dog sniff. Rather,
all of Plaintiff’s allegations place responsibility for the alleged prolonging of the stop on the
County Defendants who initiated the stop. As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly
pled a clearly established § 1983 claim against Comes. Cf. Lea v. Conrad, 2022 WL 4279728, at
*7 (W.D. Ky.) (finding, albeit at the summary judgment stage, that the plaintiff “ha[d] not
pointed to evidence in the record that [the officer], arriving to the scene after the stop in a
support role as a K9 handler, reasonably knew that he was extending the traffic stop beyond a

constitutionally permissible length. [The officer] is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.”).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff asserts Comes acted outside of his territorial jurisdiction,
the Court agrees with the City Defendants that Comes is entitled to qualified immunity. Even
assuming Comes acted outside his territorial jurisdiction, he violated no clearly established
constitutional right in doing so. As the City Defendants point out, the Ohio Supreme Court has
held that a law enforcement officer who observes a traffic violation outside his jurisdiction has
probable cause to make a traffic stop and such a stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Jones, 121 Ohio St. 3d 103, 106-09 (2009). And various courts have explained that even
if a traffic stop violates state law, that does not mean it violates the federal constitution. See, e.g.,

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (noting that while local law enforcement practices
might “vary from place to place and from time to time, Fourth Amendment protections are not so
variable[.]”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Leonard v. City of Nelsonville, 2020 WL
3429464, at *3 (6th Cir.) (“[L]inking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would cause
them to ‘vary from place to place and from time to time.’” (quoting Moore, 553 U.S. at 176)).
Plaintiff has pointed to no clearly established law holding otherwise. As such, the Court finds
Sergeant Comes is entitled to dismissal of any claim based on allegations he was acting outside
his territorial jurisdiction.
The Court therefore finds all city of Toledo Defendants are entitled to dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that the County Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in

Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (N.D. Ohio) (consolidated with Walker v. Lucas
County Sheriff’s Department, No. 25 CV 36 (N.D. Ohio)) (Doc. 10) be, and the same hereby is,
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED in part. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Baum and Danielski regarding the lack of probable cause and
prolonging of the traffic stop may proceed; all other claims asserted against the County
Defendants are dismissed; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment (Doc. 11) be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the City of Toledo Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5)

and Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) in Walker v. Comes, et al., No. 25 CV 35 (N.D.
Ohio), be and the same hereby are, GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (Doc. 17)
in Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (N.D. Ohio) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED;
and the Court
FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: July 17, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11103180. Public record. Not legal advice.