# Abor v. Russell

> District Court, N.D. Texas · June 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101511

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Texas
- **Decided:** June 17, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101511

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding citation to a federal statute in the heading of a court designed complaint form insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

MICHEALA ABOR, §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-CV-245-L-BW
§
STEPHEN JOSEPH RUSSELL, et al. §
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Stephen Joseph Russell’s (“Judge Russell”)
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No.
8 (“Motion”) (“Mot.”).) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order No. 3-
251, this case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for
pretrial management and recommendation on dispositive motions. (See Dkt. No. 1.)
As explained below, Abor has not established federal subject matter
jurisdiction, so the Court should sua sponte dismiss this case without prejudice, and
Judge Russell’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 8) should be denied as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Abor filed this action pro se on January 30, 2025, alleging a laundry list of
federal and state claims against Judge Russell, Kaufman County Clerk Laura
Hughes, and Kaufman County. (See Dkt. No. 3 (“Compl.”) at ECF p. 3.) The
record does not reflect that Abor has effected proper service on any of the
Defendants, including Judge Russell, but Judge Russell has nevertheless entered an
appearance and filed the present Motion.1 Abor filed a response on March 5, 2025
(Dkt. No. 10), to which Judge Russell filed a reply on March 18, 2025 (Dkt. No. 12).
Therefore, the Motion is ripe. Thereafter, on May 16, 2025, the undersigned issued

an Order (Dkt. No. 13) directing Abor to “file a written response supported by
evidence or facts to show the Court that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this
lawsuit.” (See id. at 10.) Abor’s response was due on June 6, 2025. (Id.) No
response has been filed.
Abor’s claims appear to arise from the foreclosure of real property located at

2118 Devonblue Drive, Forney, TX 75126 (the “Property”), and subsequent eviction
proceedings after the Property was subject to a foreclosure sale. (See Compl. at ECF
p. 4.) Abor is also a party to other litigation pending in this district relating to the
foreclosure action. See Abor, et al. v. Planet Home Lending, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:24-
CV-02205-B-BW (N.D. Tex.).2 In addition, Abor has been a party to two other

1 Abor filed a request for clerk’s entry of default on March 6, 2025 (Dkt. No. 9),
which the clerk declined to enter as Abor’s service on defendants failed to comply with Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (see Dkt. No. 11). Abor filed affidavits of service which appear to indicate
that she personally sent copies of the summons and complaint to Defendants via certified
mail. (See Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, and 6.) Rule 4(c)(2) identifies who can serve process, and it
clearly states that the plaintiff cannot: “Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a
party may serve a summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (emphasis added).
2 In the other lawsuit, Abor and her husband, C L Abor (collectively, “the Abors”),
sued Planet Home Lending, LLC (“Planet Home”), the mortgage servicer of the loan on the
Property, and Auction.com, which handled the foreclosure sale of the Property. See Abor,
No. 3:24-CV-02205-B-BW. According to the complaint, the Abors executed a note secured
by a mortgage on the Property, servicing of which eventually transferred to Planet Home.
See id., Dkt. No. 3 ¶¶ 10-11. On December 4, 2023, Planet Home issued a Notice of
Default and Intent to Accelerate. Id. ¶ 13. On January 29, 2024, the Abors received a
Notice of Substitute Trustee’s Sale. Id. ¶ 22. On April 2, 2024, the loan was foreclosed, and
lawsuits in this district related to the foreclosure action, both of which were
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Abor, et al. v.
Frazier, et al., Case No. 3:24-CV-522-K-BN (N.D. Tex.);3 Abor, et al. v. Frazier, et al.,

Case No. 3:24-cv-00777-B-BK (N.D. Tex.).4 Abor is also a party to two state cases
filed in February and March 2024. See Abor v. Frazier, No. 116369-422 (489th Jud.
Dist. Court, Kaufman Cnty.); Abor v. Frazier, No. 116603-489 (489th Jud. Dist.
Court, Kaufman Cnty.). Abor also alleges in the present lawsuit that she is the

prevailing party in another Kaufman County case, Bernard Mgmt. v. Abor, Case No.
24C-214. (See Compl. at ECF p. 3, ¶ 3.)
Abor alleges that the Kaufman County eviction proceedings were unlawful for
various reasons. (See generally Compl.) Abor’s complaint vaguely alleges
“fraudulent eviction proceedings,” “discriminatory docket management,” and “post-

judgment misconduct.” (See Compl. at ECF p. 3.) The primary basis for her
“fraudulent eviction” allegations is that eviction was entered “despite pending federal
ownership dispute” (apparently referring to her wrongful foreclosure claims in Case
No. 3:24-CV-02205-B-BW, currently pending before this Court). (Id. at ECF p. 4, ¶¶

the property was sold at auction. Id. ¶ 24. The Abors’ complaint asserts various claims
arising from what they allege was wrongful foreclosure of the Property. See id. ¶¶ 29-74.
3 In this other lawsuit, the Abors sued Attorney Thuy Frazier and McCarthy Holthus
LLP, the attorney and law firm involved in the foreclosure proceeding. See Abor, Case No.
3:24-CV-522-K-BN, Dkt. No. 3.
4 Here, the Abors sued Frazier and McCarthy Holthus, along with Planet Home
Lending and Auction.com, also related to the foreclosure proceeding. See Abor, et al. v.
Frazier, et al., Case No. 3:24-CV-522-K-BN
5-6.) Abor goes on to allege a variety of “jurisdictional errors” related to the eviction
proceedings, including “extra-jurisdictional hearings,” “misclassification” of filings,
and “refusal to correct errors.” (Id. at ECF pp. 4-5, ¶¶ 8-20.) She also alleges a

financial conflict of interest based on the Justice Court’s “acceptance of private bank
notes for profit” and that “it financially benefits from the litigation process.” (Id. at
ECF p. 6, ¶¶ 22-24.) Finally, Abor alleges that she was subject to racial and religious
discrimination as “a Black Christian female” because opposing non-minority counsel
“received preferential docketing.” (Id. at ECF p. 6, ¶¶ 25-27.)

Abor seeks an order from this Court to reverse, stay, or modify various orders
entered in the Kaufman County Court by Judge Russell; compensatory and punitive
damages; statutory penalties under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 12.002; an
injunction barring Judge Russell from presiding over matters involving Abor and her

immediate family as well as preventing “retaliation” against them; and referral to
state authorities for “removal proceedings” and “asset freeze.” (See Compl. at ECF
pp. 11-13.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; “[t]hey possess only that

power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(citations omitted). Unless otherwise provided by statute, federal subject matter
jurisdiction requires: (1) an action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, (federal question jurisdiction); or
(2) complete diversity of citizenship between adverse parties combined with an
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, (diversity
jurisdiction).

Regarding federal question jurisdiction, the most common cases “arising
under” federal law “are those in which federal law creates the cause of action.”
Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). In rare situations, a
case may arise under federal law “where the vindication of a right under state law
necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of

Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).
Federal courts may exercise “supplemental jurisdiction” over claims lacking in
subject matter jurisdiction when those claims are “so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
While pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are construed liberally, see, e.g., Perez v.
United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002); Mass v. McDonald’s Corp., No.
3:04-CV-0483-M, 2004 WL 2624255, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004), the court
“must presume that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of

establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery
v. Allstate Ins., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). And “even
though a particular statute or rule need not necessarily be cited by name[,]” the party
asserting jurisdiction must allege the jurisdictional basis “affirmatively and
distinctly;” jurisdiction cannot be “established argumentatively or by mere
inference.” Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted). “[C]ourts are not obligated to search out the identity of a party’s
vaguely-pleaded claims.” Mass, 2004 WL 2624255, at *2. Ultimately, “[t]he plaintiff

is the master of his own pleadings, and even a pro se litigant has the right to plead
himself out of court, just as an attorney may do.” Estrada v. Dominguez, No. 2:00-CV-
0064, 2001 WL 506982, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2001).
Federal courts do not have to—and in fact, should not—wait for a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. On the
contrary, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The court
“is duty-bound to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.” Burciaga v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Ins. of Ir.,

Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (explaining that
while under Rule 12(h) defenses for lack of personal jurisdiction are waived if
untimely, even an appellate court may review subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte).
Also pertinent here is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal
subject matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by state court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
[F]ederal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate
jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts. If a
state trial court errs the judgment is not void, it is to be reviewed and
corrected by the appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, recourse
at the federal level is limited solely to an application for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
footnotes omitted); see Spencer v. Wilson, No. 4:18-CV-4563, 2020 WL 822096, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2020) (“If a federal plaintiff’s alleged injury arises from an
‘allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court
judgment based on that decision,’ then Rooker-Feldman bars the federal court’s
jurisdiction.”) (quotation marks omitted); see also Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717
F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Reduced to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state
court judgments except when authorized by Congress.”) (quoting Union Planters Bank
Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
There are four elements to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) a state-court loser;

(2) alleging harm caused by a state-court judgment; (3) that was rendered before the
district court proceedings began; and (4) the federal suit requests review and reversal
of the state-court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
III. ANALYSIS
Abor asserts federal question jurisdiction on the basis of purported civil rights

violations under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; civil conspiracy in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985; criminal violations under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Deprivation of Rights
Under Color of Law), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (General Conspiracy Statute, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 645 (embezzlement and theft by court officers); “Judicial Power Violations (U.S.
Const. Art. V; Tex. Const. Art. V §1)”; and “Violations of Judicial Oath (28 U.S.C.
§453).” (See Compl. ¶¶ 1-21.) Abor also alleges various state law claims that are
analogous to the federal claims (e.g., violations of the Texas Religious Freedom
Restoration Act), as well as violations of the Texas Government Code, the Texas

Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. (See
id.)
While cast as federal civil rights and constitutional claims against Judge
Russell and the other named Defendants, Abor’s federal claims are nothing more

than an impermissible collateral attack on state court orders. Accordingly, this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review Abor’s federal claims under the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine. See Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 788–89 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(when federal action “is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the
state appellate process and to collaterally attack—in the guise of a federal civil rights

action—the validity of a state court [judgment] and other related orders,” lower
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over such action).
In one of the related lawsuits mentioned above, the Abors’ request for an
injunction was denied because both the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine supported the Court's refusal to interfere
with state court proceedings. See Abor v. Planet Home Lending LLC, No. 3:24-CV-
02205-B-BW, 2025 WL 582159 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2025), adopted 2025 WL 581450
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2025). As in the present action, the Abors alleged that the state

court wrongfully entered the eviction order while their wrongful foreclosure lawsuit
was pending and sought an injunction to enjoin state officials and others from
moving forward with an eviction order issued against them. See id. at *2.
Abor seeks monetary and non-monetary relief in this lawsuit. (See Compl. at

ECF pp. 11-13.) As for the non-monetary relief, to the extent that Abor asks this
Court to act as an appellate court by reversing, staying, or modifying any orders
issued by Kaufman County Court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine expressly forecloses
jurisdiction over such requests. See, e.g., Truong, 717 F.3d at 382; Weekly, 204 F.3d at
615; see also Green v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“Generally speaking, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that federal district
courts do not have jurisdiction to act as appellate courts and precludes them from
reviewing final state court decisions.”). “[N]o matter her dissatisfaction with the
state eviction action, [plaintiff] may not seek recourse in federal court.” Vaughns v.
Dallas Cnty. JP Cts., No. 3:23-CV-1393-K-BK, 2023 WL 5488786, at *2 (N.D. Tex.

July 28, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 5489052 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2023).
As for monetary relief, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar claims for
such relief that are independent of the state court judgment. See, e.g., Uptown Grill,
L.L.C. v. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc., 46 F.4th 374, 385 (5th Cir. 2022). But it does
preclude jurisdiction over claims for monetary relief in which a federal district court
must “review and reject the state court's decision,” or when the plaintiff’s claims are
“inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment.” Brown v. Taylor, 677 F.

App’x 924, 927 (5th Cir. 2017). If the source of injury is the state-court judgment,
and not an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, then Rooker-Feldman
applies. See Truong, 717 F.3d at 383 (citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284)
(further citations omitted).

Here, Abor seeks damages for emotional duress and reputational harm arising
from the Kaufman County eviction proceedings, which she alleges were fraudulent
for the reasons described above. (See generally Compl.) She has not alleged any
independent injury caused by the alleged act or omission of a third party. Rather,
her claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the Kaufman County eviction

proceedings, and to award her relief this Court would have to review and reject that
judgment. See, e.g., Welsh v. Thorne, 2022 WL 21714766, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 30,
2022), rec. accepted 2023 WL 6460502 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2023) (Rooker-Feldman
applied when the source of injury was the state court order, and the claims were
“inextricably intertwined” with that order).

Further, even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, Abor fails to plead
any factual allegations that support federal jurisdiction. Even under the liberal
reading required of pro se pleadings, the factual allegations in Abor’s complaint fail
to set out allegations to establish federal jurisdiction. Merely citing a federal statute
or law without any factual allegations is not enough to establish federal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Gilbeaux v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 42 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (E.D. Tex.
1998) (finding citation to a federal statute in the heading of a court designed
complaint form insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction) (quoting Fountain v. New

Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 265 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. La. 1967)); see also Cavaness v.
Dallas Cnty., No. 3:24-CV-00135-L (BT), 2024 WL 1838992, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
2024), rec. accepted, 2024 WL 1837975 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2024), appeal dismissed,
No. 24-10675, 2024 WL 5347228 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 2024); Isom v. Texas Dep’t of

Transp., No. 3:21-CV-1350-B-BK, 2021 WL 3434993, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 15,
2021), adopted sub nom., 2021 WL 3421415 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2021) (“fleeting
mention” of federal statutes did not establish federal question jurisdiction). For
example, Abor avers that she was discriminated against because she is “an African-
American Christian woman,” but her complaint is devoid of any facts to support this

conclusory allegation. (See Compl. at ECF pp. 3, 6.) Abor avers only that opposing
counsel in her case “received preferential docketing” and “no African American
judges serve in Texas[’s] 254 County Courts.” (See id.) These conclusory and
speculative statements fail to support a reasonable inference that there was any
deliberate discrimination based on race or religion during the eviction proceedings.

Furthermore, even were the Court to consider Abor’s claims, to grant her the
relief requested, the Court would have to determine that the underlying state court
judgment was tainted and therefore void. Such claims are inextricably intertwined
with the state court judgment. See, e.g., Magor v. GMAC Mortgage, L.L.C., 456 F.
App’x 334, 335 (11th Cir. 2011) (Rooker-Feldman bars a claim that a state foreclosure
judgment was procured through fraud because “reversal of the state court's
foreclosure judgment would be a necessary part of the relief requested”); see also

Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Moreover, if adjudication of a
claim in federal court would require the court to determine that a state court
judgment was erroneously entered or was void, the claim is inextricably intertwined
with merits of the state court judgment.”) (citing Jordahl v. Democratic Party, 122 F.3d

192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Starks v. Davis, No. 3:20-CV-02771-G (BT), 2021
WL 4848855, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 4846240, aff’d, No.
21-11154, 2022 WL 17591477 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2022).
Finally, Judge Russell is an elected Texas County Court at Law Judge and is
entitled to judicial immunity from civil actions for any judicial act over which his

court has jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (citing Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988);
Clements v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1992); Laird v. Spencer, No. 20-30237 (5th
Cir. Jan. 13, 2025). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from the
ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Allegations

of bad faith, malice, or corruption do not overcome judicial immunity. Id. Judicial
immunity is inapplicable only when: (1) a judge takes an action that is not within his
or her official capacity; or (2) as it concerns judicial actions, “taken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Jd. Therefore, Abor’s claims against Judge Russell fail
on this additional basis.
In sum, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Abor’s claims, and this
case should be dismissed without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this

case should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and Defendant Stephen Joseph Russell’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Claims Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 8) be DENIED AS MOOT.
SO RECOMMENDED on June 17, 2025.

bw

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation will be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this
report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after
being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be
specific, an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is
found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections
will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11101511. Public record. Not legal advice.